March 20, 1962 (3)

The Senate resumed the consideration of the motion of the Senator from Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD], to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution <S.J. Res. 29) providing for the establishing of the former dwelling house of Alexander Hamilton as a national monument.

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President, I shall continue my first speech on the motion. I was discussing the cases which bear upon the interpretation of voting rights by the Supreme Court of the United States. The first case to which I wish to refer is the case of United States v. Reece (92 u.s. 214

In United States against Reece, election inspectors were indicted under sections of a postwar Civil Rights Act for depriving a Negro citizen of the right to vote in a municipal election. The Court held that those sections of the statute were vague and indefinite, therefore unconstitutional, because they did not precisely limit the definition of the Federal crime to deprivation of voting rights protected by the 14th and 15th amendments.

The Court said-United States v. Reece, (92 U.S. 214, 217-218 <1875)) :

The 15th amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone. It prevents the States, or the United States, however , from giving preference, in this particular, to one citizen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude . Before its adoption, this could be done. It was as much within the power of a State to exclude citizens of the United States from voting on account of race, etc., as it was on account of age , property, education. Now it is not. If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be. Previous to this amendment, there was no constitutional guarantee against this discr~mination; now there is. It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the protecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Thus, under the ­ express provisions of the second section of the amendment, Congress may enforce by appropriate legislation.

In the case of Breedlove v. Suttles (302 U.S. 277, 238 (1937)), a Georgia statute making a poll tax a voting prerequisite to Federal and State elections was attacked on the ground that it violated the 14th and 19th amendments. The tax in question applied to all inhabitants of Georgia between the ages of 21 and 60, with an exception for females who did not register for voting. The Court held that the classification of the law, not being an invalid discrimination, did not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment. The Court also held that the exemption for women who did not vote was not in violation of the 19th amendment. In the course of its opinion the Court also stated clearly that the poll tax was not prohibited by the privileges and immunities clause of the 14th amendment and was a proper qualification for voting for the States to impose. I quote from the opinion:

To make payment ol poll ta x es a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the 14th amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is · conferred by the St a te and, save as restrained by the 15th and 19th amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate (Minor v. Happersett (21 Wall. 162, 170 et seq . ); Ex Parte Yarbrough (110 U.S. 651, 664-665); McPherson v. Blacker (146 U.S. 1, 37-38); Guinn v. United States (238 U.S. 347, 362)). The privileges and immunities protected are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States and not those that spring from other sources (Hamilton v. Regents (293 U.S. 245, 261)).

The question of Virginia poll tax as a prerequisite to voting was reviewed by a special three-judge court as recently as 1951 in Butler v. Thompson (D.C.E.D. Va., 97 F. Supp. 17, affirmed, 341 U.S. 937). Judge Dobie . quoted from an earlier opinion in the case of Saunders v. Wilkins 052 F. 2d 235, 237), as follows:

The decisions generally hold that a State statute which imposes a rea s onable poll tax as a condition of the right to vote does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United St a tes which are protected by the 14th amendment. The privilege of voting is derived from the St a te and not from the National Go v ernment. The qualification of voters in an election for Members of Congress is set out in article I, section 2, clause 1 of the Federal Constitution which provides that the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. The Supreme Court in Breedlo v e v. Suttles (302 U.S. 277, 283, 58 S. Ct. 205, 82 L. Ed. 252), held that a poll tax prescribed by the constitution and statutes of the State of Georgia did not offend the Federal Co n stitution.

In the case of Pirtle v. Brown (118 Fed. 2d, 218, 221), the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit considered this question: "Whether or not the Tennessee · constitution and statutes, which make the payment of a poll tax a condition precedent to the right to vote for Members of Congress, are repugnant to any of the provisions of the Constitution of the · United States."

Pirtle, otherwise qualified, but having failed to pay the poll tax required by law, attempted to vote. The defendants, judges of election, declined to allow him. In the action brought by Pirtle, the Federal district court rendered judgment for the defendants. Pirtle appealed to the circuit court of appeals. The contention of the appellant, Pirtle, was that article IV, section 1 of the constitution of Tennessee, and section 2027 of the Tennessee code, violated the "privileges and immunities" clause of the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution. The circuit court of appeals held that this point had been conclusively decided against appellant in the c a se of Breedlove against Suttles, and that the Tennessee code and constitution did not violate the "privileges and immunities" clause of the Federal Constitution.

Mr. ERVIN. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. EASTLAND. I yield for a question.

Mr. ERVIN. Does the Senator from Mississippi remember Aesop's fable about the satyr who offered a meal to a man whom he had found out in the forest, freezing? When he found him, the man was blowing on his hands to warm them. After he took him into his house, and set a hot meal before him, he observed the man blowing on his porridge.

Mr. EASTLAND. What?

Mr. ERVIN. On his porridge. The satyr asked the man why he blew on his hands outdoors and on his porridge in the house. The man said, "I blow on my hands to warm them, and on my porridge to cool it."

The satyr told the man he would have to get out of the house because "I am not going to have anything to do with a man who blows both hot and cold."

I should like to ask the Senator from Mississippi if Congress does not blow both hot and cold about taxes. It passes laws to provide for the imprisonment of men who refuse to pay their Federal taxes to the Federal Government, and then, having blown hot in that fashion, it turns around and blows cold by undertaking to amend the Constitution out of solicitude for those who refuse to pay taxes for the support of the State government.

Mr. EASTLAND. That is right; for the support of the school system.

Mr. ERVIN. I should like to ask the Senator from Mississippi if he can reconcile those contradictory actions on the part of Congress with any consistent philosophy of taxation on the part of the Congress.

Mr. EASTLAND. There is no consistent philosophy whatever. It is a part of the tremendous drive, organized, directed, and highly financed, by pressure groups, to federalize the Gov­ ture? ernment of the United States, to destroy the dual system of sovereignty, to destroy the rights and powers of the Stat e s and to concentrate all the powers in Washin g ton. That is what is behind it. That is the moving factor behind the agitation for the resolution. · Behind it are the people who would destroy our system of government and federalize this country.

