June 21, 1911

l\Ir. SHERLEY. Will the gentleman permit an inquiry?

Mr. YOUNG of Michigan. I should like to, but I have not the time. They were placed in the Constitution by a wise foresight to preserve and strengthen the Government and endow it with power to meet the exigencies of each occasion as it arose. These were beneficent powers. There let them remain, awaiting the time for their necessary exercise. Why strike any of them down?

Mr. LINTHICUM. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. YOUNG of Michigan. I should like to, but I have not the time. The main argument in favor of depriving the National Government of all power to provide for or regulate the election of its own Senators was wisely placed by his party friends in the hands of the distinguished gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY]. There is no one in this House to whom I listen with greater pleasure. The clarity of his thoughts, the precision of his expression, his intellectual integrity which has often led him to differ with his party, make him interesting and instructive. And then he enjoys the distinction of being about the only Democrat of the old school remaining in this House. Gentlemen upon that side do lip service to the great name of Thomas Jefferson, but they rarely follow his teachings. The gentleman from Kentucky, however, is always faithful to the principles of the master, except where his doctrines were consumed in the furious fires of the Civil War. But the gentleman from Kentucky, it seemed to me, labored somewhat in the impossible task he had set himself of showing a good reason why Congress should continue to regulate the election of Representatives and should be shorn of its power to regulate the election of Senators. He said there should be such a distinction because Senators represented the State and were in a sense ambassadors from the State to the General Government, while Representatives in Congress represented the people. Why, the only purpose of the amendment as to the election of Senators is to do away with what little difference exists in this respect and make the Senators more directly representative of the people.

Mr. SHERLEY. Will the gentleman permit an interruption?

Mr. YOUNG of Michigan. I should like to, but I have not the time. If this amendment will not have that effect, it is not worth passing.

But, sirs, there is little analogy between the functions of a Senator and those of an ambassador. Ambassadors negotiate treaties, subject to the approval of their principals. Senators alter, amend, approve, or reject treaties, and their action is final; and, in addition, they exercise equal jurisdiction with this body in legislating for 90 , 000,000 of people. Let us never surrender the power to keep the fount of their election pure. But gentlemen upon the other side of the House have said that the provision in this resolution which sweeps away all power to regulate the election of Senators is of little importance-they have characterized it as mere "verbiage," as " phraseology," as only a difference - in words-but, thank God, one frank and truthful Democrat from the South has spoken out. The gentleman from Georgia said the other day that with this provision in the resolution he and many other Democrats on that side of the House would vote for it; that without it they would probably oppose it. Why is so much importance attached to mere verbiage? Because it is plainly seen not to be mere verbiage, but the very essence of the proposition. What has any honest man, who believes in fair elections, who wishes to see fraud and corruption at elections punished, to fear from this proposition?

The other gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. JAMES] Sa.id that when Republicans insisted on the amendment offered by methe same Bristow amendment which is now pending, to leave the power in Congress to regulate the election of Senators-he felt almost like suspecting that we were not in good faith in supporting the major proposition-the election of Senators by vote of the people-and the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CULLOP] just now has indorsed that choice. This is no place for crimination or recrimination, for charges or countercharges. It is a great deliberate body, for the discussion of great questions. I will say, however, to the gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. JAMES] and to the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CULLOP] that it is as true now as when Butler wrote the lines thatNo man e'er felt the baiter draw

. With good opinion of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Michigan has expired.

Mr. YOUNG of Michigan. I should like two minutes more.

Mr. OLMSTED. I can not yield two minutes, but I will yield one minute more.

Mr. YOUNG of Michigan. When gentlemen are so insistent on attaching this rider to the provision for election of United States Senators by the people, if I were as suspicious .as the gentleman from Kentucky seems to be, I should almost suspect that they were inspired by desire to be free from all legal restraints in the use of money, fraud, and violence in the election of United States .Senators, but 1 will not .say I think that. I think the Hou.se should recede from its disagreement with the Senate and pass this resolution exactly as it came from that body. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman fr-Om Texas [l\Ir. HARDY].

l\fr. HARDY. Mr. Speaker, in my interruption of the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. OLMSTED] I asked him but one question, and that was in what way Federal authority over the election of Members of Congress had been exercised, .and his answer was to require that election to be by district.s. I want to say · that that very answer discloses one essential I objectio-n that we have to Federal authority .controlling the manner and time of election of Senators. To say that .senators · should be elected from the east and west .half of a State, or from this or that district of a State, might be the action taken by the Federal Go · Government under the Bristow amendment and that would be to destroy the very purpose of the organization of the Senate of the United States, which purpose was to have a body composed of representatives of the Sta.tes to sit as ambassadors of whole and undivided States.

Mr. NORRIS. Will the gentleman yield?

l\!r. HARDY. l have only five minutes, and I have all I · can say in that time and more too.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. HARDY. Furthermore, in the great State of New York, Congress might so prescribe conditions in regard to the election as to throw the election of one Senator into the city dis- States: tr . ts d f.'h, f.1'.er - t th 1 districts, · ~cts pr ntin th h 1 lC an t.Ue Ol..ll' lil O e rura "'" . ' eve State from electing one or the other, so that States might come here divided against themselves, in a body intended. to preserve the integrity of a State. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Let me say that while on its face the Bristow amendment Preser ues ._,~·e form of our Government by .adhering to the Jette r of the Con.stitution, or leaving the letter there, the fact is that the Con.stitution now prescribes that th-e whole legislature, and not a section of it, shall elect a Senator; and now .each Senator is an .ambassador from the whole State, while the Bristow amendment might be used to divide the senatorial representatives of the State. The Bristow amendment is revolutionary, :m.d would change the con.stitutional nature of one body -0f our National Congress. [Ap.Plau.se on the Democratic side.]

Let me state another thing. The gentleman last addressing the House [Mr. YouNG of Michigan] said the purpose of this amendment was to do away with the distinction between the functions of a Representative and the functions of a Senator. Not at all. The function of the Representatives in this House is to represent the aggregate mass of all the consolidated. people of the United States. Texas stands with Pennsylvania. Represented here, it might be in this House by a. mixed delegationit may be part Democrats and part Republicans-but in the election of a Senator the whole State acts as a unit. .A. Senator elected by Texas represents the whole State of Texas, and that Senator elected by Pennsylvania repre en.ts the whole State of Pennsylvania. This House represents a union of a whole people. It represents that portion of the theory of the Government in its formation which said "We are a Nation”; n; "we, the people ,. of the United States." The other body represents that · portion of the Government which in its foundation said "We are a confederacy of independent and sovereign States." The lapse of time and the march of history has destroyed the landmarks, to some extent, which our fathers established, but, thank God, north and south of Mason and Dixon's old line there still remains a devotion to the spirit of local self-government which caused the little State of Rhode Island to stand out of the Union for years and years, until Washington had been inaugurated, because she wanted to preserve the .autonomy of her independent State organization.

