June 21, 1911

The first 10 amendments are al.most an integral part of the Constitution itself. They are simply declarations of the old immutable principles of Magna Charta, a cautionary reservation of the rights of the States, a bill of rights.

The eleventh amendment was proposed in 1794, al.most immediately after the organization of the Government, and was made amendment. to recall a portion of State sovereignty with which the States had inadvertently parted. In the recital of the judicial power of the United States there was a provision that it should extend to all suits between a State and its citizens or the citizens of a foreign State; and in the early case of Chisholm against Georgia, Justice Jay declared that under the Constitution a State could be brought to the bar of the court at the instance of a citizen of a State. Then the people of the United States said, "We never . intended to do this and inadvertently parted with a part of our sovereignty," and they proceeded to amend the Constitution to recall that power.

Later on the people found that the method employed for the election of the President and Vice President, as provided in the third paragraph of the first section of Article II, was cumbersome and defective, and in the twelfth amendment they simply amended a part of the machinery of the Government at the · demand of the people of the United States, and this constitutes the twelfth amendment. You all know that the thirteenth, the fourteenth, and the fifteenth amendments grew out of conditions that were revolutionary, when the liberation of the colored race from slavery created conditions with which the States were unable to cope, and it became necessary to protect their rights by a series of constitutional amendments. It will be seen, therefore, that all of these changes grew out of the acknowledged inadequacy of the Constitution and were made in obedience to the intelligent demand of the people or of the States themselves for a change in the organic law to meet these demonstrated conditions.

But, Mr. Speaker, we are confronting a proposition to-day that this country never heard of before; we are establishing a precedent, if you adopt this resolution without the Bristow amendment, that, in my judgment, is the most serious and dangerous precedent ever established by an American Congress. Understand, gentlemen, that the Constitution of the United States is a concession of the power of the various States, and that every amendment has been made either through a demand on the part of the people for a return . of a part of that power or by a voluntary concession of greater powers by the States themselves for the establishment of a more perfect Government.

· But for the first time in the history of legislation the Members of Congress themselves are initiating a constitutional amendment that no State, or the people of no State, ever thought of or ever asked at our hands. No class of people, no State, and no newspaper even ever demanded the relinquishment of governmental power in the supervision of the election of United States Senators, a power which in the field of its operation has been demonstrated to be essential to the integrity of the Government. I repeat, neither do the people of the United States or the States themselves demand that we should relinquish that power. We initiate the demand; we beg the States to take it back; we ask to be relieved from the burden of its exercise. Why, Mr. Speaker, this proposition absolutely amounts to treason by the Congress of the United States to their own prerogatives, to their own responsibilties, and to their own constituency. [Applause on the Republican : side.] We voluntarily declare that we are unfit and unworthy to discharge the power that the States have conferred upon us. We abandon the discharge of an important function absolutely at our own 1nltiative. · ,

It has been the boast of every jurist and every statesman that the powers and functions of government have been so wisely distributed by this Constitution that by accepted principles of construction it has adapted itself to the amazing changes of a progressive century without changing its funda­ · mental character. It has been heretofore an immutable instrument written on bronze. But if you are going to adopt this simple and easy principle of amendment by a voluntary abandonment by the Congress of powers never sought to be recalled, if you begin to emasculate it by supinely relieving yourself from the exercise oi those powers, you will make it a facile instrument written in sand. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The SPEAKER. The time is up.

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I had expected to recognize the gentleman from Iowa [Mr. KENDALL] for five minutes. He is willing to yield that time to the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. MooN]. [Applause.]

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. The proposition to elect United States Senators by the people is a legitimate subject of constitutional amendment that has been demanded by the people of the States. It has been demanded by resolutions of States; it has been demanded by State legislatures. Nay, more, many of the States have practically adopted it by legislation, and _ there is a universal demand for that species of constitutional

Mr. SHERLEY rose.

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Pennsylvania yield to the gentleman from Kentucky?

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. I should like to, but I can not

The SPEAKER. The gentleman declines to yield.

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. But the second propositionthe proposition to relieve ourselves from the supervision of the election of United States Senators-is not only uncalled for but it takes away from us a vital fundamental power necessary to the preservation of the Government itself. I call your attention to the fact that it absolutely destroys the equilibrium of the United States Government as conceived by its founders and as developed and demonstrated by actual experience for 125 years. Bear in mind, Mr. Speaker and gentlemen, that the two branches é@f the legislative department, the House and the Senate, are one. They are not two coordinate powers, they are two parts of one coordinate power, differing somewhat in their minor functions, but in all constitutional powers, in all constitutional matters, one before the law of the land.

You propose to surrender to the States the right of Congress to exercise that prerogative of sovereignty in the election of United States Senators, and you propose to preserve it so far as the election of the Members of the House is concerned.