Does not the Senator realize that on the creek banks and the branches, where people can make their cwn decisions, is the greatest safeguard for human liberty in this country?

Mr. ERVIN. Madam President, will , the Senator yield for another question? ·

Mr. EASTLAND. I yield for a question.

Mr. ERVIN. Is the Senator from Mississippi aware ~f the fact that there · are now pending several measures which , are designed to establish as a Federal qualification for voting the completion of the sixth grade?

Mr. EASTLAND. That is correct-by statute.

Mr. ERVIN. Is it not true that in Mississippi, North Carolina, and all the · other States which have populations composed of the members both of the Caucasian race and the Negro race, the records show that a higher percentage of members of the Caucasian race have completed the sixth grade than have members of the Negro race?

Mr . EASTLAND. That is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator from · , Mississippi if the reasoning which is put behind these measures with reference to the literacy test would not condemn the literacy test proposed by those people : for the Federal Government if it were adopted by any State, on the ground that the figures would support the argu- : ment that it was designed to discriminate against Negroes in voting, in that more Caucasians had completed the sixth grade than had members of the other race?

Mr. EASTLAND. That is correct; but the direction of the effort is by the same groups; it is financed by the same groups; and it is for legislation. It is · designed as a step further than this joint resolution would go. However, the point is that it would result in federalization; it would result in the control of the people of the country by Washington. It would result in the destruction of the liberties and the rights of the people at the local level to make their own decisions and to protect themselves. But the first step toward the destruction of our great country is the control by Washington o{ the electorate of the Nation.

Mr. ERVIN. Madam President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield for another question?

Mr. EASTLAND. I yield for a question.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not section 2 of article I of the Constitution declare, in about as simple words as the English language affords, that the only people who can vote for Senators and Representatives are those who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legisla­

Mr. EASTLAND . . That is correct.

Mr. ERVIN. Does not that make it plain that, for all practical intents and purposes, · the sole power to fix the qualifications for voting for Senators and Representatives in Congress belongs to the States, not to the Federal Government?

Mr. EASTLAND. Of course it belongs to the States. One can read .what the State qualifications are and can then determine who may vote in an election for President, Senator, and Representative.

Mr. ERVIN. I ask the Senator from Mississippi if he agrees with the Senator from North Carolina that a person can never reach a conclusion that the Federal Government has any power under the Constitution to prescribe any quali- fications for any voter unless he first does an intellectual twist and gets himself into a state of mental confusion as a result of his effort to complicate simplicity.

Mr. EASTLAND. That is absolutely correct. I should like to ask the distinguished Senator from North Carolina this question: In the whole history of the Republic, does he know of a single reputable judge who has ever interpreted the Constitution to mean that the Federal Government had any control over fixing the qualifications of electors?

Mr. ERVIN. I would go a little further than that and say that I believe there is no decision to that effect. I will challenge, here and now, every proponent of Federal literacy test measures to point out any decision of any Federal court, handed down at any time since the beginning of the world to this date, which holds that the Federal Govern- ment has the power to prescribe any qualification for any voter, even for those who vote for Senators and Representatives.

Mr. EASTLAND. The Senator from North Carolina is exactly correct. The joint resolution and the literacy test bill have the same objective-the destruction of the States, the destruction of the power and liberties of the people at home, and the concentration of authority in one place-the Government in Washington.

Mr. ERVIN. Do not both measures contain symptoms of that disease which we call Potomac fever, a disease which exhibits itself in the conviction of people who come to Congress that the people who sent them here are not capable of managing their own affairs?

Mr. EASTLAND. That is correct.

Madam President, I shall continue to read from the opinion of the court. In holding what I have referred to, the court said:

But in any event, we are not dealing . with the question whether the payment of poll tax as a prerequisite to voting violates some natural right or fancied political right. The inquiry is, whether such provision denied any privileges or immunities protected by the Federal Constitution. We have already seen that article I, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States guarantees to the elector for Members of Congress no other privileges than those accorded him by the State as an elector for the most numerous branch of the State legislature. But appellant goes beyond this. He urges that the quoted provision of article IV, section 1 of the constitution of Tennessee and section 2027 of the code violates the "privileges and immunities" clause of the 14th amendment: that his right to vote for a Member of Congress is not taxable, regardless of whether the amount of the tax imposed ls trifling or substantial.

Madam President, I digress a moment to say that there has been no reputable showing by any person that the poll tax has ever disqualified or disfranchised anyone. In my State of Mississippi, the individual $2 poll tax is a trifling matter, but in the aggregate it means a large sum in the operation of our school system. I continue to read from the decision of the Court:

We need not labor the point. It has been conclusively decided against appellant in Breedlove v. Suttles, supra (302 U.S. p. 283, 58 S. Ct. p. 208, 82 L. Ed. 252), where the court said: ·

"2. To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the 14th amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the 15th and 19th amendments and other provisions of the Federal constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate (Minor v. Happersett (21 Wall. 162, 170, et seq., 22 L. Ed. 627); Ex parte Yarbrough (110 U.S. 651, 664, 665, 4 S. Ct. 152, 28 L. Ed. 274); McPherson v. Blacker (146 U.S. 1, 37, 38, 13 S. Ct. 3, 36 L. Ed. 869); Gu . Guinn v. United States (238 U.S. 347, 362, 35 S. Ct. 926, 59 L. Ed. 1340, L.R.A. 1916A, 1124) ) . The privileges and immunities protected are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States and not those that spring from other sources (Hamilton v. Regents (293 U.S. 245, 261, 55 S. Ct. 197, 203, 79 L. Ed. 243)) ."

I believe that it would be inconsistent for the Congress today to urge the enactment of a constitutional amendment to outlaw the poll tax by such route, in view of the fact that the principle has long been established that the States alone are to determine the qualifications of its voters.

Madam President, throughout the debates when the Constitution was written, and throughout the whole history of the Republic, there has been one fundamental factor; namely, that the control of suffrage, the defining of the qualifications of voters, has been a matter to be handled by the people of the individual States.

