March 24, 1962

Madam President, I must say that I was surprised to learn that at this late date the Department .of Justice is requesting the enactment of such legislation. If there is any lynching going on in this -country today, I do not know of it, unless it may be .by some of the gangsters in some of the big cities; and that is not classified as lynching. It is classified as gangsterism. Certainly there is no lynching in Alabama, Mississippi. or any of the other States in that part of the country.

Let me say that when I first came to the Senate-in 1938-the question at that time before the Senate was a socalled antilynching bill; and one of the greatest, most powerful, and most magnificent speeches I ever heard in all my life, I heard then in the Senate Chamber. It came from the lips oi a Senator who was se great and so powerful that we spok-e of him as "the lion .of Idaho." I r.efer to the late gr.eat SenatorWilliam E. Borah. He tore that ~ bill asunder, because of its attempted assault on the rights, duties, and responsibilities . ties of the several States. Furthermore, Madam President, it may be of interest to others to know that on that occasion Senator Borah was joined in his opposition to that bill by the great liberal .and great champion of democracy and of government · oi the people, by the people. and for the people, a man who stood out im. the Senate before his time, the late great Senator George Norris, of Nebraska.

Mr. EASTLAND. - Madam President. will the Senator :from Alabama yield for a question?

.Mr. HILL. I yield for a question.

Mr. EASTLAND. Does the Senator from Alabama realize that in the antilynching bill to which he has r-eferred, a. right of action is given f-or someone who has been mistreated; the bill w , would give him a right of action against a town, .county, or city, for negligence of the po­ .lice; and the burden of proof would be placed on the def-endant?

Mr. HILL. In -other words, as I understood the statement made earlier today by the Senator from Mississippi— and I have not bad an opportunity to .read the bill, I must say; in fact, it has not yet even been introduc.ed, printed, and made available, so far as I know; or, if it has, at least I have not had an opportunity to r.ead i:r-but, as I was say- ing, as l understood the statement the Senator made earlier this morning, the .bill would practically try the local communities, cities, or towns: and that means that the State itself would be tried, because the sovereignty reposes in the State, and the city or town exercises :only the authority of the State which the State delegates to .it.

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President. will the Senator from Alabama yield for another question?

Mr. HILL. I yield for a question.

Mr. EASTLAND. Does the Senator from Alabama realize that in its field the State is sovereign to the Federal Government; and that only in respect of the powers delegated to the Federal Government, the Federal Government is sovereign; and that that constitutes the dual sovereignty?

Mr. HILL. Yes. The State is sovereign in all its rights, powers, and authorities, except where, under the Constitution, certain powers and rights have been delegated to the Federal Government. But the basis of all sovereignty and the great reservoir of all sovereignty is the States themselves.

The fact is that there would not have been a Federal Government, and today there would not be any sovereignty on the part of the Federal Government, except for the delegation by the several States of the sovereignty which the Federal Government exercises under the Constitution of the United States.

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President, will the Senator from Alabama yield for a further question?

Mr. HILL. I yield for a question.

Mr. EASTLAND. Does the Senator from Alabama realize that if such measures, which now are being sent to Congress, were enacted into law, they would constitute a great step toward the creation in the United States of a police state?

Mr. HILL. There is no question about that. As I understood what the distinguished Senator from Mississippi said earlier today, these measures would put the Federal Government--through the FBI, or through some other Federal Government agency--over our local lawand-order authorities-for instance, over our sheriffs. I call attention to the fact that there are some 3,000 counties in the country, with some 3,000 sheriffs, and there are many police departments and chiefs of police; and in my home city of Montgomery, Ala., we have a commission in charge of the city government. The commission is composed of three commissioners. One of them has immediate and direct responsibility for the operation of our police department and for the maintenance of law and order. But the bill would put under this Federal agency all those persons, who today have the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order.

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President, will the Senator · from Alabama yield again to me?

Mr. HILL. I yield.

Mr. EASTLAND. Is it not true that one incident of the creation of a police state must be Federal control of elections and determination by the Federal Government of who can vote and who cannot vote in the elections?

Mr. HILL. The Senator from Mississippi is absolutely correct, Madam President. After all, when any dictator wishes to establish a totalitarian form of government, he first takes over the police powers-whether he establishes a Gestapo, as in Germany; or an OGPU, as in Russia; or whatever name is given to the secret police. In that way he takes over lows: the power to control local matters. He takes that power from the hands of the local governmental units, and centralizes the power in his totalitarian government. As the Senator from Mississippi has so graphically described the situation, that is exactly what Adolf Hitler did when he came into power in Germany.

Mr. EASTLAND. Does the Senator from Alabama realize that these measures lead in that direction, and that that is why we are fighting against them?

Mr. HILL. The Senator from Mississippi is entirely correct. These measures certainly go in that very direction-as the Senator from Mississippi so well stated earlier today; and that is why today we are fighting against these measures.

Mr. EASTLAND. Is it not true that the real issue that is involved is much larger or bigger than the poll tax; the real issue at stake is the U.S. Government itself?

Mr. HILL. The Senator from Mississippi is entirely correct about that. The poll tax is only an incident in this entire situation; the poll tax is only a very small; minor issue in relationship to the big, all-controlling question of the overall centralization of power in a central government in Washington, D.C. Madam President, the key to this entire debate is, of course, article I, section 2, of the Constitution. This is true in this debate, as well as in former debates on proposed constitutional amendments to abolish the poll tax. This is also true in the case of present proposals, as well as former proposals, to abolish the poll tax by . statute.

Because it preserves and secures to the . States their rights to prescribe the qualifications for electors for Members of Congress, article I, section 2, together with the same language of . the 17th amendment, supplies the bedrock of my argument, as, indeed, it does for nearly any argument against all such proposals which would diminish the power of our States to prescribe the qualifications of their electors.

The history of the adoption by the Constitutional Convention of article I, section 2, the discussions of article I, section 2, in the various States at the time of ratifying the Constitution, and the various Supreme Court decisions which have construed it, are all relevant to the question of the constitutionality of a statute to abolish the poll tax.

Such historical considerations are also relevant with respect to the merits of a proposed constitutional amendment to accomplish the same thing. In the case of a statute, these considerations are controlling absolutely. In the case of a constitutional amendment, such considerations are crucial, because they demonstrate lucidly and convincingly why the power to prescribe the qualifications of electors was reserved to the States in the first place. The case for the preservation and continuation of this power in the States is just as valid today as it was in the great convention in Philadelphia in 1787.