Mr. Speaker, I have been in this House a few years, and on many occasions-indeed, on all occasions where it was possible-I have heard the Members of this House inveigh against any attempt to create any distinction between the power, dignity, and sovereignty of this House as contrasted with the power, dignity, and sovereignty of the House at the other end · of this Capitol You now propose, gentlemen, for the first time in history, to do what the fathers never dreamed' of doing, to draw a ' distinct line of demarkation. You say, in effect, that so far as the regulation of our own elections is concerned, we can control that, but that we are entirely too weak and insignificant to control the election before the people of so great, dignified, and august a body as the United States Senate. [Applause on the Republican side.]

Why, Mr. Speaker, we are all officers of the United States Government. Our qualifications are prescribed by the same Constitution. Under this amendment we shall be elected by the same electors. Our duties are the same, and we both stand at the legislative bar of the country and take the same oath of office, the same oath of allegiance to the Government of the United States. Yet, for some covert and undisclosed purpose, you propose for the first time to destroy absolutely your own dignity and equality before the law and to place the United States Senate in a position of greater power and authority. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The exercise of the power of Federal supervision over the election of both Members of the House and the Senate is vitally important to the preservation of the integrity of the Government

The necessity for such supervision was one of the primary reasons for the adoption of the Constitution of the United States. The preamble to that Constitution declares-

We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty for ourselves · and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

The first declaration of the purpose for forming a constitution was in order " to form a more perfect union."

The. Union existing under the. Articles of Confederation was fatally defective, because there existed no power therein to eamJ)eI the States to send Representatives to the Congress.-

The- States failed or refused to send Representatives, and thereby so emasculated that body ns to render it incompetent to perform. the responsible functions of government, and far. th t re a son section 4 o.! .Article I of the- Constitution provided that tlie times. place~ and manner of holding election for Senators and Representatives. shall be prescribed in each State by the legislators thereo.f, that the Congress may at any time. by law make or alter such regulations. e:xc.ept as. to the- places Qf choosing Seno.turs.

The power to compel the States to send their representatives, both in the House and in the Senate, to create a Federal legi&- Iutirn body is one, therefore, of primary importance.

This power has been exercised by the Federal Government, not, it is true, to compel the~ to send Representatives, because no State-, e.xcept during the War of the Re~ has ever refused to perform that function.

Congress has at various times, however, exercised the power conferred upon it by this section as concerns both the- election them. of the Members o:f tl:le House and Senate.

The first exercise by Congress of the power confen:oo by this section was in 1842. To remedy the evil which uro~ from the different methods adopted in the- various States. fill!' the election of Members of the House- &f Representatives :m act w~ passed requiring that em:b l\Iembe:£ of the. House should be elected by a separate- district. composed of contiguous territory, some of the St.ates having ele.cted their representation by a general ballot-that is, by permitting each elector to vote for as many names ns there were- Re}lresentatives-whie-h worked an inj , injustice to other States which did not adopt that system.

'ro remedy the evil arising from the election of Members of Congress at various times in the different States, Congress, in 1872, placed upon the statute books a law requiring the election o:f all such Members to be held on the Tuesday following the first Monday in November in the: year 18'{8 and o.n the same day of every second yen.r therre.fter-~

Co.ngress has likewise exercised this. power with respect to the time and manner oi electing Sena.tors of the- United States Section 14 of the- Revised Statutes w s designed to provide uniformity in the time of electing -United Sta.tes Senators bJ requiring the legislature Qi each State chosen next preceding . the expiration o-f the term Qf · any Senator to choose: his sw::.. cessor on the seeonu Tu~ after its meeting ru1J] organization. Section 15 o:f the- Revised Statutes was intended to overcome the frequent failure o.f the legislatures of the States to elect Senators at the p:roper time b.y one branch of the: legislature voting for one- person. and the- other branch for another person by compelling the two bodies to. meet in joint convention, fixing the day when. this should be done and requiring them to meet every day thereafter until. a Senator was elected.

That this. power has not been more frequently used is due to the fact tha.t the- several St.ates conscious of I.ts. existence have by consistent and uniform action complied mth th~ spirit of the . Constitution. without the necessity o-f Federal action.

The res.olution of. amendment. adopted by this House, and which is now being so earnestly advocated by the Democratic majority, provides for the relinqu:i.shmmt of this vital and necessary Federal control over the election of United States Sen.ato:rs and to return the s::une to the people of the United States t°' be exercised wholly as they may determine, free from the supervision of the Federal Government.

This, Mr. Speaker, is an insidious :md dangerous attack npQU the vitality of the Federal Constitution. The central idea ~f that instrument, as conceived and constructed by the philosophic statesmen who made it, was that of n complete: FOOera.1 o:r~u.nlilm, having within itself perfect powers of organization an of perpetuation-its three c.oordi:na.tecl departments under its. O"Wn complete dominion and each exercising its own tun~ tions with entire immunity from State interference-. It wtts t o be a national autonomy, complete sovereignty, and the- essential prerogative of sovereignty is undisputed and undivided power o.ve.r Hs own instrumentalities.

