February 17, 1869

One point more, sir, and I will leave the subject. Can anything be more evident than that now, when we are extending suffrage in the United States, and extending it largely, extending it as it was not contemplated it ever could be extended until within a few years past, that it become us to improve our machinery, to improve our constitutional arrangements by which suffrage is to be worked in future? In eslling upon the people of the U nited States, to adopt an amendment which shall make this extension, which shall allow the casting into the ballot boxes Mortis, South, and West, of hundreds of thousands df votes from a new and hitherto disfranchised class, will you not present to them some proposition of reform with regard to the manner in which" this suffrage shall be exercised, so that it shall have just operation and fair effect, so that the corruption of a few votes in a State shall not turn the whole scale and change elections? In my judgment, therefore in addition to all the other considerations, this proposition is most timely. It never could have been presented at a juncture when in point of time it was more appropriate and more deserving of adoption by Congress and by the American people.

Mr. Edmunds obtained the floor.

Mr. CAMERON. I hope the Senator from Vermont will allow me to' say one word in reply to my colleague.

Mr. EDMUNDS. Certainly.

Mr. STEWART. I ask the Senator from Pennsylvania to give way so as to enable me to make my motion in proper form. I withdraw the motion for a committee of conference, and move that the Senate recede from its amendment and concur in the House proposition.

Mr. CAMERON. I shall vote in favor of the motion now made by the Senator from Nevada. I had no intention to say a word on this subject, and should not have done so but for a remark which fell from my colleague, which I think was disrespectful to the State from which he and I come, in which we were both born, and to which we owe not only allegiance but love. I was sorry to hear him say that money had been brought into Pennsylvania to influence and corrupt the elections there and to produce a result which the people did not desire. In 1854 my colleague and I separated in politics. The first election of any consequence after that was the election for President in 1856, when Mr. Buchanan and Colonel Fremont were the opposing candidates. In reply to the remark of my colleague I think I may say with confidence that there is hardly a man in Pennsylvania now living who was acquainted with that contest who does not believe that Colonel Fremont was cheated out of the vote of Pennsylvania by the activity and dishonesty of the men who supported Mr. Buchanan. Large sums of money were brought into Pennsylvania to use as a corruption fund, and they were so used. Sir, had General Fremont received the vote of Pennsylvania then, as he was entitled to do, we should have been saved the evils which grew out of Mr. Buchanan s administration, including the great rebellion which has cost this country so -ranch blood and treasure, and all its consequences. But Colonel Fremont lost the vote of Pennsylvania by the management of the chairman of the State Democratic Central Committee of that year, who through the use of money from other States changed the result of the election. Sir, such things have often happened in Pennsylvania: but ray remembrance is that they have always been done in the interests of the Democratic party. At the recent election we lost the city of Philadelphia and the Democratic party nominally eileeted three Congressmen there; bnt ail men who are acquainted with the contest in the districts of Mr. Myers and Mr. Taylor know that those gentlemen are entitled to their seats, and were onlv defeated by great frauds. They intend to claim them, and I have no doubt they will receive them. I remember that the other day, in a contest for a seat in the Legislature from the city of Philadelphia, three men were brought up and swore that they had voted at every precinct in the city, and at each place they had given different names to the amount of eight or ten each. They voted early and often, as my friend from New Jersey [Mr. Fbeujfgffuysen] suggests.

I only rose for the purpose of defending my State, and especially the Republican party mid the gentlemen belonging to the -Republican party, against this charge of fraud. The election in Pennsylvania occurs earlier than in many of the other States. It is a very important State; and of course the election is contested with great activity.

No w let me say one word in regard to the proposition of my colleague. I know that I ought to have studied the question before I attempted to speak upon it. My colleague says that of all the people in the world he despises most stupid people. I agreed with him in that. A stupid man is not to be admired by anybody; but we sometimes differ as to where the stupidity is to be found. Sometimes we think people are laughing .with us, when they are laughing at us; and so it may be in regard to stupidity. I think it would be very stupid indeed for the party in power now to give to any future Congress the right of gerrymandering Pennsylvania, Indiana, New York, and Ohio, so as to control those States; for I think half a dozen shrewd men from those States brought together could pass a bill in Congress by which they could control the destinies of this country. I am in favor, therefore, of leaving this power in the hands of the States. Let the men who know the local interests, the local feelings, and the local strength and weakness of the States settle it themselves at their own homes. To be sure, by carryingsuch an amendment as my colleague proposes the county of Berks in our State ■would vote on the one side and the county of Dauphin on the other; and under such a proposition the candidates of my colleague last year might have secured four or five electoral votes in Pennsylvania, and a few in some of the other States, but Igreatly prefer that each State shall show its whole strength. Whatever the power of the State may be, let it be given by a single vote in favor of the candidate. I am not so much in favor of State rights as some men who have been here. I learned during the war for the suppression of the rebellion that we needed a stronger Government than we ever had before. The great trouble at the beginning of the war was that there was no power at Washington, under the laws, that could not only arm the forces that were offered, but that could wield them as they could have done if there had been nobody in the States to interfere with them.

I believe this is all I have a desire to say on this subject. I think I have shown, or at least 1 have tried to do so, that Pennsylvania is not worse than the other States; and if she has done wrong, it has been the Democrats who have done the wrong.