Article I of section 2 of the Constitution of the United States declares as folThe House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

How could any language be clearer? How could any prescriptions be more definitely or more unequivocally stated than are the · prescription~ in section 2 of article I? The section simply, clearly, definitely, positively, absolutely says-what? That the electors who shall vote for Members of the House of Representatives of the Federal Congress in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch . nch of the State legislature.

Madam President, it would seem that nothing could be clearer than the language in this section of the Constitution. Because of its great importance in connection with the question before us, I should like briefly to review again the situation prevailing at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. We must recall that in 1787, when the language of the Constitution was written, the States were absolute sovereigns. They had joined in the Declaration of Independence. They had proclaimed their independence of the British Crown. They had fought through eight long, terrible, and bloody years to win their independence, and they stood absolutely independent and free from any other sovereignty on this earth. Their own sovereignty was full, complete, and absolute.

So they gathered in Philadelphia in their sovereign capacities, through their delegates to write the Constitution of the United States. The question was, How much of their sovereignty would they yield to the Federal Government? The Federal Government was not in being; it had no existence; it had no sovereignty. The only sovereignty it could have would be such sovereignty as was granted by the sovereign States of that time. Anyone who is at all familiar with the history of the writing of the Constitution knows . how jealous were the several States of their sovereignty and how reluctant they were to yield very much of their sovereignty to any Federal Government.

Mindful of their sovereignty, zestful, and determined insofar as possible to keep within their own hands as much of that sovereignty as they could and still have a Federal Government to meet the problems which had to be met by a Central Federal Government, what did they do? They provided that every State should have two Senators; two Members in this body, no matter how large or how small the State might be, no matter what the population of the State might be, no matter what the economic power of the State might be, what its industrial development or its financial development or its agricultural development might be. No matter what might be the status of a State in its power, its influence, its ability to influence other States and other persons in other St-ates, -every State 1n the United States should have equal representation in the Senate, .should have two Senators. Then" as Senators will recall, they went one further step, and provided that no State should have ment. its representation in this body reduced or taken away from it without the consent of that State. This meant that no matter how small the State might be, how weak, how ineff.ective, how uninfluential it might be, it would have equal representation in this body; it would have two Senat-ors along with the two Senators of the most powerful, the wealthiest and the greatest State in the United States. They did not stop there. The sovereign States, in their resolv-e and their determination to make secure the primary authority of the States, provided in the Constitution, before they yielded any sovereignty to the Federal Government, that State legislatures could originate amendments to the Constitution. Tha.t · was -one more step taken by the sovereign States to insure the primary authority of the States. They did not stop there. They went even further and provided that before the Constitution of the United States could be changed in any way whatever, before there could be one iota of alteration, before one single word could be taken out .of that instrument, it had to be done by amendment, and that amendment had to be ratified by three-f-ourths of the States of the Union. As we know, ratification by three-fourths of the States means that it must be by both houses of the legislatures @f three-fourths ~ of the States. Then, after the delegates representing the sovereign States had finished their work -of writing the Constitution, . Putting in all the safeguards to insure the primary authority of the States, they .closed the Constitution by writing into it the declaration that the Constitutional Convention acted "by the unanimous .consent of the States" p.r.esent. They wanted the people to kn.ow at that time, and wanted all succeeding generations to know, including the Senators sitting ' here in the year of our Lord, 1962, some 174 y . ears after the Constitution was drafted, that it was these sovereign .States which had drafted and formula ted the 'Constitution.

Furthermore, even .after the sovereign States, thr'ough their delegates at Philadelphia in th~ Constitutional Convention, had written into the Constitution all these safeguards, all these protecting clauses to insure the primary authority of the States, the people themselvesthe people back home, who had the final say, who held the final authority in the matter, and without whose voting consent there could .be no Constitutionwere not quite satisfied. They could look down the years, and they could see that there might be some trick of legerdemain, .some resort to parliamentary tactics, whereby someone wishing to rush through · some proposal, unwilling to go through the lawful and orderly processes set out and ordained in the Constitution for its amendment. would seek to read into the Constitution powers for the Federal Government which the framers of the Constitution and which the sovereign .States never intended the Federal Government should have, which the framers and · the sovereign States never intended should be yielded by the sovereign states to the Federal' GovernSo, before the people in their State conventions were willing to ratify the Constitution, to make · it effective, and bring into being the Federal Government, they said, "We must have the first 10 amendments-the Bill of Rights." And, as we know, when the Constitution was finally ratified it was well and thoroughly understood that the first 10 'amendments to it would be adopted. !Let me read the ninth amendment. It specifically declares:

The enumeration in the Constitution o! certain rights-

That means the enumeration of certain rights Jn the Federal Constitution :for the Federal Government-

The enumeration tn the Constitution o! .certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people .

The people insisted that, as a · condition of their ratification, the Constitution should contain the ninth amendment, absolutely retaining in them the rights not specifically enum-erated as rights ()f the Federal Government.

But the people did not stop with the ninth amendment, as Senators know. They insisted also on the adoption of the l-oth amendment, -and the lOth amendment was put in as a result of their insistence on a general safety clause for the rights of the state and the people. We might call this amendment the great safety clause of the Constitution. Whatdoes the lOth amendment provide? n declares:

The power.s not delegated to the United . states by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it • to · the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or .to the people .

Could any language be stronger .or more definite in absolutely safeguarding and protecting the rights of the States and the people from encroachments by the Congress of the United - States, by the Federal Government, on those rights?

we recall that, even with all these safeguards in ' the Constitution itself to which I have called attention, and even with the agreement to adopt the 1lth and lOth amendments, there was a great battle in most of the states over the ratification of the Constitution. At that time, the three most powerful and the three most influential States were Mas­ -sachusetts, New York, and Virginia. In their State conventions, because of the fear that the sovereign States might be giving up too much sovereignty, that they might be putting too much power in the hands of the Federal Government, only 53 percent of the votes were for ratification.

As -we · recall, two .of the foremost patriots of the Revolution, Patrick .Henry, who soUnded the tocsin of war and gave us the battle cry of the Revolution, .and George Mason, who wrote the Virginia .bill of rights, which gave us our Federal Bill of Rights, and the bill af' rights in every State constitutionboth these great patriots who had done so much to win our independence from the British Crown, to ivin our freedom. opposed the ratification 'Of the Constitution. They felt, as did many of their compatriots, that there might be too great a surrender of sovereignty on the part of the :States, that there might be too much yielding of power to the Fed'­ eral Government.