And this is the first mass assault on one of the very foundations of the U.S. system of government. It is a deliberate attack upon the liberties of the Amer-:­ ican people. This joint resolution is a deliberate attack upon the dual system of sovereignty. It is a deliberate attempt to concentrate power in Washington, so that groups of persons who desire to socialize the United States-and, Madam President, I think socialism is behind this entire movement-can take absolute control of the Government of the United States.

Madam President, it is not strange that in Nazi Germany, before Hitler could establish his dictatorship and could crush the liberties of the German people and could set the world on fire, he had to destroy the German federal system. But that he did, and the result was dictatorship.

There are in the United States certain groups of those who call themselves minority groups, who have access to vast publicity and to great sums of money, who want to socialize the United States. But before they can do that. they must control the suffrage, and they must, by exercising control from Washington, be able to say who can vote in the various communities in the United States. In this instance, Madam President, the U.s. Senate is asked to take the first great step in the history of this country which in the last analysis would be a step toward socialism and toward destruction of the capitalistic system, which these groups despise.

This would be the first time that this principle of a State determining the qualifications of its voters has been vitiated on grounds other than race or sex. It is sound reasoning, to me, that Congress should not be spending its time trying to outlaw a qualification for voting required by only five States, and that this State action by so small a minority should not engage the attention of the Congress and the constitutional amendment route. It is my feeling that the proponents of this proposal could better use their time by advocating the abolition of the poll tax through the State legislatures themselves-that is, work on the State legislatures of these States, rather than through the Congress by way of a constitutional amendment.

After all, Madam President, that is the American system.

However, even if only one State still required payment of a poll tax as a qualification for voting, we should not vitiate the right of a sovereign State to determine the qualifications of its own voters. Any action · relating to a determination of the qualifications of the voters should come from the sovereign States themselves.

Madam President, I have defied the proponents of this measure to point to even one Negro who has been disfranchised by a poll tax. But that is not the issue before us. The pending issue is the federalization of American institutions. It is my feeling that the State legislatures, through the States themselves, afford the proper route to take. If this proposal directed at five States is adopted by the Congress and ratified by three-fourths of the States, a pattern and precedent would be set so that subsequent action could be taken to initi- · ate further constitutional amendments which would slash away the power of the States to control the qualifications of their voters. If this constitutional amendment process were adopted, it woUld be logical for a succeeding Congress to attempt by constitutional amendment to remove from the laws of the States the educational qualifications in various States requisite to voting. Successive steps which could follow would, if carried to their ultimate conclusion, deprive the sovereign States of any control whatsoever over the qualifications of their own electors. I can only repeat that the sensible and logical approach, if these proponents so desire, is to seek repeal of the poll tax provision through the State legislatures, rather than by cluttering up the Constitution with an amendment affecting only five states.

Most constitutional questions concerning poll taxes have arisen in connection with State constitutions, involving the validity under them of particular statutes. In most instances the imposition of a poll tax as a condition of · voting originates either by express constitu- · tional provision, or by express constitutional authority in that regard directly conferred upon the legislature. fu such a situation it has been held that the legislature has the power, subject to express constitutional limitations, to impose a reasonable poll tax as a condition of the right to vote, and in connection therewith to prescribe restrictions and regulations reasonably calculated to secure enforcement of the condition, whether it be viewed as in the nature of a revenue measure or as looking to the proper regulation of elections. Legislative regulations of this kind may relate to such matters as payment of all delinquent poll taxes, payment at or within particular times, proper assessment, and the furnishing of proof of payment, an incident of which may be the preparation of official voters' lists.

Subject to applicable constitutional limitations, the power of a State to impose a reasonable poll tax as a condition of voting, and to adopt regulations reasonably calculated to enforce such condition, is generally upheld.

Madam President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a list of cases in which this right has been upheld.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection?

There being no objection, the list was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

United States: Breedlove v. Scuttles ( 1937) ( 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. ed. 252, 58 S. Ct. 205); Pirtle v. Brown (118 Fed. 2d 218 (CAA

Alabama: Shepherd v. Sartain ( (1913) 185 Ala. 439, 64 So. 57); Davis v. Teague ( (1929) 220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51 (appeal dismissed in 1930) 281 U.S. 695, 74 L. ed. 1123, 50 S. Ct. Arkansas: Martin v. Gray ( (1936) 193 Ark. 32, 97 sw (2d) 439). .

Delaware: Frieszleben v. Shallcross ( (1890) 9 Houst. 1, 19 A 576, 8 LRA 337) .

Florida: State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon ( 1893) ( 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383, 22 LRA 124). Georgia: McMahon v. Savannah ((1880) 66 Ga. 217, 42 Am. Rep. 65). See Tatum v. Langley ( (1934) 179 Ga. 731, 177 SE 243, infra, IDa3).

Kentucky: BucTcner v. Gordon ((1884) 81 Ky. 665).

Missouri: Kansas City v. Whipple ( ( 1896) 136 Mo. 475, 38 SW 295, 35 LRA 747, 58 Am. St. Rep. 657).

North C a rolina: Moose v. Alexander County ( (1916) 172 Nc. 419, 90 SE 441, Ann. Cas. 1917E 1183).

Oregon: Livesley v. Litchfield ( ( 1906) 47 Or. 248, 83, P. 142, 114 Am. St. Rep. 920).

Pennsylvania: Patterson v. Barlow ((1869) 60 Pa. 54). See .Re Election of Cusick ((1890) 136 Pa. 459, 20 A 574, 10 LRA 228, infra); .Re Corydon Twp. Election ((1912) 236 Pa. 588, 84 A 1107, infra, lie).

Tennessee: State v. Old ((1896) 95 Tenn. 723, 34 SW 690, 31 LRA 837); Vertrees v. State Bd. of Elections ( (1919) 141 Tenn. 645, 214 sw 737).

