April 13, 1965

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I yield the gentleman 2 additional minutes.

Mr. LINDSAY. I want to be very frank in stating t.hat in the Judiciary Committee I offered an amendment to reverse this procedure and provide that the President would always retain power unless Congress should decide otherwise, rather than have the Vice President be able to retain power unless reversed by the Congress, and that amendment was defeated.

After the amendment was defeated, the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. POFF] cured my problem to a great extent by tightening the time period. By a new amendment a 10-day limitation was placed on the period in which Congress must act. This limitation removed a great deal of the doubt that I had about the wisdom of establishing a procedure. In addition, the bill as it stands is vigorously supported by the American Bar Association and its special committee on this subject, the chairman of which was the former Attorney General of the United States, Mr. Herbert Brownell, who was also my former chief in the Department of Justice when the original bill on disability was drafted and submitted to the Congress. Many other leading bar associations including the association of the Bar of the City of New York, supported the bill.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Chairman, I think that Members may be satisfied in their minds that this bill is satisfactory, has the backing of the best legal minds in the country, and will at long last provide a necessary clarification of the charter under which we operate.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I urge that the bill be passed by this House, that we meet together in conference w i th the Senate to settle our differences and that this proposed constitutional amendment be submitted to the legislatures of the several States of the country with all possible - speed .

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California? ·

There was no objection?

Mr. COHELAN. Mr. Chairman, the problems of presidential succession and presidential disability have long needed constitutional clarification. I have joined in s p onsoring this measure which we are considering today, and I rise in i rt s support.

The facts themselves speak persuasively to the need for the soundly based but immediate action which this legislation provides.

Eight of our 35 Presidents have died in office. On 16 different occasions, totaling more than 38 years in the brief history of our country, we have been without a Vice President. Eight Vice Presidents succeeded to the Presidency, while seven died during their terms of office, and one resigned.

Of the four Presidents who served the United States from 1932 through November 1963, · two--Franklin D. Roosevelt and John F. Kennedy-did not live out their terms; one-Dwight D. Eisenhower-suffered a serious heart attack; and one Harry S. Truman-was the object of an attempted assassination.

In past years the office of Vice President has been subject to more ridicule than respect. But such is not the case today. The Vice President is not only the ever-possible successor to the Nation's highest office, he has become a highly important ambassador, traveling thousands of miles on behalf of the President. He is a member of the Cabinet and of the National Security Council. He is Chairman of the National Aeronautics and Space Council, and he has major responsibilities in our wars on poverty and discrimination.

There is ample evidence that the United States needs a Vice President at all times, that this person must be fully acquainted with both foreign and domestic policy and prepared to assume the Presidency on a moment's notice. Yet there is no provision in our Constitution for filling this office when there is a vacancy.

Mr. Chairman, the problem of presidential disability poses potentially greater and more difficult problems.

On two occasions, either as a result of tragic . accident or illness, we have had Presidents unable to carry out their duties for prolonged periods of time.

President Garfield lingered between life and death for 80 days after he was shot by a disgruntled officeholder. During this period he performed only one official act-the signing of an extradition paper. There was a crisis in foreign affairs, but only routine business was transacted.

President Wilson's serious illness of nearly 2 years presented the country with an even more difficult situation. Following his stroke in 1919, some 28 bills be­ ment. came law without his signature. The Cabinet met unofficially from time to time on the call of Secretary of State Lansing, but when President Wilson learned of the meetings he forced Lansing to resign, believing that Lansing was plotting to oust him.

In both of these cases of disability, the Vice Presidents were urged to act as President. But both Arthur and Marshall declin e d , fearing t hey would deprive the President of his office should he recover. Mr. Chairman , without clear authority, provided by la w , it cannot be expected that future Vice Presidents will act diffe r ently if a President is disabled, yet clearly the leader of the free world must ha v e a healthy, sure, and steady office. hand at the helm of state.

On at least two other occasions, we have had Presidents unable to carry out the full duties of their office for shorter periods of time. President McKinley lived for 8 days after he was shot, during which time the business of Government came to a standstill.

President Eisenhower's heart attack hospitalized him for 6 weeks, during the first week of which he was able to make few if any decision.

It is a strange irony indeed that we are prepared and amply so, for a President's death or impeachment, but that we are defenseless against his injury, illness, or physical incapacity. The events of the last two decades alone, however, show us all too clearly how quickly disability can strike.

Mr. Chairman, this constitutional amendment is both practical and eff ective. It recognizes that total protection against all conceivable situations is not possible but it guards against the most serious and striking omissions of our present system. ' It establishes a firm framework, grounded at it should be in the Constitution, but it leaves certain final decision which must be based on the facts of the time to the elected representatives of the people.

Most important, Mr. Chairman, it corrects the blind spots-the avoidable risks and hazards-that have impaired our Constitution for nearly 176 years and I urge that it be adopted so that presidential disability and vacancy in the office of Vice President will no longer threaten the orderly process of our democracy. I urge that this constitutional amendment be adopted to assure the orderly continuity in the Presidency that is imperative to the success and stability of our country and our form of government.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. MOORE].

Mr. MOORE. Mr . Chairman, I believe the legislation we have before us in the form of House Joint Resolution 1 is one of the great challenges of this Congress . I agree generally with those who have spoken in favor of this proposed constitutional amendment. With rare exception do I disagree. However, I would like to call the Committee's attention to page 4 of House Joint Resolution 1, for I intend to offer language in the form of an amendment to section 4 of the proposed constitutional amendAs the gentleman from New York who preceded me made some observation with respect to the Presidency and the fact that he would like to see the elected President in that position at the time as the challenge is made to his ability to discharge the powers and duties of his office. I would say that it is in this area that I am in disagreement with the language in the resolution pending before us.