I emphasize these points because the history of the ratification of the Constitution shows .clearly that, if the sovereignty of the States and the rights of the States had not been positively recognized in the Constitution, if all these safeguards and protections for their sovereignty and their rights had not been put into the Constitution, the Constitution would never have been ratified, and we would never have had .a Federal Government.

As we know, mankind had struggled through the centuries to break arbitrary power in the hands of a king. The high water mark -of this struggle, to break down this arbitrary power and to bring about the distribution of this power into the hands of the people, was reached when we fought the American Revolution.

The framers of the Constitution knew that the States, with their State governments. county governments ; city governments, .and town governments, were the citadels of local self-government. They knew that their concept of government by the people required full · and plenary recognition of the rights of the States. If the people were to hold and exercise the power of government, there had to be this recognition of the sovereignty of the St-ates .

They were fighting against a pool of · centralized arbitrary power at the seat of government. They were fighting to keep _ the wellsprings of our system of g'Overnment in the hands of the people, m the local communities, at the . cross­ _ roads, in the hamlets, the . towns, and th-e .cities. What would it have availed the .People to break the tyranny of the British Crown had they themselves then set up here in Washington -a government with central arbitrary powers? They were determined, af'ter all the long · sacrifice they had made and an their bitter suffering, to reserve the power in their own hands. To do this, I :repeat, they knew that they had to maintain the rights of the States, because within the .States are the citadels of this power. It is in the States that this power must re­ side. It is in the States that this power can function. And it is only in the States that this power can be preserved. Fo.r 150 years, in fact not until these :anti-poll-tax proposals first appeared, no record can be found that anyone ever questioned the provi-sions of article I, .section 2 of the Constitution, that the electors who vote for Members of Congress shall have the qualifications of the -electors who vote f'Or the most numerous branch of the several State legislatures. Not U.ntil recent times has amendment of the Constitution -even been sug · suggested to alter this historic reservation of power in the States.

When the 14th amendment was submitted by Congress, there was no thought, no suggestion that the Congress could step in and fix or modify or change or prescribe the qualifications of the electors for Members of Congress or the qualifications of the electors for President and Vice President.

So, as I have said, for more than 172 years we have lived under the express language of the Constitution. I might say 172 glorious years, because in all the annals of human history there is no story quite so glorious as that of the progress, advancement, and happiness of the American people under the Constitution of the United States. There is nothing to surpass the freedom which our people have enjoyed to seek their own pursuits, to follow their own dictates of their minds, to advance their own interests and bring about their own development, to acquire and hold whatever their capacity, their genius, and the sweat of their toil might entitle them to. We recall that the 17th amendment was adopted to the Constitution in 1913. That was 126 years after the ratification of the Constitution of the United States. After 126 years, when the people of the United States saw fit to change their method of electing U.S. Senators, when they desired to have their Senators elected, not by the legislatures, as provided in the original Constitution, but directly by the people themselves, what did they provide? They provided, in the 17th amendment, as follows:

The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for 6 years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

Then there is this language :

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

The people adopted the same, the identical language for the qualification of electors for the U.S. Senate that was adopted for electors for Members of the House of Representatives at the very beginning. In other words, they ratified and reaffirmed the wisdom of the Founding Fathers and of the Original States in providing that the qualifications of the electors for Members of the Congress should be the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

I think it can be said here that had the 17th amendment made any change in the fixing or determination of those qualifications, it would never have been ratified by the people of the United States. The people were determined that these qualifications should remain, to be fixed by the States, and not by either the Federal Constitution or the Congress of the United States.

Madam President, as we know, for half a century some of the finest, most patriotic, and noblest women in our country, joined by splendid, outstanding, patriotic men, carried on the campaign for the removal of sex as a qualification for voting; they carried on the campaign to have women given an equal right to vote with men. But if we examine the record we do not find anywhere that any leader in the cause for woman suffrage ever suggested that women could by legislative enactment be granted the right to vote. That campaign, which was carried on for over half a century, recognized at all times the Constitution of the United States and particularly section 2 of' article I of the Constitution in its full purport and its full integrity; and that campaign from the day of its beginning until its successful conclusion, was always a campaign for an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. As we know, when the 19th amendment was ratified and became a part of the Constitution, women were put on an equal basis with men so far as sex is concerned in the matter of the qualifications of voting. This is in contrast to those who would have us abolish the poll tax by statute.

So, as I have said, when the 14th amendment was submitted and ratified, when the 15th amendment was submitted and ratified, when the 17th amendment was submitted and ratified, and when the 19th amendment was submitted and ratified, the Congress of the United States and the people of the United States ratified and reaffirmed the integrity of section 2 of article I of the Constitution of the United States.

In the very beginning article I, section 2, vested in the State governments the power over suffrage. Without the possession of this power in the States, the whole structure upon which the division of State and National authority under the Constitution and the organization of both governments rests would be without support, and the authority of both State and Nation would fall to the ground. That is the basic reason why we should not change this section by amendment. Madam President, in 1948, Judge Charles Warren, one of the most eminent constitutional lawyers we have known, appeared before the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Commitee, which was then conducting hearings on an antipoll-tax measure. Judge Warren made one of the clearest, one of the most erudite, and profound analyses of section 2 of article I that I have ever read. At this time I want to call that analysis to the attention of the Senate.

Judge Warren, testifying before the subcommittee, quoted section 2 of article I. I think the section is like the words of Scripture. It will stand quoting and requoting, and then perhaps quoting again; so that if the Senate will bear with me, before I proceed to discuss Judge Warren's analysis of the section I shall read it:

The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the people of the several States, and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

Judge Warren then goes on to say:

You notice that that is not a grant of power specifically to the Congress of the United States. In fact, it is not a grant of power to anyone. It is a requirement of the Constitution for the formation of the new Government. The first part of it is a requirement that the people of the several States shall choose Members of the House of Representatives every second year. That was no relinquishment or delegation of power from the States. That was a constituent part of the formation of the new Government, and was a command.

That, as Judge Warren said, was a command. It was neither a delegation of power nor was it a prohibition. It was a command, and is so referred to in recent cases by the Supreme Court.

Then Judge Warren goes on as follows:

The second thing that section 2 did was: It vested a right in the electors in each State who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature-a right in those persons in the State, and those only, who were entitled to vote for Members of Congress.

In other words, as Judge Warren makes clear, it vested this right in the electors in the States to vote for Members of Congress. Judge Warren continues:

That was not a delegation of power by the State, because the State never had the power to vote, the State inhabitants never had the power to vote for Members of Congress, because there were no such things.