Texas: Solon v. State ( (1908) 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 261, 114 SW 349); Watts v. State ( (1911) 61 Tex. Crim. Rep. 364, 135 SW 585); Savage v. Umphries ((1909) Tex. Civ. App. 118 SW 893); Stuard v. Thompson ( (1923) Tex. Civ. App. 251 SW 277); Tex a s Power & L. Co. v. Brownwood Pub. Serv. Co. ( (1937) Tex. Civ. App. 111 SW (2d) 1225). See Black v. Pool ((1904) 97 Tex. 333, 78 SW 922). and Ex parte Wood ( (1904) Tex. Crim. Rep. 81 SW

529, both infra, Tia2): McCharen v. Mead ((1925) Tex. Civ. App. 275 SW 117, infra, illb2): Powell v. Baird. ((1939) 133 Tex. 489, 128 SW (2d) 786, infra).

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President, the fact that I have placed the list in the RECORD, instead of reading it into the RECORD, is conclusive proof that no filibuster is being conducted.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Madam President, will the Senator from Mississippi yield for a question?

Mr. EASTLAND. Yes.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Does the Senator from Mississippi suggest that a filibuster is now being conducted?

Mr. EASTLAND. Of course not, because no filibuster is being conducted. However, the rules of the Senate allow each Senator to make two speeches on any question or motion; and certainly all Senators should be allowed to make those two speeches before any question about long debate is raised. As a matter of fact, I have not yet finished my first speech on this subject.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. EASTLAND. For a question.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Does not the Senator from Mississippi realize that not only the Senator from Montana, but the rest of the Senate, understands that particular question and that they are also aware of the fact that, very likely, the Senator from Mississippi, who is now speaking, or who now has the :floor, probably holds the record for the longest first speech in the history of this body?

Mr. EASTLAND. Well, I disagree with my friend; but I believe, before the debate is over, we are going to convince him, and he will vote with us against his own motion.

Where a State constitution, although not specifically requiring or authorizing . either the payment of a poll tax or the procurement of an exemption certificate, contained a provision:

That any voter who is subject to pay a poll tax under the laws of the State • shall have paid said tax before offering to vote at any election in this State and hold a receipt showing that said poll tax was paid before the first day of February next preceding such election.

And by another provision recognized the right of the legislature to make such a requirement and provided that no such poll tax should be levied upon those who paid no property tax for the purpose of - paying municipal debts created or assumed by the vote of those who pay property taxes, and by still another provision expressly authorized the legislature to provide for registration of voters in cities having a population of 10,000 or more, and enact other legislation necessary to detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot box, the provisions, taken together, were held sufficient to imply that the legislature had power to levY a poll tax, and as an incident thereto, to prescribe that the tax must be paid before February 1 of each year and a receipt obtained as a condition of the right to vote-Texas Power & L. Co. v. Brownwood Pub. Serv. Co.

((1937); Tex. Civ. App. 111 SW (2d) 1225).

A legislature has been held to have power under constitutional provisions authorizing capitation taxes not to exceed $1 a year, and empowering it to make the payment thereof a prerequisite for voting, to require the payment of all annual capitation taxes remaining unpaid, not exceeding $1 for each year, as a qualification to vote, in State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon ( ((1893) 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383, 22 LRA 124). And such a statute, by requiring as a qualification to vote the payment by the elector of the poll taxes of previous year, where he was entitled to qualify himself as an elector at the last State election by registration and the payment of such taxes, but failed to do so, was held not in contravention of provisions of the Florida constitution prohibiting the payment of more than one capitation tax as a qualification, where payment of not more than $1 for each year was required. And the requirement of that statute of payment of delinquent poll taxes more than 2 weeks before an election, as a qualification to vote thereat, was held not void as being unreasonable, unnecessary, and tending to impair and subvert the right to vote, there being no constitutional limitation upon the right of the legislature applicable thereto. See also Texas Power & L. Co. v. Brownwood Pub. Serv. Co. < ((1937) ; Tex. Civ. App. 111 SW (2d) 1225, supra) .

So, the exclusion of a person from the assessment list for 12 months, for failure to pay his county poll tax, in consequence of which he was subject to being precluded from becoming qualified to vote during that year, was held not a violation of a constitutional provision that a citizen, otherwise qualified, who had, within 2 years next preceding the election, paid a county tax which had been assessed at least 6 months before the election should enjoy the rights of an elector, or a further provision that all elections should be free and equalFrieszleben v. Shallcross ((1890) 9 Houst. (Del.) 1, 19 A 576, 8 LRA 337) .

And a statute making the payment of poll taxes for the preceding year a qualification for voting for certain municipal officers was held not to contravene a constitutional provision that every free white male citizen of the age of 21 years, and so forth, shall be a voter, as another article of the Constitution. providing that officers of towns and cities should be elected in such manner and with such qualifications as may be prescribed by law, was deemed to show the intention of the framers of the Constitution that the former provision should not apply to municipal officers, but that they should be left to the legislative willBuckner v. Gordon < ((1884) 81 Ky. 665). In re Election of Cusick < ((1890) 136 Pa. 459, 20 A 574, 10 LRA 228), under constitutional provisions conferring the right of suffrage and providing that a voter should have paid within 2 years a "State or county" tax, which should have been assessed at least 2 months, and paid at least 1 month, before the election, and another providing that "no elector shall be deprived of the privilege of voting by reason of his name not being registered," it was held that a statute regulating elections and requiring any person whose name was not registered on election day to prove by affidavit certain facts as to when and where the tax claimed to be paid was assessed and when, where, and to whom paid was not unconstitutional, the requirement being a reasonable one, and that the term "elector," as used in the quoted provision, denoted a duly qualified elector, there being no eligibility on the part of an unregistered voter until compliance with the law, even under the pretense that he was at least a prima facie qualified elector.