I believe that first and foremost we should protect the President. I believe that if the question of disability really e x ists it should be settled by the Congress at a time when the President, who has been elected by the people, is in that Mr. Chairman, I believe that for us to permit the Vice President to succeed to the position of Acting President and then permit him by virtue of transmitting to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration, together with a majority of the members of the executive departments, that the President is not then capable of reassuming his office, that this puts the Vice President, then acting as President, in a position of holding tremendous power over the elected President of the United States. Sufficient power to perhaps prevent him from regaining his elected office. This should be of great concern to all of us.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that if we amend this resolution providing that once the President having been removed by the action of the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, the right to the President to simply state he is capable of reassuming his office, that he shall then reassume the office of Presidency to which he was elected by the people of this country. Then if his inability still exists, we have within this proposed constitutional amendment I believe the . language and mechanism which the Vice President and the principal officers of the executive departments can use to challenge the President with respect to whether or not he is actually capable of reassuming his office. But it gets us out of this gray area as to who is President of the United States for a period of 2 days or 10 days and it gets us out of the gray area certainly to the extent of placing the burden upon a man elected President of the United States having to fight for the office of President of the United States from some very high, lofty place here in the Nation's Capital rather than in the office of the Presidency itself.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that it is not too unreasonable to assume that if we do not permit the President to again succeed to his office and once having been ruled incapable or found incapable by the declaration of the Vice President and the principal officers of the executive departments, to reassume the office of Presidency, I believe we are encouraging some things to happen which perhaps are not in the minds of the individuals that are here listening to the debate in this Committee.

I believe we may very well put the President of the United States in a position of coming here to the Congress and trying to lobby himself back into the job to which the people have elected him.

I believe that the Congress should decide this matter of capability with the President and the Vice President in the positions to which the people of this country have elected them.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from West Virginia has expired.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 additional minutes to the gentleman from West Virginia.

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, may I say I believe it is the burden of the Congress looking into the eyes of the elected President of the United States, even though now removed, to declare him to be unfit to hold that office.

I believe we in this Congress must be jealous of the Presidency and that all presumptions should be in favor of the Presidency. All issues as to inability in my opinion should be resolved by the Congress with the elected President holding the office to which the people have elected him. Under the language of this resolution this is not done. The elected President is out of office. Pressures to keep the elected President out of office can be exerted even on the Congress of the United States.

As I have said, this can be accomplished, in my opinion, Mr. Chairman, by a series of amendments. If I may draw the committee's attention to section 4 on page 4 of the proposed constitutional amendment, line 18. After inserting a period at the end of line 17, remove the word "unless" and have the language read then beginning on line In the event the Vice President and the majority of the · principal officers of the executive departments or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within 2 days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office--

And then, I go on to page 5, line 6, and at the end change the language which states:

The Vice President shall-

! omit the words "shall continue to"­ that is, in the event the Congress determines by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President-- is then unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately discharge the same as acting President.

It gets us out of the gray area as to who controls the mechanism of government in this country during the period of time that the Congress must decide the issue of capabilities of the President of the United States in the event they are again challenged by the Vice President.

Mr . GROSS. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MOORE. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. GROSS. In the event of a disability of the President and the elevation of the Vice President, does he take an oath of office as President of the United States, and if so, what happens to the oath of office that he has taken? How is that rescinded?

Mr. MOORE. I would assume that there would be a provision that the individual would take an oath as Acting President of the United States and that the Vice President would wear two hats, so to speak, that of Acting President of the United States and that of Vice President of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I certainly recognize that there are a number of men in this Chamber here today and in this Congress who perhaps can suggest language and perhaps can suggest changes that should take place in this legislation, but I sincerely suggest at this time that it is necessary for us here this afternoon to see to it that we protect the President of the United States against any sort of manipulation which might take place as a result of the adoption of this proposed constitutional amendment in its present form. I, at the appropriate time, intend to off er an amendment -that will permit the President, who has been declared incapable of handling the duties of his office, by his written signature to reassume the powers and duties of his office. It shall then evolve upon the Vice President, not as Acting President, but upon the Vice President and the principal officers of the executive department, to bring the issue to the Congress, and then it shall be up to the Congress to decide whether or not the man who is President of the United States and elected to the office of President of the United States is incapable of handling the duties of that office. I think that amendment would once and for all settle a lot of the gray area that has been discussed here this afternoon.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I yield 7 minutes to the gentleman from Maryland [Mr. MATHIAS].

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Ohio for yielding me this time to address myself to some of the constitutional questions which are raised by this proposal.

I have some serious reservations about this constitutional amendment, and they go to the heart of the proposals that are made with respect to presidential succession. I also share some of the reservations other Members of the House have expressed in regard to the disability section of this proposal, such as have been suggested by the gentleman from West Virginia [Mr. MOORE] and the gentleman from New York [Mr. LINDSAY] who have just spoken.

But primarily I should like to address myself to the constitutional provision here proposed that the President shall nominate a Vice President, who shall take office on confirmation by a majority of both Houses.

I question whether a proposal of this sort is in harmony with principles which have guided the Republic for almost two centuries. From its very inception, the presidency has been considered to be an elective office. If you go to the Journal of the Constitutional Convention, which was kept by James Madison, you will find a great deal of discussion as to how a President should be chosen. Various methods were proposed. They were all elective methods. If we go to a new procedure under which the Vice President will be appointed by the President, as an ambassador or a judge, then we shall have changed the nature of the presidency for the first time in the history of the Republic, and it will be no longer a purely elective office. Neither the people nor their direct representat iv es will be choosing the Vice President, the heir apparent to the most powerful office in all the world. I question very sincerely whether the American people want to make the change in principle and in policy which would be involved in this particular section of the proposed constitutional amendment.

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield to the gentle­

Mr. LONG of Maryland. Has it not been true, in spite of what the gentleman says, however, that the Secretary of State and Cabinet members have been in line for succession to the presidency throughout our history?

Mr. MATHIAS. Yes, but they have never succeeded to the Presidency. The fact of the matter is, however, that many Vice Presidents have succeeded to the Presidency-unhappily as that might be, and the contingent succession beyond the Vice Presidency has been a remote thing. Those who support this section will say that they do so on the basis of an analogy with the custom, the relatively modern Political custom, whereby the wishes of a presidential nominee are consulted in . a national convention as to his choice of a running mate. I consider this analogy to be false. It is false for several reasons. One is because a presidential nominee of one of our national parties who is temporarily in a convent.ion city and who is looking for help and support from all sides will chose a man for his running mate who will help him to get elected and will choose a man who has the strength to complement his own candidacy. The same may not be true of the man who is permanently at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue; and he may have other motivations and other thoughts in choosing the man who might not only be his Vice President but will be his heir apparent, and who under the provisions of this constitutional amendment will have certain powers to dePose him.

I am very sure these arguments would have been considered very carefully in the constitutional convention. We have the duty of considering them very carefully here in this legislative body.

The fact is that a presidential nominee choosing his running mate is merely presenting a running mate to the people and the electability of the vice presidential candidate is a measure of the accountability of the presidential candidate.

