March 23, 1962 (2)

VOTER QUALIFICATIONS

Section 2(a)(1) states that Congress finds that qualifications prescribed by State laws for voting or registration in Federal and State elections, other than qualifications based on age, residence, freedom from confinement, and freedom from conviction of a crime, are susceptible of use, and have been used, to deny citizens the right to vote, because of their race or color.

Section 2(a) (2) states that Congress determines that the constitutional sources of its power to enact section 2 of the b111 are section 5 of the 14th amendment (the enforcement provision-to enforce the equal protection clause · in this case), and section 2 of the 15th amendment.

The section by itself does not amend nor is it related to any existing provision of Federal law.

Section 2(b) provides that the right of citizens of the United States to vote, to register or otherwise qualify to vote, and have their vote counted at any Federal or State elections (including special elections and primaries) , shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered with by the United States or by any State for any cause except for the following reasons, uniformly applied within the State and its political subdivisions to all persons: ( 1) inability to meet reasonable age requirements; (2) inability to meet reasonable requirements as to length of · residence within the State and its political subdivision; (3) legal confinement at the time of the election or registration; and (4) conviction of a Excepted from the application of this subsection are literacy tests which are the subject of section 3 of the bill.

This section presumably would eliminate such conditions among others, restricting the privilege of voting, now applied by the States as (1) poll tax and property qualifications, (2) loyalty oaths (for elections of State officials), (3) pauper and vagrancy tests, (4) rules on dishonorably discharged soldiers, (5) laws on dueling, a1,1d (6) rules on mental disability except where the person is under legal confinement.

LITERACY TESTS

Section 3 provides that where any literacy test (tests "designed to assure a person's ability to read and understand") is admininstered in respect to the qualification to vote, or to register to vote, in any Federal or State elections (including special elections and primaries), the "successful completion of six or more grades of formal education by such person shall satisfy all the requirements of any such test."

The section does not include a provision on a constitutional source as in the case of section 2, nor does it amend or is it related to any provision of existing law.

It does not define the term "formal education" so as to relate such education to a school system.

DEPRIVATION OF RIGHT TO VOTE THROUGH ARBITRARY ACTION OR INACTION

Section 4 amends section 131 (b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1957 (42 U.S.C. 1971(b)) by adding a new sentence at the end thereof. It provides that no person acting under color of law or otherwise "shall by arbitrary action, or by arbitrary inaction" deny, abridge, or interfere with or threaten to interfere with the right to vote in Federal elections (including primaries for such elections).

Forty-second United States Code, section 1971(b), declares that no person, acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce, any person for the purpose of interfering with the right to vote in any Federal election including primaries. The constitutional sources of authority for the enactment of this section of the bill are presumably the power of Congress to legislate as to the manner of holding Federal elections (art. "I, sec. 4 of the Constitution), and its power to protect the integrity of the Federal electoral process (U.S. v. Classic 313 U.S. 299 (1941)). (See analysis of S. 480 and S. 2750).

None of the sections (2, 3, or 4) of the bill expressly provides any legal remedy. They are declaratory (as is 42 U.S.C. 1971(b) which sec. 4 amends) and must rely for their enforcement on other provisions of law (see analysis of S. 480 and S. 2750). Only section 4 could be enforced under 42 U.S.C. 1971 (c) providing for actions by the Attorney General. ·

COMPILATION OF REGISTRATION AND VOTING STATISTICS

Section 5 provides that the Director of the Census shall compile comprehensive information and statistics relating to the registration of voters in each State and the number of such voters who vote in elections held in such State. Such statistics shall include ( 1) number of persons of voting age in each State classified by race, color, and national origin, who are registered to vote; and (2) where possible, the number of persons of each such classification who have voted ln any election since January 1, 1960. Provides that beginning with the next decennial census after enactment of the b111, the information specified shall be compiled as a part of each decennial census.

Comparison of voter

S. 2750 (MANSFIELD and DIRKSEN) (Federal elections)

FINDINGS

(a) Essential to our form of government that all qualified citizens have opportunity to participate in choiCe of elected officials.

