An Address to the People of the State of New-York, on the Subject of the Constitution

THERE are times and ſeaſons when general evils ſpread general alarm and uneaſineſs, and yet ariſe from cauſes too complicated, and too little underſtood by many, to produce a unanimity of opinions reſpecting their remedies. Hence it is, that on ſuch occaſions, the conflict of arguments too often excites a conflict of paſſions, and introduces a degree of diſcord and animoſity, which, by agitating the public mind, diſpoſe it to precipitation and extravagance. They who on the ocean have been unexpectedly inveloped with tempeſts, or ſuddenly entangled among rocks and ſhoals, know the value of that ſerene, ſelf-poſſeſſion and preſence of mind, to which in ſuch caſes they owed their preſervation: nor will the heroes who have given us victory and peace, heſitate to acknowledge, that we are as much indebted for thoſe bleſſings to the calm previſion, and cool intrepidity which planned and conducted our military meaſures, as to the glowing animation with which they were executed.

While reaſon retains her rule, while men are as ready to receive as to give advice, and as willing to be convinced themſelves, as to convince others, there are few political evils from which a free and enlightened people cannot deliver themſelves. It is unqueſtionably true, that the great body of the people love their country, and wiſh it proſperity; and this obſervation is particularly applicable to the people of a free country, for they have more and ſtronger reaſons for loving it than others. It is not therefore to vicious motives that the unhappy diviſions which ſometimes prevail among them are to be imputed; the people at large always mean well, and although they may, on certain occaſions, be miſled by the counſels, or injured by the efforts of the few who expect more advantage from the wreck, than from the preſervation of national proſperity, yet the motives of theſe few, are by no means to be confounded with thoſe of the community in general.

That ſuch ſeeds of diſcord and danger have been diſſeminated and begin to take root in America, as unleſs eradicated will ſoon poiſon our gardens and our fields, is a truth much to be lamented; and the more ſo, as their growth rapidly encreaſes, while we are waſting the ſeaſon in honeſtly but imprudently diſputing, not whether they ſhall be pulled up, but by whom, in what manner, and with what inſtruments the work ſhall be done.

When the King of Great-Britain, miſguided by men who did not merit his confidence, aſſerted the unjuſt claim of binding us in all caſes whatſoever, and prepared to obtain our ſubmiſſion by force, the object which engroſſed our attention, however important, was nevertheleſs plain and ſimple. "What ſhall we do?" was the queſtion—the people anſwered, let us unite our counſels and our arms. They ſent Delegates to Congreſs, and ſoldiers to the field. Confiding in the probity and wiſdom of Congreſs, they received their recommendations as if they had been laws; and that ready acquieſcence in their advice enabled thoſe patriots to ſave their country. Then there was little leiſure or diſpoſition for controverſy reſpecting the expediency of meaſures—hoſtile fleets ſoon filled our ports, and hoſtile armies ſpread deſolation on our ſhores. Union was then conſidered as the moſt eſſential of human means, and we almoſt worſhipped it with as much fervor, as pagans in diſtreſs formerly implored the protection of their tutelar deities. That Union was the child of wiſdom—Heaven bleſſed it, and it wrought out our political ſalvation.

That glorious war was ſucceded by an advantageous peace. When danger diſappeared, eaſe, tranquility, and a ſenſe of ſecurity looſened the bands of union; and Congreſs and ſoldiers and good faith depreciated with their apparent importance. Recommendations loſt their influence, and requiſitions were rendered nugatory, not by their want of propriety, but by their want of power. The ſpirit of private gain expelled the ſpirit of public good, and men became more intent on the means of enriching and aggrandizing themſelves, than of enriching and aggrandizing their country. Hence the war-worn veteran, whoſe reward for toils and wounds exiſted in written promiſes, found Congreſs without the means, and too many of the States without the diſpoſition to do him juſtice. Hard neceſſity compelled him, and others under ſimilar circumſtances, to ſell their honeſt claims on the public for a little bread; and thus unmerited misfortunes and patriotic diſtreſſes became articles of ſpeculation and commerce.

