February 17, 1869

Mr. STEWART. I move that the Senate take up the message from the House of Representatives asking for a conference on the constitutional amendment.

Mr. THAYER. The morning business is in order, and I wish to introduce a bill. I have been trying for half an hour to get an opportunity to do so.

Mr. STEWART. This is a privileged question.

Mr. THAYER. The morning business is privileged.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is on the motion of the Senator from Nevada.

The motion was agreed to.

The action of the House of Representatives was read, as follows:

In theHouse of Representatives, February 15 1869 Iteaolved, That the House non concur in the amendments of the Senate to the joint resolution (H. R. No. 402) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and ask a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon.-

Ordered, That Mr. Botttwdll, Mr. Shellabarger, and Mr. Eldkidob be the committee on the part of the House.

Mr. STEWART. I move that the Senate insist on its amendments, and agree to the conference asked by the House of Representatives.

Mr. WILLIAMS. When the military reconstruction bill was passed the same proceeding occurred in reference to that bill as occurred iu reference to this resolution. The House disagreed to the amendment proposed by the Senate, and suggested a committee of conference. I had the honor then to have charge of that bill, and proposed that the Senate agree to the coBafcittee of conference; birt It was then declared by Senators all around me that that was altogether a matter too important to be referred to a committee of conference, and that ths subject should be considered -and decided in open Senate. If that Mil was of so much consequence as not to be a proper one to be referred to a committee of Conference it appears to me that this constitutional amendment certainly is liable to the same argument; and I suggest that it will be altogether new, I think, in the history of this country that a constitutional amendmentshould be framed by a committee -of conference. So far as I am concerned I am opposed to it.

Mr. CONNESS. Mr. President

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine.• I ask for the order of the day.

Mr. CONNESS. This is a privileged question.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The morning hour has expired.

Mr. STEWART. I beg pardon; this is a privileged question which supersedes the order of the day.--•

The PRESIDENT The report of the committee of conference is a privileged question..

Mr. HENDRICKS. This is not a privileged question.

Mr. STEWART. The motion for a committee of conference is a privileged question.

Mr. CONNESS. I understand the Chair to have decided the question, and I have the floor. I wish to say in reply to the honorable Senator from Oregon, for a moment, that I remember the occasion that he cites very well, but the objection at that time to referring the subjectmatter to a committee of conference of both Houses was not alone because it was a great and important issue, but because of the then existing differences on that subject among the majority of the Senate, which had been debated and discussed by them, and those disagreements being well known andunderstood itwasdeemed by the Senate best not to commit their consideration to a committee of conference. I agree with the Senator that ordinarily or generally it were better that constitutional amendments should not go to a conference; but when Houses divide widely there is no way of avoiding it as a means of settlement and adjustment; and we can determine when the report of the committee of conference shall be presented to us whether the adjustment and settlement arrived at will be acceptable or not. I hope that the Senate will consent to the appointment of the conference.

Mr. POMEROY. I suppose it is in order to agree to this request of the House for a committee of conference, or to disagree or to recede.- I wish to ask the Chair whether it would be in order to recede with an amendment?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. No; that is not in order.

Mr. HENDRICKS. The Senator from California assumes

Mr. CONKLING. I ask the Senator, before he begins, to allow us to understand the question. Did the Chair say that it was not in order to recede with an amendment?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair did so inform the Senate.

Mr. CONKLING. I did not hear the de cisiou.

Mr. EDMUNDS. That is the law, unquestionably.

Mr. HENDRICKS. The Senator from California assumed that the Chair had decided that this particular business has preference over other business of the Senate. I ask the Attention of the Chair to this consideration: this is not a report from a committee of conference, but it is the action of the House of Representatives sent back to the Senate for the Senate s consideration; and in that stage I have never known it to be held that it had priority over other business. It is simplythe information communicated by the Hou e of Representatives that the House does wt «cw cur in the amendments the Senate hss made to its proposition, and asking the Senate to consent to refer them to a committee. So when it comes up the question is, shall the resolution be referred upon the suggestion of the House? and" I insist that that is not a privileged question and that the previous business has priority.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The recollection of the Chair is, that all that pertains to committees Of conference, both agreeing to the report Of the committee and a motion on a message from the other House asking the Senate to appoint a committee of conference, are privileged questions. The Chair may be wrong, and he will take the sense of the Senate upon the question if it is desired.

Mr. STEWART. I will simply say that if we cannot have the conference

Mr. FERRY and Mr. CONNESS. Let as vote on the conference.

Mr. STEWART. Very well.

Mr. BUCKALEW. Mr. President, I suppose W& are now at a stage of the proceedings of Congress on this constitutional amendment where it is necessary to take a final view of the subject. A proposition was formed by the House of Representatives and sent to us. A different proposition was formed by the Senate and sent to the House. The House proposition was to establish a new or a uniform rule of suffrage throughout the United States which should be applicable to Federal and State elections, and its main object was to permit colored suffrage in all the States. The Senate proposition, the one which after consideration was preferred by this body and was sent by it to the House of Representatives, was much more comprehensive. It applied not only to the question of suffrage in the several States, but also to the question of holding office. It proposed to a certain extent to regulate the right of suffrage in the States, whether for State or national purposes, and also to prescribe a rule under which all State and Federal officers should hereafter be held.