There was no delegation of power. A State could not delegate a power which it did not possess. Certainly a State did not have any power to elect Members of Congress, because, until the formation of the Federal Government, there was no such thing as a Congress of the United States, and, of course, there were no Members of Congress.

Judge Warren continues:

That was a direct provision in the estab .. lishment of the new Government, and it did vest a right, but it vested a right in only certain people to vote for Members of Congress.

Now, the third thing that that section 2 contains is this: It contains undoubtedly an implied prohibition on the States against fixing for electors of the Members of Congress different requirements for suffrage from those which they fixed for the electors of their own most numerous branch of their legislature, i.e., any qualifications which were not those requisite for it to render an inhabitant of their own State eligible to vote. That is an implied prohibition. The State was prohibited from establishing any kind of qualifications for electors for Members of Congress different from the qualifications of electors for the most numerous branch of the legislatures. Judge Warren continues:

Let me repeat that. There is undoubtedly an implied prohibition that the States cannot establish qualifications for electors of members of their own legislature different from those which they establish for electors of Members of Congress. That is neither a delegation nor a grant of power; that is an implied restriction, undoubtedly.

Now, is there in that section 2 any grant of power whatever? Not specifically, of course. I suppose there is, under the necessary · and proper clause of section of 8 article I, an implied power to Congress to do certain things, but what is the extent of those implied powers? It is to · make all laws which shall be necessary and proper "for carrying into execution" the above provisions of ar­ ' ticle I, section 2.

What are the provisions? I go back again. First, Congress undoubtedly has power to legislate so as to see to it that the States do elect Members of Congress every second year. Congress undoubtedly has the power to protect the right which the Constitution vested in such persons in the States as had ' the qualifications requisite to vote for mem- . bers of the State legislature. Congress undoubtedly has that power; and I think Congress has, under the necessary and proper clause, power to legislate so as to see that the States make the same provisions for qualification of electors of Members of Congress as they do for electors of their own legislature.

Those are the only three things that can be done under article I, section 2, and those are the only three things on which Congress can act under the necessary and proper clause, and "carry into execution" under that clause.

Madam President, let us go a little further in section 2. I think no one will contend-surely I have never found anyone who has ever contended-that Congress has any power to prescribe for the States whom they shall qualify to vote. Certainly no one has ever contended that Congress has any power to prescribe the qualifications for the electors who vote for members of the State legislature or other State officers or officials. As I said earlier in my remarks, before 1787 the States had absolutely full and unlimited power to establish any requirements which the people of the States, through their constitutions or legislatures, in their absolute discretion and judgment, desired in order to qualify any one of their inhabitants to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.

There was no limitation whatever upon the State, because, as I said in the beginning of my remarks, the State was absolutely sovereign, it had full and plenary sovereignty, it was subject to no other sovereignty, no other power, it was the complete master of itself, of its own actions, of its own constitution, of its own laws, of its own electors, of its own legislature, of its own officials.

As we know, at the time the Constitution was being written, in 1787, most of the States, at least nine of them, had spoken and fixed by their own constitutions the qualifications of those who should vote for the members of their own legislatures. We cannot forget, in considering this matter, that the delegates from these States knew exactly what those qualifications were in their States. They knew exactly what they were doing when they prescribed that those qualifications fixed by the States should be the qualifications for the electors for Members of the House of Representatives. It was with knowledge of these qualifications that the delegates acted in the drafting and the formation of the Constitution in the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia.

They knew what these qualifications were, and therefore when they wrote into the Constitution that the qualifications for electors for Members of the House of Representatives should be the qualifications for the electors for the most numerous branch of the State legislatures, they knew exactly what t . they were doing. They knew exactly that as of that moment they were writing those qualifications into the Constitution as the qualifications for electors for Members of the House of Representatives. There can be no doubt that it was clear to them exactly what their actions meant. The same considerations that caused them to preserve · and secure this power in the States are the considerations that should cause us to defeat the proposed constitutional amendment which is the subject of this debate.

Madam President, one of the greatest authorities in this country on the Constitution, and one whose viewpoint and feelings were definitely always toward the nationalistic theory, toward the idea of the centralization of power in Washington, whose views and feelings were always in favor of a centralized power of government, was Judge Story. Let me give the Senate his words, written in his commentaries. I quote from volume I, section 820, of Story's Commentaries. Judge Story declared - :

There is no pretense to say that the power of the National Government can be used so as to exclude any State from its share in the representation in Congress.

That was written before the 14th amendment. It was true when Judge Story wrote it, because it was before the adoption of the 14th amendment to the Constitution.

Judge Story goes on to make this categorical statement:

Nor can it be said with correctness that Congress can in any way alter the right of qualification of voters.

It is interesting to note that when the Constitution went back to the States for ratification by the State conventions, certain questions were asked in some of the States about article I, section 2. The Constitution had to be ratified by at least nine of the States. In the Massachu- setts convention there was a doubting Thomas by the name of Dr. John Taylor, from the town of Douglass, Mass. He wanted to be very sure about this thing. He wanted to make certain. He was fearful that section 4, the section with same." reference to the times, places, and manner of holding elections, not the section with reference to qualifications, might give Congress the power to prescribe a property qualification for voters in the sum, as he said of 100 pounds. He inquired of Mr. Rufus King, who, U will be recalled, was a member of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia and also a member of the Massachusetts convention, whether or not under section 4 Congress could in any way go into the question of qualifications. Mr. King, one of the leading members of the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia, had this to say:

The idea of the honorable gentleman from Douglass transcends my understanding, for the power to control given by this section extends to the manner of election, not to the qualifications of the electors.

We find that quotation from Mr. King in volume II of Elliot's Debates, pages 49 to 51.

In the Pennsylvania convention, James Wilson who had been one of the outstanding men in the Constitutional Convention at Philadelphia, made this statement: -

In order to know who are qualified to be , electors of the House of Representatives-

That is, the Federal House of Representatives. They were considering the Federal Constitution, which was to bring into being the Federal House of Representatives-

In order to know who are qualified to be electors of the House of Representatives, we are to inquire who are qualified to be electors of the legislature of each State. If there be no legislature in the States there can be no electors of them. If there be no such electors, there is no criterion to know who are qualified to elect Members of the House of Representatives. By this short, plain deduction the existence of State legislatures is proved to be essential to the existence of the General Government.

Could anything be clearer, more positive, or definite than that?