This amendment means the overthrow of this scheme. It removes from Federal control an ood.ivisable- half ot the legislative organism of the Government. It is no longer to. be a clusion. sovereign power capable- of complete independence, controlling itsowninstrumentalitiesbythelawsafitsown.creation;butheI"e- fter its Ia~s are to. be made partly by the m:nb-a~rs o.f l individual States Oi re.r whose election it can exercise no- control nnd woose> 10€3.l and peculiar interests may be adverse- to the. gene.ral interest of the whole country 1 which the United States Congress was created to protect

~ Speaker, this work we are doing to-dn.y-this off day-! which we are filling in by amen.ding. t~ Constitution, m..-.y became hlsta.nc. w~ are putting the. ax fo the root ()f our insti. tutions. We are in the most casual and. indifferent manner touching sacred things. Cut out one o:f the fnneilona1 parts of a Yibll organism. and the whole. may speedily die. I see i n this sectional attempt to strike down Federal power grave danger__. irremediable. mischieE

But, Mr. Speaker, I do not. believe the- American people will consent to it. I believe they will be wiser than we t11re. I believe tney. love our gren.t Constitution m-0re than we d0-t and I ~eiieve they will reject the amendment. The-y will see iii this attempt what we now ignore. They will understand that those. who advocate. this measure, who openly declare that will. prevent the. amendment providing for the- direct election of United States Senators being submitted to the States unless it is coupled with this revolutionary condition-I & y the people will understand that those advocates have some- dangerous ulterior object in 'Yiew-t.hat they design to obtain po el' fo:r their States which. the Constitution ot our fathers t'lem.ed The reasons for this are not difficult to discover. One- section of this country is still urrnyecl against the other politically. In the great civil conflict o:f 50 years ago they were defeated. They are now in power in this House. This demand comes chiefly from that section. It is. seeking th-e ... same power now tllo.t was denied it then-the power of th-e State t0o control the Nation for its OW'Il. end untrammeled by Federal supervision. The attempt now is more insidious but none- the les dangerous. A. constitutional amendment has not the terror of. a confli'c.t Qf Ul'lllSt, but it may be found more d-estructive.

This resolution. of submission will pass too House in the unamended form in. the face of the great Democratic majority against us; we crrn not pre.vent it. But I repeat, I have- still unbounded confidence in the people o:f the country. I OOlieTe when submitted. to them they will absolutely reject it· Uni they will no.t purchase the power to elect their Senators oy a direct 10te at the price of relinquishment of the Federal control ayer these- elections; that they will hold responsible ut the polls the party that thus seeks' t€> entrap them. I believe they will say to this Congress: If you are unwilling or nnnb e to ex.ercise the- powers conferred upon you b the- Constitution to di..~illl:rge the full measure of the- duties you '\X-iffi"e elected and sworn to d:Lc::clmrge and which: has nlmcys be-en discharge) ~ your predecessors, instead of going to the States and pleading to. be- relieved of your responsibilities bl' taking awuJ- ‘from you these powers, resign your positions, and we will send'. other lll€D.. who can and will uphold the Constitution, ~erre the Government as it was given to us by om-- fathers. and maintain the supremacy of our great Nation not only against the other nations of the world, but against its enemies at home n.s ell

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. l yield to the gentleman from Kenttreky [Mr. SHElill3.Y].

lli. SHERLEY. Mr Speaker, l.t ought not to be necessary, afte:r the prolonged discussion that TI'ITS . had here and in the Senate of this proposed amendment, to restate certain i > ropo. s:iti.ans. And yet the debate that has taken place to-day makes tl.~ restatemeii necessary.

Bear in mind that it is not, in any true and practical sen :t.CCU1'11.te to Y that in proposing simply an amendment t o ~ Constitution as ta the mmmer of el-ecting Sena.tors oi the United States you do not affect the power of the Federal Government over such elections. No man can here state-I will give such Jit, tle time as l b..'IW to any man who can sfate-n.ny practical way that the- Federal Government now has of controlling the election. of Uni t ed States ~ Sen.a.tors

Mr: MOON of Pennsylvania. Will the- gentleman permit me1

Mr. SHERLEY. The gentleman n would not yield fo rue, but I will yield to him.

lli. MOON of ~nnsylmmp. I can ten the gentleman how it Juts exercised that control \ei"y :potentially and very nece. s:!rlly.

Mr. SHERLEY. State- how and where.