Now, sir, it is proposed that these propositions, made respectively by the House and the Senate, shall be turned over for farther consideration to a committee of three members from each House, who will have power to agree with each other to accept either the House or the Senate proposition, or to report anew one compounded of both or consisting in its leading features of the one proposition and other features borrowed from the other, and possibly also with the interjection of new matter not heretofore considered in either House or passed upon by either House.

Described in general terms, then, what will this committee of conference have before them? Two great questions, questions of transcendent importance in this country, where government rests upon the will and consent of the people. They will bavetheimportant question of suffrage both for the States and for this Government in their hands and measurably under their control, because whatever form they may give to their proposition it must be adopted by each House as it is reported, or rejected in toto; it cannot be amended. They will have also before them the question of the qualification for holding office under the governments of the respective States and measurably also under the Government of the United States.

Now, Sir, here will be a singular condition of things raised by the former action of this body on this particular point. This committee of conference will have control over the question of qualification for holding office in the respective States, and may report to us a distinct and complete rule extending to the question of nativity, of religious belief, of race or color, and of property, while provisions upon some of these particulars in the Constitution of the United States, as to Federal officials, will remain unchanged. You may prescribe to a State a rule which will exclude her altogether from requiring particular qualifications of persons holding office under her constitution and laws, and yet your own Federal Constitution, under which you act, prajfei# Similar quaMeatibhS, standing there as pet'-* manetit features of your Federal system.

It follows, Mr. President, from what I have already said, that these •subjects are of great importance, and that the motion now made by the Senator from Nevada deserves and demands most careful consideration before we assent to' it and turn over these questions to three members of each House of Congress, selected' Irr the Presiding" Officers and empowered to m shape and arrange the features of the propose! amendment that the two Houses will be compelled to take the proposition as they make it entire,' under peril of giving up altogether the question of amending the Constitution under a resolution passed at this session. Yes, sir we are invited, challenged, to debate (his subject of constitutional amendment now, to consider it and to understand it thoroughly now before we abdicate our authority and jurisdiction over it, and transfer them to a committee of conference selected at hazard or according to the accident of the individual preferences of the Presiding Officers of the respective uodics, for whom, by the way, as gentlemen and as statesmen, I have entire respect.

What necessity—nay, sir, what reason of public policy is there in favor of a proposition for extending the authority of this Government and the amendment power of the Constitution to the question of qualification to hold office under a State constitution?

Mr. STEWART. If the Senator will give way to me, I will withdraw the motion and make another.

Mr. BUCKALEW. What is it that is proposed?

Mr. STEWART. I propose to move to recede from our amendment and concur in the House resolution.

Mr. BUCKALEW. I will go on with my remarks with the advantage of information as to the motion which we are to vote upon.

I have noticed, sir, for several years that upon political issues which appear herein Congress, whether in the form of propositions to amend the Constitution of the United States, or in the forms of ordinary legislation, whether by bill or joint resolution, the House of Representatives always insists that its particular views shall prevail, and in nine cases oattif ten the House has its way; its will and its opinions prevail; and it is very possible now that upon this question of amending the Constitution, or rather of forming a proposition of amendment, the House of Representatives, according to the accepted practice of Congress for many years upon political questions, will again prevail. Formerly* a member of that House, a man of peculiar mental organization, and in point of fact exercising upon particular classes of questions a sort of mastership in the House, had his will uniformly gratified either by direct concession of the Senate or by an arrangement in a committee of conference, of which he was ordinarily himself a member. This thing was so constant, was repeated SO often, that at last I came to expect it as a matter of course that whenever there was a question relating in any way to politics or involving political considerations the House or the man who controlled the House would eventually have it his own way; voting it down or amending it would amount to little or nothing, for sooner or later, and whether the Senate would be reluctant or willing, the will of the House and of the man who gave direction to the action of the House was sure to prevail.

There was apparently at one time a notable exception to this. A bill was sent over here from the House for military governments in the southern States. After a prolonged debate here in the Senate a proposition for reconstruction was attached to it as a Senate amendment; but it was comparatively a liberal measure in its first form. It was not very unacceptable to many of those who were opposed to the SoHtical ow, sir, majority. a superficial It went observer back to ont the of House. doors might say that the House courteously agreed to put reconstruction oil; that military bill; but if you will trace the history of that measure you will find that the Senate amendment was changed until it lost the essential features which it Bore when it left this Chamber. As it finally passed it w s .another and a different measure, and ft has Kj d ntbpr and different effects from those which were originally contemplated for it. Besides, as a compensation for that illusory concession by the House, another bill was got up a supplement, and passed only fcwlenty one days afterward, to wit, on the 23d of, March 1867 by which all the liberal features of the reconstruction act of the 2d o£ Harcti were struck down, and for them .were substituted rigid rules of exclusion from suffrage in the South and extended power and authority to the military commanders in that region.