And when you change, when you say that a Senator is no longer a representative of a State the equal, though his State be small, of any other Senator, though his State be large, you destroy the only principle-the foundation principle upon which our Government was divided-into an upper and lower house, as to its legislative branch. [.Applause on the Democratic side.] I wish to say that the purpose .of this . amendment was not to change the function of a Senator, not to change his representative capacity or character, not to make him less a representative of a whole State, but to make him more truly a representative of th~ people of a whole State a.s one individual entity and autonomy. (.Applause.] No other reason on earth calls fo.r this amendment except the demand that our Senators, with fill the powers, duties, .and obligations contemplated by the f.athers, be so elected as to truly represent the States, and the people of the States, whose servants they are.

.Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield to my colleague [Mr. DICKINSON].

l\fr. DICKINSON. .Mr. Speaker, the Constitution of the United States, in the first paragraph of section 3 of .Article I thereof, provides that the Senate of the United States shall be compo ed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legi.slature thereof for six years, and each Senator shall have one vote. And the first paragraph of section 4 of said .Article I of the Con.stitution provides a.s follows :

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be · prescribed in ea.ch State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place~ of choosing Senators.

Responding to a great public demand, IDJ'.' distinguished colleague, Mr. RucKE~ fr . from the second district o~ M1~ ?ur1, on the 5th day of April, 1911, introduced the following joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Con.stitution providing that Senators shall be elected by the people of the several States, which reads as follows:

Resolved bV the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House con.- curring therein), That in lieu of the first paragraph of section 3 of Article r of the Constitution of the United States, and in lieu of so much of paragraph 2 of the srune · section as relates to the filling of vacancies, and in lieu of :ill of paragraph 1 of section 4 of said Article I, in so far ns the srune relates to any authority in Congress to make or alter regulations as to the times or manner of holding elections for Senators, the following be proposed us :m amendment to the Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes :is part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the "The Senate o! the United States shall be composed of two Senato.rs g e W O e from each State, elected by the -people thereof, for six years ; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of tru;, ~~te~;:~a~~~. and manne:r of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.

"When vacruicies happen in the representation o:f any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of electlon to fill such vacancies: Pro1Jidea, That the legislature of any State may empower the executtve thereof to make temporary .appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election, as the legislature may direct.

"This amendment shall n-0t be so construed as to a.lfect the election or term of any Senn.tor chosen before it bec-0me.s . al.id ns part of the Constitution."

On a final vote in the House this joint l'esolution was adopted by a vote of 296 to 15.

In the Senate an amendment, proposed by Senator BRISTOW, of Kansas, was adopted a.a a substitute to the Rucker resolution. The Rucker joint resoluti-On, otherwise known as House joint resolution No . .39, eontains the provision that the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature.

The Bristow amendment or substitute joint resolution, passed by the deciding vote of the Vice President upon a tie vote of 44 for to 44 again.st, 'Strikes that provision out, and, in all other respects, is the same as the Rucker resolution, and comes now to the Hou.se for concurrence or nonconcurrence.

The issue is clearly made.

The demand for the election of United States Senators by direct vote -0f t.he people of the States is general and should not be longer disregarded. by · Congress, and the House resolution propo ed by Mr. RucKER of l\Ii souri, seeking to so amend the Constitution, responds to that demand by seeking to amend the first paragraph of section 3 of .Article I of the Constitution by :substituting the words " Elected by the people thereof " for and in lieu of the words " chosen by the legislature thereof," and by adding the .additional words, as follows : "The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerou.s branch of the State legislature," being the same provision as paragraph 1 of section 2 of Article I, relating to election of Members of the House of Representatives. .And the Rucker resolution seeks also to amend paragraph 1 of section 4 -0f .Article I, so as to provide in the Constitution that "the times, places, and manner of holding election.s for Sena.tors shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof,” so that Congress may not by law make or alter the regulations as to the times and manner of holding elections for Senators from that as prescribed in each State by the legislatnre thereof, placing the times -a.nil manner upon the same constitutional basis as "places of chusing Senators," which regulation by the legislature of a State can not now be interfered with by Congress. · llr. Speaker, I nm opposed to the Bristow amendment. The effect of 1t, in my judgment, is to defeat the insistent demand of the people for this great reform. Fifteen Senators from Northern and Western States, after voting for the Bristow amendment, 'Voted again.st the resolution as amended -0n its final passage, which, with the vote -cast by southern Senators against the resolution because of th~ amendment, indicates very strongly that the joint resolution would not be ratified or adopted by three-fourths of the States. Twelve States failing to adopt would defeat the joint resolution. Five Northern States voted solidly in the Senate against the resolution on final passage, as against three Southern States. Northern Senators .are more opposed to popular election of Senators than southern Senators. The Bristow amendment has evidently lessened the chance of securing this much-desired reform.

Speaking for myself, I would preserve to every St.ate in the Union the right to elect its own United States Senators.

The effort to further centralize and extend the powers of the Federal Government has been persistent on th~ part of those who would lessen the power and authority of the States. Special interests and other advocates of a strong centralized government are at all times seeking to curb and lessen the power of the people. It appears in every contest where the rights of the majority of the people are .involved. The encroachment of Federal authority upon the rights of the States and the people thereof should at all times be jealously watched and guarded. against, to the end that too much power oo not centered here at the seat of the Federal Capital or of the National Goyernment. The interference by Federal authorities in elections in the States to the end that each State may not be allowed to elect its own United States Senators in its own way and under its own laws and regulations should not find any authority in the statutes of the Nation. The special appointment of United States marshals mid other Federal officers by Federal judges, holding office for life, for the purpose of supervising State elections. should not have any sanction in the Federal laws, and the Ia w should be so written that no Federal court could find any warrant of law for any order by which the right of .any State to elect its own Senators could be interfered with.

It seems to me insistence on the Bristow amendment jeopardizes the adoption of the joint resolution. The House ought to stand by its former action. [Applause.]

If Senators a.re to be elected as heretofore, by the legislatures of the several States, the constitutional provision might well remain unchanged, but when a new method of electing Senators is inaugurated, to wit, election by direct vote of the pe o ple, it is logical and proper to so modif-y this constitutional provision as to settle the question as to what governmental authority shall safeguard the election. Who should furnish the regulation, the State that sends the two Senators to the United States Senate or the Congress that receives the credentials? The Bristow amendment coupled with the change in the law in response to popular demand restricts and narrows the power of the States while enlarging the power of Congress. The defe n t of the Bristow amendment and the passage of the original r e solution unamended restricts the power of Congress by pre­ \e n ting Congress from passing laws regulating election of S e nators.

Strong constitutional power that permits Congress to pass laws regulating the times and manner of electing Senators-with such broad pow~r-might it not permit regulations absolutely controlling said elections and an ultimate interference in the free choice of the people when deemed necessary or desirable in the judgment of strong .interests to control election of Senat o rs by the use of Federal officials, not only at the polls but by a supervision over registration of voters and qualification of el e ctors; not only a control of the ballot box, but even over the ·rnry enactment of laws, regulating elections, and to the nullification of State constitutions adopted by the people of the States? The -very sovereignty of the States may be involved by the action of United States district courts taking jurisdiction by reason of this very amendment, and enforcing their decrees through their especially appointed .marshals and supervisors platform. of elections. This very thought is involved .. ed in the discussions of this amendment. It is true, it is asserted by some favoring the Bristow amendment, that' this power exists now under the law. It is denied by those opposing the amendment. But under the new application in the change in the method of the election of Senators, and in the light of the discussions in both the Senate and the House, might not the Federal courts settle the question of dispute against the States if the Bristow amendment prevails? The great contest in. this country is between strong special interests that have long sought to dominate and control the action of State legislatures and of Congress and of the courts, and that have shown keen interest in the election of Senators, State and national, and also in the appointment of Federal judges.