Theſe and many other evils, too well known to require enumeration, imperceptibly ſtole in upon us, and acquired an unhappy influence on our public affairs. But ſuch evils, like the worſt of weeds, will naturally ſpring up in ſo rich a ſoil; and a good Government is as neceſſary to ſubdue the one, as an attentive gardener or huſbandman is to deſtroy the other—Even the garden of Paradiſe required to be dreſſed, and while men continue to be conſtantly impelled to error and to wrong, by innumerable circumſtances and temptations, ſo long will ſociety experience the unceaſing neceſſity of Government.

It is a pity that the expectations which actuated the authors of the exiſting Confederation, neither have nor can be realized:—accuſtomed to ſee and admire the glorious ſpirit which moved all ranks of people in the moſt gloomy moments of the war, obſerving their ſteadfaſt attachment to Union, and the wiſdom they ſo often manifeſted both in chooſing and confiding in their rulers, thoſe gentlemen were led to flatter themſelves that the people of America only required to know what ought to be done, to do it. This amiable miſtake induced them to inſtitute a national Government in ſuch a manner, as though very fit to give advice, was yet deſtitute of power, and ſo conſtructed as to be very unfit to be truſted with it. They ſeem not to have been ſenſible that mere advice is a ſad ſubſtitute for laws; nor to have recollected that the advice even of the all-wiſe and beſt of Beings, has been always diſregarded by a great majority of all the men that ever lived.

Experience is a ſevere preceptor, but it teaches uſeful truths, and however harſh, is always honeſt—Be calm and diſpaſſionate, and liſten to what it tells us.

Prior to the revolution we had little occaſion to enquire or know much about national affairs, for although they exiſted and were managed, yet they were managed for us, but not by us. Intent on our domeſtic concerns, our internal legiſlative buſineſs, our agriculture, and our buying and ſelling, we were ſeldom anxious about what paſſed or was doing in foreign Courts. As we had nothing to do with that department of policy, ſo the affairs of it were not detailed to us, and we took as little pains to inform ourſelves, as others did to inform us of them. War, and peace, alliances, and treaties, and commerce, and navigation, were conducted and regulated without our advice or controul. While we had liberty and juſtice, and in ſecurity enjoyed the fruits of our "vine and fig tree," we were in general too content and too much occupied, to be at the trouble of inveſtigating the various political combinations in this department, or to examine and perceive how exceedingly important they often were to the advancement and protection of our proſperity. This habit and turn of thinking affords one reaſon why ſo much more care was taken, and ſo much more wiſdom diſplayed, in forming our State Governments, than in forming our foederal or national one.

By the Confederation as it now ſtands, the direction of general and national affairs is committed to a ſingle body of men, viz. the Congreſs. They may make war, but are not empowered to raiſe men or money to carry it on—They may make peace, but without power to ſee the terms of it obſerved—They may form alliances, but without ability to comply with the ſtipulations on their part—They may enter into treaties of commerce, but without power to inforce them at home or abroad—They may borrow money, but without having the means of repayment—They may partly regulate commerce, but without authority to execute their ordinances—They may appoint miniſters and other officers of truſt, but without power to try or puniſh them for miſdemeanors—They may reſolve, but cannot execute either with diſpatch or with ſecrecy—In ſhort, they may conſult, and deliberate, and recommend, and make requiſitions, and they who pleaſe may regard them.