If, therefore sir on the present occasion the, Senate shall conclude to take back all that it has done upon this subject, to withdraw, itsproposition entirely from the field of debate and from the field of action, and assent to what was originally proposed by Iho House, if gentlemen conclude to bend their wills to the will of the House their opinions to the opinion of the House, it will be in exact accord and in perfect consistency with the political history of Congress, for, the last half dozen years, and it will be; another -proof added tomany farmer ones that in -this country the ideas which obtain in Parliament as to the relative importance of the two Houses are year after year to obtain more and more completely. There, sir, in Parliament, although the theory of the Constitution of Great Britain is that the House of Lords shall participate in legislation, and it has always been conceded even by the Commons that it has power to amend bills, yet whenever the House of Commons has made up its mind to insist upon a measure the upper House must give way. They cannot resist the demand of the Commons when that demand ispersisted in, and why? Because the House of Commons represents the people of Great Britain; the House of. Lords represents only a caste or a class of population; the voice of the British nation is heard through the lower House, and is heard through it alone. The upper House is a sort of consulting body, and it has certain judicial functions imposed upon it by the British system; but itis not, in point of fact, an efficient member of the legislative body. The Senate ofthe United States by its course and conduct upon all questions bearing a political complexion now (or many years past, and by the action proposed to it upon this measure before us, is to subside into the position of a House of Lords in this country; is not t 5 be taken as representing the majesty of our great political Commonwealths called States, or as representing in any sense the voice of that mighty people whose tides of population are swelling from ocean to ocean by many millions in each decade of our progress. No, sir; it is to subside into a body of consultation with whom the popular branch of Congress may confer occasionally by committees of conference and by messages through its Clerk, but it is to have no efficient, actual, thorough, realized power in this Government to control and direct the action of its political department.

Well, sir, of course upon this suffrage amendment it is not for me to speak the voice ofthe majority in this Chamber, nor shall I assume to nwself the privilege, although I might do so, of advising the majority as to the course which they shall pursue. Daring the former consideration of this resolution of amendment, I within for reasons which appeared to me sumcient. I thought, sir, a prolonged debate upon the question of colored suffrage in this country was not required in either House of Congress at this time. By prolonged and exhaustive debate upon that subject we should enlighten nobody. The people in all parts of our country understand that subject just as well as we do. It has been made, to some extent at least, an issue between parties, and debate upon it has gone through all our communities in all parts of the country, and it seems, therefore, work of supererogation here in Congress to debate it anew. Therefore, sir, I have, refrained from entering into general debate upon that subject.

I must, however, mention a single point raised by the amendment— I mean the amendment proposed by the House of Representatives—and that is, that it proposes to establish a rule of suffrage for the States in regard to their domestic economy, in regard to the exercise of. political rights by their people, in regard to the matters which concern themselves. It seems to me, sir that if Congress and three fourths of the States that possess this amending power are to act in the direction of changing the Constitution of the United States on the subject ofc suffrage, they ought -to confine themselves to those aspects of it which are Federal; to prescribing a rule of suffrage which shall affect, and affect only, the election of Representatives to the lower House of Congress and the election of electors of President and Vice President of the United States, for these are the only elections in which the whole country and the country in its united capacity is at all concerned or interested. At least there is no such concern or interest directly involved in popular elections beyond this point. Local power and local interests might be left entirely untouched by Federal authority or by the amendment power of the Constitution while an entire and complete regulation could be secured as to elections in which the States in common in their united capacity are interested. Mr. President, the Senator from Nevada informs us that he proposes to submit a motion that the Senate recede from the amendments which it has made to this joint resolution. The effect of that motion, if successful, will be, as I have already explained, to give the House of Representatives its own way upon the subject of suffrage. We should, by the success of that motion, take the proposition as it was originally framed by that House and cast aside altogether the labor bestowed upon this resolution for the purpose of perfecting it, But his motion would have the additional effect of displacing the proposed sixteenth article of amendment which was adopted by the Senate; which has never been deliberately considered in the House; which has not been passed upon by that branch; but which, having been agreed to by the Senate, is worth consideration anew now that it is proposed or will be proposed by the motion of the Senator from Nevada to drop it. Of course in the House hurried votes were taken on the subject of the amendments made by the Senate, and this second proposition of amendment in the resolution, I repeat, was not deliberately passed upon by the House. Now, Mr. President, I shall occupy a few minutes in speaking to that second amendment, and what I have to say upon it I trust will be thought instructive in this Chamber and outside of this Chamber, because it will involve some considerations that have not been in debate and which yetare, inmyjudgment, most important.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. With the permission ot the Senator, as he is about to enter on a new branch of the argument, I desire to inquire of the Chair what is the precise question before the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question now is on the motion that the Senate insist on its amendment and agree to the conference asked by the House of Representatives. That is the motion.

Mr. STEWART. I desire, whenever I can get the floor, to move

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. Allow me to make an inquiry. I understood the Chair to say that the question whether this was a privileged motion would be submitted to the Senate. I supposed it was on that question that the Senator from Pennsylvania was addressing himself to the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. A privileged question can be displaced by a vote of the Senate, like any other question.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. I should like to raise that point. I raise .the question of order whether this is a privileged question.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It was the opinion of the Chair that it was a privileged question, but it is subject to the control of the Senate to vote like any other question. It may be superseded by a vote of the Senate. They are not compelled to proceed with a privileged question.