The South is no more involved, in my judgment, by the Bristow amendment than any other State. The selfish interests will exercise their power and influence in the large cities and in all parts of the United States so as to place in the Senate men closely allied with them to secure legislation for their own special benefit and to defeat popular will.

The advocates of the Bristow amendment seek to shield the desires of the interests by attacking conditions in the Southobscuring the real issue-by attempts to fire the heart, obscure the judgment, and play upon the prejudices of some Members to aid them in fastening upon the country the right of the Federal Go · Government to control the election of Senators in the interest of the money power and great corporate influences. It is true that for 124 years Congress has not availed itself of its constitutional power to pass laws regulating the times and manner of holding elections for Senators. The people have not desired during th-ese long years that Congress should exercise this power, and now that the people of the States are about to take from the several legislatures and unto themselves the power of direct election of Senators to .represent sovereign States-not special interests-in the Senate of the United States they do not want any Federal restraint or interference in their free choice of United States Senators other than the regulations provided by the laws of their own St.ates. They would preserve the original thought of the fathers of the Republic, when the Senate was constituted of two Senators from each State to represent in that body the sovereignty of each State and the entire people thereof 1 regardless of the population of said State. They would preserve the integrity and sovereignty of each State and its representation in the United States Senate by retaining absolute control over their election.

The country should watch with jealous care a:nd anxiety all attempts by the courts to usurp the rights and powers of the legislative department, and the fundamental law of the land should be so written that no court shall be able to construe away the rights of the people or write into the law unwarranted language. This day and age is fraught with apprehensions of dangerous encroachments upon the rights of the people, who, by reason of the fact that malefactors of great wealth have had undue influence in the Nation, are seeking to gain control of all branches of the Government.

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Nebraska [Mr. NORRIS].

Mr. NORRIS. Mr. Speaker, I have always felt that there was n-ot and ought not to be any partisanship in the question of the election of United States Senators by direct vote of the people. I have known that the rank and file of the people, ns far as I have come in contact with them, have be-en in favor ot this proposition for many years, and they were not confined to any one political party.

I have known that there were thousands who for various reasons opposed this change in our Federal Constitution, and that this class of people was not confined to any one political party. We are confronted, however, here to-day with practically a division along partisan lines on the question as it is presented before the House. The resolution now before this House that has passed the Senate provides simply and solely for the elec· tion of United States Senators by a direct vote of the people. The Constitution as now existing provides that the Senators shall be chosen by the legislatures of the States. In substance the resolution now before the House changes the words "chosen by the legislature" and substitutes in lieu thereof " elected by the people."

The Democratic Party in 1908 in its national platform said: We favor the election of United States Senators by direct vote of the people, etc.

In the platform of 1904 they said the same thing. In the platform of 1900 they said the same thing. It seems almost as if the Democratic platform makers had a rubber stamp n.nd they slapped this proposition on every time they adopted a I um not speaking of it in any disrespect; it is commendatory of them; but, my friends, the day of promise has passed, the time of redemption is here. You have pledged to the people that if you had the power you would change th~ Constitution of the United States and make United States Senators elected by a direct vote of the people. That is the proposition that is now before the House, and a vote to concur in the Senate amendment will bring about .a redemption of that pledge.

Mr. SHARP. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NORRIS. For a question.

l\fr. SHARP. Mr. Speaker, the simile used by the gentleman as to the use of the rubber stamp prompts me to ask if the frequent use of that stamp has not tended a great deal to bring about the sentiment which has crystallized in the resolution now before us?

Mr. NORRIS. It may be, and you are entitled to all of the credit that actually belongs to you. I want to say, however, that the promises that have been frequently made by political parties and the redemption of those promises are two propositions. It seems to me if you have meant what you said all these years, you will vote to concur in the Senate amendment, which means the Bristow amendment, as it is spoken of here, the Senate resolution as now before us. But what is the predicament we find ourselves in? We find the Democrats who have thus far spoken have said to us, Yes; we are in favor of the election of United States Senators by the people, but we are not going to give that right to the people unless you take with it another amendment, and so you propose to couple on here an amendment of a different part of the Constitution, wherein the power to control Federal elections is vested by the Constitution in Congress; and you say, if we must have the election of Senators by the people, we are going to take with it an amendment to the Constitution that gives to the States exclusive control over the election of United States Senators.

Mr. SHERLEY. Will the gentleman yield?

1\!r. NORRIS. l\Ir. Speaker, I hope the gentleman will not interrupt me, as my time is very limited. It has been argued that this amendment now before the House, if adopted, would defeat the proposition. Let us see. It is a simple proposition to elect Sena.tors by a direct vote of the people. You propose to put in its place a resolution that is identically the same, as far as it goes . , but which goes further and says that the right to control elections of Senators shall be taken away from Congress and vested in the several States. I would vote for the proposition either way, but I want to submit to you, my friends, that it is not fair to put on this proposition that the people of the United States are almost unanimous for a proposition that has never been advocated at any time by any faction or put in any platform of any political party anywhere on earth. If this has something of merit in it, then why should you couple it onto this other thing which everybody admits has merit, and that practically everybody wants? There are men who honestly think that it is very damaging. I think it would be a mistake myself, but at the same time I do not look on it with the same fear that some other people honestly do. It has been said here that this can not be approved by the legislatures unl e ss this additional amendment is tacked on. My friends, what State would refuse to approve it? The gentlemen who have made that argument have been Democrats, and have made it along partisan lines, and I want to call your attention to a fact that everybody knows to be a fact, and that is that, as a rule, the legislatures that will defeat this amendment are the Democratic legislatures, and they are going to say to the people, While we pledged to you all these years that we ought to elect Senators by a direct vote of the people, we will not give you that privilege unless you amend the Constitution at the . same time in another respect. If there is any merit in this other proposition, why don't you submit it as a separate proposition and let it stand on its own bottom; let it go to the legislatures on its own merits; let it stand here in this House on its own merits. Why will you couple with the proposition to elect Senators by a direct vote of the people another amendment that nobody has asked for, at least in the open?

I do not believe there has been a political party which has held a cQnvention and adopted a platform anywhere in the United States that ever approved that proposition. Take the Democratic platform that I have read from and all of the other Democratic national platforms, if you will read them, and not one put in the proposition to give the States control over Federal elections that you insist shall be put in here to-day. It seems to me that it reduces itself to this proposition. Everybody, practically, is in favor of an amendment to the Constitution for the election of Senators by a direct vote of the people. You who have the power in this House to-day either to kill or to pass that resolution are going to say to the country: You can not have that amendment unless we tack on another one, that we never discussed before, that you never discussed, and that nobody dares to stand before the people of the country on as a part of any political platform.