From this new and wonderful ſyſtem of Government, it has come to paſs, that almoſt every national object of every kind, is at this day unprovided for; and other nations taking the advantage of its imbecility, are daily multiplying commercial reſtraints upon us. Our fur trade is gone to Canada, and Britiſh garriſons keep the keys of it. Our ſhip-yards have almoſt ceaſed to diſturb the repoſe of the neighbourhood by the noiſe of the axe and hammer; and while foreign flags fly triumphantly above our higheſt houſes, the American Stars ſeldom do more than ſhed a few feeble rays about the humbler maſts of river ſloops and coaſting ſchooners. The greater part of our hardy ſeamen are plowing the ocean in foreign pay; and not a few of our ingenious ſhipwrights are now building veſſels on alien ſhores. Although our increaſing agriculture and induſtry extend and multiply our productions, yet they conſtantly diminiſh in value; and although we permit all nations to fill our country with their merchandizes, yet their beſt markets are ſhut againſt us. Is there an Engliſh, or a French, or a Spaniſh iſland or port in the Weſt-Indies to which an American veſſel can carry a cargo of flour for ſale? Not one. The Algerines exclude us from the Mediterranean, and adjacent countries; and we are neither able to purchaſe, nor to command the free uſe of thoſe ſeas. Can our little towns or larger cities conſume the immenſe productions of our fertile country? or will they without trade be able to pay a good price for the proportion which they do conſume? The laſt ſeaſon gave a very unequivocal anſwer to thoſe queſtions—What numbers of fine cattle have returned from this city to the country for want of buyers? What great quantities of ſalted and other proviſions ſtill lay uſeleſs in the ſtores? To how much below the former price, is our corn and wheat and flour and lumber rapidly falling? Our debts remain undiminiſhed, and the intereſt on them accumulating—our credit abroad is nearly extinguiſhed, and at home unreſtored—they who had money have ſent it beyond the reach of our laws, and ſcarcely any man can borrow of his neighbour. Nay, does not experience alſo tell us, that it is as difficult to pay as to borrow? That even our houſes and lands cannot command money—that law ſuits and uſurious contracts abound —that our farms ſell on executions for leſs than half their value, and that diſtreſs in various forms, and in various ways, is approaching faſt to the doors of our beſt citizens.

Theſe things have been gradually coming upon us ever ſince the peace—they have been perceived and proclaimed, but the univerſal rage and purſuit of private gain conſpired with other cauſes, to prevent any proper efforts being made to meliorate our condition by due attention to our national affairs, until the late Convention was convened for that purpoſe. From the reſult of their deliberations, the States expected to derive much good, and ſhould they be diſappointed, it will probably be not leſs their misfortune than their fault. That Convention was in general compoſed of excellent and tried men—men who had become conſpicuous for their wiſdom and public ſervices, and whoſe names and characters will be venerated by poſterity. Generous and candid minds cannot perceive without pain, the illiberal manner in which ſome have taken the liberty to treat them; nor forbear to impute it to impure and improper motives—zeal for public good, like zeal for religion, may ſometimes carry men beyond the bounds of reaſon, but it is not conceivable, that on this occaſion, it ſhould find means ſo to enebriate any candid American, as to make him forget what he owed to truth and to decency, or induce him either to believe or to ſay, that the almoſt unanimous advice of the Convention, proceeded from a wicked combination and conſpiracy againſt the liberties of their country. This is not the temper with which we ſhould receive and conſider their recommendations, nor the treatment that would be worthy either of us or of them. Let us continue careful therefore that facts do not warrant hiſtorians to tell future generations, that envy, malice and uncharitableneſs purſued our patriotic benefactors to their graves, and that not even pre-eminence in virtue, nor lives devoted to the public, could ſhield them from obloquy and detraction. On the contrary, let our boſoms always retain a ſufficient degree of honeſt indignation to diſappoint and diſcourage thoſe who expect our thanks or applauſe for calumniating our moſt faithful and meritorious friends.

The Convention concurred in opinion with the people, that a national government competent to every national object, was indiſpenſably neceſſary; and it was as plain to them, as it now is to all America, that the preſent confederation does not provide for ſuch a government. Theſe points being agreed, they proceeded to conſider how and in what manner ſuch a Government could be formed, as on the one hand ſhould be ſufficiently energetic to raiſe us from our proſtrate and diſtreſſed ſituation, and on the other be perfectly conſiſtent with the liberties of the people of every State. Like men to whom the experience of other ages and countries had taught wiſdom, they not only determined that it ſhould be erected by, and depend on the people; but remembering the many inſtances in which Governments veſted ſolely in one man, or one body of men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it moſt prudent that the three great branches of power ſhould be committed to different hands, and therefore that the executive ſhould be ſeparated from the legiſlative, and the judicial from both. Thus far the propriety of their work is eaſily ſeen and underſtood, and therefore is thus far almoſt univerſally approved—for no one man or thing under the ſun ever yet pleaſed every body.

The next queſtion was, what particular powers ſhould be given to theſe three branches? Here the different views and intereſts of the different States, as well as the different abſtract opinions of their members on ſuch points, interpoſed many difficulties. Here the buſineſs became complicated, and preſented a wide field for inveſtigation; too wide for every eye to take a quick and comprehensive view of it.