Mr. MOON cf Pennsylvania. h1 compelling the two h -o uses t01 meet jo.intly for the election of a United States · s~a . tor, thereby preventing what might frequently occur, the two b uses voting separately for different men a:nd never reaching a co~ M:r. SHERLEY. The- gentleman has stated one ease whem Congress provided as to how the legislature shall ballot, and to thnt ertent my statement may seem too broad, but the gentieman would have to admit tJi1tt there is: no power now in the: Federal Government! to control the erection of Senators m th~ same sense that the power exists to control the election of Renre.sentatlYe&. While the fu.no.'"cmge is the- same'- the practical power is different. Und e r the power to regulate the manner of holding an election for Repre s ent a ti v e s , Congress, while unable t o prescribe the qu a lifi c atio ns of voters, can give to the JJ , Federal Government com p lete control, as it actually did during the reconstruction period; but while Congress can now determine the manner by which membe r s of the legislature Df a State Shall elect a Sena.tor, it can not control the manner by which those members .of a State legislature shall be chosen. As the Constitution now reads, Congress has power over but one of the two steps in the election of Senators. Now, by pro v iding for the direct · election of Senators you eliminate this step, 1-eaving only one, and to that transfer the power that now relates only to the second. The result is that this House and the conntry in considering this amendment is confronted with this proposition: Shall you, by changing the method of electing Senators in Congress, enlarge the power of the Federal Government, or shall you narrow the power'.? That is the practical question. The Bristow amendment enlarges the power. The adoption of the House provision nar.rows the power. I fill1 going to be :Perfectly frank; it does not leave it in the same -condition; it does legally narrow it, although, in my judgment, it does not narrow it in any practical way. N-either is it so, as implied · by speeches of gentlemen on that side of the House, that the Federal Government nas by the Constitution the same power to contro1 all of the agencies necessary to its own existence. If .gentlemen will .read the provision ref erring fo the .election of President and Vice President; they will find that the power there conferred was originally limited to the " time" and did not extend to the "manner." And yet the gentleman from Pennsylva.nia would use the strong word "treason" because we say a different rule should apply to the _power of the Federal Government over the election of Bena.tors to that over fhe election of Representatives.

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; I will yield to the gentleman.

:rtfr. MOON of Pennsylvania. The gentleman does not pretend to say that the Constitution does not exercise a :p:rotective power over the election of President and Vice President?

Ir. SHERLEY. l mean to .say that the Constitution of the 'United States does not confer upon Congress anything like as capacity. broad power over the selection of electors .as it does over the election of Representatives.

Mr. l\IOON of Pennsylv.ania. Does it not prescribe the time and manner and place of holding the election?

Mr. SHERLEY. I will read what the Constitution says. The third paragraph of the first sec.tion of the . second article is 1 " The Congress may determine the time of choosing electors . "

It does not refer to the place and manner .

'.Mr . .M:OON ol: Pennsylvania. Read the twelfth . amendment.

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes; I will lt .reads:

The electors shall meet in their respective States and vote b:y ballot history President and Vice President, .one of whom at lea.st shall not be an inhabitant of the same .State with themselves.

l\Ir. MOON of Pennsylvania (mteITUJJting). The amendment -g_oes on to tell how the election shall b~ held and · d~clai·es the .time, the pla-ce, and the m~nner o: ho1dmg that electiDn. 1 l\1r. SHERLEY. That 1S true! but the gentlemn.n can not show any warrant for an asse~f:ion that t~e F~deral Government has ~ontrol over ~e selection of -presidential ele~ors by the State i~ the sense that they have over the selection of a Representative. .

M:. MOON of Pennsylv~a. Oh, no- . " Mr. ~Y. ~he oen~€Illan from Pe1:IlBYlvama sa.-ys, ' Oh, ~o, . and that 1 ~ the _?tal matter. It is tne power. to determme the manner ill which such electors are ch_osen wll1ch :ls f:undam~ntal, and Congress .has not the power ill t~at .regard that J.t now possesses over elections of Representatives.

Mr .. MOON of Pennsylvania. The Constitution prescribes the time, manner, and place of controlling the electors for Members, the electors for Senators, the electors for Vice Presi- mit-· _ dent, but th~ people happen to be the electors of Representati'es. The legislatures of the vari-Ous States are the electors '9f Senators, and the constitutional · electors are the electors of the President and Vice President.

Mr. SHERLEY. The Constitution -0f the United States does not, in my judgment, give to the Federal Government the power as to the choosing of electors that it does over the choosing r0f Representatives. The power is not the same. The power as to the Federal Government over the election of :Senators now is not the same as exists over the election of Representatives. Now, it is true that the Supreme Court 'held that the -power oTer -an election of Representatives was a power sufficient to .enable the Federal Gm-ernment to l)ractically take charge of the election of Representatives.