Mr. EDMUNDS. Mr. President, the question that the honorable Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Buclalew] has so elaborately discussed is one of such importance that I do not feel at liberty, for one, to let it go by without a few words of reply. I have not, like him, prepared an essay upon the subject, and perhaps, unlike him, I do not feel so deeply the tremendous gulf on the edge of which lie supposes us to stand, as it respects the political future of this country, on account of the present Constitution of the United States.

The amendment which he proposes, and whith is now the subject of consideration, as it appears upon a casual reading, is certainly a very simple one. It only seems to provide that instead of electors of President being elected in such manner as the Legislatures of the States shall direct, they shall be elected by the people of the States, on the same principle and to the same number, to act in the same way and with the same effect, as the present Constitution requires; and the only efficacy of the amendment so far is to take away from the Legislatures of the States, representing the people of the States, the power of prescribing the manner of electing those same electors, and providing the manner ourselves, so far as it affects the persons who vote.

Does that reach any practical evil? The people of the States from the beginning have elected electors in exactly that way. The State of South Carolina, I believe, has been an exception; but as a whole, the people of the States always have elected their electors of President, and they always will; and in the case of South Carolina my honorable friend will not assert that in any single instance of her history her Legislature in electing electors departed from the will of her people. That Legislature has chosen the persons and for the purpose that the will of the people behind the Legislature desired; so that, even in that exceptional case, this departure from a supposed principle of governments by the people has been merely one of form and not of substance; and it must always be so, because the Legislatures of the States are the mere instruments and servants of the people. Tiuy are created by the breath of the people of the States; and if one Legislature makes a law that the people do not like they elect somebody else, and it is corrected. So that under the present Constitution there is not the slightest danger in point of fact or practice that the power of electing these electors will ever be withdrawn from the will of the people of the several States; and no man, I venture to say, is more sensible of this fact than our honorable friend.

But that is not the purpose of the amendment when you get really at it. The purpose of the amendment is found in the last two lines: The Congress of the United States shall have power to regulate the manner of choosing electors.

Mr. BUCK ALB W"." Prescribe the man-

Mr. EDMUNDS. I do not profess to quote the language,' but the substance. The substance of it is, that Congress—the Senate and House of Representatives and President acting together—shall take the place of the Legislatures of the States, and at their will and discretion declare that one rule shall prevail in one State and another in another State, according to what? According to the political discretion of the party who happen to be in power; according to the political advantage that the party who happen to be in power preceding a presidential election may think they can obtain by changing an existing rule. That is the proposition. The proposition is to give to Congress the power, if a political majority here think they can gain anything by it, to declare that the electors in the State of Vermont shall be elected by districts, and to so adjust the districts that two Democrats and one Republican, or if it were us, now, who were to do it, according to political predilections, two Republicans and one Democrat, should compose the electors, and so on; and in the State of Pennsylvania, orin the State of New York, where we supposed we could carry it upon a general' ticket, then we would provide as to those that the manner of electing electors should be by a general ticket.

Senators may say that would not be equal. Certainly it would not; but there is nothing in the amendment which requires us to regulate and prescribe this manner by one uniform rule, such as the Constitution requires, as it respects bankruptcy and naturalization. We are not tied up by the proposition which the honorable Senator submits to any sentiment of equality, to any other sentiment than that of the mere political expediency and temptation of the moment. Would that be wise? I think not. Would it be just? It would not be just if the founders of this Government understood the subject that they undertook to deal upon when they prescribed in its original framework the method and channel by and through which the Chief Magistrate of the nation was to be elected. This was, it is true, a Constitution of the people; but the people, in making the Constitution, undertook to preserve to themselves as separate communities in States certain rights and powers, and among those rights and powers, and among the chief of them as the grand security of liberty and equality, was the provision that the President of the United States should be, in fact and substance, selected by the States, and not by the people as a whole body. That was their design; and they went so far in carrying out that design as to provide in the case of a disagreement among the electors that the President should be immediately elected by the House of Representatives by States, one vote for each State ana no more. But, sir, times advance, and w® find the ancient sticklers for State rights andfetate sovereignty, the chief and chosen leaders of the Democratic party, undertaking to break down and utterly ignore and abrogate this great supposed security for State rights and. State lib-. erty that the founders of the Constitution instituted. My honorable friend has referred, as an illustration of the dangers of the present system, to his observation in the South American Republics.- He tells us that wars and confusion and anarchy and revolution are the constant consequence of presidential elections there. I suppose they are. Are they the cOnstant consequence of presidential elections under such safeguards and provisions as we have? By no means. I. take it, although I do not speak from study, that in the chief of the South American republics the presidents are voted for by the people. If I am in error my honorable friend, who is familiar with their constitutions and history, will inform me. We, find, then, so far as observation and illustration will go, that in the very cases referred to by my friend of tumults and revolutions that have followed from presidential elections, they followed where the people themselves are brought in direct collision over the question of who shall be their choice. And it is so, necessarily, everywhere; and I have no. doubt that it was one of the chief motives of the wise men who framed this Constitution, in framing it as they did, that they would remove from the intense heat of the great fire of a whole nation of voters coming in personal collision to a calmer and serener tribunal selected by sections and States the decision of this great question. If there is anything in the illustration to which my friend has referred, and there is, it is the greatest possible proof of the wisdom of that decision.