There is, therefore, a very real check on his choice. While it can be replied, of course, that congressional confirmation is a sort of check on the appointment of the Vice President, I would suggest that in many cases it would be a formality only. Those of us who sat in this House in November of 1963 well know that in the emotion of that period which gripped the Congress as well as the country, we would have not questioned closely the confirmation of an appointed Vice President within a considerable period of time after November 22, 1963.

Mr. CORMAN . Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. MATHIAS. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. CORMAN. Would the gentleman consider perhaps that it would be no less a formality than the selection of Mr. Miller and Mr. HUMPHREY in the summer of 1964?

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the gentleman for his observation. Perhaps it merely proves what I have attempted to express to the House today. The gentleman will recall that the selection or Mr. Miller and Mr. HUMPHREY was: merely for the purpose of presentingtheir names to the country.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. MATHIAS. I yield to the gentleman.

Mr. RUMSFELD. In this same connection, we look at page 3 of the resolution, line 23, and then again at page 5, line 5, where it points out that the House and Senate will by a vote approve these actions in one case the selection of a Vice President and in the other the disability question.

It is obvious that under this constitutional amendment these decisions could be made by the Congress by a nonrecord vote.

Mr. MATHIAS. I believe that is clearly true. Certainly there is no provision for it in the amendment.

Mr. RUMSFELD. Not only could there be a nonelected Vice President, as the gentleman has pointed out, but the Vice President could conceivably be selected without the Members of the House and the Members of the Senate ever going on record as to whether they approved or disapproved the President's request.

I am personally concerned, because I believe a subject matter of this importance to the country should be decided on a record vote. In the past we have seen many important measures pass the House by a nonrecord vote. I . believe the public's business should be conducted in public.

Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. Chairman, I should like to point out briefly that in addition to my reservations about section 2 providing for an appointive Vice President, my concern is increased by the fact that we would couple the appointive powers of the President with the power of the Vice President thus appointed to dePose the President, This to me is a conflict in powers which I believe can create serious trouble for this country in the future.

On another question not touched upon, I should like to ask the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. POFF] to respond to a question. I point out to the gentlemen that nowhere in this proposed amendment and nowhere in the committee report is there any reference to the state of the law in the event of simultaneous death of the President and Vice President. Does the gentleman from Virginia consider that it would be the intent of this amendment that the existing language of the Constitution covering the death or otherwise the removal of both the President and Vice President would be in effect notwithstanding adoption of this amending language?

Mr. POFF. The answer is definitely in the affirmative. The gentleman has reference to the language in article II, section 1, clause 5. The amendment which we are considering, if it becomes a part of the Constitution, would simply be a supplement to rather than a substitute for that language.

I add that I am reliably informed that former Attorney General Brownell, to whom this proposition has been put, PHREY. shares my feeling on this score.

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the gentleman from Virginia. I believe it is very important that we should make it clear that while the language in this constitutional amendment, if adopted, would supplant the first part of the sentence dealing with vacancies and succession, it would not supplant the second part dealing with vacancies in both the offices of President and Vice President. ·

Mr. POFF. The gentleman is correct. Stated differently, the adoption of this constitutional amendment would not repeal in any sense the present law on succession.

Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the gentleman from Virginia.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I yield such time as he may consume to the gentleman from New Jersey [Mr. CAHILL].

Mr. CAHILL. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 1. Recognizing the need for some legislation in this field, I sponsored House Joint Resolution 922, which was introduced on February 8, 1964, and which proposed an amendment to the Constitution relating to vacancies in the office of Vice President. The present legislation proposes to correct not only the situation that exists UPon the death of a President and his succession by the Vice President, but likewise to correct that situation which results from presidential inability.

The history of our country is replete with examples of presidential disability which required some action in order to continue the every day life of the Republic. In this day and age with immediate decisions required on a myriad of subjects, it is inconceivable that this country should continue without the full service of a chief executive.

Because of the precedent, known as the Tyler precedent, it seems clear that when a Vice President succeeds to the office of President of the United States, he inherits all of the powers of the office and in the words of Daniel Webster:

The powers • • • are inseparable from the office itself.

Thus, under present law, if a disabled President is displaced by a Vice President who assumes the prerogatives of the Presidency, he could not upon recovery, displace the Vice President who had assumed the office.

American history will disclose that when President Garfield was shot he lingered for almost 3 months unable to perform any official acts, except the signing of an extradition paper. President Wilson, likewise, suffered a severe stroke which came at a time when the struggle concerning the position of the United States in the League of Nations was at its height. Recently, we all recall the illness of President Eisenhower and his concern about the omission in the Constitution relative to presidential inability. Because of his concern, it will be recalled that he entered into a formal agreement with Vice President Nixon. President Kennedy likewise entered into a similar agreement with Vice President Johnson as did President Johnson with Speaker McCORMACK and Vice President HUM­

I am sure all of us in the House recognize that such agreements are not adequate and there is a definite need for a constitutional change.

Attorneys General of both Republican and Democratic administrations have agreed that the best method to settle the problem is by means of a constitutional amendment. It seems clear, therefore, that some changes must be made in the existing Constitution as it relates to presidential inability and presidential succession together with some provision for the appointment of a Vice President where the Vice President succeeds to the Presidency.

Historically there has been a dispute as to whether or not the changes which admittedly were needed could be accomplished by statute or whether a constitutional amendment was necessary, It now appears clear from overwhelming legal authorities that the proper and indeed the safest procedure is by amending the Constitution. Attorneys General Brownell, Rogers, and Katzenbach have agreed that an amendment is necessary. This view has the support of the American Bar Association and most of the State bar associations, It, therefore, seems to me that since the need is great and urgent and since the method is clear and direct, that we in the House should adopt the resolution presently being considered so that this important omission in the basic law of the land may be corrected at the very earliest opportunity. Mr. Chairman, it is indeed urgent, it is indeed necessary; and we should act promptly. I urge the adoption of House Joint Resolution 1.

Mr. McCULLOCH. Mr. Chairman, I now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN].

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of the pending measure, believing that it represents a responsible answer to a difficult constitutional and political dilemma. I want to compliment the committee for its superb work on this legislation and for bringing before us a most commendable measure.

I was privileged to testify in behalf of House Joint Resolution 1 on February 10 before the committee. The amended version presently under debate is not materially different from the original proposal, and I believe the committee has contributed some valuable clarification and change.

