An American Citizen, Number II

WE have ſeen that the late honorable convention, in deſignating the nature of the chief executive office of the United States, have deprived it of all the dangerous appendages of royalty, and provided for the frequent expiration of its limited powers—As our preſident bears no reſemblance to a king, ſo we ſhall ſee the ſenate have no ſimilitude to nobles.

Firſt, then, not being hereditary, their collective knowledge, wiſdom, and virtue are not precarious, for by theſe qualities alone they are to obtain their offices; and they will have none of the peculiar follies and vices of thoſe men, who poſſeſs power merely becauſe their fathers held it before them, for they will be educated (under equal advantages, and with equal proſpects) among and on a footing with the other ſons of a free people. If we recollect the characters, who have, at various periods, filled the ſeats of congreſs, we ſhall find this expectation perfectly reaſonable. Many young men of genius, and many characters of more matured abilities, without fortunes, have been honored with that truſt. Wealth has had but few repreſentatives there, and thoſe have been generally poſſeſſed of reſpectable perſonal qualifications. There have alſo been many inſtances of perſons not eminently endowed with mental qualities, who have been ſent thither from a reliance on their virtues, public and private—As the ſenators are ſtill to be elected by the legiſlatures of the ſtates, there can be no doubt of equal ſafety and propriety in their future appointment, eſpecially as no further pecuniary qualification is required by the conſtitution.

They can hold no other office civil or military under the United States, nor can they join in making proviſion for themſelves, either by creating new places, or encreaſing the emoluments of old ones. As their ſons are not to ſucceed them, they will not be induced to aim at an increaſe or perpetuity of their powers, at the expence of the liberties of the people, of which thoſe ſons will be a part. They poſſeſs a much ſmaller ſhare of the judicial power than the upper houſe in Britain, for they are not, as there, the higheſt court in civil affairs. Impeachments alone are the caſes cognizable before them, and in what other place could matters of that nature be ſo properly and ſafely determined? The judges of the foederal courts will owe their appointments to the preſident and ſenate, therefore may not feel ſo perfectly free from favour, affection and influence, as the upper houſe who receive their power from the people, through their ſtate repreſentatives, and are immediately reſponſible to thoſe aſſemblies, and finally to the nation at large—Thus we ſee, when a daring or dangerous offender is brought to the bar of public juſtice, the people, who alone can impeach him by their immediate repreſentatives, will cauſe him to be tried, not by judges appointed in the heat of the occaſion, but by two-thirds of a ſelect body, choſen a long time before, for various purpoſes, by the collected wiſdom of of their ſtate legiſlatures. From a pretence or affectation of extraordinary purity and excellence of character, their word of honour is the ſanction, under which theſe high courts, in other countries, have given their ſentence—But with us, like the other judges of the union, like the reſt of the people, of which they are never to forget they are a part, it is required that they be on oath.

No ambitious, undeſerving or inexperienced youth can acquire a ſeat in this houſe by means of the moſt enormous wealth, or moſt powerful connections, till thirty years have ripened his abilities, and fully diſcovered his merits to his country—a more rational ground of preference ſurely than mere property.

The ſenate, though more independent of the people, as to the free exerciſe of their judgment and abilities, than the houſe of repreſentatives, by the longer term of their office, muſt be older and more experienced men, and are veſted with leſs effective power; for the public treaſures, the ſinews of the ſtate, cannot be called forth by their original motion. They may indeed reſtrain the profuſion or errors of the houſe of repreſentatives, but they cannot take any of the neceſſary meaſures to raiſe a national revenue.

The people, through the electors, preſcribe them ſuch a preſident as ſhall be beſt qualified to controul them.

They can only, by conviction on impeachment, remove and incapacitate a dangerous officer, but the puniſhment of him as a criminal remains within the province of the courts of law, to be conducted under all the ordinary forms and precautions, which exceedingly diminiſhes the importance of their judicial powers. They are detached, as much as poſſible, from local prejudices in favour of their reſpective ſtates, by having a ſeparate and independent vote, for the ſenſible and conſcientious uſe of which every member will find his perſon, honor and character ſeriouſly bound—He cannot ſhelter himſelf, under a vote in behalf of his ſlate, among his immediate colleagues. As there are only two, he cannot be voluntarily or involuntarily governed by the majority of the deputation—He will be obliged, by wholeſome proviſions, to attend his public duty, and thus in great national queſtions muſt give a vote, of the honeſty of which he will find it is neceſſary to convince his conſtituents.

The ſenate muſt always receive the exceptions of the preſident againſt any of their legiſlatve acts, which, without ſerious deliberation and ſufficient reaſons, they will ſeldom diſregard. They will alſo feel a conſiderable check from the conſtitutional powers of the ſtate legiſlatures, whoſe rights they will not be diſpoſed to infringe, ſince they are the bodies to which they owe their exiſtence, and are moreover to remain the immediate guardians of the people:

And laſtly, the Senate will feel the mighty check of the Houſe of Repreſentatives—a body ſo truly popular and pure in its election, ſo intimately connected, by its intereſts and feelings, with the people at large, ſo guarded againſt corruption and influence—ſo much, from its nature, above all apprehenſions, that it muſt ever be able to maintain the high ground aſſigned to it by the foederal conſtitution.