An American Citizen, Number III

IN purſuing the conſideration of the new foederal conſtitution, it remains now to examine the nature and powers of the Houſe of repreſentatives—the immediate delegates of the people.

Each member of this truly popular aſſembly will be choſen by about ſix thouſand electors, by the poor as well as the rich. No decayed or venal borough will have an unjuſt ſhare in their determinations—no old Sarum will ſend thither a repreſentative by the voice of a ſingle elector. As we ſhall have no royal miniſters to purchaſe votes, ſo we ſhall have no votes for ſale; for the ſuffrages of ſix thouſand enlightened and independent freemen are above all price. When the increaſing population of the country ſhall render the body too large at the rate of one member for every thirty thouſand perſons, they will be returned at the greater rate of one for every forty or fifty thouſand, which will render the electors ſtill more incorruptible. For this regulation is only deſigned to prevent a ſmaller number than thirty thouſand from having a repreſentative. Thus we ſee a proviſion follows, that no ſtate ſhall have leſs than one member, for if a new and greater number than thirty thouſand ſhould hereafter be fixed on, which ſhould exceed the whole of the inhabitants of any ſtate, ſuch ſtate, without this wholeſome proviſion, would loſe its voice in the Houſe of Repreſentatives—a circumſtance which the conſtitution renders impoſſible.

The people of England, whoſe Houſe of commons is filled with military and civil officers and penſioners, ſay their liberties would be perfectly ſecured by triennial Parliaments. With us, no placeman can ſit among the repreſentatives of the people, and two years are the conſtitutional term of their exiſtence. Here, again, leſt wealth, powerful connections, or even the unwarineſs of the people ſhould place in this important truſt an undeſerving, unqualified, or inexperienced youth, the wiſdom of the Convention has propoſed an abſolute incapacity till the age of twenty-five. At twenty-one a young man is made the guardian of his own intereſt, but he cannot, for a few years more, be intruſted with the affairs of the nation. He muſt be an inhabitant of the ſtate that elects him, that he may be intimately acquainted with their particular circumſtances—The houſe of Repreſentatives is not, as the ſenate, to have a Preſident choſen for them from without their body, but are to elect their Speaker from their own number—They will alſo appoint all their other officers. In great ſtate caſes, they will be the grand inqueſt of the nation, for they poſſeſs the ſole and uncontroulable power of impeachment. They are neither to wait the call, nor abide the prorogations and diſſolutions of a perverſe or ambitious Prince, for they are to meet at leaſt once in every year, and to ſit on adjournments to be agreed on between themſelves and the other ſervants of the people. Should they differ in opinion, the Preſident, who is a temporary fellow-ſervant, and not their hereditary maſter, has a mediatorial power to adjuſt it for them, but cannot prevent th•• conſtitutional meeting within the year. They can 〈◊〉 the attendance of their members, that their public duty may not be evaded in times of difficulty or danger—The vote of each repreſentative can be always known, as well as the proceedings of the houſe, that ſo the people may be acquainted with the conduct of thoſe in whom they repoſe ſo important a truſt. As was obſerved of the Senators, they cannot make new offices for themſelves, nor increaſe, for their own benefit, the emoluments of old ones, by which the people will be exempted from needleſs additions to the public expences, on ſuch ſordid and mercenary principles—They are not to be reſtrained from the firm and plain language, which becomes the independent repreſentatives of freemen, for there is to be a perfect liberty of ſpeech. Without their conſent, no monies can be obtained, no armies raiſed, no navies provided. They, alone, can originate bills for drawing forth the revenues of the union, and they will have a negative upon every legiſlative act of the other houſe.—So far, in ſhort, as the ſphere of foederal juriſdiction extends, they will be controulable only by the people, and, in contentions with the other branch, ſo far as they ſhall be right, they muſt ever finally prevail.

Such, my Countrymen, are ſome of the cautionary proviſions of the frame of government your faithful convention have ſubmitted to your conſideration— ſuch the foundations of peace, liberty and ſafety, which have been laid by their unwearied labours—They have guarded you againſt all ſervants but thoſe "whom choice and common good ordain," againſt all maſters, "ſave preſerving Heaven."