The measure provides an unambiguous means of filling the office of the VicePresidency when this personage assumes the higher office upon death or resignation of the President. Second, House Joint Resolution 1 establishes a method for the determination of presidential inability and procedures open to assure a continuity of leadership when such disability occurs.

When the President disqualifies himself, or is otherwise disqualified by the chief executive officers and Congress, the powers and duties shall devolve upon the then Vice President who becomes Acting President. Provisions are set · down whereby this period of inability can be terminated.

The committee believed that in a case where the President declares himself disabled, he should be able to resume discharge of his powers immediately through simple notification to Congress. The committee rePort notes:

To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily relinquishing his powers in case of illness.

This is a wise and . reasonable amendment.

We have two important clarifications to the original House Joint Resolution 1. The words "heads of the executive departments" are changed to "principal officers of the executive departments" to insure that only those of Cabinet rank can participate in a determination of presidential disability. The amendment to section 3 specifies that the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmitted to the President pro tempore of the Senate and to the Speaker of the House. It is add i tionally made clear. that if Congress is not in session when the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet contradict a presidential assertion that no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble to decide the issue, as provided.

It would be impossible, Mr. Chairman, to imagine all the varying cases which may arise touching upon presidential succession and inability. Historical experience is instructive, but it also indicates that similar predicaments will vary in important details. We should leave room for human judgment.

House Joint Resolution 1 provides a framework through which the Nation can legally assure itself of executive leadership when incapacity strikes. This assurance has become crucial in the 20th century.

While there exists no mathematical device to prescribe the detailed conduct of Government officers in every hypothetical situation, we must protect ourselves by establishing procedures for constitutional action. House Joint Resolution 1 represents a sufficiently flexible approach.

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. HALPERN. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from Connecti­

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Chairman, I compliment the gentleman from New York on the statement that he is making and I subscribe to the sentiments which Office. he has expressed.

I strongly favor the passage of House Joint Resolution L This legislation is substantially in accord with House Joint Resolution 158, which I introduced in this Congress, and is similar to House Joint Resolution 990, which I introduced in the 88th Congress.

I am proud of the manner in which the Congress is meeting its responsibility in this important area of Presidential succession and Presidential inability. The history of the country is replete with instances where the Government of the United States has been hobbled by the absence of a provision such as we are considering today. If more evidence were required of the necessity of such a revision of our law, the situation attendant upon the tragic death of President Kennedy forcibly brought this need to our attention. Frequent mention has been made of the problems faced by President Andrew Johnson and President Truman because of the lack of succession and students of the Wilson era will be familiar with the hiatus of Government which occurred after Wilson was stricken because of the absence of any · provision governing presidential inability.

The constitutional amendment which we consider today will fill the legal void that has too long existed. In taking the action which I am confident we will take today, the Congress is acting in the best tradition of this great body and in accordance with the highest standards of democratic government.

Mr. ROGERS of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Chairman, I rise in support . of House Joint Resolution 1 and urge its adoption. The reason for this proposal arises from the fact that we have, throughout history, had instances of the President's inability to perform the functions of his office. That is the only reason why we are considering this legislation today. As has been pointed out heretofore, during the term of office of Woodrow Wilson and even under the past administration of President Eisenhower, the inability of the President to perform the functions assigned to him became highly important. We, as Members of Congress, and those who have preceded us here, have not exercised all of the authority that we could have exercised under article II, section 1, clause 5, which has been read here several times. The only step Congress took was to provide for succession in the event of a vacancy in the office. Prior to 1947 the succession was the Secretary of State and so on down the line in the Cabinet. In 1947 Congress changed the line of succession so that in the event of a vacancy and there were not a Vice President, the Speaker of the House would become the President. In the event of a vacancy of President and Vice President, and even if this amendment were adopted by four-fifths of the States, then the succession would still continue. What we are trying to do here is to meet the problem of the inability of the President to fulfill the responsibilities of his This matter has been discussed by many Members of Congress and particularly in the Committee on the Judiciary for a number of years. Particularly was it highlighted at the time of the sickness of President Eisenhower. But no action was taken, and finally it was thought that some definite position should be taken by the Congress of the United States.

The resolution we have before us, after many years of thinking and study comes nearer to solving the problem than anything that has been suggested up to date. We recognize that there are bound to be individuals who may disagree as to the proper method in meeting this problem. We also recognize that the members of the Cabinet who are appointed by the President, if they should arrive at a conclusion that he has not the ability to perform the functions of his Office, are going to be hesitant in making that determination. They, themselves are the ones who have had the opportunity to observe the President and his actions. Therefore I suggest that we adopt this resolution and refer it to the respective States and at last fill the void that has existed from the founding of the Constitution down to date.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 1. The action that the House is considering today is long overdue and I commend · the House Committee on the Judiciary Committee for developing what I believe to be a highly satisfactory solution to a problem that has plagued us since the beginning of our Nation.

Even during the debates at the Constitutional Convention, the lack of clarity of article II, section 1, clause 5 was apparent. No one had an answer for John Dickinson's question "What is the extent of the term 'disability' and who is to be the judge of it?"

In my judgment, House Joint Resolution 1 supplies the answer.

The problem of presidential disability and vice-presidential vacancy has come up several times in our history. By precedent we resolved the question of the Vice President succeeding to the office of President upon the death of a President, but we have not dealt with vicepresidential vacancy or with the delicate problems of disability.

It is regrettable that we have been moved to action by the tragic assassination of a President and the vacancy of the office of Vice President for more than a year. In this day and age we cannot be without all of our constitutional officers.

Just as these events have brought this proposal before us, I hope that they will also lead us to deal with the question of the crime of presidential or vice-presidential assassination. At the present time it is not a Federal crime to assassinate the President. I have introduced legislation in the 88th and 89th Congresses, as have a number of"other Members to eliminate this gap in our laws.

I congratulate the members of the Judiciary Committee on their outstanding work on this proposal and urge their consideration of H.R. 7338 and related measures.

Mr. DONOHUE. Mr. Chairman, I most earnestly hope and urge that this House, after due deliberation and discussion, will overwhelmingly accept and approve this measure before us, House Joint Resolution No. 1, with amendment, providing for swift and orderly succession to the Pres i dency and Vice-Presidency and reasonably resolving those cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his high and burdensome office.

It is hard to believe that this · great and powerful Nation , predominently dependent upon almost moment-to-moment guidance of its complex affairs from the White House, has practically no systematic means, now, of meeting the profound emergency of presidential inability or prompt vice-presidential replacement.