And a st a tute providing for and regulating the payment of poll taxes and issuance of receipts therefor, requiring coll e ctors to cease issuing poll tax rec e ipts after a specified date and construed to rend e r the holders of receipts thereafter issued disqualified to vote, even though they had actually paid the tax before such date, was held not to be in conflict with and not to deprive a person of his right to vote under a constitutional provision making eligible to vote, at subsequent elections, only those "who shall exhibit a poll tax receipt or other evidence that they have paid their poll tax at the time of collecting tax e s next preceding such election," the Court expressing the opinion that the phrase "at the time of collecting taxes" related to the time determined by legislative enactment when such taxes must be p a id, and that since the legislature could determine the time wh e n poll taxes must be paid, it could likewise determine what must be done to accomplish such p a y­ ment, and that according to the statute "payment of a poll tax" was not consummated, as a condition of voting. until the issuance and delivery of the poll tax receipts prior to the date limited. preceding the election at which they were to be exhibited, all of which was in harmony with the Constitution-Martin v. Gray < ((1936) 193 Ark. 32, 97 SW (2d) 439). See also State v. Old ( Cl896) 95 Tenn. 723, 34 SW 690, 31 LRA 837, infra, And in Powell v. Baird ((1939) 133 Tex. 489, 128 SW (2d) 786), a statute requiring persons subject to pay munic ipal poll taxes to pay them in order to qualify as voters was held constitutional, as being a statutory declaration of the constitutional law as already expounded in previous cases. See also McCharen v. Mead ((1925) Tex. Civ. App. 275 SW 117, infra, IDb2).

And it has been held that prohibiting payment of a voter's poll tax by another, in attempting to satisfy the voting condition, is within the power of the legislature-Solon v. State ((1908) 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 261. 114 SW 349). and Watts. v. State ((1911) 61 Tex. Crim. Rep. 364, 135 SW 585, both infra, lic). See also State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon < (1893) 32 Fla. 545, 14 So. 383, 22 LRA 124, infra, liia3). and Re Corydon Twp. Election < 0912) 236 Pa. 588, 84 A 1107. infra, lie).

It is. of course, a familiar and traditional :rule that the exercise of the suffrage, whether deemed as in the nature oi a "right" or a "privilege," is neither created nor conferred by the Federal cvnr--288

Constitution. although the provisions of any State constitution or statute in regard thereto are subject to the limitations which it prescribes, some of which expressly recognized and embrace voters• rights, privileges, and qualifications. Subject to these limitations, as pointed out in Breedlove v. Suttles < ((1937) 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. ed. 252, 28 S. Ct. 205, infra) • and Pirtle against Brown, cited supra. the whole matter rests within the control of the States, to be dealt with in their respective constitutions and statutes ~

In Pirtle v. Brown «CCA 6 t h), supra), a State constitutional provision applying to persons entitled to vote for members of the general assembly-embracing the most numerous branch of the State legislature-and making the payment of such poll taxes as should be required by law a condition of voting, construed in connection with a legislative imposition of poll taxes, was h e ld not to violate any Federal constitutional right of a delinquent poll-tax payer seeking unsuccessfully to vote for a Member of the House of Representatives, either under article I, section 2, providing that electors of members of that body shall have the qualifi c ations "requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature". or the provision of the 14th amendment relating to privileges and immunities. See also Breedlove v. Suttles ( (1937) 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. ed. 252, 58 S. Ct. 205).

In Davis v. Teague ((1929) 220 Ala. 309, 125 So. 51, appeal dismissed in (1930) 281 U.S. 695, 74 L. ed. 1123, 50S. Ct. 248.) , the Court held that a provision of the Alabama constitution exempting persons in the military or naval service of the United States between January 1, 1917, and November 11, 1918, from the payment of a poll tax in connection with the right of suffrage did not · violate the 14th amendment to the Federal Constitution, as a denial of equal protection of the laws to persons not so serving, upon the theory that the right of suffrage is a political privilege or civil right which the State may reasonably and under a proper classification control or regulate in this respect. The Court said:

The right of suffrage and the right to hold an office under authority of the State, unlike the right of a citizen to engage in a gainful occupation, is not considered, as a general rule, a privilege or immunity belonging to a citizen of the United States, nor an inherent or natural right existing in the absence of constitutional provision or legislative enactment. It is rather considered as a political privilege or civil right under the control of the State, which it may regulate or restrict, so long ar the right of suffrage is not denied to any person on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The obligation to pa¥ a poll tax is not an obligation that ma:- be enforced by legal process or otherwise, but Is an obligation to be performed voluntarily as a test of good citizenship, leaving to each individual otherwise qualified the right to determine whether he will qualify as a legal voter or not.

In Savage v. Umphries ((19a9); Tex. Civ. App. 118 SW 983), under a constitutional provision which confer:red the right of suffrage, and although not specifically making the payment of a poll tax a condition of the exercise thereof, provided:

That any voter who is subject to pay a poll tax under the laws of the State shall have paid said tax before he offers to vote at any election in this State and holding (hold) a receipt showing (payment of) his poll tax before the first day of February next preceding such election. Or if said voter shall have lost or misplaced said tax receipt, he shall be entitled to vote upon making affidavit before any officer authorized to administer o a ths that such tax receipt has been lost. Such affidavit shall be made in writing and l e ft with the judge of the election, and this pro v ision of the constitution shall be self-e n acting without the necessity of further e r e l gi s lation.