If this be the principle upon which the people, in framing this Constitution, left it to the States to select the President, and for such wise reasons of State equality and peace, where is the ground to complain that it sometimes happens that the whole mass of the people by a majority do not have their choice? They have agreed to it. They have agreed to it for wise purposes of security to individual liberty and to local sovereignty and legislation. Where, then, is the ground of complaint? None whatever.

But the figures which my friend has presented here are somewhat delusive, it will be found on investigation. The great fact that appears in them arises largely from the existence of slavery in the States; that three fifths of a class of people, numerous, outnumbering the white population in some cases, are represented by a select and chosen and diminished class of voters; and, therefore, figures which are based upon such facts are altogether delusive in undertaking to show that minorities of the whole people have elected Presidents. It may be so, possibly, if that were left out; but whether so or not, gentlemen ought not to forget that that is a result which comes from the very principle upon which, the Government was founded by the people of the States, that the States or the people of the States, as such, rather than the whole mass of the people, should be intrusted with the choice of the Chief Magistrate of the nation.

I should be surprised and sorry indeed to see the Senate of the United States, the representatives of the States, undertake, in the light, of the experience we have had of the beneficent and peaceful operation of this clause of the Constitution, to strip themselves and the people whom they represent of that very power and safeguard and security that their forefathers had carefully put into the very framework and heart of the Constitution. We might then expect, truly, as is my friend s observation, in South America, that the heat and collision of the people in voting directly for President of the United States and bya general ticket would produce from the frauds and force and violence of such, conflicts arevolution almost every time that an election was close. It certainly has that tendency. All human experience—and my friend cannot point to a single exception— demonstrates that the danger to the stability of republican government is in the contests of the actual voters at the polls.

This is not an argument against the principles of republicanism and self goyernment but it is an argument in favor of reaching the will of the people by sections and divisions in a great nation, in order that each section and division may have a voice dependent somewhat upon its local power and its local independence, as well as upon the mere weight of its numbers, irrespective of intelligence or of virtue.

But, Mr. President, unprepared, as my friend was not, and unwilling to occupy the time of the Senate at this stage in the session, I only rose for the purpose of saying in a few words that I totally disagree to the ideas advanced by my friend touching the purpose which be wishes to accomplish.

Mr. WILSON. I feel constrained t0 vote, against the motion submitted by the Senator from Nevada. I had hoped, snchis theimportance o£ the subject, that early in the session Congress would have passed a constitutional amendment providing for the equality of citizens of the United States in their right to vote and their right to be voted for. But early action was not taken, and when the proposition came from the House of Representatives I thought it very imperfect. In the lights of to day it seems to me that we are putting in peril the rights and privileges of citizens in portions of the country. We are having a contest over the action of the State of Georgia. There the black man voted and was permitted to hold office. The Legislature, without raising the question as to their right to vote, raised the question as to their right to hold office, and turned out the colored members. That question is here, and Georgia is not represented in this body on account of that fact. Now, sir, the amendment of the House of Representatives leaves out the question of holding office. I should have been well content to take that amendment had it applied to holding office as well as to voting. The amendment that came from the Committee on the Judiciary, I think, was a far better one, for it provided not only for voting, but for holding office. I should be content to take that amendment. My own amendment to the Constitution, adopted by the Senate, I am sorry to find, is too broad, comprehensive, and just to be sustained by the country. Yes, sir, it is too broad, too "comprehensive, too generous, too liberal for the American .people of to day Rhode Island, Connecticut, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and some other States, desire, to preserve their own notions, even if their notions are contrary to the rights of citizens of the United States. The great object that we have in view is to give the right to vote and to be voted for io three quarters of a million of colored men.

Mr. PATTERSON, of New Hampshire. I should like to say to the gentleman that New Hampshire gives universal manhood suffrage, and always lias done so.

Sir. WILSON. But it so happens that New Hampshire does not give by her constitution the right tb a Roman Catholic to hold office in the State, although she does it by practical action. The constitutional amendment that we passed applied to that provision of her constitution.

Mr. President, I generally govern myself by this practical rule; to get whatever good I can get and advance as far as I can to day hoping to be able to advance further to morrow If I am not able to accomplish all I wish to day I will do what I can, and if 1 am not in the world to do what I want to do to morrow somebody else will be left to do it, I, should cordially concur in this motion to recede if it did not, in my judgment, give an encouragement to the men m Georgia who have smitten down colored representatives in the Legislature, and if it would not be an inspiration to that class of men, that while they must concede suffrage to three quarters of a million of colored men they may refuse to permit, them to sit on juries or to hold office. Believing that such would be its tendency, that it would have that effect, after what has taken place, if I vote alone I feel compelled to vote against this motion to recede. I regret this necessity that compels me to differ from honored friends, but duty impels me to do so. I feel that I am discharging a sacred duty—duty to my country and to the rights and interests of humanity.