It may well be considered among our greatest blessings that, as yet, no confounding catastrophe has erupted out of vacancies in the vice- presidency or presidential incapacity.

The resolution before us does offer, after the deepest committee s . study and extended consultation with recognized experts, an equitable and practical mechanism by which the Vice President can be replaced in case of the vacancy of his office from any cause.

A section of this amended resolution also provides an orderly process of enabling the President to be temporarily relieved of his tremendous duties -in case of a disabling sickness with no fear of being permanently displaced. This measure further seeks to recognize and meet even the most remote emergency of a President being unable himself to request needed relief by providing that the Vice President, on the initiative of himself and the Cabinet, could temporarily dischar g e the duties of the Presidency.

Mr. Chairman, by the resounding approval of t h i s measure we will be rightfully acting to remove the causes of utmost anxiety and apprehension that inevitably would arise, here and throughout the world, if, may God forbid, this Nation should ever again endure the tragedy and sorrow of a fallen or disabled leader. I hope the House will take this patriotic action, in the national interest, without undue delay.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Chairman, while the framers of the Constitution gave scant attention to the problem of presidential inability and succession, the fact remains that since the Presidency of George Washington the Nation has been without a Vice President 16 times, and has had 3 Presidents who were so disabled there was grave doubt of their ability to perform their duties as President. We are all familiar with the lengthy periods when Presidents . field and Wilson lay close to death , and aware that during the illness of President Wilson, Mrs. Wilson and members of the White House staff conducted affairs of state because Vice President Thomas Mitchell feared his acting as President would oust President Wilson from office.

Most recently the heart attacks of President Eisenhower , and the assassi· nation of President Kennedy , again reminded us of the compelling and urgent need for Congress to provide for the orderly and prompt determination of a President's disability, and on the death or disability of the Vice President for the selection of an immediate successor.

Since 1953 I have in every Congress introduced legislation calli n g for a solution to the problem of Presidential disability and succession. It was in 1953 when I joined with the distinguished Senator from Rhode Island, the venerable Theodore Green, to establish a Commission to look into the problem of presidential inability and succession. Today we have an opportunity to enact legislation which would provide a solution to the problem. I have worked and supported my own legislation in this moval. field, House Joint Resolution 33, and I am pleased to commend to the House of Representatives today , the Committee on the Judiciary's bill, House Joint Resolution 1, a much-needed and good bill for the future of our Nation.

Mr. GILBERT. Mr. Chairman, I rise in support of House Joint Resolution 1, which proposes an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to succession to the Presidency and Vice-Presidency and to cases where the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

As a member of the Judiciary Committee, I have followed and participated in the hearings on this important proposal. We have been concerned with two problems: first , the lack of a constitutional provision assuring the orderly discharge of the powers and duties of the President in the event of disability or incapacity; second, the lack of constitutional provision assuring the continuity of the office of Vice President, and office which itself is provided for the primary purpose of assuring continuity.

Problems have existed in this country for almost two centuries so far as continuity of the executive branch of our Government is concerned. President Johnson said in his message to Congress: It is truly astonishing that over this span we have neither perfected. the provisions for orderly continuity in the executive branch, nor have we had to pay the price our continuing in a ction invites and risks.

Mr. Chairman, we have been without a Chief Executive during several periods of our history during which the President was unable to perform his duties. It could happen again, unless our Constitution is clarified and amended to define procedures for a successor to assume the powers and duties of the Presidency. The American people have not hesitated to amend their Consti t ution when commonsense has dictated it, and certainly commonsense and deep concern for the welfare of our country dictate it now. In such perilous . times as these, there should be no doubt about whose hand is responsible for the running of our country. We are prepared for the possibility of a President's death, but we are not prepared for the probability of a President's incapacity by injury, illness, or other affliction.

House Joint Resolution 1 would amend the Constitution to provide a detailed and orderly procedure for the transfer of Executive power from the President to the Vice President in times of Presidential inability.

I would like to call the attention of my colleagues in the House to each section of the proposal.

Section 1 of House Joint Resolution 1 states:

In c a se of the removal of the President from office or of his de a th or resignation, the V i ce President sh a ll become President.

This affirms the practice by which a Vice President becomes President upon the death of the President, and it extends the practice to resignation or removal from office. The provisions relative to inability are separated from those relating to death, resignation, or Section 2 provides that in the event of a vacancy in the office of Vice President, the President shall nominate a successor, subject to congressional approval by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress. This would virtually assure that the Nation will at all times have a Vice President.

I am of the opinion that the best way to fill the office of Vice President in the event of a vacancy is as proposed in this resolution. It is desirable that the President and Vice President enjoy harmonious relations and mutual confidences, and that the President be granted the generally accepted prerogative of choosing his Vice President. On the other hand, this amendment would recognize the right of the people to have a voice in the Vice President's selection through their elected Representatives in Congress.

The office of Vice President has become one of great importance. It is no longer simply an honorary position. It carries specific and far-reaching responsibiliti-es in the executive branch of the Government. Vacancies in the office of Vice President have occurred on 16 different occasions for periods totaling more than 37 years. Seven Vice Presidents have died in office and one resigned; eight Vice Presidents have taken over the Office of President upon the death of the incumbent President since 1841. It is essential that there always be a presidential successor fully conversant with domestic and world affairs and prepared to step into this high office on short notice and work harmoniously with the President.

Sections 3 and 4 of House Joint Resolution 1 deal with procedures for determining when a presidential inability begins and ends. The principal purpose of the amendment is to distinguish between, first, inability voluntarily declared by the President himself-in which event House Joint Resolution 1 provides the President can resume his duties by making a simple declaration that the inability no longer exists; and second, inability declared without the President's consent-in which case, House Joint Resolution 1 provides procedures for promptly determining the presence or absence of inability.

Section 3 makes clear that the President may declare in writing his disability and that upon such an occurrence the Vice President becomes Acting President. He assumes "the powers and duties of the office" and not "the office." This section further clarifies the status of the Vice President during the period when he is discharging the powers and duties of a disabled President. · It clarifies the procedure and the consequences when the President himself declares his inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, as follows: First , the officials to whom the President's written declaration of inability shall be transmitted are the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House; second, in case of such voluntary self-disqualification by the President, the President's subsequent transmittal to the same officials of a written declaration to the contrary-that is, a written declaration that no inability exists-terminates the Vice President's exercise of the presidential powers and duties, and that the President shall thereupon resume them.