(b) Right to vote in Federal elections should be kept free from discrimination and other corrupt influence.

(c) Many persons have been subjected to arbitrary and unreasonable voting restrictions on account of race or color.

Literacy tests and "other performance examinations" have been used extensively to effect arbitrary and unreasonable denial of right to vote.

Existing statutes are inadequate to assure all qualified persons have right to vote.

(d) Education in United States is such that persons who have completed 6 primary grades in public or accredited private school cannot reasonably be denied franchise on grounds of illiteracy or lack of sufficient education or intelligence to exercise prerogatives or citizenship.

(e) Large numbers of American citizens also State citizens are deprived of right to vote because of birth and education in part of United States where Spanish is commonly used: these citizens are qualified to exercise franchise: information necessary for intelligent exercise of franchise available through Spanish-language news sources.

Lack of proficiency in Spanish provides no reasonable basis for excluding these citizens from participating in democratic processes.

(f) Authority: Art. 1, sec. 4, of the Constitution; sec. 5, 14th amendment; sec. 2, 15th amendment.

VOTER QUALIFICATION OTHER THAN LITERACY

No provision for.

Amends 42 U.S.C. 1971{1>) which was enacted by the 1957 Civil Rights Act, and which now defines the right to vote free of intimidation, threats, or coercion, in "any general, special, or primary election for President, Vice President, Presidential electors, and Members of Congress and other national officers."

The bill substitutes for the quoted terms, the phrase "Federal elections." It broadens the scope of action prohibited by this section to include "deprivation of the right to vote."

Since the section is enforced by civil actions for damages and other relieJ by private individuals, and by the Attorney General in civil actions for injunctions and other preventive relief, the bill, by defining the "deprivation of the right to vote," adds 2 new grounds for such actions:

(1) application to any person of "standards or procedures" more stringent than are applied to others similarly situated.

(2) the denial to any person otherwise qualified by law of the right to vote on account of his performance in "any examination whether for literacy or otherwise," if he has completed the 6th primary grade of any public school or accredited private school in any State or territory, the District of Columbia, or Puerto Rico.

information AND VOTING STATISTICS

No provision.

The section does not include a reference to a constitutional source but presumably the power of Congress to enact it would rest on a.rticle I, section 2, clause 3 of the Con-" stitution which is the decennial census requirement. Extending the scope of the census to secure information for Congress necessary for legislative action has received the implied approval of the Supreme Court (Legal Tender cases, 12 Wall. 457, 536 (1871)). qualification bills now pending before the Constitutional S. 480 (J A VITS et al.) (Federal and State elections)

FINDINGS

(a) Right to vote is fundamental to free government. It continues to be responsibility of Federal Government to protect this right against unreasonable, arbitrary restrictions.

(b) Right to vote of many persons has been subjected to arbitrary, unreasonable restrictions on account of race or color.

"Literacy tests" have been used as device to arbitrarily deny right to vote to otherwise qualified persons. di~;~~;;g ~g~~~in:rd~~~;~e to assure right without (c) llliteracy rapidly disappearing: Quality of elementary education of high caliber: persons completing 6 grades in State-accredited school can reasonably be expected to be literate. Literate electorate can be assured by affording right to vote to any otherwise qualified person who bas completed 6 grades. Any literacy test that denied right to vote to one who has completed 6 grades is arbitrary and unreasonable.

(No provision for foreign-language citizens.)

{d) Authority: Act necessary "to make effect the guarantees of the Constitution, particularly those in 14th ment. and 15th amendments."

VOTER QUALIFICATION OTHER THAN LrrERACY

No provision for.

Amends 42 U.S.C. 197l(a) which defines the right to vote in any election free of discrimination on grounds of race. color, or previous condition o ! servitude, to include the right to vote without subjection to "any arbitrary or unreasonable 'test, standard, or practice with respect to literacy'."

Defines "test, standard, or practice" to mean "any requirement designed to determine literacy, comprehension, intelligence, or other test of education or ~~w~~~o~r~~e:~gi~!·':uin ~~~S:~~f~~~ih: completed the 6th primary grade in a school accredited by any State or by the District of Columbia.

