Article I, Section 3, Clause 7

Besides, when the house of representatives have impeached, and the senate tried any one, and found him guilty of the offence for which he is impeached, they can only disqualify him from holding any office of power and trust in the United States: and after that he comes within the jurisdiction of the law of the land.

Describes the limit of judgment in impeachment to disqualification from office, after which the person is subject to the law, which only this clause provides.

They can only, by conviction on impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the puniſhment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminiſhes the importance of their judicial powers.

The paragraph describes conviction on impeachment as removal and disqualification, with punishment as a criminal left to the courts, which is the content of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7.

If convicted on impeachment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined, impriſoned or puniſhed, but only may be diſqualified from doing public miſchief by loſing his office, and his capacity to bold another.

The paragraph describes the judgment on impeachment as limited to losing office and disqualification, with a further trial for any crime, which is the content of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7.

Judgment in caſes of impeachment ſhall not extend further than to removal from office, and diſqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, truſt or profit, under the United States but the party convicted ſhall nevertheleſs be liable and ſubject t• indictment, trial, judgment and puniſhment, according to law.

The paragraph prints Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the Constitution as signed; the quoted words are the same as the clause's (apart from capitals and the long s), though the pamphlet's punctuation differs in places.

After having been sentenced to a perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.

Says one convicted on impeachment "will still be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law" and speaks of "dismission from a present, and disqualification for a future, office," echoing this clause's words.

The President of the United States would be liable to be impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law.

Says the President, once removed, "would afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary course of law," echoing this clause's "shall nevertheless be liable."

They are liable to be impeached for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and disqualified for holding any other.

Citing "the article respecting impeachments," the paragraph names dismissal from office and disqualification "for holding any other," echoing this clause's "removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office."

This system is undermined and rendered nugatory by 1st art., 6th and 7th clauses, where the senate in the new constitution, have the trial and judgment on all impeachments.

The paragraph cites "1st art., 6th and 7th clauses" on the senate's trial and judgment of impeachments; the seventh clause of Article I, Section 3 is the judgment clause (the section number is not printed).

The officers of the United States are excluded from offices of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States, on impeachment for, and conviction of, high crimes and misdemeanors.

Maclaine describes the clause limiting the punishment on impeachment ("Here it is expressly provided how far the punishment shall extend").

Notwithstanding the mode pointed out for impeaching and trying, there is not a single officer but may be tried and indicted at common law; for it is provided, that a judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend farther than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States; but the party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

Maclaine reproduces the clause on judgment in cases of impeachment ("it is provided, that ...").

In the clauses under debate, it provides that the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments, and then subjoins, that judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States.

Maclaine quotes the clause on the extent of judgment in cases of impeachment.

The sentence which provides that “judgment, in cases of impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office,” is joined by a conjunction copulative to the other sentence,—“and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States,”—which incontrovertibly proves that…

Maclaine quotes the clause, in quotation marks, to argue from its grammar; he quotes its second part ("and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit, under the United States") separately.

The Constitution says: "Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than removal from otnee and a disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States."

The paragraph quotes the impeachment clause, introduced with "The Constitution says"; the words are from Article I, Section 3, Clause 7.