In cases in which a President himself declares his inability, the period of his disability would be terminated by a simple Presidential notice to both Houses of Congress. To permit the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge such an assertion of recovery might discourage a President from voluntarily relinquishing his powers in case of illness. The right to challenge would be reserved for cases in which the Vice President and the Cabinet, without the President's consent, had found him unable to discharge his powers and duties.

Section 4 deals with the factual determination of whether or not the inability exists. It provides that whenever the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments, or such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.

The term "principal officers of the executive departments" has been substituted for the term "heads of the executive departments" as originally used in House Joint Resolution 1, to make it clearer that only officials of Cabinet rank shall participate in the decision as to whether presidential inability exists. The committee concluded that the combination of the judgment of the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members would be the most feasible formula. It would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the President, and it is assumed that such decision would be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts.

Another change made in former sections 4 and 5 is to specify the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House as the congressional officials to whom the declaration concerning presidential inability shall be transmitted, as is done in section 3.

Former section 5 of House Joint Resolution 1 was amended, first, to make clear that if Congress is not in session at the time of receipt by the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of a written declaration by the Vice President and a majority of the principal officers of the executive departments contradicting a Presidential declaration that no inability exists, Congress shall immediately assemble for the purpose of deciding the issue; and second, to provide that in such event the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Congress within 10 days after receipt of such declaration of Presidential inability determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is in fact unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and the Vice President shall c:ontinue to discharge the duties of the office as Acting President.

To clarify this a little more, House Joint Resolution 1 provides that, following a Presidential declaration that a disability previously declared by others no longer exists, a challenge to such a declaration must be made within 2 days of its receipt by the heads of the House and Senate and must be finally determined within the following 10 days. Otherwise, the President having declared himself able, will resume his powers and duties. Mr. Chairman, I urge prompt approval of House Joint Resolution 1 to amend the Constitution, so that the States might proceed with the long process of ratification. I am firmly of the opinion that a constitutional amendment as offered in this resolution is the most adequate way to fill a very dangerous void in our system of Government.

Mr. FUQUA. Mr. Chairman, the Constitution of the United States has left unsolved the problem of how the presidential duties and powers are transferred in the event a President become incapable of administering the duties of his office. This is particularly true in the event that the President does not understand and realize he has become incapacitated. Study of the problem indicates that there has long been an awareness of the lack of clarification by the Constitution, but, as of this time, it is a matter left unresolved . It is my hope that we can act upon this legislation and rectify the provisions with clearer language than originally written. The only satisfactory method of resolving the problem of presidential inability and the filling of the vacancies in the Office of Vice President is by the constitutional amendment as proposed in House Joint Resolution 1 before us today and in my identical resolution, House Joint Resolution 250.

Of course, in the event of the death of a President there is not the point in question as much as in the case of his being incapacitated since the Tyler precedent has been accepted and used in seven other instances. In this case, historical practice has been the answer to the present constitutional provisions in such an eventuality. On the other hand, there is no such practice which can be used as a criterion for presidential inability. The informal understandings which our Presidents and Vice Presidents of recent administrations have had were steps forward, but even these left unanswered situations which might arise in the event the President and Vice President disagreed on the question of inability.

The ambiguous language of the Constitution indicates there is clearly the need of a permanent and complete solution to the subject of thought. I find the committee report has the situation perfectly summarized into one sentence by stating:

The language of the clause is unclear, its application uncertain.

More important than ever before is the continuity of the powers of the Executive Office and it is imperative that this continuity be maintained with the least possible disturbance at the time of a President's disability.

The urgency at the time of the death of a President is very great, but it could very well be just as pressing in the event of a President's incapacity to execute the powers and duties of his office. Our country has been most fortunate to never have experienced national chaos caused by the uncertainty and anxiety of the Nation being without responsible and capable leadership. Not that I would even anticipate there ever being such circumstances, I feel very strongly that there is a need for constitutional clarification which would act as a preventive to such apprehensiveness. I feel this is most apparent in our day when time is of essence to a degree greater than ever before since only the pressing of a mere button can result in hostile conflict that took days to come about in years gone Our Nation has a unique concentration of powers and responsibilities in the Office of the President since in most nations these are shared by two or even three officials. The President's active leadership is most essential to the eff ective operation of the Government in every respect-domestic affairs, military leadership, foreign affairs and even a leadership for Congress to perform its own role properly. Therefore, in this light, every effort toward bringing about the smoothest type of transition with as little uninterrupted exercise as possible of presidential powers and duties is most desirable and needed.

In giving my support to such an amendment to our Constitution, I feel it is most important to emphasize my strong belief in that portion of the resolution requiring congressional approval to serve as a check and symbolize popular participation and for establishment of legitimacy where the Vice President would have to carry out the provisions of this legislation. This country has been blessed to not have the overzealous men we have seen in other nations who usurp the rightful leadership of their governments. However, it is always our desire to protect our Nation and its citizens from any actions which would result in a deterioration of the excellent and fine Government established by the forefathers of the Nation.

Of equal importance to Presidential inability, and sometimes related to it, is the matter of being faced with the critical problem of vacancies in the Office of Vice President. I believe it is actually little known that our Nation has been without a Vice President 16 times--in almost half of the 36 administrations in the history of the country. The gap which such a vacancy leaves in our executive branch badly needs remedial action at these times when the working relationship between the two offices has become increasingly important and desirable.

I support this resolution and feel its provisions are needed and will place the executive branch of our Government in a position to better cope with crises which could mar the effective operation, leadership, and administering of the Offices of President and Vice President.

Mr. RODINO. Mr. Chairman, the 89th Congress now has under consideration the best solution ever offered the American people to one of the oldest and most perplexing problems of our constitutional system.

In House Joint Resolution 1, a proposed amendment to the Constitution, we have before us a comprehensive, workable, and democratic plan to cover the possibility presidential of inability and succession.

Approval of this resolution by Congress and the State legislatures will assure the people of this country uninterrupted leadership in our highest office. It will guarantee stability in the Government in vital areas that for almost two centuries have been a source of apprehension and uncertainty.

The fifth paragraph under section 1 of article II in the Constitution reads, in -part:

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President.