Mr. POMEROY. I will inquire if the unfinished business does not take precedence even of this question at the expiration of the morning hour? This matter came up before the expiration of the morning hour, and at the end of that hour did not the unfinished business of yesterday take precedence of it?

The PRESIDENT prtr tempore. The Chair supposes so.

Mr. POMEROY. I do not understand myself that any request of the other House asking for a committee of conference :is a privileged question. It may be so, but 1 do not -so understand it,

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania is entitled to the floor;

Mr, MORRILL, of Maine. I ask for a decision of the Senate on the question of order whether this is a privileged question.

Mr. BUCK ALE W. I will give, way if there is any question of order about it.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. I wish to raise the question whether this is privileged matter.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Chair will submit to the decision of the Senate whether the motion under consideration is a privileged question. The motion is that the Senate insist on its amendments and agree to the conference asked by the House of Representatives. The question is whether that is a priviledged question.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. I understand that while this motion was pending the hour arrived for the- consideration of the regular order, which is the unfinished business of yesterday, and my proposition is that this question of conference does not take precedence of that unfinished business ef yesterday.

Mr. EDMUNDS. There is no doubt about that.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. That is the question, and on that question I ask the judgment of the Senate.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is, under the circumstances is the motion before the House a privileged question?

Mr. HENDRICKS. Does the Chair submit that question to the Senate?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. That is submitted to the vote of the Senate.

Mr. HENDRICKS. Then I wish to ask the Chair this question, whether this is not simply, upon the request of the House, a motion to refer the joint resolution to a committee, and under what rule of the Senate or joint rule of the two Houses is it that a motion to refer one bill to a committee has preference over prior orders?

Mr. EDMUNDS. Of course it has not any precedence

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The question is whether the motion is privileged.

Mr. SHERMAN. I understood the Senator from Nevada to move to take up this question. I do not think it is a question of privilege. It is a question whether the Senate will do what is asked or not. I wish to vote with the Senator from Nevada, but I cannot vote that his motion is a privileged motion.

Mr. FESSENDEN. I wish to inquire whether my colleague raises the point of order as to whether this matter is a privileged question.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. I raise the point that it is not a privileged question, and does not supersede the regular order.

Mr. FESS ENDEN I agree "with my colleague upon that point, that it is not a privileged question. I believe it has never been held to be such, and I can so vote with my present understanding j but I will suggest, as this question must be settled, and as it is now under discussion, whether it is not better to let it take its coarse and be finished than to go tbiwigh the form of proceeding that we had yesterday and raise these questions one after another. It is best to finish that which is up that we know must be determined, and let it go, even if it delays other bills for a short time. I suggest to my colleague whether it is not better ontbe ■whole to finish this matter. I suppose the Senator from Pennsylvania will get through his speech some day or other, so that we can vote before the adjournment on this measure.

Mr. BUCKALEW. Inasmuch as the Senator from Pennsylvania does not speak very often nor ordinarily at great length, the presumption is in favor of precisely the result the Senator from Maine supposes.

Mr. FESSENDEN. I thought go. I suggest that it is better to finish this matter and not have question upon question raised, and nothing finished.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. My object was to facilitate the business of the Senate. My object was to reach the Indian appropriation bill, which is in my charge. I thought if I got this matter out of the way the Senate would then indulge me in sa motion to proceed to the consideration of the Indian appropriation bill; but if it is the judgment of our friends that this matter had better go on I will not interpose.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The priority of business is under the control of the Senate. They can postpone this and all other orders to take up the appropriation bill if they choose.

Mr. MORRILL, of Maine. I withdraw my suggestion for the present.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania is entitled to the floor.

Mr. BUCKALEW. Mr. President, I shall endeavor to make my remarks as brief as possible upon this second question on which I was entering when interrupted by the Senator from Maine.

Mr. TRUMBULL. Mr. President, I desire to call the attention of the Chair to the fact that some days ago, at my instance, the bill to reorganize the judicial system of the United States was made the special order for to day at one o clock and I think I am entitled to call it up.

Mr. DRAKE. The unfinished business of yesterday takes precedence.

Mr. TRUMBULL. When the hour of one o' clock arrived this bill should have been called up. I wish to know if I am not, under the rules of the Senate, entitled to call it up. It was set down for one o clock to day

Mr. MORTON. I sincerely hope the Senate will not now lose its hold on this constitutional amendment until it is disposed of one way or the other. The adoption of the constitutional amendment by the States, if it shall be passed by Congress, depends very much upon the question of "time. Every day that is now lost in passing this amendment through Congress endangers its adoption by the States, and those who are the friends of the amendment in some form or other, I hope, will not consent that it shall be displaced until it is disposed of. I have my own form that I prefer to any other; but if I cannot get my choice, perhaps I will take something that I think is not quite so good. This question is upon us, and it must be disposed of. We cannot afford for very many reasons to allow it to remain in this condition beyond this session of Congress. I hope, therefore, that no other measure will be allowed to be considered until the constitutional amendment is disposed of.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor unless he yields it for this motion.