Mr. Wilson went on with reference to section 4, the section with reference to times, places, and manner, not the section as to qualifications:

If the Congress had it not in their power to make regulations, what might be the consequences? Some State might make no regulations at all on the subject; and so the existence of the , House of Representatives, the immediate representation of the people in Congress, depends upon the wm and pleasure of the State governments. We find upon examining this paragraph that it contains nothing more than the maxim of selfpreservation.

The great State of New York embodied a recommendation in its resolution of ratification. What did that recommendation say? What did it say, to you and me? Remember, they were talking to us. It said they ratified the Constitution "in full confidence that the Congress will not make or alter any regulation in this State respecting the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators or Representatives, unless the legislature of a State shall neglect or refuse to make laws or regulations for the purpose or from any circumstances be incapable of making the The historic State of religious freedom, the little State of Rhode Island, ratifying the Constitution on May 29, 1789, copied without change the New York declaration, and added, after the final word of it, a comma and the words, "and that in those cases such power will only be exercised until the legislature of this State shall make provision in the premises.”

Madam President, just a word about section 4 of article I. I shall not dwell on this provision, because the Supreme Court has made very clear that this section, dealing with the times, places, and manner of elections and giving Congress the power to act with reference to times, places, and manner, has nothing whatever to do and is in no way whatever germane or relevant to section 2 of article I, which deals with the question of qualifications.

The Supreme Court has made section 4 clear. and I do wish to call attention to the decisions of the Court, because I think any discussion of this subject should have some reference to the meaning of that section.

In 1931, in Smiley v. Holm (285 U.S. 355, p. 366), the Court spoke through its Chief Justice, Charles Evans Hughes. I think no one will dispute that · Charles Eva~ Hughes stands " in the frorit rank 8.mong _ th . e . jp:' _ eat . C~ief ~ustic~ . ~f the United States. I shall never forget " the last appearance of Chief Justice Hughes before a joint session of the Senate and the House of Representatives. I can never forget the drama of that moment-the spontaneous overwhehning outpouring of tribute by all the Members of both the Senate and the House, irrespective of party lines, irrespective of whether they were Democrats or Republicans. They paid a wonderful, heartfelt, heart-stirring tribute to this great Chief Justice. •

It has been my good fortune in the days I have been in Washington to know some of the members of the Supreme Court. I know the high regard in which they held Charles Evans Hughes. I know their estimate of the greatness of the man, the power, magnitude, and profundity of his intellect, his great capacity for the dispatch of business, for orderly procedure, for making certain that the Supreme Court of . the United States carried on its high functions in the best of American traditions.

Mr. EASTLAND. Madam President, will the Senator yield for a question?

Mr. HILL. I yield to the distinguished Senator from Mississippi for a question.

Mr. EASTLAND. Is it not true that . Charles Evans Hughes was not a Demo­ ~rat or a Republican, but ~ American, and that he interpreted the law . as it . should have been interpreted, and not to please some pressure group or groups here or elsewhere in the country?

Mr. HILL. The Senator will recall that in 1916 Charles Evans Hughes was the nominee of the Republican Party for President, but all that the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has said about Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes is certainly correct. His conscience was his guide. He had a magnificent, wonderful, and analytical mind. He was a great student of history. · He had but one yardstick for measurement, and that was the Constitution of the United States and the welfare and future of our country.

Mr. EASTLAND. Does the Senator know that Charles Evans Hughes was a member of the Republican Party . and the Republican Governor of New York State, as well as the nominee of the Republican Party for President, but that when he went on the bench, he was not a Democrat or Republican but was an American?

Mr. HILL. As the distinguished Senator from Mississippi has so well said, Charles Evans Hughes was the Republican Governor of New York. He was also the nominee of the Republican Party for President in 1916. But when he went on the bench, he cast aside all thoughts and all connections with the Republican Party or any other party, or any party affiliations of any kind, and sought to determine the cases presented to him according to the law, and the great provisions and principles written into the Constitution of · the United States.

The Supreme · Court . spoke through Chief Justice Hughes in 1931. That was not too long ago to refer to the case as a recent case. The Court had . this · to say about section 4 of article I, the section dealing with the times, places, and manner of elections:

The subject matter is the "times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives." It cannot be doubted that these comprehensive words embrace authority to provide a complete code !or congressional elections, not only as to times and places, but in relation to notices, registrations, protection of voters, duties of inspectors and canvassers, · sers, and making and publication of election returns; in short, to enact the numerous requirements as to the procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved. * • • All this is comprised in the subject of "times, places, and manner of holding elections,” and involves lawmaking in its essential features and most important aspect.

In this case Chief Justice Hughes had made clear that we can have our Federal Corrupt Practices Act; that we can make sure that the times, places, and manner be provided, so that the electors may duly and lawfully, and in an orderly manner, cast their ballots. That, however, has absolutely nothing whatever to do with the question of who the electors shall be, or the question of prescribing the qualification of the electors.

In other words, as Chief Justice Hughes makes clear, section 4 of article I simply prescribes the power of Congress to set forth, if necessary, the mechanism of the election. But that does not deal at all with the question of who shall be the electors. The section deals only with the orderly procedure, and the properly protected mechanism for the elector who is provided for in article I, section 2, to perform his duty of casting his ballot for a Member of the House of Representatives or a Member of the Senate.

As I stated earlier, section 4 of article I deals with the "how" of the election. It has nothing whatever to do with section 2 of article I, which deals with the “who” of the elector. They are two entirely different subjects.

I have quoted from the framers of the Constitution, showing how clearly and definitely they understood section 2 of article I to mean that the qualifications should be prescribed by the States and not by the Congress. · I have quoted from the debates on the 14th amendment, showing that the authors and the advocates and proponents of that . amendment held fast to the views of the ages. framers and founders of the Constitution, that the Federal Government could not :fix, prescribe, or alter the qualifications, and that the whole question r Of qualifications was left solely and entirely in the hands of the States.

I should now like to call the · attention of the Senate to a few words to be found in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, eighth edition, Carrington, volume 2. Mr. Cooley, a great and universally ac­ _ cepted authority on the Constitution, de- _ clared: " ·

The exclusive right of the several States to regulate the exercise of the elective franchise and to prescribe the qualifications of voters was never questioned, nor · attempted to be interfered with, until the 15th amendment to the Constitution of the . United States was forced upon unwilling communities (the States then lately in rebellion) by the military power of the General Gov. . ernment, and thus made a part of our organic law; a necessary sequence, perhaps, of the Civil War, but nonetheless a radical change in the established theory of our Government. (Brightly election cases, author's note, pp. 42, 43.)