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. NORRIS. In just a moment. The gentleman from Indiana [Mr. CULLOP] said that this Bristow amendment, which - is the one now before the House, was a proposition to defeat the election of United States Senators by a direct vote of the people. I want to deny that most emphatically. It is the only genuine proposition, uncoupled and untrammeled with any other expired. proposition, that is before this House. Op. the other band, the amendment that you would add to it, a separate additional amendment to a different part of the Constitution, is one that, in my judgment, will endanger the adoption of this amendment by the legislatures of th~ different States, because, as I have said, many men who favor the election of United States Senators by a direct vote of the people will not vote to change the Constitution in the other respect and take away from the Congress the right to control the election of United States Sena.tors and Members of the House of Representatives. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Florida [Mr. QLARK].

Mr. CLARK of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I agree fully with the gentleman from Indiana [l\Ir. CULLOP]. It may not be the intention of its proponents, but the result of the adoption of the Bristow amendment will be to defeat tlle resolution. There is not any sort of question about that. Now, I want to address myself for just a moment to the situation as I see it. This is a proposition, Mr. Speaker, to elect Senators by a direct vote of the people. As the gentleman from Kentucky has well said, Senators stand upon a different plane from Representatives in Congress. The Congress, in the first place, apportions representation among the different States. ,, They prescribe how many Representatives a State shall have. The Constitution prescribes how many Senators a State shall have, and the Con· gress has never undertaken to interfere, and I question seriously whether they now have the power to interfere, in the manner and the times of the elections of Senators. The gen· tleman from Nebraska [l\Ir. NoRRis] says, or rather asks the question, Why should we couple another proposition? I assert, Mr. Speaker, that the original resolution which passed this House is the only genuine proposition providing absolutely for the election of Senators by the people that has been before this Congress. Gentlemen on the other side desire to couple it wit! something else. They charge us with being afraid of the peo· ple. Now, this resolution of ours is the only proposition which is designed to leave the election entirely to the people at in· terest. [Applause on the Democratic side.] And those gentlemen desire that Congress shall have authority and supervision over the election by the people in the different States. You are not leaving it to the people as long as you hold or attempt to hold some kind of supervision over the action of those people. A Senator comes from a State; he is an ambassador; he repre· sents the State in its entity. The State is a sovereignty which Senators represent at the other end of . this Capitol.

Now we propose to take the election away from the legislature aud put it directly in the hands of the people of the different States to elect their own Senators, and you propose, although you say you are willing for that to be done, that although the people may have the right to elect, yet you insist that you, a body sitting here in Washington, in the Capital of the Nation, shall reserve to yourself the right to say whether or not the people have been fair, whether they have been honest, whether they have been just in the election of their Senators. We propose to strip it from every outside influence; we propose to take the power a way from the legislature, arnl to take it away from the Congress, and leave the people of tho~e sovereign States absolutely free to elect their own Senators. If the people are corrupt, then it is the fault of the people, not ours; and if the people of the different St.ates are so corrnpt that they can not hold an election for United States Senator without that election be tainted with fraud, then your Government is a failure, and a failure now. So that I say, Mr. Speaker, that instead of our undertaking to attach something to this to deprive the people of absolute power, the Bristow amendment proposes to do that and to give another, a foreign body, a body entirely removed from the State, removed from the people, surveillance or jurisdiction or censorship over their acts in the election of their own Senators.

Mr. CULLOP. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman permit an interruption?

The SPEAKER. Will the gentleman from Florida [llr. CLARK] yield to the gentleman from Indiana?

Mr. CLARK of Florida. Yes.

Mr. CULLOP. It goes further than that. It vests the powPr in Congress to pass the election law by which the election shall be held ; it goes further than supervising.

Mr. CLARK of Florida. Undoubtedly; and goes further than the power given now, because they can not pass laws to regulate the election of members of the legislature who, under the present system, elect the Senator. [Applause.]

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Florida has l\Ir. RUCKER of Missouri Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missis ippi IMr. W..rrHEBSPOON].

Mr. WITHERSPOON. Mr. Speaker, · .as 1 un.dersta.nd the ques- . tion before the House, it is this: That the resolution for the election of Senators by the people, .as :passed by this House, provided that the time, the places, . es, and the manner for the people to - elect their Senators :Should be :provided · by the legislatures. "That Te-solution, as it passed the -Sen:rte, -a-s it now · pends under this .motion before the House, strike.s antihat provision and1ea\es !he power to regulate the time and the -manner of holding the election for United -States Senators ultimately in the Congress of the-United States. And for that reason, Mr. Speaker, l am opposed to it. I d o not believe that the Congress of the United States .should have the power io -determine the time, the place, and the JIUUlner for a State to elect its Senators. Wlly :Shoulil lt :SO deter- · mine.? Does .the Congress of the Uni tea States know better, -and can 1t determine with greater LWi-sdom the ' ti.me when Mississippi shall elect her Senators? no the Members of this House from other States think that the.Y ‘have so much hetter lmow1- edge of the local conditions e-xisting in our Stat-e L and of the conveniences of our people that t'hey could v.ote in this House more . e intelligently to de:termine fue time and the manner of ele c ting our Senators than we.J I undertake to say that you kn o w no more .about wha.t is best ln .our State thun we ao of what is best in your State. Now, in the very formation of 'the Government we see in every provision this fundamental idea : That there are certain .matt.er.s which in their nature m·e of such .general interest that the Congress of the Unit-ed States can deal with them · better 11Ild with gr.eater wisdom than the people of the several . States. We see that :the Nation can ;Legislate with greater wisdom on matters that affect . our foreign relations, on.matters that.affect our interstate commerce, and on every matter of that kind which is of general interest; 'Il.D.d f.or lliat reason the framer.s of .our Government in their wisdom have committed n.11 such matters to the Congr.ess. -On the other hand, there are n great many matters of local interest where · fhe wise and best solutions. of the questions that arise out of them can be made with more wisdom by a local .government, and that is the foundation of the doctrine of local : self-government [Applause on the Democratic .side.]

The Talue of local self-government lies in the fact that tOO _ p eop le of any community .have so much deeper interest in their local affairs and so much better knowledge of local conditions that they are able to enact be.tter laws , to regulate their affairs than it is possible for those to · enact who live in distant States. For this reas.on the people of ea.ch State in the Union reserved t-0 itself in the formation of ±he Federal Government the right to regulate everything of a local nature. The proteci-0n of life, liberty ., and propert.Y within the State, the question ef public education, the maintenance of benevolent institutions, th-e enfor c ement of the criminal laws, th-e construction and maintenance of public hi.ghways, and the enactment, interpretation, and execution of laws pertaining to these and all oth-er matters of local interest was wisely r.eserved within the control and jurisdiction -0f the .S.tate governments.