Mr. BUCKALEW. I have given way for gentlemen to make suggestions.

Mr. TRUMBULL. It is not a motion I make. I call for the order that was set down for one o clock to day

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. It i? the opinion of the Chair that when the Senate have passed that order and h ve t ken Hp other. business, it has lost its priority.

Mr. TRUMBULL. This was taken up before one o clock No business has been taken up since one o clock TM3 was under consideration before one o clock

The PRESIDENT jpro tempore. The Senator from Pennsylvania has the floor, and none of these motions can be made until this question is got out of the way.

Mr. BUCKALEW. I have, I repeat, given way twice to suggestions as to the order or priority of business. Otherwise, I desire to hold the floor and to pursue my remarks at this time.

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will proceed.

Mr. BUCKALEW. The Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. Sumner] on a former occasion pronounced a strong denunciation of electoral colleges for the choice of President and Vice President of the United States. In that he uttered the voice of public opinion everywhere, long formed, about which there is no dispute. These colleges are badly constituted; they do not operate well nor to accomplish the purpose of their original institution. With reference to all that I think there is a general agreement. But the Senator went on to make another remark, and that was that he preferred a direct vote by the people of the United States for candidates for these great offices of President and Vice President.

Sir, he followed the lead of great men in expressing that opinion or desire. President Jackson made a recommendation of a change of the Constitution to secure such a popular vote, I think, in six annual messages. It was a favorite question of reform with the late Senator Benton. I believe you, sir, also a few years ago introduced the question into the Senate and had a formal proposition for amending the Constitution of the United States considered here.

Now, Mr. President, theoretically it is understood through the country that the people do choose their President themselves, that they vote for him, and the machinery of the Electoral College is looked upon as surplusage, unnecessary—as the Senator from Massachusetts expresses it, "a sham." It is thought to be a thing superfluous, a piece of machinery established by the Constitution which the people have outgrown; that it is in point of fact obsolete. and that the people themselves do, after a fashion, vote for the candidates for President and Vice President of the United States. Sir, this is a very incorrect opinion. The people do not vote for President and Vice President of the United States, and the votes they cast for electors to perform that function to cast actual votes for the election of President and Vice President do not accomplish necessarily the object for which they are given. I showed some days since, when this subject was before the Senate, some startling statistics to prove this. Among other facts then shown were the facts that in 1860 it required 114 596 popular votes to obtain an elector for Mr. Douglas, who was one of the candidates for President, while it required only 15 144 to obtain an elector for Mr. Bell, one of the other candidates. The figures also show that Mr. Douglas, who was the second candidate before the people, who received 1 375 157 votes, was the lowest of all the four candidates in the electoral colleges, so that if there had been a slight disturbance of the actual vote as it was given in a few States, by which the election would have been sent to the House of Representatives—it came very nearly going there anyhow—Mr. Douglas, the second candidate before the people in the number of votes polled, would have been ruled out of the House altogether, and the choice of that House would have been between Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Breckinridge, and Mr. Bell: Breckinridge receiving 847 953 popular votes independent of South Carolina,) Bell 590 631 and Douglas 1 375 157 What would have been the result? Why, sir, that House would have chosen

Mr. WILSON. Will the Senator explain fcow it would be that Mr. Douglas would have been ruled out? .Ite Constitution,. if I understand it, requires the House to choose from the four highest candidates*

Mr. BUCKALEW. The three highest candidates..

Mr. WILSON. Four.

Mr. BUCKALEW. Three. So, -In 1824, Mr. Clay was ruled out of the House because Jackson, Adams, and Crawford were above him; he was the fourth man. Infallibly that House in 1860, if by a mere accident there had been a few votes changed in a few States, would have made John Bell or John C. Breckinridge President of the United States. They could not have elected Mr. Douglas if they bad desired.

Mr. EDMUNDS. Will the Senator permit me to ask him, for information, a question?

Mr. BUCKALEW. If it relates to tkisprecise point.

Mr. EDMUNDS. I should like to have him explain how that happened; whether it was in connection with the fact that in the slave States a much fewer number of votes on account of the slaves being represented in the result accomplished the election of an elector, and whether, therefore, Bell, and Breckinridge carrying more of the slave States than Douglas got votes in the northern States, did not come in on that theory?

Mr. BUCKALEW. Undoubtedly that affected the question to a certain extent, but it does not account for the great part of the discrepancy.

Mr. EDMUNDS. It accounts for just what would make the difference.

Mr. BUCKALEW. Just for the difference it caused; and I will say to the Senator that it is not a very considerable element in the calculation, although it is a just one to be considered. And it did not affect the vote between Lincoln and Douglas.

How did the electoral vote run in 1864? The result was right that year; the voice of the people was executed; but not by any necessary operation of our system. Mr. Lincoln s electors were chosen of a ratio of 10 292 those of McClellan by a ratio of 86 274 I repeat, the result was right; but that was not the merit of the system, it was a mere accident. So in 1824, when Jackson had one half more votes than Mr. Adams from the people. The return does not show his full popular vote, because South Carolina chose by her Legislature. He had one half more than Mr. Adams; he had more than Mr. Adams and Mr. Crawford combined before the people; and what was the result? Why, sir, he was left in a large minority in the electoral colleges. Adams and Crawford together obtained 26 more electors than belonged to them, changing the result by 52 electoral votes. The election was thrown into the House of Representatives, and there a g eat mistake was made; an affront was given to the American people—or at least they accepted it as such—and it had an effect to a large extent upon subsequent elections.