It is ſaid that "in a multitude of counſellors there is ſafety," becauſe in the firſt place, there is greater ſecurity for probity; and in the next, if every member caſts in only his mite of information and argument, their joint ſtock of both will thereby become greater than the ſtock poſſeſſed by any one ſingle man out of doors. Gentlemen out of doors therefore ſhould not be haſty in condemning a ſyſtem, which probably reſts on more good reaſons than they are aware of, eſpecially when formed under ſuch advantages, and recommended by ſo many men of diſtinguiſhed worth and abilities.

The difficulties before mentioned occupied the Convention a long time, and it was not without mutual conceſſions that they were at laſt ſurmounted. Theſe conceſſions ſerve to explain to us the reaſon why ſome parts of the ſyſtem pleaſe in ſome States, which diſpleaſe in others; and why many of the objections which have been made to it, are ſo contradictory and inconſiſtent with one another. It does great credit to the temper and talents of the Convention, that they were able ſo to reconcile the different views and intereſts of the different States, and the claſhing opinions of their members, as to unite with ſuch ſingular and almoſt perfect unanimity in any plan whatever, on a ſubject ſo intricate and perplexed. It ſhews that it muſt have been thoroughly diſcuſſed and underſtood; and probably if the community at large had the ſame lights and reaſons before them, they would, if equally candid and uninfluenced, be equally unanimous.

It would be arduous, and indeed impoſſible to comprize within the limits of this addreſs, a full diſcuſſion of every part of the plan. Such a taſk would require a volume, and few men have leiſure or inclination to read volumes on any ſubject. The objections made to it are almoſt without number, and many of them without reaſon—ſome of them are real and honeſt, and others merely oſtenſible. There are friends to Union and a national Government who have ſerious doubts, who wiſh to be informed, and to be convinced; and there are others who, neither wiſhing for Union nor any national Government at all, will oppoſe and object to any plan that can be contrived.

We are told, among other ſtrange things, that the liberty of the preſs is left inſecure by the propoſed Conſtitution, and yet that Conſtitution ſays neither more nor leſs about it, than the Conſtitution of the State of New-York does. We are told that it deprives us of trial by jury, whereas the fact is, that it expreſly ſecures it in certain caſes, and takes it away in none—it is abſurd to conſtrue the ſilence of this, or of our own Conſtitution, relative to a great number of our rights, into a total extinction of them—ſilence and blank paper neither grant nor take away any thing. Complaints are alſo made that the propoſed Conſtitution is not accompanied by a bill of rights; and yet they who make theſe complaints, know and are content that no bill of rights accompanied the Conſtitution of this State. In days and countries where Monarchs and their ſubjects were frequently diſputing about prerogative and privileges, the latter often found it neceſſary, as it were to run out the line between them, and oblige the former to admit by ſolemn acts, called bills of rights, that certain enumerated rights belonged to the people, and were not comprehended in the royal prerogative. But thank God we have no ſuch diſputes—we have no Monarchs to contend with, or demand admiſſions from—the propoſed Government is to be the government of the people—all its officers are to be their officers, and to exerciſe no rights but ſuch as the people commit to them. The Conſtitution only ſerves to point out that part of the people's buſineſs, which they think proper by it to refer to the management of the perſons therein deſignated—thoſe perſons are to receive that buſineſs to manage, not for themſelves, and as their own, but as agents and overſeers for the people to whom they are conſtantly reſponſible, and by whom only they are to be appointed.

But the deſign of this addreſs is not to inveſtigate the merits of the plan, nor of the objections made to it. They who ſeriouſly contemplate the preſent ſtate of our affairs will be convinced that other conſiderations of at leaſt equal importance demand their attention. Let it be admitted that this plan, like everything elſe deviſed by man, has its imperfections; That it does not pleaſe every body is certain, and there is little reaſon to expect one that will. It is a queſtion of great moment to you, whether the probability of our being able ſeaſonably to obtain a better, is ſuch as to render it prudent and adviſable to reject this, and run the riſque.—Candidly to conſider this queſtion is the deſign of this addreſs.