In my humble judgment that Power was never contemJ)laied ly the :makers -0f the Oonstitution, but that is no longer a material question, because the .Supreme Court declared the power was there. But there never has been and can not be under the Constitution as it now exists the power over Senators that now exists 01er Representatives. Some of us are not willing tG give that power. We -do not believe that the danger of the Federal Government failing through the States failing to elect Senators is nearly so great or potential as is the danger of an abuse of p o w e r in the election of Senators, if the Federal Government was given that.Power now. [Applause on the Democratic side.] Whatever fear there was in the beginning of this Government that the Government would not exist by reason of the failure of its component parts to provide for the election of Members of Congress has passed away. There is no man who seriously . believes that we are in any danger of the Senate disappearing as a body by reason of the failme of the States to elect Senators. If we really believed that, you would have been willing to accept the suggestion l made on this floor, and the suggestion that was made in the other body, that tne amendment be limited to those cases where the States refused to act. But gentlemen contend that this power must be giTen.

The Federal Constitution is a compromise between the · be­ 1ie rnrs in . a National · Government and the believers in a Federal Government. Running all through that instrument are these two ideas. Those who believed in a central go-.vernment, where the States should be merged into it, had to concede their e-x­ treme position, just .as the State rights men, who did not lieve in tile Federal Government hav.ing any power to exist except .at the volition of the St.ates, had to give up some of their contentions. Out of those concessions came the Co.nstitution. The wery provision that a Sena tar shall represent a State is an evidence of that compromise, and in .representing a State he does not represent the people in the sense that a Representative does. The provision as to Representatives is distinctl y national, that as to Senators distinctly Federal. Every .IRe p r entative here is here because of the number of people in his district. JDvecy Senator in that body is there irrespective of the number of the people within the State that he represents. [Applause.] He stands as an ambassador, and I repeat what I said before, as an :ambassador of the Stat-e in its sovereign How childish is it t-0 say that the people of a State can not be trusted to send their representatives to the Senate of the United States, to a · body that has power in some respects greater than either the Executive or the House of Represen.tatives. lt ea.n do with the Executive what the House can not do . It can lo, with the House acting with i t, what the Ex:ecutiv.e · and the Rouse · can not . do.

I deny that the Stat-es will ever fail to elect l\lembers to this great body, and I do not believe supervision by the Federal Government is either necessary or, in the broad sense gentleman urge it, desirable. I say to you that when history is written without passion, when the ev.ents -of the . days when our coun - try was rent in ~ twain have faded into enough distance to judge f that period impartially and without regard to · section, it will not be found that the intervention of the Federal Government in the election of .Representatives helped in the long, true course of history tow.ard the preservation of purity of - elections or of the real rights of the States and of the people. IAp ­ plause . ] r d-0 not believe that ;we can afford now to enlarge this power of the Federal Government. lf it were possible to keep the power as it now is I would say yes; and ·why will not gentlemen on that side be iair? Why constantly underta1."'e to give the impression that it iB possible to leave the control of the Federal G-Overnment the same? Will the gentleman from Pennsylrnnia I.Mr. MooN] state that in his judgment as a lawyer he belie-ves that the adoption of the Bristow amendment would not serve in .a practical .sense to enlarge the power of the Federal Government over the election of Senators?

.Mr MOON f p 1 · If th tI 0 ennsy vanm. e gen eman would per-

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman . yield?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr . .MOON of Pennsylvania . I would Bay, if the gentleman would permit me l!Il.d l had the time to discuss the proposition in his time, that l would engage to -demonstrate with mathematical accuracy that it would do just that thing.

Mr. SHERLEY. All I can say in .answer to the gentleman is that he occupies the unique distinction, so far, of being rthe only gentleman wllo ha:s been willing to maintain that position. .The debates fu each ibody of -Congress have not shown .anyone else possessed of such a. judgment as to power.

Mr. OLMSTED . Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. SHERLEY . Yes.

Yr. OLMSTED . I would like to ask the gentleman whether he 1 does not believe .that the prohibition of campaign contribu - tions by corporations to the election of Representatives tends to purity of elections?

Mr. SHERLEY. I do.

Mr. OLMSTED. Then do not you believe that the same prohibition applied to the election of Senators when they are elected by the people would further tend to purify the elections?

.Mr. SHERLEY. I do.

.Mr. OLMSTED. Then why do you not join with us in concurring in this amendment, which would leave the power in Congress?

Mr. SHERLEY. For this reason: Because the giving of the power that the gentleman wants would not simply rest in giving to the Federal Government the power to prevent corporate campaign contributions. The gentleman is wise enough to know that in this life you can not segregate things in that

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. I yield five minutes additional to the gentleman.

l\Ir. SHERLEY. It is because I believe that it is more important to preserve, having some knowledge of the history of my country and of the conditions that confront all sections of it, the absolute control of the States in the election · of their Senators than it is simply to give the Federal Government power to pass a law as to campaign contributions that I do not agree with the position occupied by the gentleman. This is my answer to the assumption of the gentleman that the power gf Congress to protect elections at which Federal officers are chosen rests only on section 4 of Article I.