I will not dwell upon this point further than simply to refer to the numbers at two other elections. Take the election of 1882. The Jackson electors had a ratio of 3 139 the Clay electors 11 228 In 1852 the Pierce electors had a ratio of 6 242 the Scott electors of 82 846 In 1824 the plurality candidate for President was beaten because of the machinery of the electoral colleges. In 1860, that great election which touched the depths of the popular heart throughout the country, the candidate second in the choice and hearts of the American people by the machinery of the electoral colleges had no possibility of ever entering the House of Representatives as a competitor for the result. It required one hundred and fourteen thousand American freemen to give him one vote in the electoral colleges, when twelve thousand could give Breckinridge one vote; and if you made all allowance for the counting of the three fifths of slaves in the South, it would not have- disturbed the ratio more than a few thousands.

You see. sir, that this old nKtehiSBeryVthen,* not a mere .sham; it is an instrument o£ inibs oe ®a I will add of. peril also to the future of this country. Any time at the next presidential election, in 1872. or at any other future election, a large majority of the American people may vote without avail and without result for their choice for the office Of President; and a minority man a man largely in the minority before the .people, may obtain a majority of presidential electors. It depends upon the accident of how majorities happen to run in particular States.

Ms.: President, during three years that I resided in one of the Spanish American repub- 3iss there were revolutions in thirteen out of fourteen of those republics. Those republics are scourged and desolated by revolutions, beginning with Mexico and going south to the Argentine Confederation and to Chili. What produces these revolutions ordinarily? A disputed presidential election. That is the cause three, times out of four, and has been ever since 1825, when those republics began to take their present organizations. Three times out of four, and' -.perhaps oftener, a dispute about a presidential election causes revolt and civil war, and desolates all those portions of the NewWorld. Mr. President, the very point upon which I .am now speaking is a tender and delicate point of our Constitution, and it has contained in it perhaps more, danger to our country than all other political causes combined. You have no mode of deciding a contested election of President and Vice President, no machinery provided, no clear grant of power in your Constitution. It is not even positively certain how you shall count electoral votes in case of dispute. A surging and rampant House of Representatives turns itself into a mob even now when your Constitution is about being executed by the Presiding Officer of the Senate, and it requires days of heat—I had almost said of indecorous debate—in that House to compose the waves of passion which are roused upon a mere technicality, with no actual change of the result of the election depending upon the decision.'

It is the point, of danger in your political institutions, this point of presidential elections. Will you wait until the danger is upon you; will you wait until civil war is again let loose; will you continue the old and defective machinery, always unjust, always full of peril and danger, until the crisis shall come? Slavery is gorte—the great question which divided our communities of the North and South. ,It is buried in the tomb of the past; no voice will b e sufficiently loud or powerful in all the centuries of the future to wake it or to speak it again into life. It will no more return to vex the councils of this Government or to inflame the hearts of our people; no blood will he shed to settle the great issues which it raises and which it inflames. But here in the very heart of your Constitution is a defective and weak point. I c all your attention to it. I ask you to consider it, and now in the days of quiet and of peace, before trouble has come, fortify yourselves against future danger; take hold upon these electoral colleges, which are not merely shams, as the Senator from Massachusetts says, but boxes .of Pandora from which may issue demons of discord and violence to trouble and scourge your country and your people in future years. Give the opportunity to men of statesmanship and of wisdom to reform these colleges by regulating the manner in which the electors shall be chosen. That is one proposition contained in the Senate amendment which went to the House which that House will adopt if you insist upon it.

Mr. President, why is it that the recommendations of President Jackson were unheeded, and that other men having the ear of Congress and having the ear of the country since have been unable to secure the adoption of a proposition for the amendment of our Constitution to dispense with the electoral colleges? Why is it? Why cannot you submit at once a proposition that the people shall vote directly for President and Vice President and expect its adoption 1 It is my business to answer that, •and. I have a complete and satisfactory answer. Under the scheme of electoral colleges each State has two senatorial electors, as they are called; that is, has two. electors as a State, and then it has an additional number equalto the number of Representatives from the State. When you propose that the people shall vote directly for President and Vice President you virtually strike off from each of the States the equal power which they now have in choosing senatorial electors. You give to each State, then, in point of fact, in substance, a power proportioned to the number of Representatives which they select to the lower House of Congress. What is the effect? Why, that Rhode Island, and other of the small States lose a large portion of their political power in the presidential election. Draw an amendment and send it down to the States to morrow proposing this change, and how would it present itself to their reflections? Here are Delaware, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, Nebraska, and Oregon, six States with three electors each, two senatorial and one Representative. Your amendment would mean that each of these States should give up two thirds of its political power in the election of President and Vice President. Instead of having three electors as at present to count in an electoral college, they would have a popular vote, equivalent to only one to count upon the general result. Then take the States which elect two members, Rhode Island and Minnesota. Each of these has four electors, and under the amendment• suggested they would have what would be equal to two; they would lose one half of their power. The States electing three Representatives and having five electors are New Hampshire, Vermont, California, and West Virginia. They would lose two fifths of their political power in a presidential election. Connecticut, South Carolina, and Texas each elect four Representatives and have six electors. They would lose one third of their power. Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi, and New Jersey would lose two sevenths. Alabama, Iowa, Michigan, and Wisconsin would lose one fourth, as they are now entitled to eight electors each.

