May 9, 1866 (6)

Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. I rise, Mr. Speaker, simply to finish what I desired to say when the hammer fell as I was addressing the House j before, and for the purpose, also, of giving the i gentleman from New York [Mr. Raymond] an opportunity to submit anything in reply that he may desire.

I undertook, when I was on the floor before, to show that the remark the gentleman made to day in justification of his vote against the civil rights bill was not in harmony with his action as a member of the House in the introduction of a bill guarantying the rights of citizens without distinction of race or color, and also in submitting to the House a proposition, which I read to the House, for the benefit of the freedmen.

I stated" that I could not see that the position taken to day was consistent with that presented by tlte bill sfid the proposition to which I referred, for it seems to me that the second section of the bill, as I have stated before, and the proposition to which I referred, embodied the principle of the first section of the civil rights bill.

I was about to remark, when my time expired, that if the gentleman intended his explanation to apply only to those portions of the civil rights bill which succeeded the first section, it might raise another question, namely, whether, after declaring all persons born in the United States citizens and entitled to all the rights and privileges of citizens, it would be competent for the Government of the United States to enforce and protect the rights thus conferred, or thus declared by the second section of the bill which the gentleman introduced. Now, as I understand his remark to day it was directed to the principle involved in the first section of the civil rights bill which related to the rights to be protected by the provisions of that bill. That being conceded, the power to protect those rights must necessarily follow, as was laid down in the well known ease of Priggts. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, where the Supreme Court declared that the possession of the right carries with it the power to provide a remedy.

Now, sir, it seemed to mo that there was an inconsistency between that record and the explanation of to day and as I do not wish to do the gentleman any injustice in this regard, I yield part of ray time now for explanation.

Mr. RAYMOND. Mr. Speaker, I supposed it was a matter of very little consequence to any one but myself what rnv record might be. I do not wish here to enter into a detailed examination of that record. Those who are more concerned in regard to it than myself will probably do that for me here or elesewhere.

But with regard to my position upon this civil rights bill and the principles involved in it, I think I can explain in a very few words what it is so as to be understood by all. Almost at the very outset of this session, before the civil rights bill, which passed here and which is now the law of the land, had been reported, I introduced a bill proposing, first, to strike out the word "white" in the naturalization laws, and, secondly, declaring that all persons born in this country heretofore, or hereafter to be born, should be. and were thereby declared to be, citizens of the United States.

In some remarks that I submitted upon the subject I stated that my object was either to recognize the citizenship of the men lately freed from slavery, if that citizenship existed already, or to confer upon them citizenship if they were not now citizens, and Congress had power so to confer it.

I also said that I proposed a section in the bill which declared them to be entitled to all the rights, privileges, and immunities of other citizens of the United States, whatever those rights may be.

And it followed as a necessary inference that they were to have the same security for the enjoyment of those rights and the same remedy for their violation as any other citizen had: whatever laws Congress might make to protect other citizens in the enjoyment of their rights, they were also entitled to the protection of those laws. But the civil rights bill, when it came before us for our action, contained not only this declaration, in which 1 fully agreed, .but it contained a provision by which the Government of the United States undertook to secure to them and to all other citizens the enjoyment of certain rights, and to provide for their violation certain remedies within State jurisdiction, where it seemed to me Congress under the existing Constitution had not the right so to act. It was this provision which rendered it impossible for me, with these opinions, to vote for the bill.

It was the remedy provided, one feature of which was giving power to the judiciary of the United States to imprison officers of the State courts for enforcing State laws, which I did not think Congress baa the right to do; it Was tMs exercise of a power which I did not think that Congress under the Constitution possessed which constituted the reason why I voted against the bill, and I see nothing; whatever in that vote inconsistent with my oft repeated declaration that I was in favor of the principle of the bill, which was also embodied in the bill which 1 introduced for the purpose of securing to all the rights of citizenship with whatever power we possessed.

But now it comes before us in the form of an amendment to the Constitution, which proposes to give Congress the power to attain this precise result. I shall vote for that amendment cheerfully, because I think Congress should have that power. iSTow, I do not think there is any inconsistency in these two positions. If there is, the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. Wilson] is welcome to all he can make out of it. I do not feel at all embarrassed by it myself. And I submit to him that it is not of very great consequence to anybody but myself whether I am consistent or not.

Mr. WILSON, of Iowa. I admit that it is not of very great consequence whether the gentleman is consistent or not.

But there is one view of this question which I thought, rendered it proper to call the attention of the gentleman and .the House to this subject. The gentleman attempted to justify his vote, and in doing so referred to the pending amendment to the Constitution, and attempted to draw the conclusion that all those who might vote in favor of this amendment would be stultifying themselves if they had voted for the civil rights bill in the absence of this amendment. Now, if the gentleman will look to his remarks carefully, he will find that he referred, not to the second section, to which ho now refers, nor to any other section but the first section, which declares against any discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of rights among citizens of the United States in the several States. I quoted the provision of the bill which he introduced, and which, in addition to declaring them citizens, declared that they shall be entitled to all the rights and privileges as such.

Now, I submit to the gentleman that the Government of the United States cannot protect citizens in the enjoyment of these rights without going within the jurisdiction of the State. A citizen of the United States is always a citizen of the State in which he resides; and the rights which he possesses as a citizen of the United States can only be secured to him by laws which operate within the State in which he resides. Now, to show that the same class of rights were referred to by the gentleman, I call attention to the proposition contained in his speech made, I believe, in January last. He said that—

"In the third place, we should provide by law for giving to the freedmen of the South all the rights of citizens in courts of law and elsewhere."

"All the rights of citizens in courts of law and elsewhere 1 are broader terms than those used in the first section of the civil rights bill; but what I insist upon now is, that the gentleman being in favor of conferring these rights in courts and elsewhere, he must of course admit the power in the Government to enforce and protect those rights "in the courts and elsewhere." Therefore, the subsequent sections of the civil rights bill were but the result of that power, affirmed by the Supreme Court in the decision to which I have referred, to protect the rights which the citizen possessed.

Mr. RAYMOND. I desire to say, in reference to that point, merely that while in that speech and elsewhere I did declare myself to be in favor of extending and securing to all citizens their rights in courts and elsewhere, I did not declare myself in favor of the doctrine that Congress had the power to enforce those rights by such penalties as is prescribed in the civil rights bill.

Then, as to invading the jurisdiction of the States, the gentleman misunderstood me. I did not mean simply that the civil rights bill authorized Congress to enter into the territorial 39tii Cong. 1st Sess —No 158. jurisdiction of the State, I m cant that it seemed to me that it trenched upon the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the State. I did not say or intimate that every member of the House who voted for this amendment would stultify his vote for the civil rights bill, nordid I mean to impugn the motives of any member. I merely said that it seemed to me that by this vote the belief could fairly be inferred that Congress had not now that power.

The hour of half past four o'clock p. m. having arrived, the House, pursuant to order, took a recess until half past seven o'clock p. m.