He quotes the Brightly election cases, author's note, pages 42 and 43. He says, that the 14th amendment was a radical departure, a radical change in the established theory of our Government, that theory being, of course, to leave to the States the plenary power as to the qualification of electors.

Mr. Cooley continues:

The right to vote is not of necessity con- . nected with citizenship. The rights of the citizen are civil rights, such as liberty of person and of conscience, the right . to acquire and possess property, all of which are distinguishable from the political privilege of suffrage.

Senators will notice that Mr. Cooley there departs from the use of the word "right" and uses the word "privilege"; not even conceding that there is any . right to suffrage; that it is a privilege conferred by government, and under our Federal system conferred by the States. The history of the country shows that there is no foundation in fact for the view that the right of suffrage is one of the "privileges or immunities of citizens."

The right to vote is not vested, it is purely conventional, and may be enlarged or re­ - stricted, granted or Withheld, at pleasure / and without fault.

Then Mr. Cooley cites the case of Blair v. Ridgely (41 Mo. 161). He continues:

In Blair v. Ridgely ( 41 Mo. 161) , the question at issue arose out of the provision of article II, section S of the constitution of 1865 of the State of Missouri. By this section it was provided that no person should be deemed a qualified voter who had ever been in armed hostility to the United States. or to the government of the State of Missouri; that every person should, at the time of offering to vote, take an oath that he was not within the inhibition of this section, and that any person declining to take such oath should not be allowed to vote. The plaintiff, at an election held in the city of St. Louis on November 7, 1865, offered to vote, but refused to take the oath prescribed by the constitution. His vote being rejected, he brought his action against the judges of the election for damages. ease was taken to the Supreme Court of Missouri, where it was argued exhaustively, and with much learning, by eminent counsel, and the argument is to be found in full in the reports of the Supreme Court of Missouri, volume 41. It was contended · by the plaintiff that the section of the constitution in question was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, being a b111 of attainder and an ex post facto law within the . meaning of that instrument, and, ln consequence, null and void. But the court held against this contention, drawing the distinction between laws passed to punish for offenses in order to prevent their repetition and laws passed . to protect the public franchises and privileges from abuse by falling into unworthy hands. ·

The State may not pass laws in the form or with the effect of bills of attainder, ex post . facto laws; or laws impairing the obligation of contracts. It may and has full power to pass laws, restrictive and exclusive, for the preservation or promotion of the common interests as political or social emergencies may from time to time require, though in certain instances disabilities may directly flow in consequence. It should never be forgotten that the State is organized for the public weal as well as for individual purposes, and while it may not disregard the safeguards that are thrown around the citizen for his protection by the Constitution, it cannot neglect to perform and do what is for the public good.

Mr. Cooley then said:

It was argued in Blair v. Ridgley that the · decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Cummings v. Missouri (4 Wall. 277), where it was held that this section of the Missouri constitution, so far as it provided an oath to be taken by preachers, was in the nature of pains and penalties, and consequently void, was decisive of · the Blair case. But the distinction between the right to practice a profession or follow a calling and the right to vote is clearly stated in the opinion of Judge Wagner, as follows:

"The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the Cummings case proceeds on the idea that the right to pursue a calling or profession is a natural and inalienable right and that a law precluding a person from practicing his calling or profession on account of past conduct is inflicting a penalty, and therefore void. There are certain rights which inhere in and attach to the person, and of which he cannot be deprived except by forfeiture for crime, whereof he must be first tried and convicted according to due process of law. These are termed natural or absolute rights. • • • But is the right to vote or to exercise the privilege of the elective franchise a right either natural, , absolute, or vested? It is certain that in a state of nature, disconnected with government, no person has or can enjoy it.

"That the ' privilege of participating in the elective franchise in this free and enlightened country is an important and interesting one is most true. But we are not aware that · it has ever been held or adjudged to be a vested interest in any individual.

"Suffrage in the United States not being a vested right, it results that persons who have enjoyed and exercised the privilege, and who have been qualified electors, may be entirely disfranchised and deprived of the privilege · by constitutional provision, and such persons are entirely without a remedy at law (McCrary, Elections, p. 9).

"The whole subject of the regulation of elections, including the prescribing of qualifications for suffrage, is left by the National Constitution to the several States, except as it is provided by that instrument that the · electors ' for representatives in Congress shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, and · as the 15th amendment • forbids denying to citizens the right to vote on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."

If Judge Cooley were writing these comments on constitutional limitations today, he would have to include the 19th amendment; but, these commentaries were written before the 19th amendment, and therefore he did not include the 19th amendment, which, as we know, is the women suffrage amendment.

Participation in the elective franchise is a privilege rather than a right, and it is granted or denied on grounds of general policy, the prevailing view being that it should be as general as possible consistent with the public safetyCooley's Constitutional Limitations, eighth edition, Carrington, volume 2.

Madam President, I intend to show · that the proposed amendment to abolish the poll tax contravenes in the words of Mr. Justice Story in Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch 43,52:

The spirit • • • of the Constitution of the United States. As we know, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the general spirit of the Constitution. Also in the early days of our Nation, Mr. Justice Johnson spoke of the spirit, intent or meaning of the Constitution and of the true spirit of the Constitution.

I should like to call the Senate's attention to some important cases which support my contention that the proposed anti-poll-tax amendment contravenes the basic intent, meaning, and spirit of the Constitution.

In 1874, the Supreme Court upheld, in Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 0874), a provision in the Missouri constitution limiting suffrage to men. This had been challenged as contrary to the 14th amendment. The Supreme Court, in rejecting this contention, stated, in fact, that:

The 14th amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of men. In this particular, therefore, the rights of Mrs. Minor do not depend upon the amendment. She has always been a citizen from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship. The amendment prohibited by the State, of which she is a citizen, from abridging any of her privileges and immunities as a citizen of the United States; but it did not confer citizenship on her. That she had before its adoption. ·

If the right of suffrage is one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States, then the constitution and laws of Missouri confining it to men are in violation of the Constitution of the United States, as amended, and consequently void. . The direct question is, therefore, presented whether all citizens are necessarily voters.

The Constitution does not define th'e privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we mu.st look elsewhere. In this case we need not determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one . of them.