It seems to me, sir, that this difficulty might be, easily settled; that the subject could be referred to a committee of conference, and we could have a single proposition reported securing the right to suffrage and the right to hold office, and providing that color, race, or previous condition of slavery should not be a test for voting or a qualification for holding office by .citizens of the United States in any part of the country. I wish the Senate would adopt that course. I believe that a committee of conference could agree upon a proposition, and that we might complete this great work, at any rate so far as to provide that race, color, or previous condition of slavery should never be made a test in any part of the country against any citizen of the United States for voting or for holding office. I think it would be better for the Senate to vote down this motion to recede, and then to insist on our amendment and join with the House in having a conference committee. If the committee fail, then we might take the House amendment. But, sir, this motion means simply that we shall take the House proposition as they sent it to us originally nothing more and nothing less. That proposition does not deny to the States the power to exclude citizens of the United States from the right to hold office on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery.

Mr. CONKLING. I inquire what the motion is?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The motion now is that the Senate recede from their amendment to the resolution of the House.

Mr. CONKLING. Simply. Now, Mr. President, I ask the attention of the honorable Senator from Massachusetts who has just taken his seat to that fact. If the motion were tha the Senate recede and concur in the amendment of the House, his remarks would be well founded.

Mr. STEWART. That was ray motion.

Mr. CONKLING. That, the Senator from Nevada says, was his motion. If it were so understood by the Chair I should ask him to change it to the motion as the Chair underdcrstands it, and I will suggest to him one reason. This amendment, in order to be consummate, as far as it is made so by the action of the two Houses, must be adopted by a twothirds vote of each House. We can recede from our amendment by a majority vote. Suppose now the motions were coupled, and as one motion it should prevail by a vote of a majority of the Senate, to wit, a majority of the Senate vote that we recede from our amendments and concur in the House proposition, that proposition will never have passed the Senate by a two thirds vote, as the honorable Senator from Nevada will see; whereas, if his motion is propounded as the Chair understands it, and as I am glad the Chair does understand it, as a motion simply to recede, the whole process becomes simple. Why? Because when we recede from our amendments the proposition of the House is before us subject to all the mutations to which it was subject originally. It is as if we had not adopted an amendment to it.

Mr. Pohbroy rose.

Mr. CONKLING. I ask the Senator to pardon me for one moment. I am aware, as the Chair lias ruled, that we cannot recede and concur in the House proposition with aa amendment in any form which would mate it an amendment to our amendment; and if Senators who seem inclined to rise wish to get me right on that point I beg to set myself right.

Mr. POMEROY. That is not the point.

Mr. CONKLING. My proposition is not that we can concur with an amendment to ouramendment, or adhere with an amendment to our amendment; it is that we can recede from, our amendment; and that having done that, we can concur in the House proposition wita such an amendment as we choose. I do not state this without having reflected upon it and without having reflected upon the distinction 5 and I call the attention 01 Senators and of the Chair to the statement of it in Jefferson s Manual.

Mr. POMEROY. Page 223.

Mr. CONKLING. The Senator has looked at it undoubtedly. I have no doubt that he has; and if he will allow me to repeat what I was saying——

Mr. POMEROY. A Senator behind me inquired what page it was.,

Mr. CONKLING. I beg pardon. I read from Jefferson s Manual this statement:-

"Either House may recede from its amendment and agree to the bill; or recede from their disagreement to the amendment, and agree to the same absolutely, or with an amendment; for here the disagreement and receding destroy one another, and the subject stands as before the disagreement."

And so, further:

"But the House cannot recede from or insist on its own amendment with an amendment"— Certainly not—

"for the same reason that it cannot send to the other House an amendment to its own £iet after it has passed the act. They may modify an amendment from the other House by ingrafting an amendment on it, because they have never sent it to it; but they cannot amend their own amendment, because they have, on the question, passed it in that form."

Citingaprecedent in the Senate, among other precedents. So, sir, this is my proposition, if Senators will pardon me for restating it: that it is competent for the Senate to recede from its amendment, and that leaves the House proposition as it was before us originally, and Senators who cannot vote for it without modification will then have the opportunity to modify it. i can vote for it as it came from, the House, for one; and I hope that we may vote for it in that form so as to concentrate the two thirds vote requisite upon it, and so as to end, if possible, the debate which has already dragged so much. I am very free to say on that question, while I am up, that I prefer the proposition as it came from the House to the proposition as it ultimately became, as I think rather by accident and by weariness than by design, by the action of the Senate.

Mr. FERRY. I desire to correct what seems to me to be an error into which both the Chair and the Senator from New York have fallen. I heard the motion of the Senator from Nevada, and nnderstoodit to be clearly a motion to recede and concur. The Senator from Nevada can state whether I am correct.

Mr. CONKLING. If the Senator will allow me, anybody can call for a division of that motion, and therefore it would lead to the same thing. It has two members, both of them substantive, and we can vote on them separately.

Mr. FERRY. I wish to know from the Senator from Nevada what is the motion; whether I understood him aright?-

Mr. STEWART. My motion was to recede and concur.

Mr. FERRY. That was and is the motion.