The question therefor.e presented by the motion to concur .in the Senate amendment :is whether the determinatien of .the time and manner of . the election of .a United :States Senator by a .State is a matter of local interest, like the -establishment of a common school, like the punishment of :a murderer, like the maintenance of an .asylum for the insane, .®out which the people of other States would know nothing and have but ilitfile concern, and should the.ref.ore oo intrusted to the State go:vernment; or is the determination of the time -and manner of electing Senators like a treaty between ' ll foreign . go-vernmen.t _ an.d " om· own, like the regulation of interstate commerce or like the coinage af money, Jn which all the people of :the Union · hu-,e . the same identical interest, and which is therefore best .in­ . trusted to . a common government? Every State in the Union :is deeply interested in who shall be the :Senators . of ~very other State, because the Senators of . every .other State must participate in the enactment of th~ laws pertaining .to matters 'in which each State has, together · with all others, a common interest, and therefore the Democrats of the House without 11. single dissenting vote have passed tile resolution fo amend the Constitution 1 S.O as to take from the legislature Df each State the power to ,elect the Senators from such .and to intrust that power -to -the people thereof. Too value of this change lies . in the fact · fuat the wisdom, virtue, and patriotism · of the peopl-e of a St.ate will result in the selection of Senators who will · serve the people better and enact better laws than could be -expected from Senat-0rs chosen by the legislatures. 'Ille bribery, the scandal, and the shame which has resulted from the in.trusting of this power to the legislatures, -and the servile fidelity of those elected by legislatures to the special . interests of ithose wnose money and power had influenced their election in the 1egig- latures fully justifies the wisdom af this .change fu .the organic law. The proposed cllllnge ln the Constitution will give to the :people of -each .state not only the .right to .choose their own Senators, but the guaranty that the honesty .and intelllg.eruie of .the people of ever~ .other State will be exercised Jn choosing its Senntors.

While this Change in the organi-c law ls ,a matter of common and universal interest, and while - eaab State is so deeply mter­ .ested In the selection of .fill the Senators, y-et no Stat-e hn.s any -sort of interest or concern in either the ~ or .manner of electing Senn.tars .in the o.ther . States. The time and manner · in which the Bena tors from Miss.i:ssippi are ,elected is 'Of no inte-r-est or concern .to the people · etf .Maine, nor do -the people of Mississippi care when or how t1J.f! people of I:ndiana elect their Senato.rs. . The time at which .the people of Mississippi -should - elect their Senators presents n question e.f locaJ convenience in which no other State 1uis any interest. Being . engaged mostly in agnicultur.e, it suits the welfare of the people of .Mississippi best no hold their :elections in July an.d August, between the .end of the cultivation <find the beginning of th-e harvest of their .. crops, and since .no other , :State has any concern in the time of their elec tions, the control t0f the time is not a matter in · which any other State .should illl\e a voice. Lt seems t-0 .suit !the people of other States to · hold their elections at different seasons of the year, and .therefore Mississippi -should ha-ve no voice in .fixing the time for them. When the time for -electin,g Senators is fixcii by the laws .of the State it can be so .arranged as to have the election of Senators, Congressmen, and State and co.unty officers a11 at the .same time and thus .save a great deal of expense . to the people. but if . Congress should .fix the time of holding elections for Senators it would have tofu: the same time in All the States, . .auil thus fasten upon the people .a double and useless &pense.

The manner of electing Senators is purely local and should be left to the States. lf ::my State .in the Union should elect tw.o _ men to represent it in the Federal Senate J10 other St-ate .could .hirre the :Slightest int-eres.t in the IDilllller of . such election, The Constitution of the United . States prescribes the qualifieutions for Sena.tors, .and if the chosen -senators from any .Stat.e (have the prescribed qualifications . it should not matter · what :the ma11Iler of election wa-s.

But it is · urged that the time and · manner of electing Senaio.rs is a :matter Gf ; common int-erest a1l.d national concern, and ±hnt Congress should control it, because it :is necessary to 'the preservation of the Federal Government. This I deny. The true theory of fue F-€deral Governmen;t is maintained "by leaving the entire selection of Senator£ to the :Sta:tes , The Federal Corrstitution was largely a compromise between the aa : v . ocaies of .a .strong centralized Government · and the :f:riends <>f State rights, .and one of the most prominent and important of .all the . conces sions to the sovereignty of .the States wfill the provision that each State should be represented in the Federal .Senate by m~o Senators, without .. r-egard t'6 po-pulation, t tln1S putting all the States cm .an equality. The id-ea was that . each State should have the same ;power in the Senate and that its two Senators :Should represent the State. It is in perfect nccord with turn idea that the · state should .elect its .senators in its own tilll£l and manner'. 1f Congress can determine the time and manner · Of electing Senators, and the time and manner fixed by Con­ .gress does not suit the Sta:t-e, then, in so far as the time antl manner of the ele.ction i£ concerned, the Senators elected contrary to the time and manner des-ired by the State and in a.e­ co.rdance with the will nf Congress will represent not the State, but th-e Nation.al Goverru:n£n.t.

J:f the Senu1:or.s .:ah0uld represent :the National -Oovernmen.t :m its will as i:o the time and manner o.f their election, then we will have taken one step toward their -repr . representation of n c.entraUzed government in -all res11ec.ts, and .instead af pres-erdng the Fed-eral Government .in its in .t -e gtit'J , the object nnd effe.c.t of ihe Bristow amendment is to destroy the yery nature of the ]'ederal Go--vernment in so f a r ns it is affected by the time anCl. manner of eleeting .Senatoi.'S. One uf the great political e\US of the . da_y iB the fact that tcto many Members of the Senate re _ present, not the will of the people, 'but the will af theh' ~­ ters who dominate a · subservient legisla.tur.e to secure their election, and the ;v.ery object of the proposed amendment to t1m ‘Constitution is to 11emedy this evil. It is therefore illogicn.1 to ccncur in the :Bristow .m:n.endment. which provides that Senato · r.s from .a .State may not :represent the will of the people of :that State n..s to the time and .manner -0f their election.

J3ut the · Bristow -amenament ls ill-Oglcal, 'UilWise, rma ineun­ .sistent in that, if it be adopted, the pow-er io fix the plnc~ at electing .Senators will be Testen m th~ State government, and the time and manner of their e1eetion in the Federal Go-vemment. This will necessitate two systems of laws, one of which must be enacted by the States to determine the places of holding the elections · and the other must be enacted by Congress to determine the time and manner of the election. If the places of holding the elections for Senators is not a matter of national concern and common interest, which should therefore not be intrusted to Congress, it is _ impossible to conceive any reason why the time and manner of the election is not also a matter of State jurisdiction. If the will of the people of the State should prevail as to the places of electing their Senators, why should not that same will prevail as to , the time and manner of the elections? If the preservation of the Federal Government does not depend upon its selection of the places of holding the senatorial elections, as the Bristow amendment concedes, how, then, can it depend upon the selection of the time and manner of the elections? But the argument is made that the Constitution, as it now stands, provides that the legislature can fix the places and Congress the time and manner of the elections. This is true, and there is some reason for it, because the elections of Senators by the legislatures, as now provided, had to take place at the capitals of the States, and it would therefore have been folly to empower Congress to provide for an election by the legislature · at any other place; but when the election is transferred from the legislature to the people, there can be no good reason why the legislature should fix the places of the election, as the Bristow amendment admits it should, and not also fix the time and manner of the election.