The Court held cons t itu ti onal, notwithstanding the · self-enacting provision, a statute re g ulating the determination of how and when a voter should or should not be declared subject to a poll tax, and providing, in creating an exempt class, that those becoming 21 on or before the date of an election and not subject to a poll tax preceding the election. who by reason of minority had not theretofore been subject to a poll tax. and who should possess all the other .qualifications of voters, should be entitled to vote upon obtaining a certificate of exemption from the county collector before February 1 preceding the election, which should specify the day of attainment of the age of 21 and contain all other requisites of a certificate of exemption, and also providing that "before the certificate of exemption shall issue the applicant therefor shall make written affidavit of his age to be administered and certified to by the county collector. who shall file and preserve same" upon the theory that the language of the constitution did "not attempt to restrain the legislature from declaring when and in what manner it shall be determined that one offering to vote at an election is not subject to the payment of a poll tax." And in Texas Power & L. Co. v. Brownwood Pub. Serv. Co. < < 1937) Tex. Civ. App. 11 SW (2d) 1225 > , it was held that a statutory provision exempting from payment of a poll tax every person more than 60 years of age, and providing that. such a person can vote without such payment "if he has obtained his certificate of exemption from the county tax collector when the same is required by the provisions of this title," and a provision expressly requiring, in cities of more than 10,000, that those who are exempted from payment of a poll tax shall procure their exemption certificates before February 1 of the year in which they offer to vote. and making the requirements with respect to exemption certificates the same as those attached to the right to vote in connection with poll tax receipts, were proper r the court considering that inasmuch as the matter of requiring payment of a poll tax as a prerequisite to the right to vote was one determinable solely in the wisdom of the legislature, it followed that the latter could make such exemption regulations as it saw fit, so -long as they did not otherwise contravene the Constitution; and that since it undoubtedly could have required payment of a poll tax of all electors as a condition precedent to their right to vote, it could, as regards the creation of exemptions, validly fix an age limit within which such exemptions should be operative, and likewise, in order to preserve the purity of elections, impose additional safeguards upon cities of more than 10,000, and as an incident to creation of the exemptions it had "equal power to prescribe, as a qualification for voting, equal or similar requirements for those gratuitously exempted from poll tax payments as it does for those who are required to pay the tax"; that it was a necessary implication from the statute that a citizen over 60 years of age, by seasonably paying a poll tax, should be entitled to vote in any event; that if an exempt person desired to take advantage of the exemption afforded him by law, and not pay a poll tax, he could validly be required, as a qualification for exercise of his suffrage rights in cities of more than 10,000 seasonably to obtain an exemption certificate; and that therefore those more than 60 years of age who had not secured such certificates were not qualified voters. And it was held on rehearing, in connection with the statutory requirement upon those 60 years of age or older to procure exemption certificates as a condition precedent to the exercise of their suffrage rights, that the formal act of registration could not be regarded as a mere method of furnishing to the election judge evidence of the right to vote, and not as being a limitation upon the right to vote, inasmuch as if failure in these regards should not be deemed a disqualification, the availability of the requirements to preserve the purity of the ballot would be rendered ineffectual and the constitutional provision authorizing registration rendered nugatory. See also Breedlove v. Suttles ((1937) 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. ed. 252, 58 S. Ct. 205, infra, Ild) .

In Solon v. State ( 0908) 54 Tex. Crim. Rep. 261, 114 SW 349), a statute providing, among other purposes, as a condition of voting privileges, for the payment of poll taxes by every male person between the ages of 21 and 60 residing in the State on January 1 of each year, except Indians, insane persons, the blind, the deaf, and the dumb, and those having lost one hand or foot, was held to embrace a proper classification and not to be unconstitutional for inequality and nonuniformity.

In Solon against State, supra, under a constitutional provision that the qualifications of electors should embrace payment of a poll tax before the 1st of February next preceding the election at which an elector should offer to vote, and authorizing the legislature to make regulations to detect and punish fraud and preserve the purity of the ballot, it was held that a statute providing that anyone who loaned money to another knowing it was to be used for paying such other's poll tax should be guilty of a misdemeanor was not unconstitutional as unduly restricting the right of suffrage, or as a deprivation of rights without due process of law, or as an unreasonable abridgment of the right to contract.

And in Watts v. State ( 0911) 61 Tex. Crim. Rep. 364, 135 SW 585), under the general provisions of the Texas constitution under which the legislature was authorized to regulate elections, providing that any voter "subject" to pay a poll tax shall have paid the same before he offers to vote and hold a receipt, and so forth, the court held that a statute penalizing "any person who loans or advances money to another knowingly to be used for paying the poll tax of such person" was not an unconstitutional or unreasonable abridgment of the right to contract, and did not violate any of the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the 14th amendment, or violate the bill of rights of Texas as disfranchising persons without due process of law, or denying to persons of one class public privileges conferred upon others, or denying equal protection of the laws, or unduly abridging the qualifications of voters and placing a burden upon them not authorized by the Constitution.

In State v. Old ( ((1896) 95 Tenn. 723, 34 SW 690, 31 LRA 837), under a constitutional provision that every male citizen of the age of 21, a citizen of the United States and a resident of the State and county of voting for certain periods should be entitled to vote for certain officers, and that-

There shall be no qualification attached to the right of suffrage, except that each voter shall give to the judges of election where he offers to vote satisfactory evidence that he has paid the poll taxes assessed against him for such preceding period as the legislature shall prescribe, and at such time as may be prescribed by law, without which his vote cannot be received. And all male citizens of the State shall be subject to the payment of poll taxes within such ages as may be prescribed by law. The general assembly shall have power to enact laws requiring voters to vote in the election precincts in which they may reside, and laws to secure the freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.

The Court held that the legislature was authorized to enact statutory provisions that the "satisfactory evidence" should consist of the original poll tax receipt, or a duly certified duplicate thereof, or the duly authenticated certificate prescribed by another section of the statute allowing a trustee's certificate and providing for its form in cases where the tax was paid to a constable and not to trustee, properly certified by the recipient, or an affidavit of the voter that he paid his poll tax and that his receipt was lost, which should be filed with the election judge, and to these ends to enact that a person voting, or an election judge allowing such person to vote, without compliance should be guilty of a misdemeanor.