This paragraph then goes on to give Congress the power to provide by law what officer shall act as President should both the President and Vice President be unavailable for any of the above reasons. The term "inability" as used in this paragraph has resisted all efforts to give it precise definition from the time the Constitution was drafted in 1787 to this very day. Obviously, inasmuch as we have so far failed to define inability, we have also failed to establish procedures to be followed in the event of its occurrence,

As regards presidential succession, Congress has in the lifetime of this Republic enacted three different laws.

Under the first of these laws, the Succession Act of 1792, the Vice President was followed in the line of succession by the President pro tempore of the Senate · and then the Speaker of the House. This law prevailed until 1886, when the members of the Cabinet, headed by the Secretary of -State, were put in the line of succession after the Vice President. The law now in effect, passed in 1947, reverts to the basic idea of the 1792 act. After the Vice President, the line of succession goes first to the Speaker of the House, then to the President pro tempore, and, finally, to the Cabinet · members.

None of these succession laws has ever been regarded as completely satisfactory by everybody, and indeed it is not difficult to direct strong arguments against, as well as in favor of, each of them.

The great virtue of House Joint Resolution 1 is that it will not only clarify the meaning of inability and establish methods for dealing with it, but will also provide an eminently sound and practical answer to the succession issue.

Let us examine in nontechnical language the substance of this proposed amendment.

Section 1 merely affirms what has always been true under the Constitutionthat if the President is removed from office, dies, or resigns, he is succeeded by the Vice President.

The next section, however, constitutes · a very marked departure from anything that we have heretofore known. It calls upon the President, whenever a vacancy exists in the Office of Vice President, to nominate a candidate to fill this very important national position. The nominee would take office as Vice President only after being confirmed by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Thus, the Vice-Presidency would never again be left vacant until the next election, and orderly presidential succession would be assured. The requirement of congressional confirmation is an added safeguard that only fully qualified persons of the highest character and national stature would ever be nominated by the President.

Sections 3 and 4 deal with Presidential inability-what it is, when it exists, and what to do about it. The third section states quite simply · that whenever the President, by written message to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House, declares his own disability, the powers and the duties of the Presidential Office shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President. The President would then resume his powers and duties whenever he, again in writing, informed these same congressional officers that he was able to do so.

Section 4 is more difficult and complicated because it is concerned with the factual determination of the existence of inability and the possibility of a controversy over the issue involving the President and the Vice President ,

This section permits the Vice President, when joined by a majority of the Cabinet members, to present a written declaration to the congressional officers already mentioned stating that the President is unable to perform the powers and duties of his office. Under these circumstances the Vice President immediately becomes Acting President. The President may declare in writing to these same leaders of Congress that this inability is at an end and resume his office.

If, however, this presidential statement of his capacity to serve is challenged within 2 days by the Vice President and a Cabinet majority, the issues goes before Congress which will immediately decide the issue. If out of session, Congress will immediately assemble for this purpose. If, within 10 days after receiving the written challenge from the Vice President and the Cabinet, Congress decides by a two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President will continue as Acting President. If Congress does not so decide, the President resumes his regular role.

We must be impressed by the many contingencies covered in this section. We must also be impressed by the way the Office of the President, with all its real and symbolic significance, is protected while at the same time the national welfare remains the foremost consideration. The pressing need for incorporating this proposed amendment into our fundamental law with all possible speed seems to me to be overwhelming.

In our political history we have had Presidents disabled for long periods by assassins' bullets or illness. It is true that we have managed to weather these crises in one way or another, but if the Constitution is allowed to remain vague and ambiguous concerning inability as it now is, we may not always be so fortunate.

It is also a fact that because eight Presidents and seven Vice Presidents have died in office and one of the latter resigned, this Nation has on 16 occasions been without a Vice President. For more than 37 of our 176 years as a nation, our second highest office has been unoccupied.

We have relied too long on luck and wishful hopes that presidential inability and succession would never become critical or controversial issues that could disrupt our national life or governmental structure.

Let us act now to settle these matters wisely, prudently, and expeditiously. Let us pass House Joint Resolution 1 now so that it may be sent on promptly to the States for their approval.

Mr. FASCELL. Mr. Chairman, the problem of presidential inability has remained an unresolved constitutional issue of greatest magnitude throughout all the one and three-quarters centuries of our life as a nation.

At the same time, none of the three presidential succession laws, enacted in 1792, 1886, and 1947, has provided a truly satisfactory answer to this related problem.

Now, this House has under consideration in House Joint Resolution 1 the most thoughtful, comprehensive, and democratic solution to both of these great issues that has ever been presented to the American people.

Under this plan a vacancy in the office of Vice President would always be filled by the President. This would be possible because the President would be authorized to appoint a Vice President when, for any reason, the second highest office in the land is unoccupied. The President's appointee would take office only after being confirmed by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

Thus, in a thoroughly logical and easily understandable way, this resolution solves two of our most difficult and enduring problems. It assures us that the Vice-Presidency will always be filled, and it provides for a smooth and untroubled succession to the Presidency.

The other sections of House Joint Resolution 1, as amended by the Judiciary Committee, are concerned with inability. Inability in its simplest form would be determined by the President himself through a written declaration to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. The President would also state when his inability is at an end by writing to these same congressional officers. In the interim, the Vice President would act as President.

If the President were unable to determine his own inability, or if there were doubt or controversy about it, the matter would then be settled by the Vice President, the Cabinet, and Congress. In this eventuality, there would be adequate, fully democratic procedures and safeguards to protect both the Presidential office and the welfare and best interests of the country.

I am proud of the fact that I was one of the sponsors of this resolution in its original form. I believe now that the amended version we are considering is an even better proposal.

I regard this proposed amendment as essential to the strengthening of constitutional principles and the structure of the Federal Government.

I urge its immediate pa.ssage so that it may be sent on to the States for their approval.

Mr. RANDALL. Mr. Chairman, there is no such thing as an indispensable man. But if ever there were an approximation to an indispensable man, it is the President of the United States. Over the past several decades we have witnessed an expansion in his office and its powers to unparalleled dimensions. We have come to expect the President to set the guidelines for conduct of domestic policy and to bear the standard of leadership for the entire free world. We know from experience that even a weak President must have strong advisers and associates to insure that the minimum functions of his office are carried out. And we have learned recently the lesson that continuity of purpose and direction are one of the greatest blessings a nation can receive when a great national leader has fallen.