Mr. CONKLING. Of course the motion is under the control of the Senator. He can modify it now if he chooses, and he can splice the two motions to recede and to concur; and' if he thinks it wise to do so, so be it. But I propound to him this inquiry: if, the Chair having submitted the motion to the yeas and nays, it turn out that a majority only vote in favor of that motion, where do we stand? Obviously, it seems to me, in a confusion, in an anomalous condition; because the act of passing the amendment is not. consummate unless it lias a two thirds vote whereas the act ftf receding from our own amendment is eotophfee when more than a majority of those voting sustain that side.

Mr. STEWART. I do not care for the vote to recede to succeed unless the vote to concur also succeeds, because I am thoroughly satisfied that if this matter is to go back to the House of Representatives and is opened again to amendment here the time of the session will not permit us to pass any constitutional amendment. And here let me say to the Senator from Massachusetts that I, with him, am very anxious that the right to hold office should also be included in this proposition. I appreciate the embarrassment in Georgia as much as he does. But I think if we let this session pass without doing anything, which will probably be the result if it is thrown open again to amendment, we shall lose everything. I should like to have the question taken on the motions together, because if we recede and then throw it open to amendment, and spend two or three days in proposing all sorts of amendments, and then have it go back to the House, we shall probably lose the whole proposition. Without occupying any time, I appeal to the friends of the proposition to stand by it as it came from the House, and let us terminate it here and get something, make some progress; because if we fail in this effort we shall fail altogether. I ask the friends of the measure to stick by it now until we get a vote; and while I am on my feet I will move that the order for a recess be rescinded.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That order can be recinded by unanimous consent.

Mr. POMEROY. We may reach the vote by four o clock and it is not necessary to rescind it at this moment.

Mr. STEWART. We had better do it now.

Mr. SHERMAN. I think we can have the vote before four o clock I desire to say a word on this subject if I have the floor.

Mr. POMEROY. I desire to say a word on the question of order.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore.■ Is there any objection to putting the question on the motion to rescind the order for a recess

Mr. VICKERS. I object.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Objection being made, the motion cannot be entertained.

Mr. POMEROY. Itisquitaimportantthat when we do take a vote on this question we take it intelligently and under the rules of the Senate, because there is a good deal of importance attached to the question whether we do pass this amendment in a constitutional manner and according to our own rules. We may have different views, although I think we can all agree with the Senator from Nevada in our anxiety to perfect and pass the measure and to stick by it, as he says, until it is passed. But I apprehend that the moment you recede from the Senate amendments that moment you have agreed to the House proposition. There is no such thing as receding and agreeing, because it you present to the Senate a proposition that you will now agree to the amendment of the House, that is open to amendment. You cannot bring the proposition of the House here and ask me to vote upon it unless I have the right to amend it. That simple statement proves the absurdity of the position of the Senator from New York that there are two questions, one of receding and one of concurring. There is but one question, and the moment you have receded from the Senate amendments you have passed the House proposition. Technically that proposition has passed by a two thirds vote. The Senator says not. It passed by a two thirds vote in this way: when you sent over to the House the aetionof the Senate you sent the resolution over by a two thirds vote. You sent it over, to be sure, amended; but it passed this body by a two thirds vote.

Mr. CONKLING. Will my friend allow me to ask mm a .question?

Mr. POMEROY. -Certainly.

Mr. CONKLING. Was not that vote expressly on striking it out- snck inserting som6" thing else?,

Mr. POMEROY. No', sir; it was not. So, that if we intend to adhere strictly to the parliamentary law on this subject there is only one motion that can be put, and that is to recede; and if the Senate recedes from its amendments, then the House proposition is adopted, and in strict parliamentary law it is adopted by a twothirds vote, although we may recede from our amendment by a majority vote. I admit that it would be more in conformity to popular ideas to take another vote, and then vote to adopt the House proposition; but the moment you have introduced that I can get up and move to amend it, and it is open to amendment.- You cannot produce a proposition from the House here and ask me to vote upon it when it is not subject to amendment. Therefore the proposition to recede and concur is a false proposition, and cannot be voted upon under the rules of the Senate.

Mr. MORTON. I have great respect for the opinion of the Senator from Kansas on questions of order and every other question, and for the opinions of others with whom I have consulted; but, sir, the Constitution requires that any amendment of the Constitution submitted to the States shall have the approval of two thirds of each House. I ask if that constitutional requirement can be obviated by any technicality of rule o r any kind of jugglery that can be resorted to in the way of rules? I submit that it cannot; that we cannot lay before the States a constitutional amendment for them to ratify except it shall have the approval of two thirds of each House, that being the constitutional requirement; and that that requirement cannot be obviated or overcome by any parliamentary law or rule that may be adopted. Now, Mr. President, the House proposition has not received the concurrence of two thirds of the members of the Senate. If we shall recede from our amendment by a simple majority, then the question comes up on the House proposition. It we shall agree to it by twothirds of the votes of the Senate, then it is a proposition to go before the States. But, sir, if we shall hold that by merely receding from the amendments of the Senate the House proposition is adopted, what is the practical effect? That we submit an amendment to the Constitution to the several States when the Senate of the United States has never voted on the proposition either by two thirds or by a majority, but has simply by a majority receded from its own amendments which were a very different thing. We cannot overcome the Constitution of the United States in that way.