Another fact, which demonstrates that the power to fix the time and manner of electing Senators should reside in the people of a State is that, while the Congress has from the beginning of the Government had the ultimate power to determine the time, places, and manner of electing Representatives, yet it has for more than an hundred years permitted the States to exercise it. The fact that the Congress has for such a long time acquiesced in the exercise of this power by the States, and that each State has provided for the time and manner of electing its representatives, is a confession of the Federal and State governments that the power can be exercised with greater wisdom and to the best advantage by the States and not by the Congress. The wisdom of the rule that the States should control the time, place, and manner of elections is forcibly illustrated and emphasized by the only exceptions to the rule, which were in the dark days of reconstruction and force bills, when, dominated by sectional hate and bitter partisanship, the Republican Party assumed control of the elections of the South and destroyed local self-government, substituting the rule of ignorance and vice for that of intelligence and virtue, and with the point of Federal bayonets fastening the heel of the negro upon the neck of the white man.

But it is . urged that the Bristow amendment should become a part of the Constitution because, while the Congress has never exercised its power to control the election of Representatives except in the period of reconstruction, yet it has always exercised that power as to the time and manner of election of Senators. This is a mistake. While section 14 of the Revised Statutes does provide that the legislature shall on the second Tuesday · after it convenes proceed to elect the Senator, yet this does not fix the time, because the State determines when the legislature shall convene. The fact that section 14 does not · fix the time of electing Senators is demonstrated by the fact that no two States elect their Senators at the same time. There is hardly a month in the year in which some State does ment. not elect its Senators, and this great difference in the times of the election is the result of . each State determining for itself when it will elect its Senators, and shows that even when Congress attempts to fix the time, as it did in section 14, it can not do so, but the time of the election varies and changes according to the will of the State.

But it is also urged that the Congress has exercised the power to provide for the manner of electing Senators in the legislature. The manner in which the legislature shall elect the Senators, as provided in section 15 of the Revised Statutes, is harmless and unimportant, because no manner that could be devised for the election by a fixed and definite body, over whose numbers and membership Congress has no control, could possibly affect the result or change the choice of the person elected. An election of the Senator by the people is a radically different proposition, in which the control of the manner could be and would be exercised to determine the choice, and the very fact that Congress has exercised its power to control the manner of the election of Senators by the legislature, which manner could not in the nature of the election affect the result, and that if has failed to control the manner of the election of Representatives by the people where the control of the manner would affect the result is an irresistible argument to show that the wisdom of Congress, as manifested in the whole history of the country, favors the jurisdiction of the State over the manner of popular elections, and is a historic condemnation by Congress of the Bristow amendment.

It is therefore clear that the Congress throughout the hi3tory of the country has always deemed it best to leave the selection of the time and manner of Federal elections to the States, except during the very period when above all others it should have done so, and that was when partisanship had dethronccl reason and sectional hate had supplanted patriotism and brotherly love. And the very motive now behind the insistence that the power to control the time and manner of Federal elections should be reserved in the Congress is the hope of the Republican Party that the dark day may return when the happy reunion and widespread affection which now binds every section of the Union together will give place to such sectional ill will ancl hostility that public sentiment at the North will sustain that party in again overthrowing southern civilization. The exhibition of ill will to the South and the repeated flings at our section that have come from the Republican side of the House all through the debate at this session of Congress is sufficient assurance that this party still has the disposition to overthrow local self-government in the South, and has been deterred from doing so by public sentiment in the North. And while I confidently believe that this public sentiment and sectional good will is now and always will be sufficient protection to the people of the South, yet I can not support the Bristow amendment to the resolution, since its only object and purpose is, as I believe, to enable the Republican Party to destroy southern civilization whenever sectional conditions may so change that it can gratify its malignant feelings toward the South without danger of being turned out of office. It seems, therefore, that both the rule of inaction on the part of Congress throughout the entire history of the country, permitting the States to control Federal elections, and the lamentable exception to that rule both demonstrate the wisdom of vesting the States with the power to regulate the time and manner, as well as the places, of holdiug senatorial elections.

But it is said that Congress should have the power to determine the time and manner of holding senatorial elections, because it has the power with reference to the election of Representatives. This contention is based on the idea that there is some virtue and advantage in making the power of Congre . s the same in both cases. Even if this were a sound argument, it would be inapplicable to the Bristow amendment, which does not propose to give the Congress the same power with reference to the election of Senators which it has with reference to the election of Representatives, for the Congress can control the time, places, and manner of electing Representatives, while the Bristow amendment proposes to give the Congress power to control only the time and manner, and to leave the State the power to control the places of the election of the Senators.

The provision of the Constitution with reference to the election of the Representatives, whether wise or unwise, is at least logical, consistent, and sensible, being based on the fact that the same government, whether the Federal or State government, should control the time, place, and manner of election, while the Bristow amendment is illogical, inconsistent, and senseless in making a useless and unreasonable division of the same election by committing the place of the election to the jurisdiction of the State and the time and manner to the Federal Government. the argument that the provisions with reference to the election of Senators and Representatives should be the same is not only inapplicable but is unsound. The fact that the Congress has the power to control the time, place, and manner of electing Representatives is · a strong reason why it should not also have the power to control the time and manner of elect· ing Senators, because if the Congress should ever again exer· cise that power so that the Congressmen from a State would not represent the sentiment and will of the people of the State, then there should be a constitutional guaranty that the State could, at least, choose its Senators at such time and in such manner that its sentiment and will should have some ex· pression in one branch of the Congress at least. There is no escape from this conclusion, except to those who may desire that in certain contingencies the will of the people should be wholly disregarded, and that the present union of the States shall become a great empire in which the Members of both branches of Congress shall represent not the will of the people but the will of the Government.

If, therefore, as I have shown, the people of a State can more wisely determine the time and manner of electing its Senators because it has a deeper interest and better knowledge of local conditions than the Congress; if, as I have shown, the time and manner of electing Senators is . not a matter of common con c ern, but of local interest and a part of local self-government; t ; if, as I have shown, the committing to the State of the power to determine the time and manner, as it now has the _ con s titutional right to determine the places of the election, would . save expense and trouble and promote the public c9n· : venience; if, as I have shown, the determination of the time and manner of electing Senators carries out the fundamental theory of our Government that the two Senators from a State should represent its wishes, its sentiment, its will and welfare, and not the will, wishes, and sentiment of the Federal Government; if, as I have shown, it is illogical and without reason that the matter of the election should be so divided that the State will have jurisdiction over the places and the Congress over the time and manner of senatorial elections; if, as I have shown, the failure of Congress from the beginning of our his­ . tory to fix the time and manner of Federal elections, except in times of great sectional excitement and partisanship, is an admission that the determination of the question had better be left to the control of the States; if, in short, as I have shown, every consideraion of reason, policy, and convenience, expense, and theory favors the jurisdic;tion of the State over the time and manner of elections of Senators, and if there is no sound reason why the Congress should have the jurisdiction, the question arises why is the Republican Party, both in the House and in the Senate, so determined that the people of the State should not control the time and manner of electing Senators? And why has this party made such a long and vigorous fight to tack the Bristow amendment to the resolution for the popular election of Senators? Why so much vehemence and feeling to nothing. manifested on the Republican side to retain the power to fix the time and manner of electing Senators?