Here are twenty four States which would each lose one fourth of their political power or more up to two thirds by adopting such an amendment to the Constitution. Twenty four States out of thirty seven interested by that large percentage of power against the adoption of such a change to the Constitution 1 Ten States can defeat an amendment when all the States are counted. These figures are exactly accurate, except we are to take into account that the large States would lose their senatorial electors, although the percentage of loss to them would be very small; it would affect the result only to a very small extent. That, is, the loss of power to the States I have enumerated would not be quite as large as these figures make it, although it would be nearly that. If, then, you have twenty foor out of the %thirtyseven States largely interested in rejecting such an amendment to the Constitution, nobody can doubt that instead of such an amendment receiving the three fourths vote of the States necessary toits ratification, it would be rejected by a majority of the whole number, and that whenever submitted. In other words, it is impossible to procure an amendment to the Constitution of the United States by which the people of our country shall vote directly for President and Vice President. It is against the interest of too many States; it is against the interest of too many State interests to permit it to take place at all, and therefore it will never be accomplished.

This reform, then, of a direct choice by the people being out of the question, what can be done? Why, sir, you can do what this amendment proposes; you can give to Congress the power to prescribe the manner in which electors shall be chosen and thus you can introduce reform, and in no other way whatever. At present the power to prescribe the manner in which electors shall be chosen rests with the Legislatures of .the several States. In former times in South• Carolina the Legislature prescribed that they themselves should choose electors, and fbat arrangement continued until recently. The new constitution of South Carolina, formed under the reconstruction laws, provides that the people shall select them by popular vote. That provision in that constitution is a nullity undoubtedly. It is impossible for South Carolina by an amendment of her constitution to take away from her Legislature a power imposed upon it by the Constitution of the United States. The provision therefore is a mere nullity. The Legislature of South Carolina will be at any time competent to re.- sume her former practice of choosing electors of President .and Vice President. The Legislature of Alabama recently proposed to take •this power into its own hands, and it was only checked by an executive veto. Hereafter this mode of choosing electors may he resorted to by Legislatures of other States, and. thus great trouble and difficulty may be introduced. It is a thing which ought not to be permitted! Now, Mr. President, in point of fact if the Legislatures of the States do not assume to themselves the p o wer to choose electors they cannot reform the -present system of choosing by general ticket, and that will be seen in a momentby any one who will bestow due reflection upon this subject. In all the States, Florida alone excepted, and perhaps Louisiana also, electors are chosen by general ticket; that is, each voter of the State votes for as many electors as the State is entitled to in her electoral college, and the majority obtain the whole number for that State.

It is impossible to change this system as the power is now located; and why?. Take the ease of the State of New York; you propose in the State of New York that electors shall be chosen by single districts or according to some other plan of reform, and what will be the answer? "Why we cannot afford to do that in this State; we shall only break up our own political power; our party will lose nearly one half its strength in this State; therefore we cannot afford to do it, and will not do it. .Besides that, if we were inclined to do it, we could not, because other States not doing the same thing we should lose a portion of our political strength iotbis State, while the opposite party, to us in another State electing by general ticket would hold the whole of its power, and thus we should inflict injury on ourselves as a political organization without any compensation whatever."

The political majority in any Legislature anywhere in the United States would say this to itself and to you if you proposed to it any reform whatever in the mode of choosing presidential electors. They would give the conclusive answer," We cannot afford to do it and weaken our own power; we cannot control other States; and as long as they do not adopt the same mode of choosing electors you simply ask us to make a sacrifice; we cannot do it, and we will not do it." The result is that although the old general ticket system for choosing representatives was changed twenty or thirty years ago because it was intolerable the choice of presidential electors is still according to the old plan, because there is no power here in Congress to amend it. The power which does exist in the State Legislatures cannot be exercised, and I venture to say it never will be. Therefore you have fixed in the Constitution the electoral colleges, an institution which three fourths of the States will not change, which is imbedded in the Constitution firmly, and then you have a system of election by general ticket of the members of those colleges in the respective States which cannot be changed and will notbe changed bytheLegislatures who "have theoretically the power to do it. There will be no change, and what is the result? Here I come to the point which touches us to the quick; which should make our blood bound through our veins when we think of it. By general ticket your presidential election is poissd upon the vote of two or three of the large States, Pennsylvania particularly; and the year of a presidentiafeleetion into those States are poured all the corlupt influences which .elections can invite. Wffare deluged with evils because our large States have an unjust or badly arranged power in the electoral colleges. Mcmey is poured into our States in a profuse stream to corrupt and to degrade the elections held among our people. It was because the voice of Pennsylvania, under an electoral college system, was likely to rule or influence t he result throughout the country that half a million of dollars perhaps were poured out in that State in 1868.