In this connection attention is called toRe Corydon Twp. Election ( 0912) 236 Pa. 588, 84 A 1107), where the Court in approving the view that the vote of one for whom another had paid a "State and county" tax as a condition of voting, contrary to the statute involved, was unlawful, approved and applied the statute, which provided that it should be unlawful for anyone to pay or cause to be paid any poll--State and county-tax assessed against any elector except on the written and signed order of the elector authorizing such payment to be made, and which further provided how it should be presented, and make it "unlawful for any officer, clerk, or other person authorized to collect taxes and receipt therefor, to receive payment of, or receipt for any" such tax, and "unlawful for any person to vote or attempt to vote at any election upon a tax receipt obtained in violation" of the act, the Court considering that at least insofar as it was directed toward regulatory features of the exercise of the franchise and the prevention of fraud and corruption it was proper and designed to such an end, even though it contained a penal provision. The Court said:

The constitutional requirement is that the elector "shall have paid his State or county tax" before he is qualified to vote. The prime purpose of the legislation creating occupation and poll taxes was to enable persons to become qualified as voters rather than to raise revenue, and the legislature, having afforded this opportunity, may in all reasonable ways prescribe and regulate the manner of the payment of such taxes. The act of 1897 was no doubt passed to remedy a public evil which had come into existence through the wholesale purchase of tax receipts by organized political parties, contrary to the intent of the Constitution that each elector should individually pay a tax. The object of the act was to see to it that each elector should in good faith pay such taxes with his own funds. There is nothing in the statute which serves to disfranchise the citizen for it rests with each man properly to qualify himself to exercise the franchise of an elector, and the act affords him ample opportunity so to do, without unreasonable restraints.

It comes to this:

The Constitution requires that each elector shall pay a tax in order to qualify himself. The legislature has afforded that opportunity, at the same time hedging it around with proper and reasonable safeguards, and only payment in the manner prescribed by this legislation constitutes a payment of the tax in a legal sense, so as to give the voter the requisite constitutional qualification.

In Breedlove v. Suttles ( ((1937) 302 U.S. 277, 82 L. ed. 252, 58 s. Ct. 205) , the Court held that a Georgia statute providing for the collection of a poll tax as a prerequisite to the right to register and vote at any election did not violate the equal protection of privileges and immunity clauses of the 14th amendment because it applied only to persons between the ages of 21 and 60, and to women only if they registered for voting, or because in the case of women, registration was permitted without payment of such taxes for previous years. The Court stated that the equal protection clause did not require absolute equality, and invoked the familiar constitutional rule that the privilege of voting at State elections is not derived from the United States, but conferred by the State, and that except as restrained by the 15th and 19th amendments and other applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may make any conditions, as regards suffrage, that it deems appropriate, and that the privileges and immunities protected under the 14th amendment are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States, and not those springing from other sources. And it was particularly considered that the right of male electors to vote was not denied on account of their sex, within the meaning of the 19th amendment to the Federal Constitution, by a Georgia statute requiring that men between the ages of 21 and 60 should pay all poll taxes, including those of previous years, as a prerequisite of voting, while requiring women to pay a poll tax only if they registered for voting.

I have establis h ed, from cases throughout the whole history of this country, that this is a matter which should be adopted by the States, and that the power to fix qualifications of voters should remain absolutely and alone in the State government, where the great wisdom of the writers of the Constitution placed it.

I respectfully urge that the Senate do not create such a precedent as is sought to be created here.

My distinguished colleague from Mississippi [Mr. STENNIS], in his first speech against the enactment of an antipoll tax amendment, pointed out-and I thought appropriately so-the increase in crime in the Nation's Capital. That is a matter which should be dealt with by Congress. It is a matter that is primarily the duty of the Congress to deal with. We have conditions here, as described by my colleague, of secretaries in the Capitol of the United States and in the offices of Senators who have to ask for police protection in order to get to their automobiles, to go home in the evening, because of the rape and robbery and murder that are committed right here in the District of Columbia and right here on Capitol Hill.

It is a deplorable condition. It is a horrible condition.

That is a matter which is within the duty of Congress. It is the primary responsibility of Congress. Congress should attend to that condition, instead of taking up a two-bit amendment to take away from five States the right to levy the poll tax, when it does not dis . ­ qualify anyone from voting, and when there is no showing that anyone is disqualified from voting. We should attend to conditions that affect us right here, which are of primary importance to us, rather than playing politics and taking up political measures.

Senator STENNIS has described the situation now developing. in which no person's wife or property is safe anywhere or at any time from the hoodlums, muggers, robbers, murderers, and rapists who roam the streets at every hour of the day and night in the Nation's. in 1960. Capital. Congress could better spend its time in cleaning up a situation in an area where it has the primary responsibility, rather than to be here engaged in an attempt to take more powers away from a handful of States on an insignificant matter such as the poll tax.

Mr. President, why is it that we do not have the courage to come to grips with the rape, the robbery .. the murder, and all the other crime in the District of Columbia, including the area. around the Capitol of the United States itself? While we from the South have persistently and rightfully denied that there is any relationship between the poll tax issue and civil rights, proponents of socalled civil rights legislation always equate anti-poll-tax legislation in the civil rights area. The most remarkable Single factor concerning the ag,itation for civil rights legislation generally .is that the primary origin for the movement to enact punitive legislation against a handful of Southern States arises in the great metropolitan areas of the United States, including the city of Washington, D.C. God pity the future of this country if civil rights are to mean a license to steal, rob, rape, assault, and murder with impunity. It has even been necessary to station police dogs on Capitol Hill because of the rampant crime. Yet, we in Congress do not have the courage to come to grips with our responsibility and protect the people who govern the country. Yet, the tragic record that is now being written in regard to crimes of violence, both premeditated and unpremeditated, in our metropolitan areas is one that must shock the sensibilities of the civilized world. I wholeheartedly agree with my colleague from Mississippi that Congress should concentrate on activity that York. would insure to the individual citizen and to the com1nunity the right to be safe in both his person and property from the gangsters, hoodlums, and vagrants that roam the streets of Washington and create a reign of terror. Let us examine the record. The complete reports for 1961, prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, on crime figures in the United states have just recently been released. This report states that preliminary crime figures for the calendar year 1961 as reported by American cities with o.ver 25.000 population reveal a 2-percent crime increase over 1960. Increases were recorded in all crime categories except robbery, which was down 1 percent. The year ended with forcible rape up 1 percent over 1960, with cities in the 250,000 to 500,000 population groups reporting a sharp 19 percent increase. Aggravated assaults were up 3 percent, and murder rose another 2 percent over the previous year. Burglary continued an upward trend, with a a­ percent increase. Other crimes against property; namely, larceny of $50 and auto theft, also showed increases of 2 percent. The . report concludes with this significant statement:

Although the crime trends a.nd arrest trends are less sharp than a year ago, it. should be kept in mind that these increases, even though appearing to be moderate, were registered on top of the crime peak reached Thus. the FBI reports that 1960 was the peak year in crime trends, and yet even after the peak was reached, 1961 reflected still another gain of up to as: much as 3 percent in the overall register of crime statistics. The greatest area of increase was registered in the larger cities, such as Washington.