Mr. JACKSON. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

Mr. SHERLEY. Yes.

Mr. JACKSON. Does the gentleman think it is dangerous to increase the power of the people over the Federal officers of the Government?

Mr. SHERLEY. I do not But I have not so much fear of the people of the respective States that I fear any danger to the National Government through the exercise of their rights to choose Senators of the United States. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I have more faith in the people of Kansas than to believe that.

Mr. JACKSON. The people of Kansas did choose their own Senators contrary to many of the Southern States, and the man who offered this amendment in the United States Senate was elected by the people of his State, and yet the man who comes here and charges that he is not in favor of this amendment must know--

Mr. SHERLEY. Ob, I have not charged anything of the kind. The gentleman was either unable to hear me or to understand me.

Mr. JACKSON. I was not charging the gentleman-­

Mr. SHERLEY. I simply stated--

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Kentucky refuses to yield.

Mr. SHERLEY (continuing). I stated I had enough faith in the people of Kansas to believe their having exclusive power over the election of Senators from that State would not imperil the Nation. If the gentleman draws the other inference from it he is welcome to it.

Mr. JACKSON. I regret there is a difference between Kansas and other States in the Union--

Mr. SHERLEY. Ob, well, I congratulate myself that my belief in the patriotism of the people of America is not confined to sections. [Applause on the Democratic side.] I trace my ancestry through those who stood on opposite sides when this country was divided in the great conflict. I, for one, thank God those days are far back, and I do not believe there is anything in the history of the Southland since those days that warrants the aspersions which the gentleman undertakes t.;> cast upon those people and my people. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. JACKSON. Did not the gentleman state in the main debate on this question that he wanted this amendment, or ' wanted it passed as the House passed it, because if it was not so passed it would be defeated in the Southern States?

Mr. SHERLEY. I stated this: The gentleman from Kansas asked me the question and he asked my opinion. I stated that, in my opinion, in the State of Kentucky it would make no difference, but I was inclined to believe, and I still am, that there was more probability of the amendment being adopted if it went to the States as passed by the House than if it contained what is now known as the Bristow amendment.

Mr. JACKSON. Well, did not that in itself bring sectionalism into the debate?

Mr. SHERLEY. It brings the viewpoint of sections, and there is a vast difference between the viewpoint of sections and that narrow prejudice that impugns the motives of men because they differ with one another. [Applause on the Democratic side.] It is a distinction that is world'-wide.

Now, Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will permit, the colloquy can hardly add to the solution of this question.

Let me in conclusion say to the House simply this, that the question that you have presented is not one of whether you will leave, as it now exists, the power over the election of Senators, but the question is whether you shall enlarge that power by the Bristow amendment or whether you shall narrow that power. In my judgment, for all practical purposes the power does not exist now. We have presented what we believe is the real reform asked by the people. And let me state one curious fact, that it is those people who are least in sympathy with the reform itself that seem most solicitous over having the Bristow amendment incorporated in it. [Applause on the Democratic side.] And if gentlemen doubt the accuracy of that statement, a review of recorded votes will do much to enlighten them on the subject. So I conclude now, as I concluded before, that those of you who believe sincerely in giving to the peop1e a more direct method over the election of their Senators can well afford to stand, as they stood a while ago, in the position taken by the House. They need not have any fear that the Federal Government's existence is going to be imperiled. The gentleman from Pennsylvania stated that the power, because it existed, would probably not need to be · used. I go a step further and say that, if existing, I do not believe it will be used, and if not existing, no need for it will arise. Many men differ with me as to the probability of its use, and I beg of you who really desire to bring about this reform that you do not force those who hold a position more extreme perhaps than mme, but who are sincerely desirous of this reform, from the advocacy of it into an opposition of it. [Applause on the Democratic side.]

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I yield 10 minutes to the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. CANNON].

Mr. CANNON. Mr. Speaker, I always listen with great pleasure t? th~ gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY]. .And yet what is this proposition? It is a proposition to change the method of electing. Senators. I voted several times, right or wrong, but following my best Judgment and voicing what seemed to me to be public sentiment, to submit to the States an amendment to the Constitution for the election of Senators by direct vote of the people of the respective States.

I voted against the passage of the House joint resolution at this session, not because it proposed to amend the Constitution to elect Senator~ by direct vote of the people, but for the reason that the Joint resolution, in addition to providing for a direct vote, would have changed the Constitution in that provision which enables the Congress of the United States at any time, if the necessity should arise, to make or alter regulations made by the respective States for the election of Representatives and the choosing of Senators.

The Senate amendment to the House joint resolution provides for the election of Senators by a direct vote of the people but otherwise does not change the Constitution as it now is: The gentleman from Kentucky [Mr. SHERLEY] was not as happy as he usually is when he sought to place the Senate higher than the House by calling the Senators "ambassadors " of their respective States. Nay, nay; they are plain Senators. [Laughter.]