Since this section may also be enforced in civil actions by individuals under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and by the Attorney General under sec. (c) of the statute (the 1957 act), the bill thus adds a new basis for such court actions, the denial of the right to vote in Federal and State elections to any person who has completed the 6th grade and has not been found incompetent.

REGISTRATION .AND VOTING STATISTICS

No provision.

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a comparison of the three bills, prepared by the staff of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary, be printed at this point in the REc­

There being . no objection, the comparison was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

Rights Subcommittee

S. 2979 (KEATING et al.) (Federal and State elections)

FINDINGS

Qualifications prescribed by State laws for voting or registering to vote, in Federal and State elections, other than qualifications based upon age, residence, freedom from confinement, and freedom from conviction of a crime, are susceptible of use, and have been used to deny citizens the right to vote, because of their race or color. (No provision for foreign language groups.)

Authority: Sec. 5, 14th amendment; sec. 2, 15th amend­

VOTER QUALIFICATION OTHER THAN LITERACY

Except as provided in sec. 3 (relating to literacy tests), the right of U.S. citizens to vote, register, or otherwise qualify to vote and have their vote counted in any general, special, or primary election to select candidates for Federal and State office, shall not be denied, abridged, or interfered with by United States or any State for any cause except inability to meet reasonable requirements relating to age, length of residence within State and its political subdivisions; legal confinement at time of election or registration; and conviction of felony.

DEPRIVATION OF RIGH ':" TO VOTE THROUGH ARBITRARY ACTION OR INACTION

Amends 42 U.S.C. 197l(b) relating to Federal elections, to provide that no person shall by arbitrary action or inaction deny, abridge, or interfere with right o . any person to vote or to register to vote or to have his vote counted in such election. The section apparently provides new "due process" grounds for private and U.S. civil actions in Federal elections in accordance with standards set in other portions of the bill relating to voter qualifications and literacy tests.

LITERACY TESTS

Sec. 3 provides that in any case in which, under the laws oJ any State, "any literacy test or any other test" designed to assure a person's ability to read and understand is administered in order to determine whether a person is qualified to vote, or to register to vote, in any "Federal or State elections," including primaries, the successful completion of 6 or more grades of formal education by such person shall satisfy all the requirements of any such test.

REGISTRATION AND VOTING STATISTICS

Provides that the Director of the Bureau of the Census shall compile information and statistics relating to registration of voters In the States and the number who vote in elections in States. Information to include (I) number of registered persons of voting age, classified by race, color, and national origin; (2) number who have voted in elections since January 1960 •

Mr. ERVIN. Mr. President, if I had not spent the major portion of my life practicing law, or observing, in the capacity of a judge, other lawyers in the practice of law. I would be at a total loss to comprehend how any intelligent and informed person could reach the conclusion that any one of the bills I have cited is constitutional. But having had this experience with lawyers, I am able to understand why some of them will assert in good faith that these measures are constitutional. Sometimes lawyers do what can most aptly be called the Intellectual Twist. A lawyer indulges in the Intellectual Twist when he tries to assign to simple words a meaning other than the clear, . the plain, and the obvious meaning of those words.

Mr. President, when a lawyer indulges in such an Intellectual Twist, and attempts to assign to simple words a meaning wholly incompatible with those simple words, he engages in the art of complicating simplicity. Anyone who engages in the art of complicating simplicity gets himself into such a state of mental confusion that he cam~ot understand the simplest or clearest things. For example, he cannot accept the conclusion that when the authors of the Constitution wrote it, they intended the words they used to mean exactly what those words say.

Mr. President, there may be another group who say they think these measures would be held constitutional if they were enacted into law; and I would suggest that the only basis upon which they could reach that conclusion is that they have decided that the Supreme Court of the United States has lost all of its intellectual integrity and all of its judicial stability.

Mr. President, I assert that these measures ought not be approved by the Senate--for two reasons. Those reasons are as follows:

First, these measures are totally unnecessary for the accomplishment of the purpose which those who propose them profess to have in view.