Let me quote the bare figures in our larger metropo.litan areas. In 1960 New York City reported 390 homicides in the various categories. 1961 showed an increase of murder and manslaughter to the number of 482'. Rapes dropped from 841 to 788.

Think of that, Mr. President: More. than two rape cases a day in New York City. Yet it is from that area that we hear the howling for law enforcement in the South, which is the most peaceful part of our country ~

Robberies in New York City decreased slightly from · 6,579 to 5.955, but aggravated assaults increased from 11,021 to 11,976. Burglaries increased from 36,049 to 38,460, and larcenies of over $50 increased from 54,213 to 54 , 827. Even with a popul a tion such as that which is conta i n e d in the land area of New York City, these a r e fearsome totals of crimes of violence. I sat in on hearings the o t her day involving a judicial appointment in the southern district of New York. A witness test i fied that the nominee had been the chief judge in a threejudge court that was required to proce s s and adjudicate more than 70,000 juvenile cases in a calendar year. The witness pointed out the difficulty that any judge would have in having to personally hear and determine more than 23,000 cases in a year. That figures out at almost 2,000 cases a month, and this, mind you, is in just one court in the city of New

That is where the how] is. raised, that is where the agitation comes from. to federalize this. country and :force the conditions of New York on the people of the Southern States. But let me move an to other areas.

In the city of Philadelphia, murder dropped from 150 to 144; rapes from 529 to 500. Robbery increased from 2,014 to 2,215. Aggravated assaults decreased from 4,041 to 3,842. Burglary remained almost. constant at 11,840 to 11,752, and larceny decreased from 4,594 in 1960 to 4,152 in 1961.

The old :refrain is being repeated day after day in Philadelphia. I shall read now from an article appearing in the Philadelphia press in 1958. Mr. President, when the article was written in 1958, the crime :rates in Philadelphia were not as high as they were in 1960. and not as. high as they were in 1961 . and not as high as they are in 196 · 2. So we must consider this article in the light of the even milder conditions which prevailed then.

I now read from the article:

We wonder how long the present public indignation about the murder of a Korean student by a gang of 11 young hoodlums last week will continue. The city has seen somewhat similar atrocious attacks on storekeepers or old women. There have been public outcries. Within a matter of days, however, · all is forgotten except by the widows and orphans or families of the beaten and killed. There have been vicious murders before and juries have convicted some defendants as many a.s five times. Appellate courts have reversed them on technicalities found by s!lck lawyers . Minuscule errors by judges and prosecutors have resulted In killers being turned loose.

Certainly, every defendant should have all the . safeguards of the law but no more · . The law should protect the public also.

There was & time when criminal punishment was too severe and there was public revulsion. The pendulum seems to have swung the other way entirely, and ' now the utmost liberty 1s given criminals. The "bleeding heart" social workers who make up most of the pena:l and correctional staffs seem. to think that. & slap on the wrist is enough for & criminal who uses brass knuckles or & lead pipe on a defenseless old man or woman; that probation, given over and over again, is · the answer and that we musn't hurt the feelings of the poor "underprivileged".

Judges and magistrates with political ties and political fears are only too happy to accept their decisions.

Much of the trouble goes back to the younger generation of the Negro race. It would be nice to be able to pretend it isn't so and hide one's head in the sand, but sta-1 tistics and facts can't be shrugged off. It is unpopular to discuss Negro crime and the Negroes have done little to help themselves. Philadelphia, traditional city of brotherly love, opened its heart, its arms, and its purse to the less fortunate from the earliest days. Now the repayment is in crime, terrorism Of ' schools and institutions, and a lessening of standards generally.

· Negro youth, boys and girls, almost monopolize many of the recreation centers, not only those in their own neighborhoods but in white areas too. There have been running battles around high schools, in particular, covered up by police, the schools and other authorities. They have frightened schoolteachers and some refuse to work at schools in Negro areas.

The excerpts I have read are from an article written by John · c. Calpin, and published on the editorial page of the Philadelphia Bulletin on Sunday May 4, 1958. Every word that he states in this article is equally true of the situation that exists here in Washington, and the crime statistics for the city of Philadelphia have shown an upward increase since that article was written in 1958.

The city of Chicago has only recently installed a system of crime reporting that makes figures available to the public. It now uses standards that are satisfactory to the reporting system of the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the figures for 1961 reveal that there were a total of 365 murders; 1,481 rapes; 18,993 robberies; 11,410 aggravated assaults; 39,452 burglaries, and 27,678 cases of larceny of $50 or over. It will be interesting to see how the Chicago figures for the year 1962 come out, because this will be the first time that we shall have had an opportunity to make a comparison as to an increase or decrease in its crime statistics.

Detroit, Mich., while losing population between the 1950 and the 1960 censuses, still ranks in fifth place in population of cities. Detroit's comparative crime figures for the period between 1960 and 1961 show a decrease in murder from 150 to 136; forcible rapes from 332 to 315; robberies from 3,988 to 3,397. Aggravated assaults increased from 5,012 to 5,052. Burglaries decreased from 16,500 to 15,300, and larcenies of $50 or over decreased from 4,800 to 4,364.

Los Angeles, Calif., shows the following comparative figures for the period between 1960 and 1961: Murders increased from 154 to 159. Rapes increased from 1,085 to 1,156. Robberies decreased from 6,068 to 5,729. Aggravated assaults increased from 7,565 to 7,973. Burglaries decreased from 36,256 to 35,404. Larcenies of $50 or over decreased from 21,417 to 20,192.

Mr. President, the point is that under our system of Government, the U.S. Government does not have control of the police. The city governments do, under the police power.