On behalf of my people; on behalf of our republican institutions put in peril; on behalf of justice and honesty in elections; on behalf of the American people, whose voices ought to be heard and counted fairly, I appeal to you to support this amendment, which will permit reform and will secure it. The road of reform is now closed up. The patriot and the honest man must now work and labor in vain; They can do nothing. Here is the golden opportunity. An amendment relating to suffrage is sent here from the House respecting the persons who shall vote in the United States, and here is an amendment proposing that the people shall have secured to themselves the right of choosing -presidential electors; that it shall not be taken or snatched from them by intrigue or corruption in the Legislatures; that their honest voices shall always be heard in the choice of electors; and next, that reform in the manner in which elections shall be held may be introduced by the Congress of the United States upon due cause shown. Congress can introduce reform, and will do it. It did introduce reform in electing Representatives to the lower House. It ordered the States to break themselves up into single districts; and when New Hampshire and one or two other States resisted enforced its will, because it spoke by virtue of the power of this Federal Constitution of ours. Give to Congress identically the same power over the choice of presidential electors; say, as this amendment says, that Congress may prescribe the manner in which they shall be chosen. Congress is not obliged to do it; it only permits it; and by a simply statute here you can divide the States, or order the Legislatures to divide the States, into single districts for choosing presidential electors, or you can provide what farsighted and just men now contemplate, and which eventually all will seize upon as a measure of more complete and perfect justice, that the people in each State, according to .their party divisions, may so vote that each shall get a due share of power in the Electoral College, by simply voting for the number of men for which they have an adequate number of votes; that in my State, with six hundred thousand voters, each party holding three hundred thousand of them, each or either may vote for twelve instead of twenty four electors, and by uniting their vote upon "that smaller number elect them. This is what I hope may eventually be reached. But nothing is commanded; the future is left open; and the men who represent the people of the United States, and who -represent the States of this Union here assembled in council in these two Houses, may reach out their hands to this system of election and reform it so as to secure popular rights, so as to secure honest elections and a just voice and expression by the American people in these great elections of President; and thus you will have a guarantee of inestimable value against future disturbance, difficulty, and possibly revolution and war iii this country from a dispirited presidential election. Justice and public safety appeal to you.

Is there any objection to this? None at all, except a mere prejudice. Some men say, "Why, you are giving more power to Congress; you are taking power away from the States; you are increasing Federal power, and the tendency of this measure is toward consolidation." Niw, sit, of all the people in the world with whom I least patience, -give me the man of stupidity; the man who is fighting against his own purpose and objeot without knowing it; the man who with good and sincere motives is doing bad and evil work and does not know it. These people who are shouting State rights and State privilege and State immunity and authority, and doing the work of mischief at the same time, are persons with whom we should have least patience; perhaps no patience at all.

The choice of presidential electors is properly a Federal question, rather than a State question. It relates to this Government, and not to the government of the States. It will therefore be properly lodged in this Government, because it belongs and pertains to it legitimately. In the next place, as I have already shown to you, the location of this power in Congress is a necessity. Located as it is now it will never be exercised; you can introduce no reform. Being, therefore, Federal in its nature, being necessary to the in trod acting of any reform in the regulation of the choice of presidential electors, it should be located ifct the two Houses of Congress, where, if it should at any time be exercised improperly, you can introduce change and amendments afterward.

Mr. President, 1 will read one single passage from one of the best printed and best edited newspapers in the United States, although my opinions are as wide from it as the poles are asunder. In speaking of this proposed amendment it says:

It will prevent the entire vote of such a State as New York, for instance, being east for a particular candidate through the rascality of its chief city."

I am not indorsing that statement. I am reading what this paper says:

It will give more nearly than bow the sense of the people for President in the electoral colleges, because each district will have its own representative. If anything- was to be done at all with the election vote, we should prefer to have had the colleges abolished, that t e untrammeled will of the people should bo expressed directly upon the question of the fitness of the candidate for President."

I have already spoken to that point and shown that it is impracticable. This article concludes by saying:

However, this question will no t embarrass the suffrage proposition, as the two articles are to be voted on separately."

Mr. EDMUNDS. What paper is that?

Mr. BUCKALBW. The Boston Commonwealth.

From what I have said, Mr. President, it will be discovered that I have very strong opinions, possibly strong feelings also, in favor of this proposition for amending the Constitution of the United States in regard to the choice of presidential electors. I have imperfectly, and without much preparation, stated to the Senate a few of the leading considerations which, in my judgment, demand this reform. It is now within our reach. We can seize upon it; we can secure it; we can appropriate it, not to ourselves only, but to the whole American people, and all this can be done without embarrassment in regard to the other proposition of amendment of suffrage. It is distinct in its nature And it is to ba submitted distinctly for the* action of the several States. One proposition can be acted upon without embarrassing the other in any way whatever. We have now a golden opportunity for presenting this proposition, and presenting it in connection with an amendment which invites it, because it is an amendment for the extension of suffrage, while this is for the regulation of suffrage.