No explanation can be obtained by a consideration of the subject of the contention. To the ordinary mind it would seem that the mere time and manner of an election is a matter of little importance, and does not merit the great consideration that it has received. It would seem to one who only looks upon the surface and fails to discover what is concealed beneath, that it is utterly immaterial whether the State or the Federal Government fixes the time and manner · of the election. If a State can elect a Senator to represent it at one time and can also elect the same person as Senator at a different time, it is true that the question of the time would amount to nothing whichever government might fix it; and if the State can elect the same person as Senator in a manner determined by the State as in a · manner fixed by the Congress, then the manner would be immaterial. It is plain, therefore, that there is a deeper significance involved in the question than appears on the surface. There is something more important than the mere time and manner of the election which has aroused such determined effort on the part of the Republican Party. Under the fraudulent pretense of controlling the time and manner of electing Senators, the real purpose and object of the Republican leaders is to determine who shall be the Senators from the Southern States. Instead of Senators who will represent the sentiment, views, and will of the southern people, the Republican leaders would like to have southern Senators, as they once did, who would represent the will of the Republican Party, and who will be the pliant tools of the trusts and monopolies, which are the masters of the Republican Party and which furnish the money to keep that party in power for their selfish ends. The accomplishment , of this purpose finds its possibility, and the danger in the whole proposition lies in the ambiguity of the two words " people" and "manner." The friends of the Bristow amendment tell us that it really works no change in the Constitution, that the pro v ision now is that the Senators shall be chosen by the legis­ 'lature and that the Bristow amendment only substitutes for the w'ord " legislature " the word " people." But right here lies the danger. The word legislature _ is a fixed, unambiguous term, describing a body composed of a certain number of men 'ele c t e d by the people of the State. The Congress has no jurisdiction over the election of members of the State legislature, and if the legislature fails to elect Senators who represent the will of the people of the State, the people have the power to turn their legislators out of office and to replace them with men who will respect the popular will, as they often do. But the word " people," which the Bristow amendment substitutes for the word " legislature , " is an uncertain, ambiguous term. It is sometimes used to include . children as well as adults, women as well as men, unregistered as well as registered vot e rs, and when we say that the people shall elect Senators, then whichever government, whether the State or the Federal, has the power to determine the manner of an election must determine what classes constitute the people. Under the present law of Mississippi, the people who have the right · to elect officers are the men 21 years of age who can read the Constitu· tion, or understand it when read to them, and who have paid their taxes on or before the first day of February in the year in which they seek to vote, and who have not been convicted of certain crimes, and who have registered four months before the election. These classes of men constitute the people of Mississippi as determined by the legislature of the State, but the real object of the Bristow amendment is to let Congress determine who shall be included in the word " people." And the leaders of that party would like to determine that every negro in Mississippi, whether he has paid his taxes or not, whether he can read the Constitution or not, whether he is a criminal or not, and whether he is a registered voter or not, is a part of the " people " and shall have the right to vote.

The object of the Bristow amendment is to wrest the political power of Mississippi and every other Southern State from the virtue and intelligence of the people and vest it in the ignorant and vicious class of the State. In short, the object is to destroy the civilization of the South, and instead of southern representa· tion in the Congress of the United States they aim ultimately at the overthrow of local self-government in the South and the selection of the tools of monopoly and trust to sit in the House and Senate as representatives of Southern States. Whenever this object is accomplished and the Senators from the Southern States cease to represent the will of the people of those States, but represent the will of the Republican Party, then the Union of the States shall have been destroyed and converted into an empire, in which the voice of the people amounts The accomplishment of the real object of the Bristow amendment will be facilitated also by the uncertainty and ambiguity of the word "manner." What does the manner of the election mean? Does it include the registration of the voters? If so, then the Government which has the jurisdiction to fix the manner must provide for the registration, and hence determine who are qualified to be registered. Does it include the appointment of the clerks and managers? If so, then the Government which controls the . manner must appoint the managers and clerks of the election. Does the manner of the election include the determination and declaration of the result of the election? If so, then the Government having control of the manner must decide who has been elected. It is therefore clear to my mind that the whole object of the Bristow amendment is to deprive the State of the power to determine who shall represent it in the Senate, and to give to Congress the power to determine and select Senators of the Southern States.

The danger to Southern civilization in this unrighteous amendment would not be half so great if the American people were divided into two national parties . But the Republican Party is a sectional party. It was organized as a sectional party, and it has never had any existence in the South, and never will have. The hearts of its leaders are · filled with bias, prejudice, and hate toward the southern people, and all through the debates in this very Congress they have given full expression to their ill will toward the people of the Sou t h. And just as long as there is a possibility of this sectional South-hating party having control of the Federal Government, just so long will I oppose giving the Congress the power to interfere with elections in the South.

It is perfectly clear that the ground of Republican contention in the Bristow amendment is to overthrow white supremacy · and to reinstate negro domination in the Southern States. The Republican position, clearly expressed throughout the debate, full of malignant tirades against the South, and breathing the bitterness of hate toward the southern people, does not even pretend to limit the operation of the Bristow amendment to the control of the time and manner of the election throughout the Union, but boldly warn us that the object and aim of the amendment is negro rule in the South, is Federal interference with southern elections, is Federal compulsion of what is denominated honest and fair elections in the South. The Republican Party not only avows its regret that it has heretofore been too lenient in not overthrowing local self-government in the South, but avows its purpose, under the Bristow amendment, to usurp control of southern elections ' whenever necessary to preserve the progressive civilization of the day.

If one-half the reports in circulation are true, and if the statements of Republican and northern Senators correctly describe the political situation, then the very center of the unfairness, dishonesty, and corruption in senatorial elections has not been in the South, but in those very Northern States in which the Republican P a rty rai s e the cry of dishonest and unfair elections in the South in order to divert attention fr o m its own shame. The very ground of the well-nigh universal demand throughout the North for th~ popular election of Senators is the bribery and the corruption which has been prac-­ the ticed in northern legislatures by the trusts and monopolies zation which dominate and control the Republican Party, and surely and tllls party of corruption and vice should be silent about the elections in the South.

But by honest and fair southern elections is not meant elections free from bribery and corruption on the part of the -corpcr worse. rate masters of the Republican Party, but the term " honest and fair elections" is used to describe southern elections in which be ignorant and criminal negroes are used to control southern elec­ or tions, -as was on~e done under Republican misrule. In other between words, the purpose of the Bristow amendment, as interpreted struggle by the Republican Party, is not merely to have the Congress or determine the time and manner of the election, but to give the General Government jurisdiction to enforce such elections serving in the South as the sectional South-hating Republican Party may call honest and fair, and thereby, under the false pretense of controlling the time and manner of southern elections, to secure establish e1ectio:r:..s in which ignorant and vicious negroes shall be the When managers and clerks and in which a negro majority shall be rights counted.