It certainly is nowhere made so in express terms. The United States has no voters in the States of its own creation. The elective officers of the United States are all elected directly or indirectly by State voters. The Members of the House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people of the States, and the electors in each State must have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. Senators . are to be . chosen by the legislatures of the States, and necessarily the members of - the legislature required to make the choice are elected by the voters of the State. Each State must appoint in such manner, as the legislature thereof may direct, the electors to elect the President and Vice President. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives are to , be . prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators.

It is not . necessary to inquire whether this power of supervision thus given to Congress is sufficient to authorize any interference with the State laws prescribing the qualifications of voters, for no such interference has ever been attempted. The power of the State in this particular 1s certainly supreme until Congress acts.

The amendment . did not ; ad~ tQ the privi· leges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished an additional guarantee for the protection of such , as he already had. No new voters were necessarily made by it. Indirectly, it may have had that effect, because it may have increased the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under the constitution and laws of the States, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through the States and the State laws, and not directly upon the citizen.

It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted. This makes it proper to inquire whether suffrage was coextensive with the citizenship of the States at the time of its adoption. If it was ,' then it . may with force be argued that sutfirage was one of the rights which belong to citizenship, and - in the enjoyment of which every citizen must be protected. But 1! it was not, the contrary may with propriety be assumed. , t

When the Federal Constitution was adopted, all the States, with the exception of Rhode Island and Connecticut, had constitutions of their own.

These two continued to act under their charters from the Crown. Upon an examination of those constitutions we find that in no State were all citizens permitted to vote. Each State determined for itself who should have that power.

The next case to which I refer-and it is one of the best known cases-is that of Ex parte · Yarbrough 010 U.S. 651), decided in 1894. The decision was handed down by Mr. Justice Miller. He said:

The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures, do not do this with reference to the election for Members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualifications for voters for those eo nomine. They [the States) define who are to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature, and the Co;nstitution of the United States says the same person shall vote for Members of Congress in that State. It-meaning, of course, the Constitution of the United States-"adopts the qualifications thus furnished as the qualifications of its own electors for Members of Congress."

There are many of these cases, and I shall not cite all of them. Let me come now to the case of Wiley v. Sinkler 079 U.S. 58), decided in 1900, so it may be called a 20th century case. In discussing the right to vote for Members of Congress, Mr. Justice Gray said:

They define-

He had been referring to the States, and he means the Stateswho are · to vote for the popular branch of their own legislature and the Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for Members of Congress in that State.

Meaning . the Constitution of the United States, of courseadopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for Members of Congress.

Then in the case of Pope v. Williams (193 U.S. 621), decided in 1904, we find that Mr. Justice Peckham, in speaking for the Court, said:

The simple matter to be herein determined is whether, with reference to the exercise of the privilege of voting in Maryland, the legislature of that State had the legal right to provide that a person coming into th~ State to reside - should make the declaration of intent a year before he should have the right _ to be , registered as a voter of the State.

The privilege to vote in any State is not given by the Federal Constitution, or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States (Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162). It may not be refused on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States: In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised as the State may direct, and upon such terms as it may seem proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution.

The State might provide that persons of foreign birth could vote without being naturalized, and, as States by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, supra, such persons were allowed to vote in several of the States upon having declared their intentions to become citizens of the United States. Some States permit women to vote; others refuse them that privilege. A State, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, might provide by its own constitution and laws that no one but native-born citizens should be permitted to vote, as the Federal Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon any one, and the conditions lows: under which that right is to be exercised are matters for the States alone to prescribe, subject to the conditions of the Federal Constitution, already stated; although it may be observed that the right to vote for a Member of Congress is not derived exclusively from the State law. See Federal Constitution, article I, section 2; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58. But the elector must be one entitled to vote under the Stare statute. See also Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U.S. 487, 491. In this case no question arises as to the right to vote for electors of President and Vice President, and no decision is made thereon. The question whether the conditions prescribed by the State might be re- · garded by others as reasonable or unreasonable is not a Federal one. We do not wish to be understood, however, as intimating that the condition in this statute is unreasonable or in any way improper.

we are unable to see any violation of the Federal Constitution in the provision of the Sta.te statute for the declaration of the intent of a person coming into the State before he can claim the right to be registered as a voter. The statute, so far as it provides conditions precedent to the exercise of the elective franchise within · the State, by persons coming therein to reside (and that is as far as it is necessary to consider it in this case), is neither an unlawful discrimination against anyone in the situation of the plaintiff in error nor does it deny to him equal protection of the laws, nor is it repugnant to any fundamental or inalienable rights of citizens of the United States, nor a violation of any implied guarantees of the Federal constitution. The right of a State to legislate upon the subject of the elective . franchise as to it may seem good, subject to the conditions already stated, being, as we believe, unassailable, we think it plain that the statute in question violates no right protected by the Federal Constitution. . The reasons which may have impelled the State legislature to enact the statute in question were matt.ers entirely for its consideration, · and this court has no concern with them.

It is unnecessary in this case to assert that under no conceivable state of facts could a State ~tatute in regard to voting be regarded as an infringement upon or . a discrimination against the individual rights - of a citizen · of the United States removing into the State and excluded from voting therein by State . legislation. The question might arise if an exclusion from the privilege of voting were founded upon the particular State from which the person came, excluding from that privilege, for instance, a citizen of the United States coming from Georgia and allowing it to a citizen of the United States coming from New York or any other State.

In such case an argument might be urged that, under the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution, the citizen from Georgia was by the State statute deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Other extreme cases might be suggested. We neither assert nor deny that in the case supposed the claim would be well founded that a Federal right of a citizen of the United States was violated by such · legislation, for the question does not · arise herein. We do, however, hold that there is nothing in the statute in qu'estion which violates the Federal rights of the plaintiff in error by virtue of the provision for making a declaration of his intention to become a citizen before he can have the right to be registered as a voter and to vote in the State.

Then in the · case of Guinn v. United States (238 U.S. 347), decided in 1915, Mr. Chief Justice White declared, in reference to the 15th amendment, as folBeyond doubt the amendment does not take away from the State governments in a general sense the power over suffrage which has belonged to those governments from the beginning and without the possession of which power the whole fabric upon which the division of State and national authority under the Constitution and the organization of both governments rest would be without support and both the authority of the Nation and the State would fall to the ground. In fact, the very command of the amendment recognizes the possession of the general power by the State, since the amendment seeks to regulate its exercise as to the particular subject with which it deals.

Of course, Madam President, the amendment dealt with the one subject of race, color, or previous condition ' of servitude.

So the Court said that all of this reservoir of rights remained in the States, except as to the one proposition covered by the 15th amendment.