As the importance of this queſtion muſt be obvious to every man, whatever his private opinions reſpecting it may be, it becomes us all to treat it in that calm and temperate manner, which a ſubject ſo deeply intereſting to the future welfare of our country and poſterity requires. Let us therefore as much as poſſible repreſs and compoſe that irritation in our minds, which too warm diſputes about it may have excited. Let us endeavor to forget that this or that man, is on this or that ſide; and that we ourſelves, perhaps without ſufficient reflection, have claſſed ourſelves with one or the other party. Let us remember that this is not to be regarded as a matter that only touches our local parties, but as one ſo great, ſo general, and ſo extenſive in its future conſequences to America, that for our deciding upon it according to the beſt of our unbiaſſed judgment, we muſt be highly reſponſible both here and hereafter.

The queſtion now before us naturally leads to three enquiries: 1. Whether it is probable that a better plan can be obtained? 2. Whether, if attainable, it is likely to be in ſeaſon? 3. What would be our ſituation, if after rejecting this, all our efforts to obtain a better ſhould prove fruitleſs?

The men who formed this plan are Americans, who had long deſerved and enjoyed our confidence, and who are as much intereſted in having a good government as any of us are, or can be. They were appointed to that buſineſs at a time when the States had become very ſenſible of the derangement of our national affairs, and of the impoſſibility of retrieving them under the exiſting Confederation. Although well perſuaded that nothing but a good national Government could oppoſe and divert the tide of evils that was flowing in upon us, yet thoſe gentlemen met in Convention with minds perfectly unprejudiced in favor of any particular plan. The minds of their Conſtituents were at that time equally unbiaſſed, equally cool and diſpaſſionate. All agreed in the neceſſity of doing ſomething, but no one ventured to ſay decidedly what preciſely ought to be done—opinions were then fluctuating and unfixed, and whatever might have been the wiſhes of a few individuals, yet while the Convention deliberated, the people remained in ſilent ſuſpence. Neither wedded to favorite ſyſtems of their own, nor influenced by popular ones abroad, the members were more deſirous to receive light from, than to impreſs their private ſentiments on one another. Theſe circumſtances naturally opened the door to that ſpirit of candor, of calm enquiry, of mutual accommodation, and mutual reſpect, which entered into the Convention with them, and regulated their debates and proceedings.

The impoſſibility of agreeing upon any plan that would exactly quadrate with the local policy and objects of every State, ſoon became evident; and they wiſely thought it better mutually to concede, and accommodate, and in that way to faſhion their ſyſtem as much as poſſible by the circumſtances and wiſhes of the different States, than by pertinaciouſly adhering, each to his own ideas, oblige the Convention to riſe without doing any thing. They were ſenſible that obſtacles ariſing from local circumſtances, would not ceaſe while thoſe circumſtances continue to exiſt; and ſo far as thoſe circumſtances depended on differences of climate, productions, and commerce, that no change was to be expected. They were likewiſe ſenſible that on a ſubject ſo comprehenſive, and involving ſuch a variety of points and queſtions, the moſt able, the moſt candid, and the moſt honeſt men will differ in opinion. The ſame propoſition ſeldom ſtrikes many minds exactly in the ſame point or light: different habits of thinking, different degrees and modes of education, different prejudices and opinions early formed and long entertained, conſpire with a multitude of other circumſtances, to produce among men a diverſity and contrariety of opinions on queſtions of difficulty. Liberality therefore as well as prudence, induced them to treat each other's opinions with tenderneſs, to argue without aſperity, and to endeavor to convince the judgment without hurting the feelings of each other. Although many weeks were paſſed in theſe diſcuſſions, ſome points remained, on which a uniſon of opinions could not be effected. Here again that ſame happy diſpoſition to unite and conciliate, induced them to meet each other; and enabled them by mutual conceſſions, finally to compleat and agree to the plan they have recommended, and that too with a degree of unanimity, which, conſidering the variety of diſcordant views and ideas they had to reconcile, is really aſtoniſhing.

They tell us very honeſtly that this plan is the reſult of accommodation—they do not hold it up as the beſt of all poſſible ones, but only as the beſt which they could unite in, and agree to. If ſuch men, appointed and meeting under ſuch auſpicious circumſtances, and ſo ſincerely diſpoſed to conciliation, could go no further in their endeavors to pleaſe every State and every body, what reaſon have we at preſent to expect any ſyſtem that would give more general ſatisfaction?