The entire drift of the debate on th-e Republican side shows people that negro domination of southern elections is the ultimate aim classes, of the Bristow amendment. The love of the Republican Party Mr. for the negro is the rankest hypocrisy. The iniquitous system of taxation by which the fruits -of the negro's toil, as well as of the southern white man, have been legislated into the coffers originally of the monopolies and trusts of the country shows that the Re­ connected publican Party only lo-ves him to rob him. In the whole Repub­ for lican organization there is not as much real affection for the out negro as you can find in one southern white family. We know ing that the welfare of the negro as well as that of the white man forbids that he should again, under the guidance of the Repub­ the lican carpetbaggers, ruin the Southern States, and we therefore elections oppose the Bristow amendment, which aims at such disastrous to results.

But the Bristow amendment is not made in good faith. It is Senators. not proposed because it is believed that the Federal Government can more wisely determine the time and manner of an now election in a State than the State can do. The object of the amendment is not to improve and better the law, but it is a amendment scheme to defeat the popular election of Senators. Those who oppose the popular election of Senators all favor the Bristow amendment. The real idea of the Republican Party is the same one old Hamiltonian idea that the people are incompetent and unfit agreed, to rule, and that a strong centralized government is necessary to compel the people to submit to the will of the government. We In every State where this idea is dominant, the legislature will gress. refuse to ratify the amendment for the popular election of United Senators, and the scheme of these enemies of the people was to House so change the resolution by the Bristow amendment as to this threaten southern civilization with negro rule and thereby hnste. force the Southern States to join the Republican enemies of the policy people in Northern States where that party still has control I think and defeat and kill the proposition for popular senatorial elec­ dian tions. This unrighteous scheme will certainly be successful if schedule. the Bristow amendment is adopted, and for that reason, l\Ir. We Chairman, I oppose it.

In conclusion, the question presented by the Bristow amend­ therefore ment is apparently not whether it is best and wisest that the the State or the Congress shall control the time and manner of and senatorial elections but really whether southern Senators sha.ll stress represent the will of the people of those States or the will of a. man partisan majority in Congress. The practical importance of this half question in the past became apparent when theRepublicanParty Mr. overthrew local self-government in the South and established The negro supremacy in order to perpetuate itself in power.

The patriotic sentiment of the North and the sectional affection that now binds every part of the Union together has for many years restrained the Republican Party from a repetition man's of its hostile interference with the election laws of the South, that but the strong effort to fasten the Bristow amendment on the ample, resolution for the popular election of Senators, and the expres- OLMSTED - s!ons of the Republican leaders of their hatred of the South and of their infatuation for negro rule, show that the hope of the again destroying southern civilization is still cherished in their Mr. hearts. T.he time when they dream of accomplishing this pur­ an pose is indicated in the avowal that the Federal Government [Mr. should exercise the power given it by the Bristow amendment him "·llenever it shall become necessary to the preservation of our progressive civilization. It is a civilization in which th.e Repub­ !Sider lican Party has exercised every function of the Government to from legislate the wealth of the country from the masses who pro­ the duce it into the pockets of the classes wb.{> enjoy it. It is n made

C!ivilization in which year by year the rich are made richer an~ poor are made poorer by unjust legislation. It is a civi11· in which half of the American people own no property the number of paupers · are increasing and the number of millionaires and multimillionaires are multiplying under the orr eration of the class legislation of the Republican Party. This civilization is called progressve. It is growing from bad to And the great issue of American politics is whether thfs civilization, a it is called, shall progress still further or shall changed-whether injustice in legislation shall be continued abandoned. It is an issue between the masses and the classes, the people and plutocracy. And when the Inst final comes, when it is finally decided whether the peopl the plutocrats shall govern the country, it is the dream o:f Republicanism, as openly expressed, under the necessity of prethis progressive civilization, to overthrow local self. government in the South and to use the poor deluded negro to ov-erthrow and destroy the rights of the American people and to forever the reign of plutocracy in American politics. that awful day comes, then the preservation of the of the American people in every Northern State will need southern Senators who represent the will of the southern instead of Senators who represent the will of the favored who dominate and control the Republican Party.

OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MooN]. );fr. l\IOON of Pennsylvania. :Mr. Speaker, the resolution adopted by the House proposes two distinct and disamendments to the Constitution. The one providing the election of United States Senators by the people, without intervention of State legislatures, and the other deprivCongress of all power of supervision over these elections. The Bristow amendment to the House resolution eliminates provisions to abrogate Federal control of the senatorial and confines the proposition to the one subject, namely, amend the Constitution of the United States so that the people of the several States may vote directly for United States The . proposition to concur in the Senate amendment which is before us affords the opportunity to limit the proposed amendment to one subject. I · nm in favor of concurring in that l\lr. Speaker, however we may differ respecting either the advisability or the legality of the present proposition, there is thing upon which I think .both sides of this House will be namely, that we are now engaged in one of the most important functions conferred upon us by the Constitution.

are exercising the extraordinary legislative power of Con­

We are engaged in amending the Constitution of the States. I want to call the attention of gentlemen of this to thls fact, tlmt we are proceeding in the cUscharge of important duty with what we all must admit is unseemly

We occupy many days in the discussion of the fiscal of the Government in the adoption of tariff measures.

we took 10 or 15 days here for the discussion of Canareciprocity and a week in the discussion of the wool-tariff We are on the eve of n. temporary adjournment. harn one day remaining before that time. The Members want to get away on Thursday. We have a day to fill in, nnd we say, ".All right; let us amend the Constitution of

United States." Now, that is what we are attempting to do, the gentleman from Missouri [.1\1r. IlucKE&], under the of such conditions, was obliged to deny to the gentlefrom Pennsyl>ania [Mr. OLMSTED] even two hours and n to discuss this problem.

RUCKER of Missouri. Mr. Speaker--

SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania [~ MooN] yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. RucKER]? Mr . .MOON of Pennsylvania. I ha·rn only 10 minutes. Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. I merely want to call the gentleattention to the fact that yesterday evening gentlemen on side expressed the belief that an hour and a half would be · and I have given the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr ..

J all the time he wants.

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. My statement was that under stress of conditions like these you were obliged to do it.

RUCKER of Missouri. The gentleman always make such interesting speech that if the gentleman from Pennsylrnnia OLMSTED] can not yield enough time to him, I will yield some time myself. Mr. MOON of Pennsylrnnia.. Now, gentlemen, let me con· this proposition from a different standpoint than that which it has already been considered. I do not desire, in little time at my command, to repeat the arguments .already and so well made. But let me recall the fact to you, gentlemen, that if we are willing to a.mend the Constitution under these irregular circumstances and with so much unseemly haste, the people of the United States are not willing to join with us ln so serious a proposition.

Do you know that in 125 years there have been seriously proposed over 2,000 amendments to the Constitution of the United States? And do you know that the people of the United States have practically rejected every one of them. Let us consider for a moment what the people have done in the past with such propositions and the circumstances and conditions under · which the existing amendments to the Constitution were adopted, and out of that consideration let us draw a line of policy to be pursued at the present time. We have, it is true, 15 amendments to the Constitution, but a consideration of the subject of those amendments and the circumstances under which they were proposed and adopted give no warrant for our present proceedings.