Second, these measures are unconstitutional on at least five grounds. Let me enumerate those five grounds:

First, these measures undertake to have Congress prescribe the qualifications for voters in congressional elections, in violation of section 2 of article I of the Constitution and in violation of the 17th amendment to the Constitution, which declare in clear, plain, and simple words that the only persons eligible to vote for Senators and Representatives in the National Congress are those in each State who possess "the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature." Second, these measures undertake to have Congress direct that presidential and vice-presidential electors shall be appointed by citizens who have "completed the sixth primary grade in a school" in any State or in the District of Columbia or in Puerto Rico, in violation of clause 2 of section 1 of article II, which states in clear, plain, and · simple words that "Each State shall appoint" such electors "in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."

Third, these measures undertake to have the Congress legislate affirmatively upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation, under section 2 of article I, section 1 of article II, and the 17th amendment to the Constitution; and thus these measures exceed the power of Congress to enforce the provisions of the 14th, 15th, and 19th amendments by appropriate legislation.

Fourth, these measures undertake to vest in Congress a portion of the judicial power of the United States, and thus they violate section 1 of article ill of the Constitution, which stipulates as follows:

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.

Fifth, these measures undertake to legislate the truth of facts, and thus forbid the exercise of an indestructible judicial function, in violation of the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. President, at a later stage in my presentation I shall return to a discussion of my contention that these measures are unconstitutional in each of the five ways I have just now stated, and I shall point out in some detail the reasons for my position.

At the present time I wish to deal with my assertion that these bills are wholly unnecessary. Each of these bills contains certain preambles and whereases. Whenever a bill contains preambles and whereases a legislator acts wisely when he scrutinizes it very carefully. This is true because preambles and whereases are used as camouflage, in the hope that they will prevent the legislator from discovering the iniquitous provisions which are in the bill itself.

Each of these bills contains in the preambles and whereases an assertion to the effect that the laws presently in effect are inadequate to assure that all qualified persons will enjoy this essential right-that is, the right to vote-without discrimination on account of race or color.

I believe one can assert without fear of successful contradiction that there are more laws upon the statute books of the United States to secure and vindicate the right of persons to vote against any denial or abridgent of this right based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude than there are laws on any other subject whatever.

In the first place, any person who is qualified, under the provisions of section 2 of article I of the Constitution and the 17th amendment, to vote for Senators and Representatives in Congress, and who is wrongfully denied that right, has two different remedies under an act of Congress available to him personally. These remedies are set out in title 42, section 1983, of the United States Code. The statute reads as follows:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the has. United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held, in .a number .of cases, that if any qualified person is denied the right to vote by any State election official, he has a right, under the statute, to sue such election official for damages. Among those many cases are Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268; Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536; and Myers v. Anderson, 238 u.s. 368.

The statute which I have just read states that any person who is wrongfully denied any right he has under the Constitution, under color of any State law, has a right to bring a suit in equity for preventive relief.

Under the statute which I have been discussing, the individual wrongfully denied his right to vote because of his race, color, or previous condition of servitude has adequate remedies whereby he can recover damages for injuries actually done him, and whereby he can obtain preventive relief in equity to prevent any threatened injury being done him in this respect.

I sincerely hope that the Department of Justice is not going to claim there is any validity to the assertion in the preambles and whereases of these bills reciting that laws presently in effect are inadequate to assure that all qualified persons shall enjoy the right to vote without discrimination on account of race or color. If the Department of Justice should make any such claim as that, I would be compelled to say to the Department of Justice that its claim reminds me of the time John was courting Mary.

John and Mary were sitting on the bench one night. The moon was shining brightly. The odor of flowers permeated the atmosphere. They were in surroundings which were calculated to make anyone feel romantic. John said to Mary, "Mary, if you wasn't what you is, what would like to be?" Mary said, "John, if I wasn't what I is, I would like to be an American Beauty rose." Then Mary turned the inquiry on John and asked, "John, if you wasn't what you is, what would you like to be?" John said, "Mary, if I wasn't what I is, I would want to be an octopus." Mary said, "John, what in the world is an octopus?" John said, "Mary, an octopus is a kind of an animal or a fish or something that has a thousand arms." Mary said, "John, if you was an octopus and you had a thousand arms, what would you do with them?" John said, "Mary, if I was an octopus and had a thousand arms, I would put every one of them around you." Mary said, "John, go on away. You ain't using the two arms that you already got."