Suppoſe this plan to be rejected, what meaſures would you propoſe for obtaining a better? Some will anſwer, let us appoint another Convention, and as every thing has been ſaid and written, that can well be ſaid and written on the ſubject, they will be better informed than the former one was, and conſequently be better able to make and agree upon a more eligible one.

This reaſoning is fair, and as far as it goes has weight; but it nevertheleſs takes one thing for granted, which appears very doubtful; for although the new Convention might have more information, and perhaps equal abilities, yet it does not from thence follow that they would be equally diſpoſed to agree. The contrary of this poſition is the moſt probable. You muſt have obſerved that the ſame temper and equanimity which prevailed among the people on the former occaſion, no longer exiſts. We have unhappily become divided into parties, and this important ſubject has been handled with ſuch indiſcreet and offenſive acrimony, and with ſo many little unhandſome artifices and miſrepreſentations, that pernicious heats and animoſities have been kindled, and ſpread their flames far and wide among us. When therefore it becomes a queſtion who ſhall be deputed to the new Convention; we cannot flatter ourſelves that the talents and integrity of the candidates will determine who ſhall be elected. Foederal electors will vote for foederal deputies, and anti-foederal electors for anti-foederal ones. Nor will either party prefer the moſt moderate of their adherents, for as the moſt ſtaunch and active partizans will be the moſt popular, ſo the men moſt willing and able to carry points, to oppoſe, and divide, and embarraſs their opponents will be choſen. A Convention formed at ſuch a ſeaſon, and of ſuch men, would be but too exact an epitome of the great body that named them. The ſame party views, the ſame propenſity to oppoſition, the ſame diſtruſts and jealouſies, and the ſame unaccomodating ſpirit which prevail without, would be concentred and ferment with ſtill greater violence within. Each deputy would recollect who ſent him, and why he was ſent; and be too apt to conſider himſelf bound in honor, to contend and act vigorouſly under the ſtandard of his party, and not hazard their diſpleaſure by preferring compromiſe to victory. As vice does not ſow the ſeeds of virtue, ſo neither does paſſion cultivate the fruits of reaſon. Suſpicions and reſentments create no diſpoſition to conciliate, nor do they infuſe a deſire of making partial and perſonal objects bend to general union and the common good. The utmoſt efforts of that excellent diſpoſition were neceſſary to enable the late Convention to perform their taſk; and although contrary cauſes ſometimes operate ſimilar effects, yet to expect that diſcord and animoſity ſhould produce the fruits of confidence and agreement, is to expect "grapes from thorns, and figs from thiſtles."

The States of Georgia, Delaware, Jerſey and Connecticut, have adopted the preſent plan with unexampled unanimity; they are content with it as it is, and conſequently their deputies, being apprized of the ſentiments of their Conſtituents, will be little inclined to make alterations, and cannot be otherwiſe than averſe to changes which they have no reaſon to think would be agreeable to their people—ſome other States, tho' leſs unanimous, have nevertheleſs adopted it by very reſpectable majorities; and for reaſons ſo evidently cogent, that even the minority in one of them, have nobly pledged themſelves for its promotion and ſupport. From theſe circumſtances the new Convention would derive and experience difficulties unknown to the former. Nor are theſe the only additional difficulties they would have to encounter. Few are ignorant that there has lately ſprung up a ſect of politicians who teach and profeſs to believe, that the extent of our nation is too great for the ſuperintendance of one national Government, and on that principle argue that it ought to be divided into two or three. This doctrine, however miſchievous in its tendency and conſequences, has its advocates, and ſhould any of them be ſent to the Convention, it will naturally be their policy rather to cheriſh than to prevent diviſions: for well knowing that the inſtitution of any good national Government, would blaſt their favorite ſyſtem, no meaſures that lead to it can meet with their aid or approbation.

Nor can we be certain whether or not any and what foreign influence would, on ſuch an occaſion, be indirectly exerted, nor for what purpoſes—delicacy forbids an ample diſcuſſion of this queſtion. Thus much may be ſaid without error or offence, viz. That ſuch foreign nations as deſire the proſperity of America, and would rejoice to ſee her become great and powerful, under the auſpices of a Government wiſely calculated to extend her commerce, to encourage her navigation and marine, and to direct the whole weight of her power and reſources as her intereſt and honor may require, will doubtleſs be friendly to the Union of the States, and to the eſtabliſhment of a Government able to perpetuate, protect and dignify it.—Such other foreign nations, if any ſuch there be, who, jealous of our growing importance, and fearful that our commerce and navigation ſhould impair their own—who behold our rapid population with regret, and apprehend that the enterprizing ſpirit of our people, when ſeconded by power and probability of ſucceſs, may be directed to objects not conſiſtent with their policy or intereſt, cannot fail at leaſt to wiſh that we may continue a weak and a divided people.