Now, Mr. President, I desire to say one word in explanation of the vote I am about to give. I voted for the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. Wilson,] which was adopted by the Senate. I believed it a better proposition than the one that came from the House. But I am satisfied that we cannot obtain the Senate amendments, and therefore I am willing to take one that is not so good, in my opinion, rather than to have the whole measure fail. The great central idea is, that the colored people shall not be debarred from the right of suffrage on account of color, race, or previous condition of slavery. While I should be glad to accompany it with some other restrictions upon the power of the States as to restricting the right of suffrage, still I am willing to take the House amendment because it does cover the main idea.

In regard to the amendment originally proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. Buckalew] for the reformation of the electoral colleges, I am in favor of it. I have not heard an argument that goes against the merits of that proposition. The argument of the Senator from Vermont [Mr. Edmunds] was able and ingenious. But when he told us that the election of electors by a State Legislature was an expression of the popular will, and that it could not be wrong so far as the popular feeling of the State is concerned, I do not concur with him. Under the Constitution as it now stands it was entirely competent for a Legislature elected in 186 7 without any reference to the presidential election', to have elected elect^ ors to cast the vote of the State for President in 1868. Would that have been an expression of the popular will? And yet it is competent far any State to do that under the Constitution as it now stands. When the Senator from Vermont tells us that the concluding part of that amendment, which gives to Congress the power to prescribe the manner in which the people shall choose electors, is a dangerous power, my answer is that' it is just the same power that Congress now has to prescribe the manner in which members of the House of Representatives shall be elected—no greater, and no less.

But, Mr. President, while I am in favor of that amendment, I am not willing to hazard the- main question' by insisting that it shall become a part of the constitutional amendment submitted to the people. I have reason to believe that the House will not concur in that amendment. That amendment is not of a party character, and I believe it will be submitted and adopted hereafter. It commends itself to the good judgment of the American people, and 1 believe that hereafter men of all parties will support it. I am not willing, therefore, to risk the adoption of a constitutional amendment on the main question even by attaching to it one so good as that proposed by the Senator from Pennsylvania. I am therefore willing to waive my views in regard to the superior character of the amendment offered by the Senator from Massachusetts, [Mr. Wilson,] and of the great value of the one offered by the Senator from Pennsylvania. I am willing to recede from the Senate amendments, and I then want a vote taken squarely upon the amendment presented to us by the House. I believe that under the Constitution we cannot submit that to the States until it has received a majority of two thirds of each body. We cannot by any jugglery of rules or parliamentary law evade the requirement which requires it to receive a majority of two thirds of each body.

Mr. SHERMAN. I do not wish to consume time, and do not intend to do so, because I am willing to vote for this amendment in any form. But I think it would be better to take the ordinary course and send this question to a committee of conference, and then allow any debate to spring up on the report of the committee. The only points of disagreement between the two Houses are, first, as to whether the amendment shall embrace the question of holding office, and second, whether it shall extend the discrimination to questions of alienage, &c., beyond color. I do not care to enter into that debate. I shall vote to send it to a committee of conference iu the ordinary way, and I believe that will expedite the passage of the constitutional amendment. I rose

Mr. POMEROY. I should like to inquire of the Senator how he is going to vote to do that under this motion that is pending?

Mr. SHERMAN. I propose, before I sit down, to explain that. I will move that the Senate insist on its amendment and agree to the conference asked by the House.

Mr. FESSENDEN. That is not in order.

Mr. SHERMAN. It is perfectly in order.

Mr. POMEROY. The motion to recede takes preference.

Mr. SHERMAN.' Certainly it does. Bufe if the Senate should vote down the motion to recede as a matter of course the question will come up on the motion to insist; and it is plainly the right, under the parliamentary law, if a motion is made to recede from the Senate amendment and to agree to the House proposition for any member of the Senate to call for a division of the motion and to take the vote on the motion to recede. That can be done by a majority. Then the motion to agree still remains, and that can be passed by a vote of two thirds.

Mr. HENDRICKS. I should like to ask the Senator this question, inasmuch as I have great respect for his opinion on questions of parliamentary law: how a majority of this body can recede, which is tantamount to a vote to reconsider, from a proposition that was adopted, and could only be adopted, by a twothirds vote? How can a majority overcome the action of two thirds?

Mr. SHERMAN. Because there is nothing in parliamentary law that requires two thirds to adopt an amendment to a proposition passed by either House. The Constitution requires on the adoption of a constitutional amendment that two thirds shall agree to it; but on all questions of parliamentary form only a majority is required, unless the rule expressly requires two thirds and the Senate can propose by a majority vote any amendment to any proposition sent to us from the House of Representatives. In this case the parliamentary law laid down in Jefferson s Manual is very plain.

The questions respecting amendments from another House are, first, to agree; second! disagree.”

Those are opposite motions, and therefore the adoption of one precludes the adoption of the other. Then the next motion is, "third, recede; fourth, insist.’’ As a matter of course those are opposite motions. If the motion to recede is carried, the motion to insist fails. If the motion to insist prevails, the motion to recede fails. But when motions to agree and to recede are made together, they are motions that are plainly divisible. A majority may carry the motion to recede; and yet to agree to the House proposition the Constitution requires a majority of two thirds. That being this case, I ask for a division of the question as presented by the Senator from Nevada, so that the question shall be first taken 011 the precedent motion to recede, and if that is carried by a majority, as a matter of course, the question to agree will require a two thirds vote. That will enable us to vote on this question understanding^. If his motion to recedefails, I will then submit a motion, or let him do it, as it is his place to do it, having charge of this subject, to insist and agree to the conference asked by the House.