Now, I will not vote for a proposed amendment to the Constitution which places a Senator in his election without the safeguards that .surround the election of Representatives. Therefore I am going to vote for this Senate amendment, which will cure what many people believe has grown into an a.busethe control of legislatures in the selection of Senators by improper methods.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. OLMSTED] asked a question as to whether it would be in the power of a State-in effect, by throwing the State into districts-to elect Senators by a minority vote in the event the House joint resolution was enacted into law without the Senate amendment. Undoubtedly that might be done. Undoubtedly the respective State legislatures would have this power. And yet gentlemen on that side-Democrats, glorying in "the rule of the people "-propose to place it in the power of a State legislature, by this joint resolution, to enact laws under which practically a minority can choose Senators; and the Congress of the United States would be powerless in the premises if the joint resolution is enacted without amendment and should be agreed to and ratified by the States.

A law has been-or will be-enacted for publicity of campaign expenses. Such a law, if the Constitution should be amended as this House joint resolution proposes, would compel publicity of campaign expenses of candidates for Representatives, but would not apply to senatorial " ambassadors." [Laughter.]

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman permit an interruption?

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Illinois yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

Mr. CANNON. With pleasure.

Mr. MOON of Pennsylvania. I would like to hear the gentleman discuss a feature of this subject which I think is of great importance, and which I did not get the opportunity to touch upon. The gentleman will observe that there is one very vital distinction between the original and the language that is left m. That feature does not seem to have been referred to at all in concerned? the discussion. The existing provision of the Constitution is: The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.

· Now, the portion that they leave in they change vitally. They say:

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.

I wish the gentleman would discuss that feature.

Mr. CANNON. Precisely. The Congress can prescribe the manner of the election of Representatives under the Constitution as it is and under the Constitution as it would be in the event the Senate amendment is agreed to and ratified; but in the event the Senate amendment is not agreed to and ratified the Congress will be powerless to change the regulations ill any State as to the election of Senators. For one, I shall not approve, by speech or vote, such a provision.

I want to say to gentlemen from the South, we had an unfortunate contest between the majority and the minority, leading to the great Civil War. Prejudice p.ass.ed away from me long, long ago. You say there is no danger in the future. God knows. I trust there is no danger. Some people believe that if danger should come in the future it would not come from the Southland. Many so believe. Oh, I would to God that the successors of the men in the main who made that great contest from the Southland would recognize, as they practically do, the results of the great contest and would legislate in the present and in the future without harking back to the graveyard and conjuring up ghosts and then running from the ghosts. · I do not believe there would be the slightest objection on that side to the Senate amendment except as it might b · e made by you who failed in that great contest, for those who fail are always last to forgive and forget [Applause on the Republican side.]

The SPEAKER. The time of th~ gentleman has expired.

Mr. CANNON. I would like just one more minute.

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I · yield five minutes more to the gentleman.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Illinois is recognized for five minutes more.

Mr. CANNON. I shall not need that much time.

If you had forgotten, a.s we have forgotten-we who coIIBtitnted the majority in that contest-this joint resolution as passed by the House, in my judgment, never would have been passed in its present shape, and the Senate amendment would not now be opposed.

Now, my friend from Kentucky, always candid, says that, true, under the Constitution Congress may in certain cases regulate the election of Senators. Yes; he acknowledges it

!\fr. SHERLEY. Will the gentleman permit?

Mr. CANNON. Yes.

Mr. SHERLEY. I said I would simply state this, that there is no practical way in which they can do it now.

Mr. CANNON. Precisely. There is no practical way, the gentleman says, and there is no practical way now by which the people can elect Senators by direct vote. I will not split hairs with the gentleman. If there is no way that the same law and the same power should reside in the American Congress, to"Q.ching the election of Senators as well as Representatives, I am here to help provide a way. [Applause on the Republican side.] I would not, to secure this joint resolution, make legislation that would apply to this body in the election of its Members and would not apply to the Senate in the election of its Members. ·

We are trying to correct that real or supposed abuse by a direct vote of the people; and yet you say "Nay ; nay; we do not want that direct vote of the people to give the people the same power as to Senators that they have as to Rep.resentatives." Great God ! if a man is competent to vote for the election of a Representative, is he not competent to vote for the election of a Senator?

Mr. COOPER. Will the gentleman permit a question?

The SPEAKER. Does the gentleman from Illinois yield to the gentleman from Wisconsin?

Mr. CANNON!..- Oh, certainly.

Mr. COOPER. I am much interested in what the gentleman said on the question of an ambassador from a State. Now, in the case of the late Galusha A. Grow, who was a · Representative at large from the State of Pennsylvania, all the people of the State having voted for him, the Congress of the United States could have passed a law regulating his election, could it? l\Ir. CANNON. Absofately.