Theſe conſiderations merit much attention, and candid men will judge how far they render it probable that a new Convention would be able either to agree in a better plan, or with tolerable unanimity, in any plan at all. Any plan forcibly carried by a ſlender majority, muſt expect numerous opponents among the people, who, eſpecially in their preſent temper, would be more inclined to reject than adopt any ſyſtem ſo made and carried. We ſhould in ſuch a caſe again ſee the preſs teeming with publications for and againſt it; for as the minority would take pains to juſtify their diſſent, ſo would the majority be induſtrious to diſplay the wiſdom of their proceedings. Hence new diviſions, new parties, and new diſtractions would enſue, and no one can foreſee or conjecture when or how they would terminate.

Let thoſe who are ſanguine in their expectations of a better plan from a new Convention, alſo reflect on the delays and riſques to which it would expoſe us. Let them conſider whether we ought, by continuing much longer in our preſent humiliated condition, to give other nations further time to perfect their reſtrictive ſyſtems of commerce, to reconcile their own people to them, and to fence and guard and ſtrengthen them by all thoſe regulations and contrivances in which a jealous policy is ever fruitful. Let them conſider whether we ought to give further opportunities to diſcord to alienate the hearts of our citizens from one another, and thereby encourage new Cromwells to bold exploits. Are we certain that our foreign creditors will continue patient, and ready to proportion their forbearance to our delays? Are we ſure that our diſtreſſes, diſſentions and weakneſs will neither invite hoſtility nor inſult? If they ſhould, how ill prepared ſhall we be for defence! without Union, without Government, without money, and without credit!

It ſeems unneceſſary to remind you, that ſome time muſt yet elapſe, before all the States will have decided on the preſent plan. If they reject it, ſome time muſt alſo paſs before the meaſure of a new Convention, can be brought about and generally agreed to. A further ſpace of time will then be requiſite to elect their deputies, and ſend them on to Convention. What time they may expend when met, cannot be divined, and it is equally uncertain how much time the ſeveral States may take to deliberate and decide on any plan they may recommend— if adopted, ſtill a further ſpace of time will be neceſſary to organize and ſet it in motion:—In the mean time our affairs are daily going on from bad to worſe, and it is not raſh to ſay that our diſtreſſes are accumulating like compound intereſt.

But if for the reaſons already mentioned, and others that we cannot now perceive, the new Convention, inſtead of producing a better plan, ſhould give us only a hiſtory of their diſputes, or ſhould offer us one ſtill leſs pleaſing than the preſent, where ſhould we be then? The old Confederation has done its beſt, and cannot help us; and is now ſo relaxed and feeble, that in all probability it would not ſurvive ſo violent a ſhock. Then "to your tents Oh Iſrael!" would be the word. Then every band of Union would be ſevered. Then every State would be a little nation, jealous of its neighbours, and anxious to ſtrengthen itſelf by foreign alliances, againſt its former friends. Then farewell to fraternal affection, unſuſpecting intercourſe, and mutual participation in commerce, navigation and citizenſhip. Then would ariſe mutual reſtrictions and fears, mutual garriſons,—and ſtanding armies, and all thoſe dreadful evils which for ſo many ages plagued England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland, while they continued diſunited, and were played off againſt each other.

Conſider my fellow citizens what you are about, before it is too late —conſider what in ſuch an event would be your particular caſe.—You know the geography of your State, and the conſequences of your local poſition. Jerſey and Connecticut, to whom your impoſt laws have been unkind—Jerſey and Connecticut, who have adopted the preſent plan, and expect much good from it, will impute its miſcarriage and all the conſequent evils to you. They now conſider your oppoſition as dictated more by your fondneſs for your impoſt, than for thoſe rights to which they have never been behind you in attachment. They cannot, they will not love you—they border upon you, and are your neighbours, but you will ſoon ceaſe to regard their neighbourhood as a bleſſing. You have but one port and outlet to your commerce, and how you are to keep that outlet free and uninterrupted, merits conſideration.— What advantages Vermont in combination with others, might take of you, may eaſily be conjectured; nor will you be at a loſs to perceive how much reaſon the people of Long-Iſland, whom you cannot protect, have to deprecate being conſtantly expoſed to the depredations of every invader.