It is interesting to note that Chief Justice White in his decision referred to a statement in the argument made at the time by the •Solicitor General of the United States, Mr. John · W. Davis. We recall that Mr. John W. Davis, while a distinguished Member of the House of Representatives, was also an outstanding member of the Judiciary Committee of the House. He was later appointed by President Woodrow Wilson to be Solicitor General of the United States. Chief Justice White embodies the statement by Mr. John W. Davis, submitted by him as Solicitor General of the United States, for the Government of the United States, in these words:

The United States-

The U.S. Government is speaking through its Solicitor General-

The United States says that Stare power to provide for suffrage is not disputed, although, of course, the authority of the 15th amendment .and :the limit . on their power is insisted on-hence no assertion denying the right of a State to exert judgment and discretion in fixing the qualifications of suffrage 1$ advanced.

If Mr. Davis were speaking today he would include the 19th amendment.

Speaking for the Government of the . United States, he was saying that the Government advanced no assertion that in any way denied to the States the right to exercise their judgment and discretion in fixing the qualifications of suffrage. Madam President, I shall refer now to the Breedlove case decided by the Supreme Court in December 1937. In Breedlove v. Suttles (302 U.S. 277), the plaintiff, a citizen of Georgia, attempted to vote in a State election and also in the Federal election held at the same time, for a Representative in Congress. He was excluded from both elections, having . failed to pay the poll tax.

The case involved a Georgia tax of $1 per annum upon persons between 21 and 60 except for females who did not register and for the blind. Payment of all poll taxes, including any unpaid taxes for previous years, was a prerequisite to registration for voting. Aliens could not vote but were subject to the tax. The validity of the tax was challenged by a white male citizen. The Supreme Court, in holding the law valid, called attention to the difference between the classes of persons liable for the tax, and those qualified to vote. The Court stated that the requirement of payment before registration undoubtedly serves to aid collection from the electors desiring to vote. It also pointed out that the payment of poll taxes as a prerequisite to voting is a familiar and reasonable regulation long enforced in many States.

Mr. Justice Butler rendered the unanimous decision of the Court and said:

Levy by the poll has long been a familiar form of taxation, much used in some countries and · to a considerable extent here, at first in the Colonies and ' later in the States. To prevent burdens deemed grievous and oppressive, the constitutions of some States prohibit or limit poll taxes. That of Georgia prevents more than a dollar a year. Poll taxes are laid upon persons without regard to their occupations or property to raise money for the support of government or some more specific end. The equal protection clause does not require absolute equality. While possible by statutory declaration to levy a poll tax upon every inhabitant of whatsoever sex, age, or condition, collection for all would be impossible for always there are many too poor to pay. Attempt equally to enforce such a . measure would justify condemnation of the tax as harsh and unjust. Collection from minors would be to put the burden upon their fathers or others upon whom they depend for support. It is not unreasonable to exclude them from the class taxed.

Payment as a prerequisite is not required for the purpose of denying or abridging the privilege of voting. It does not limit the tax to electors; · aliens are not there permitted to vote, but the tax is laid upon them, if within the defined class. It is not laid upon persons 60 or more years old, whether electors or not. Exaction of payment before registration undoubtedly serves to aid collection from electors desiring to vote, but that use of the State's power is not prevented by the Federal Constitution.

Madam President, to make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or immunity protected by the 14th amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the 15th and 19th amendments and other provisions of the Federal Constitution, the State may condition suffrage as it deems appropriate. The privileges and immunities protected are only those that arise from the Constitution and laws of the United States and not those that spring from other sources.

Approximately 2 years after the Breedlove decision came the Pirtle case, which arose in the State of Tennessee out of an election held in that State on the 13th day of September 1939 for a Member of Congress. There was no State election at all, as I recall; it was a special election for a Member of Congress. The plaintiff in that case was fully qualified, except for one thing: He had not paid his poll tax. He came to the polls, although he had not paid his poll tax, and demanded the right to vote, but was excluded by the election omcers and denied the right to vote on the ground of such nonpayment. He brought suit in the Federal court. The suit finally went to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit, in which judgment against the plaintiff was rendered in a unanimous decision of the three judges, affirming the judgment against the plaintiff as rendered by the lower court. The opinion of the court of appeals follows the opinion of Justice Butler in the Breedlove case to which I have referred.

When the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rendered a decision against the plaintiff in the Pirtle case the plaintiff asked for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court of the United States. That Court, without any opinion-it did not even dignify the petition for a writ of certiorari by an opinion or by a statement of any kindforthwith proceeded to deny the petition for the writ of certiorari, which, of course, confirmed the decision of the circuit court and the decision of the lower court.

The question of the Virginia poll tax as a prerequisite to voting was reviewed by a special three-judge court as recently as 1951 in Butler v. Thompson (341 U.S. 937), Circuit Judge Dobey, speaking for .the three-judge court, quoted from Saunders v. Wilkins (152 F. 2d 235, 237), as follows:

The decisions generally hold that a State statute which Imposes a. reasonable poll tax as a. reasonable condition to the right to vote does not abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States which are protected by the 14th amendment. The privilege of voting is derived from the State and not from the National Government. The qualification of voters in an election for Members of Congress is set out in article I, section 2, clause 1, of the Federal Constitution which provides that the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors for the most numerous branch o! the State legislature.

Madam President, the power to prescribe the qualifications of electors was left to the States by the Founding Fathers for sound reasons-for sound reasons that were uppermost in their minds at the Constitutional Convention. I have attempted to review, in my remarks today, the thoroughness, the precision, and the meticulous care with which the Founding Fathers · made it absolutely clear that this power to qualify electors, which goes to the very heart of our Federal system, was reserved exclusively to the States. At the same time, I have attempted to show that the impelling case for the preservation and continuation of this power in the States is just as valid today as it was in that great Convention in Philadelphia in 1787, and as it was in the conventions held in the various States for ratifying the Constitution.

I oppose the proposal before the Senate because it would be an impairment of this power which is the cornerstone and foundation of our whole system of government. In fact, the Constitution has been the word of life to our dual system of government. It has been the buffer and the shield for the protection of the liberties of our people and for the rights of our States.

Let us preserve the great work of the Constitutional Convention that we may preserve the rights of the States of the United States and the liberties of the people of the United States. Let us defeat this poll tax amendment and continue that which was guaranteed to the people and to the States 172 years ago by the Constitution of the United States. Madam President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MUSKIE. Madam President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.