Mr. COOPER. He would have b~n jnst as much an ambassador, would he not, so far as the State of Pennsylvania was .Mr. CANNON. Oh, yes; in substance.

l\Ir. SHERLEY. Will the gentleman from Illinois yield?

.Mr. CANNON. I always yield to the gentleman.

Mr. SHERLEY. I want to suggset that the exception to a rule is hardly the test . of a rule.

Mr. CANNON. You know our power is pretty considerable under the Constitution as it is; not greater than it ought to be in the main. [Applause on the Republican side.]

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman has again expired. .

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi [Mr. SrssoN].

Mr. SISSON. .Mr. Speaker, when I addressed the House before on this amendment I called attention to the fact that the power to elect Senators is now in the State legislatures, and if section 4 of Article I remains as it is, it does extend the power of Congress to the electorate.

This extension of the power of Congress over the voter of the State is too dangerous. That power now only extends to the election of Members of the House. . . In the very fact that Congress can, if it deems proper, regulate and control the elections to the lower House of Congress and can not now control elections as to the other branch lies the real reason why Congress has i;i.ot passed general election laws for the control of all Federal elections.

If now they passed a law prescribing the manner in which Congress should be elected and providing for Federal officers to hold these elections and determine who should vote in such elections, they could only control the election of Congressmen, because under Article I, section 4, of the Constitution as it now is, the power of Congress only gets as far as th~ State legis1:iture, but if we change the Constitution and put the power to elect Senators in the hands of the people, where it belongs, then the power of Congress to control elections of both branches of Congress will add tenfold to the desire to pass Federal election laws.

The people should control the Federal Government and not the Federal Government the people. The people of the States so says the Constitution in Article X, are the source of all power. They can always be trusted. The Federal Government should reflect their sovereign will and not the people the will of Congress. Congress should ever be under the control of the people and not the people under the control of Congress.

No Federal election law should eve1· be passed. .Mr. Madison and Mr. Hamilton, when the States were asked to ratify the present Constitution, assured the people of all the States that no such laws would ever be enacted by Congress. If the States had believed that the power would ever have been exercised there never would have been States to ratify the instrument. No man who can trust his own constituents and the people of his own State can ever consent to extend the power of the Federal Government over elections. In God's name, as we love our liberty and freedom, let us guard at least one branch of our Congress from the possibility of Federal control

I believe in placing all the officers of the Government as close as possible to the people who elect them. The power to determine who shall and who shall not vote is the sovereign power. If Congress can determine the manner of holding elections 8 it can pass election laws, appoint the officers to hold the elections prescribe the qualifications of voters, and say who shall or who shall not vote, and who shall or who shall not hold office, and finally become the supreme power in all elections, thus transferring the power of control from the people to the Federal Government. God forbid that such an evil day should ever come.

A complete guaranty that no Federal election laws will ever be passed is to adopt this amendment as it originally passed the House. A guaranty that Federal election laws will be passed wi11 be to pass the Bristow amendment. .

Mr. Speaker, it is indeed surprising that some of our friends on the other side of the Chamber should, with such zeal, oppose the Rucker amendment. They are very careless with the facts of history.

A moment ago this colloquy occurred:

Mr. RUCKER of Missouri. Mr. Speaker, I presume it is in the gentleman's mind, having stated that it was that portion of the proposed amendment to which he objects, to tell the House why he objects to it, and I would like to know.

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, I shall proceed to do so, and I hope to make my objection clear. .

Mr. KENDALL. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OLMSTED. Certainly.

Mr. KENDALL. If the Bristow amendment, which is now before the House for action, shall be adopted, the Constitution will remain the same, except that Senators will be directly elected by the people.

Mr. OLMSTED. That will be the only change.

Mr. KENDALL. And if the Bristow amendment is rejected, as proposed by the gentleman from Missouri, and the House resolution should he enacted into law, the Congress of the United State! would surrender all authority over the election of Senators?

Mr. OLMSTED. Mr. Speaker, as another gentleman was speaking to me at the moment, I did not understand the gentleman's question.

Mr. KENJ>ALL. If the resolution as it passed the House should be finally enacted into law, it would amount to a surrender on the part of Congress of any authority over the election of Senators?

Mr. OLMSTED. It would indeed ; and it Is very questionable whether it would not so emasculate section 4 as to make it inoperative and ineffectual for any purpose.

Mr. LONGWORTH. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OLMSTED. Certainly.

Mr. LONGWORTH. I understood the gentleman to say that the proposition for the election of Senators by the people has passed the House at different times.

.Mr. OLMSTED. Yes.

Mr. LoNGWORTH. Has it ever passed the House with the amendment proposed in this House resolution-amending section 4?

Mr. OLMSTED. It never has to my knowledge-never. The demand for the change of that section sprung up only after the recent elections had changed the political complexion of this House.