Theſe are ſhort hints—they ought not to be more developed—you can eaſily in your own minds dilate and trace them through all their relative circumſtances and connections.—Pauſe then for a moment, and reflect whether the matters you are diſputing about, are of ſufficient moment to juſtify your running ſuch extravagant riſques. Reflect that the preſent plan comes recommended to you by men and fellow-citizens, who have given you the higheſt proofs that men can give, of their juſtice, their love for liberty and their country, of their prudence, of their application, and of their talents. They tell you it is the beſt that they could form; and that in their opinion, it is neceſſary to redeem you from thoſe calamities which already begin to be heavy upon us all. You find that not only thoſe men, but others of ſimilar characters, and of whom you have alſo had very ample experience, adviſe you to adopt it. You find that whole States concur in the ſentiment, and among them are your next neighbours; both of whom have ſhed much blood in the cauſe of liberty, and have manifeſted as ſtrong and conſtant a predilection for a free Republican Government as any States in the Union, and perhaps in the world. They perceive not thoſe latent miſchiefs in it, with which ſome double-ſighted politicians endeavor to alarm you. You cannot but be ſenſible that this plan or Conſtitution will always be in the hands and power of the people, and that if on experiment, it ſhould be found defective or incompetent, they may either remedy its defects, or ſubſtitute another in its room. The objectionable parts of it are certainly very queſtionable, for otherwiſe there would not be ſuch a contrariety of opinions about them. Experience will better determine ſuch queſtions than theoretical arguments, and ſo far as the danger of abuſes is urged againſt the inſtitution of a Government, remember that a power to do good always involves a power to do harm. We muſt in the buſineſs of Government as well as in all other buſineſs, have ſome degree of confidence, as well as a great degree of caution. Who on a ſick bed would refuſe medicines from a phyſician, merely becauſe it is as much in his power to adminiſter deadly poiſons, as ſalutary remedies.

You cannot be certain, that by rejecting the propoſed plan you would not place yourſelves in a very awkward ſituation. Suppoſe nine States ſhould nevertheleſs adopt it, would you not in that caſe be obliged either to ſeparate from the Union, or reſcind your diſſent? The firſt would not be eligible, nor could the latter be pleaſant—A mere hint is ſufficient on this topic—You cannot but be aware of the conſequences.

Conſider then, how weighty and how many conſiderations adviſe and perſuade the People of America to remain in the ſafe and eaſy path of Union; to continue to move and act as they hitherto have done, as a Band of Brothers; to have confidence in themſelves and in one another; and ſince all cannot ſee with the ſame eyes, at leaſt to give the propoſed Conſtitution a fair trial, and to mend it as time, occaſion and experience may dictate. It would little become us to verify the predictions of thoſe who ventured to prophecy, that Peace, inſtead of bleſſing us with happineſs and tranquility, would ſerve only as the ſignal for factions, diſcords and civil contentions to rage in our land, and overwhelm it with miſery and diſtreſs.

Let us alſo be mindful that the cauſe of freedom greatly depends on the uſe we make of the ſingular opportunities we enjoy of governing ourſelves wiſely; for if the event ſhould prove, that the people of this country either cannot or will not govern themſelves, who will hereafter be advocates for ſyſtems, which however charming in theory and proſpect, are not reducible to practice. If the people of our nation, inſtead of conſenting to be governed by laws of their own making and rulers of their own chooſing, ſhould let licentiouſneſs, diſorder and confuſion reign over them, the minds of men every where, will inſenſibly become alienated from republican forms, and prepared to prefer and acquieſce in Governments, which, though leſs friendly to liberty, afford more peace and ſecurity.

Receive this Addreſs with the ſame candor with which it is written; and may the ſpirit of wiſdom and patriotiſm direct and diſtinguiſh your counſels and your conduct.