The tragic death of John Fitzgerald Kennedy has forced those of us who would rather not dwell upon such contingencies to reflect upon questions of Presidential succession and disability. It has caused us to realize that this country cannot do without a President and that at all times the continuity of both his office and his powers must be preserved. The business of the Government is too important and too pressing to be postponed for weeks or months because of a vacuum at the center of the executive branch. For whatever reason, whether through death or because of physical or mental incapacity, -the absence of a leader in the White House could mean virtual paralysis of the executive branch of Government with unpredictable consequences for the safety of the Uni.ted States itself. Yet, our Constitution is not · at present written to cope adequately with crises in presidential leadership.

Mr. Chairman, House Joint Resolution 1, the constitutional amendment proposed by the gentleman from New York and reported favorably by the Committee on the Judiciary, will resolve most of the constitutional ambiguities related to presidential succession and inability. It is a sound proposal which should be made part of the Constitution with deliberate speed and without further modification.

The provisions of this amendment are addressed to two ba.sic problems of presidential continuity. I touched on these problems in my testimony before the Judiciary Committee, but it is appropriate to review them once again in the context of this historic debate.

The first problem dealt with by the amendment is vacancy in the office of President or Vice President arising from death, resignation, or removal from office. The second problem concerns situations in which the President holds office in a technical sense, but is incapacitated in such manner a.s to preclude the proper exercise of the duties, functions, and obligations of his position.

In 16 instances lasting a total of 37 years, this country ha.s been without a Vice President. Only an accident of history and perhaps the intervention of divine providence have protected us from the severe crisis that could have resulted if a President had died in office or been otherwise incapacitated during such a period.

The first two sections of this amendment seek to minimize the likelihood of such a tragedy in the future. Henceforth, whenever there is no President the Vice President shall immediately assume the office and duties of President. Whenever a vacancy in the office of Vice President occurs, the President will nominate a new Vice President who will take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.

We have listened very carefully to debate in which it is suggested that section 2, permitting the President to name his own Vice President subject only to confirmation of both Houses, would lead to "dynasty." Although our bill contained this section at the time of drafting, we had no such thing in mind, and we have no such thing in mind today. The only reluctance we have at all to this section is the fact that it changes the !ine of succession and might give the appearance--­ a.s some Members pointed out--that it downgrades the House of Representatives and was an affront to the Speaker. Certainly no one intended or does intend now that this section should have that connotation.

On the other side of the issue, however, is the possibility that under the present line of succession a President might find that the next in line of succession would be of a different political faith. Of course, that is one of the strong arguments in favor of section 2 a.s it stands. The section would permit the President to designate one whose views are similar to his own and who will be working toward the same objectives.

In addition to these provisions relating to succession to office, the proposed amendment provides two general methods to cope with presidential inability or incapacity to act. From the point of view of the President, one of these methods is voluntary and the other is involuntary.

First, section 3 of the amendment permits and encourages the President to declare himself unable to discharge his duties and to pass his powers over to the Vice President, temporarily acting in the capacity of Acting President. For instance, if the President were to become hospitalized for some reason, he might ask the Vice President to shoulder his burdens for the duration of the illness. I am pleased to note that the committee concurred in an argument expressed in my testimony before them that if the President declares himself to be disabled, he should have an a.bsolute right to terminate such an inability through a · simple written declaration. Without such clarification, now embodied in the committee bill, it would have been unlikely that a President would have ever made use of the clause, no matter how incapacitated he believed himself to be.

The further idea that a President might actually be forced to step down involuntarily from office because of physical or mental incapacity is fraught with unpleasant associations. If not carefully drawn, such authority could be abused and could have the same dire results as the many foreign coups and putsches of this century.

Yet there are legitimate circumstances in which such actions might be necessary and proper. Surely it is better to establish regular and orderly procedures for the temporary transfer of presidential power than to suffer the consequences of constitutional chaos. Sections 4 and 5 of the proposed amendment establish procedures both for declaring and for terminating periods of presidential inability.

The precedures for declaring and terminating presidential inability are of necessity weighty and complex, yet the committee has succeeded in drafting language which is at once succinct and unambiguous. That they should have been able to improve upon the language and provisions of version of the resolution pa.ssed by the other body is a monument to the experience and wisdom of the chairman and his distinguished colleague, the ranking minority member of the committee.

Under provisions of section 4, the Vice President will immediately become Acting President upon transmittal to the House and the Senate of a written declaration that he and a majority of the Cabinet have determined the President to be unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

Section 4 further states that the President may declare his own inability terminated and that such determination shall be final unless the Vice President, a majority of the Cabinet, and two-thirds of the Members of both Houses of Congress determine within 10 days that the President is still unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office.

The section is worded in such a way that all procedures are crystal clear; the benefit of the doubt is given tb the President; and time limits for action are firmly established. All procedures are deliberately avoided which might lead to circumstances in which two individuals simultaneously claim the authority of the Presidency.

Language avoiding these latter difficulties was initially proposed by the gentleman from Ohio [Mr. McCULLOCH] and was incorporated in my own presidential inability amendment, House Joint Resolution 265. If this language has not been adopted, it would have been possible for an uncooperative and hostile Congress to prolong inability proceedings indefinitely and through inaction to keep an otherwise fit and healthy President from resuming office.

In conclusion, I should like to make an observation on the mechanics used to prepare this resolution for final passage by the House. Too often critics of the Congress are prepared to cite the slightest delay in passage of a bill as evidence of the unworkability of current legislative institutions. They are quick to condemn the roadblocks and obstacles which a bill . or a resolution must overcome before being passed into law.

An examination of the legislative history of House Joint Resolution 1 will show that these cumbersome procedures actually serve a useful purpose. If it had not been for these archaic procedures, this body would today be voting on a considerably interior constitutional amendment. Indeed, I am sure that some of my colleagues would have pref erred the amendment to have been scrutinized even longer by the gentleman from New York and his judicious band of judicial scalpel-wielders.

If the Congress had acted hastily last session to pass the so-called Bayh amendment, it would never have had the benefit of the language changes made this session by the Senator from Indiana himself. These changes were not easily arrived at, and yet I think that both friends and foes of this amendment will agree that the technical language improvements alone make its provisions more acceptable and defensible.

If there were not a necessity for concurrence of both Houses of Congress, the changes in section 4 of the amendment might never have seen the light of day. Yet these changes have clarified some serious difficulties previously buried in the ambiguities of the amendment as passed by the other body. The easy course would have been to adopt the measure as sent across the Hill, but the Judiciary Committee was willing to take · a fresh look at the entire proposal and as a result they came up with some con- . crete improvements.