If the Department of Justice should come to Congress and make any claim to the Senate that it needs any more laws than it already has, I should have to say to it that it has come to that conclusion because it is not using the laws it already Let us see what laws the Department already has.

I call the attention of the Senate to title 18, section 242 of the United States Code, which bears the title "Deprivation of Rights Under Color of Law."

I read from the statute:

Whoever, under the color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any inhabitant of any State, Territory, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties , on account of such inhabitant being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held in a number of casesnotably, in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299-that the right of a person possessing the qualifications defined in section 2 of article I of the 17th amendment to vote in an election for Senators or Representatives in Congress is a right secured or protected by the Constitution within the meaning of this statute, and that any election official who wrongfully deprives any qualified voter of any race of that right is guilty of a crime under this section of the United States Code.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ERVIN. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. HILL. Would it not be true that anybody who felt his rights had been denied or impaired under that statute would have a right to go before a U.S. Commissioner and to swear out a warrant for the arrest of the party he felt had committed the act against him?

Mr. ERVIN. Certainly he would have that right. There is another statute which provides penalties against a U.S. Commissioner who does not issue a warrant under those circumstances. As the Senator from Alabama well knows, there is a U.S. Commissioner in virtually every county in the United States.

Mr. HILL. Is it not true that anybody who felt he was aggrieved or that his rights were denied or impaired would have a right to ask to go before a Federal grand jury to present the case to a grand jury?

Mr. ERVIN. Yes, he would have that right, and it would be the duty of the U.S. attorney, if the evidence were reported to him showing a violation of the statute, to cause an indictment . or information to be filed against the alleged offender, and to see to it that he was brought to trial if there were probable cause to believe him to be guilty.

I state to the Senator from Alabama, however, that those who are interested in agitating racial matters on a national level do not seem to wish to invoke the remedy set by this statute because when one agitates things in the Congress one does not have to prove them, all one has to do is to assert them. However, when one goes before a court it is necessary to prove the case. It is much easier to make charges against election officials than to prove such charges in court. In Congress many of the charges are made by organizations which find it to their financial advantage to make charges.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ERVIN. I am happy to yield to the distinguished Senator from Alabama.

Mr. HILL. Of course, the organiza­ them. tions to which the Senator has referred know that the charges they make will not be weighed, sifted, and considered on their merits, as they would be before a court. Is that correct?

Mr. ERVIN. Those organizations know full well that there are certain people in public life in this country who are always ready to accept any such charge as being the gospel truth. I dislike to make that statement. In other words, not only do some organizations receive great financial profit, but also some officials reap great political advantage from accepting such charges and agitating them.

I invite the attention of Senators to another criminal statute; namely, title 18, section 241, which is headed "Conspiracy Against the Rights of Citizens." T h e statute reads a!) follows:

If two or more persons conspire to injure, o p pres s , threaten or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or pr i vilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or bec a use of his having so exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured , they shall be fined not more th a n $5,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years or both.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held in a number of cases that the right of voters qualified under section 2, article I, and under the 17th amendment, to vote at an election for Senators or Representatives is a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, and that a conspiracy to deprive them of that right is covered by title 18, section 241, of the United States Code, which was formerly section 51 of the Criminal Code.

Among the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States so holding are Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 and Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651.

I have cited two Federal statutes that make it a criminal offense on the part of an election official wrongfully to deny the right to vote to any person qualified to vote for Senators and Representatives under section 2 of article I, and under the 17th amendment, or to conspire with another to commit such crime. Such a conspiracy is punishable by as much as a $5,000 fine and 10 years' imprisonment or both.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ERVIN. I yield.