Mr. HOWARD. I rise to make an inquiry of the Chair. I understand the motion now on the part of the Senate is to recede from its amendments to the House resolution. Now, suppose the Senate recedes from the amendments which it has made, I inquire of the Chair whether such a vote would have the effect of the adoption by the Senate of the House resolution?

Several Senators. No, no.

Mr. POMEROY. I desire to have the decision- of the Chair on that question.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. If it was a joint resolution of the House that did not require a two thirds vote, or a bill passed by the House to which we had added an amendment, if the Senate receded from, its amendment, it would pass the bill; but this being a constitutional amendment, it requires a twothirds vote, and therefore the question is somewhat complicated. We have passed a great many bills here in the course of the session where we receded from our own amendments, and then the bill itself was passed as it came from the House, and that was the end of it.

Mr. HOWARD. Undoubtedly; but in this special case I concur entirely in the opinion of the Senator, from Indiana, that we ought to come to a direct vote upon the question of adopting or concurring, in the resolution of the House, so as to give the country the fact, if Such exists, that two thirds of this body do approve of this proposed amendment.

Mr. SHERMAN. TheSenator from Nevada makes a double motion. A vote must be taken on both branches of that motion when a divisi ion is asked foe, and, consequently there is no nal vote. He makes a motion to recede and to agree. We take the question first on- the tuotioa to recede, wkiph is one half of his motion.

Mr. HOWARD. Then the motion indivisible.

Mr. SHERMAN.- It is divisible. Then we take a vote on the motion to agree, which requires a two thirds vote. There is no difficulty in coming at it.

Mr. EDMUNDS. I wish to make a simple suggestion on this question of order. I do not suppose I shall enlighten anybody, but it seems to me to be so very free from any difficulty in a mere parliamentary sense that I cannot forbear making a suggestion. We have agreed by a two thirds vote to the resolution of the House in form and in substance with a proposition to the House of Representatives to amend that resolution by substituting other words in the place of it. So stands the Journal; so stand the books; so stands the substance. It is just like a bill. We have, therefore, already agreed to the resolution of the House proposing the amendment in their form to the Constitution by the necessary constitutional majority; but we have proposed, as coupled with that, another proposition to the House of Representatives. They do not agree to it. Now itcomes back, anda motion is made to recedeandagree. That is no other motion in reality, in a parliamentary sense, than a mere motion to recede, because, as the Chair has stated with entire propriety, and there is no precedent or rule to the contrary anywhere, receding from the proposed amendment to the resolution to which you have agreed with that amendment leaves the resolution standing as agreed to without any further action of the body, and without the power of any further action. The Senator from Nevada has put his motion in that way in order to have the Senate perceive by that vote, and in order to have the country perceive by that vote, if we can vote after all, that in real substance two thirds do agree in point of fact to the resolution of the House, because in point of fact, in effect, we have not agreed to that resolution; in point of law we have agreed to it by the necessary two thirds.

Mr. WARNER. I should like to ask the Senator from Vermont how he knows, how the Senate knows, that Senators would have voted for the House proposition by itself?

Mr. EDMUNDS. I know it in this way: I know that Senators have voted for the House proposition, and I assume that every Senator knew the law under which he did vote; and therefore I assume that every Senator who voted for the House proposition with the amendments, if he chooses to recede from the amendments, understands that he is willing to waive the propositions of amendment he has made to it and let it stand as it is.

Mr. WARNER. I should like to ask the Senator one other question. Suppose that the Senate amendment had been to strike out the whole of the House proposition and put in a different proposition, how, then, would he know that Senators would have voted for the original proposition?

Mr. EDMUNDS. That is just what the Senate amendment was, and every Senator in voting for the House proposition with this proposition of amendment agreed to it with that modification. Now, if a Senator chooses to abandon that modification that is his affair, .not mine.

Mr. POMEROY. I desire to address a single question to the Senator from Ohio who has spoken on the subject of parliamentary law. The Senator from Ohio tells us that we can vote to recede, and then afterward vote to concur iu the House proposition. I ask him when the proposition arises simply to concur in the House proposition, is that open to amendment?

Mr. SHERMAN. Unquestionably it is in parliamentary law. But what is the use of discussing such questions? We shall never pass this constitutional amendment if we go off on collateral questions of order that are not involved in it.

Mr. POMEROY. This is involved in the ■case precisely. The Senator says that voting to recede from our amendment does not pass the House resolution. Then the House resolution is open tousthe same as though wehad never passed it. There is no parliamentary law in that.

Mr. HENDRICKS. I should like to know, and I think it is right that we should know in advance, what is the effect of this vote? If to recede is to pass the whole resolution, then, of course, we must recede by a two thirds majority, else you can amend the Constitution of the United States by a less vote than two thirds of the Senate. The Senate does not concur in the House proposition. On the contrary, the Senate has said it would not concur but would change it; and the Senate did change it, and having changed it adopted its proposition by two thirds. Now, by abandoning our proposition in some way or other two thirds o£ the Senate have agreed to that. That will not- do. I understand that there are a great many precedents on this subject, and that they are uniform in the Senate, that on an ordinary bill at this stage if the Senate recede from its amendment that is the end of it.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It passes the bill of the House.

Mr. HENDRICKS.' It passes the bill Land that is also the practice of the House of Representatives. It is queer; but if it is established parliamentary law of course when Senators or members of the House vote to recede they vote for that result. But, Mr. President, if we now vote to recede with the understanding that the effect of that vote is to be to pass the House proposition, then I insist, upon the Constitution itself, that we recede by a vote of two thirds. The records of this body show that the body has not concurred by a two thirds vote in the proposition of the House. The record of the Senate shows that we have disagreed to that by changing it. When we change it we say it is not agreeable to us. When we say it is not agreeable to us we vote that we will not agree to it. By amending it we express our dissent. Then to withdraw our amendments, and to say that a majority vote shall pass the proposition, is to say that a majority in the Senate can so express the will of this body 83 to amend the Constitution of the United States, which is in the face of the Constitution itself. Now, if we are to hold that to recede is to pass the resolution, I insist that we can only recede by a vote of, two thirds- ["Agreed!"

"Agreed!"]

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair can see no difficulty in having a direct vote on a division of the question; but if it is coupled together

Mr. STEWART. I will modify it to save discussion, and ask the Senate to recede and let us get a vote on that. [‘‘No!’’ Nof J Well, I will let the motion stand, and let a division be had on it.

Mr. DOOLITTLE. I have no doubt that the view taken by the honorable Senator from. Vermont is correct. We have agreed to the proposition of the House, namely, to submit an amendment to the Constitution. True, we varied in the amendment we proposed to submit from the House; but we agreed in the main proposition to amend the Constitution. The House disagreed to our amendment. The proposition comes back to the Senate, and if we now recede from our amendment we pass the resolution, if it is passed, by a two thirds vote, just precisely as if there came ii oin the House of Representatives an appropriation bill to appropriate 5 000 000 for the support of the Army, and the Senate should amend it by saying," We agree to the bill, provided it shall be §3 000 000 and it goes to the House, and the House disagree to our amendment reducing it to 3 000 000 and it comes back to the Senate, and the Senate recede from their amendment; they pass the bill; so that this question of receding is the very essence of this proceeding in a parliamentary point of view and I insist, as the Senator from Indiana does, that in order to recede, which is to pass the resolution, it must be by a twitted® vote of the Senate; otherwise we do mat comply, with the Constitution.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Will the Senator from Nevada state exactly what his proposition is?

Mr. STEWART. It is to recede.

Mr. WARNER. I ask if it is to recede from all the Senate amendments?•

Mr. STEWART. To recede from our disagreement.

Mr. POMEROY. I hope the Senator will state his motion as he desires it to be put. There is some importance in it.

Mr. STEWART. My motion is to recede from our disagreement from the amendments that we made and agree to the House proposition.

Mr. SHERMAN. Then I call for a division of the question.

Mr. POMEROY. May I inquire whether, after we have voted to recede upon the question, then to agree to the proposition of the House, it is open to amendment?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. I think not.

Mr. SHERMAN.' "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair cannot decide questions in anticipation.

Mr. HENDRICKS. I do not choose to adopt the sentiment of the Senator from Ohio, that

"sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

If it be the fixed lavv of thisbody by immemorial usage that to recede from the Senate amendment passes the resolution we ought to know it now, because that vote, in my judgment, can only be by two thirds.

Mi'. MORTON. Is it possible that a vote to recede from an entirely different proposition from that of the House is to be regarded as a vote concurring in the proposition of the House?

Mr. SHERMAN. Certainly not.

Mr. MORTON. Let us have the vote on the motion.

Mr. HENDRICKS. It is not a question of possibility, allow me to say to my colleague, it is a question of law, and 1 understand it has been possible to make very many laws in that very way, and they stand on the statute books now. By receding they became the law.

Mr. EDMUNDS. Certainly; the Journals are full of them. I have got my finger on one

Mr. DIXON. I wish to say one word on this question whether a vote to recede passes the resolution. I understand that to be the question. In ordinary cases it is agreed that it does; and why? Because we agree to a bill with an amendment; we pass a bill with an amendment; the House refuse to concur in the passage of the bill with the amendment; and then we recede from the amendment; that is, we pass the bill without the amendment. That is the meaning of it when a bill is offered. t Mr. MORTON. The last vote will cure it anyhow.

Mr. STEWART. I move that the recess be dispensed with. I presume there will be no objection this time.

Several Senators. Oh, no; there is time enough to dispose of this subject.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senate can entertain the motion to rescind the rule providing for a meeting this evening only by unanimous consent. Is there any objection to putting the question on that motion?

Mr. VICKERS: I object.

Mr. STEWART. Then I move temporarily to lay the constitutional amendment aside for the purpose of making a motion.

Mr. VICKERS. I object to that.

^r,\ STEWART. I can move to lay this matter on "the table until we settle the recess

I make that motion.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The quesSorii \st011 motion to lay the resolution on the table.

The motion was agreed to.