Mr. HILL. Would not the Senator from North Carolina say that those statutes have real teeth in them?

Mr. ERVIN. I should say that they have. The statute relating to conspiracy provides about as severe a punishment as is to be found in the case of ordinary crimes denounced by the Congress as crimes against the United States. Both statutes are at the disposal of the Department of Justice, which has in every Federal judicial district in this country a full-time U.S. attorney and a number of full-time assistant U.S. attorneys who are charged tion. with the duty of prosecuting persons who violate the statutes or either of

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. ERVIN. I am glad to yield.

Mr. HILL . Is not each U.S. attorney and his assistants entirely subject to the directions, orders, and authority of the Department of Justice? In other words, if at any time the Department feels that a U.S. attorney or assistant is not doing his duty and not meeting his full responsibilities, can he not be removed?

Mr. ERVIN. As a practical matter, they are subject to the complete direction of the Department of Justice and, as a matter of law, they are removable by the Department of Justice at its election .

In the light of these circumstances it is nonsense to assert that the Department of Justice is without sufficient laws to bring to justice every State election official in the United States who wrongfully deprives any qualified American citizen of his right to vote.

To be sure, when the Department of Justice invokes these statutes, it must prove its allegations. It cannot stop with putting a great many preambles and whereases on a paper.

Mr. HILL. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. ERVIN. The Department of Justice is able to secure the conviction of any State election official who violates these statutes, provided the evidence is available for that purpose. In addition to having district attorneys and assistant district attorneys to conduct the investigations, the Department of Justice has the FBI agents scattered in all of the areas of the United States. So it is nonsense to assert that the Department of Justice does not already have sufficient laws to accomplish everything that these preambles and these whereases say ought to be accomplished. I yield to the Senator from Alabama.

Mr. HILL. Is it not true that there are no requirements, so far as the statutes are concerned, that do not apply to all criminal statutes?

Mr. ERVIN. That is correct.

Mr. HILL. Not only criminal statutes of the Federal Government, but criminal statutes of the States and criminal statutes of the municipalities and various units of the States.

Mr. ERVIN. Yes. If a state election official, either acting alone or in a conspiracy with another person or persons violates these statutes, he ordinarily violates them in a public office under the glare of the noonday sun. That contrasts with the violation of the law by people who engage in moonshining. While a moonshiner conducts his operations in swamps and in remote sections of the mountains, I have never heard anyone complaining about the Department of Justice not having sufficient statutes to deal with moonshining. Or we might consider counterfeiting, for example, which is also committed in secret.

The Department of Justice may claim that it is sometimes difficult to persuade juries to convict, and that therefore they need legislation to cope with that situa­

As the able and · distinguished senior Senator from Alabama will remember, that was the tale the Department gave us in 1957, and again in 1960. Although the Thirteen Colonies gave · as one of the reasons - in the Declaration of Independence for severing their political bonds - with the mother country England, was that the King and Parliament had denied the Colonies the right of trial · by jury, the then Attorney General came to Congress and persuaded it to give him some laws under which Americans could be robbed of the right of · trial by jury, which is secured by the Constitution, in many .cases coming under the sections of the .criminal code which I have just read.

Congress listened to the plea of the Attorney General, and Congress passed what is now called the Civil Rights Act of 1957. I wish to read this act, so that it may be available to Members of the Senate who wish to investigate whether this assertion in the preambles and whereases, to the effect that they do not have sufficient laws is the truth or is a proposed legislative prevarication. I do not know of a gentler way to describe The Civil Rights Act of 1957 is now embodied in title 42, section 1971, of the United States Code.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may be permitted to yield to the able and distinguished Senator irom South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] to introduce a bill and to make a statement in reference to it, without losing the privilege of the floor and without having these remarks or any subsequent remarks which · I will make after he completes his introduction of the bill and his statement counted as more than one speech on this subject.

Mr. McGEE. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, may I inquire the subject matter of the Senator's remarks?

Mr. MUNDT. This has nothing to do with the controversy in question. It is connected with the proposed United Nations bond issue.

Mr. McGEE. I have no objection.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered.