An American Citizen, Number IV

IN conſidering the reſpective powers of the Preſident, the Senate and the Houſe of Repreſentatives, under the foederal conſtitution, we have ſeen a part of the wholeſome precautions, which are contained in the new ſyſtem. Let us examine what further ſecurities for the ſafety and happineſs of the people are contained in the general ſtipulations and proviſions.

The United States guarantee to every ſtate in the union a ſeparate republican form of government. From thence it follows, that any man or body of men, however rich or powerful, who ſhall make an alteration in the form of government of any ſtate, whereby the powers thereof ſhall be attempted to be taken out of the hands of the people at large, will ſtand guilty of high treaſon; or ſhould a foreign power ſeduce or over-awe the people of any ſtate, ſo as to cauſe them to veſt in the families of any ambitous citizens or foreigners the powers of hereditary governors, whether as Kings or Nobles, that ſuch inveſtment of powers would be void in itſelf, and every perſon attempting to execute them would alſo be guilty of treaſon.

No religions teſt is ever to be required of any officer or ſervant of the United States. The people may employ any wiſe and good citizen in the execution of the various duties of the government. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, no proteſtant can hold a public truſt. In England every Preſbyterian, and other perſon not of their eſtabliſhed church, is incapable of holding an office. No ſuch impious deprivation of the rights of men can take place under the new foederal conſtitution. The convention has the honour of propoſing the firſt public act, by which any nation has ever diveſted itſelf of a power, every exerciſe of which is a treſpaſs on the Majeſty of Heaven.

No qualification in monied or landed property is required by the propoſed plan; nor does it admit any preference from the prepoſterous diſtinctions of birth and rank. The office of the Preſident, a Senator, and a Repreſentative, and every other place of power or profit, are therefore open to the whole body of the people. Any wiſe, informed and upright man, be his property what it may, can exerciſe the truſts and powers of the ſtate, provided he poſſeſſes the moral, religious and political virtues which are neceſſary to ſecure the confidence of his fellow citizens.

The importation of ſlaves from 〈◊〉 foreign country is, by a clear implication, held up to the world as equally inconſiſtent with the diſpoſitions and the duties of the people of America. A ſolid foundation is laid for exploding the principles of negro ſlavery, in which many good men of all parties in Pennſylvania, and throughout the union, have already concurred. The temporary reſervation of any particular matter muſt ever be deemed an admiſſion that it ſhould be done away. This appears to have been well underſtood. In addition to the arguments drawn from liberty, juſtice and religion, opinions againſt this practice, founded in ſound policy, have no doubt been urged. Regard was neceſſarily paid to the peculiar ſituation of our ſouthern fellow-citizens; but they, on the other hand, have not been inſenſible of the delicate ſituation of our national character on this ſubject.

The people will remain, under the propoſed conſtitution, the fountain of power and public honour. The Preſident, the Senate, and the Houſe of Repreſentatives, will be the channels through which the ſtream will flow—but it will flow from the people, and from them only. Every office, religious, civil and military will be either their immediate gift, or it will come from them through the hands of their ſervants. And this, as obſerved before, will be guaranteed to them under the ſtate conſtitutions which they reſpectively approve; for they cannot be royal forms, cannot be ariſtocratical, but muſt be republican.

The people of thoſe ſtates which have faithfully diſcharged their duty to the union will be no longer ſubjected alone to the weight of the public debts. Proper arrangements will call forth the juſt proportion of their ſiſter ſtates, and our national character will again be as unſtained, as it was once exalted. Elevation to independence, with the loſs of our good name, is only to be conſpicuous in diſgrace. The liberties of a people involved in debt are as uncertain as the liberty of an individual in the ſame ſituation. Their virtue is more precarious. The unfortunate citizen muſt yield to the operation of the laws, while a bankrupt nation too eaſy annihilates the ſacred obligations of gratitude and honor, and becomes execrable and infamous. I cannot refrain from reminding my fellow-citizens of our near approach to that deplorable ſituation, which muſt be our miſerable condition, if the defects of the old confederation remain without amendment. The propoſed conſtitution will cure the evil, and reſtore us to our rank among mankind.

Laws, made after the commiſſion of the fact, have been a dreadful engine in the hands of tyrannical governors. Some of the moſt virtuous and ſhining characters in the world have been put to death, by laws formed to render them puniſhable, for parts of their conduct which innocence permitted, and to which patriotiſm impelled them. Theſe have been called ex poſt facto laws, and are exploded by the new ſyſtem. If a time of public contention ſhall hereafter arrive, the firm and ardent friends to liberty may know the length to which they can puſh their noble oppoſition, on the foundation of the laws. Should their country's cauſe impel them further, they will be acquainted with the hazard, and uſing thoſe arms which Providence has put into their hands, will make a ſolemn appeal to "the power above."

The deſtruction of the ancient republics was occaſioned in every inſtance by their being ignorant of a great political poſition, which was left for America to diſcover and eſtabliſh. Self-evident as the truth appears, we find no friend to liberty in ancient Greece or Rome aſſerting, that taxation and repreſentation were inſeparable. The Roman citizens, proud of their own liberty, impoſed, in the freeſt times of the commonwealth, the moſt grievous burdens on their wretched provinces. At other times we find thouſands of their citizens, though reſiding within the walls of Rome, deprived of legiſlative repreſentatives. When America aſſerted the novel truth, Great Britain, though boaſting herſelf as alone free among the modern nations, denied it by her legiſlature, and endeavoured to refute it by her arms—the reaſoning of tyrants. But the attempt was vain, for the voice of truth was heard above the thunders of the war, and reached the ears of all nations. Henceforth the people of the earth will conſider this poſition as the only rock on which they can found the temple of liberty, that taxation and repreſentation are inſeparable. Our new conſtitution carries it into execution on the moſt enlarged and liberal ſcale, for a Repreſentative will be choſen by ſix thouſand of his fellow-citizens, a Senator by half a ſovereign ſtate, a Preſident by a whole nation.

The old foederal conſtitution contained many of the ſame things, which from error or diſingenuouſneſs are urged againſt the new one. Neither of them have a bill of rights, nor does either notice the liberty of the preſs, becauſe they are already provided for by the ſtate conſtitutions; and relating only to perſonal rights, they could not be mentioned in a contract among ſovereign ſtates.

Both the old and new foederal conſtitutions, and indeed the conſtitution of Pennſylvania, admit of courts in which no uſe is made of a jury. The board of property, the court of admiralty, and the high court of errors and appeals, in the ſtate of Pennſylvania, as alſo the court of appeals under the old confederation, exclude juries. Trial by jury will therefore be in the expreſs words of the Pennſylvania conſtitution, "as heretofore,"—almoſt always uſed, though ſometimes omitted. Trials for lands lying in any ſtate between perſons reſiding in ſuch ſtate, for bonds, notes, book debts, contracts, treſpaſſes, aſſumptions, and all other matters between two or more citizens of any ſtate, will be held in the ſtate courts by juries, as now. In theſe caſes the foederal courts cannot interfere. But when a diſpute ariſes between the citizens of any ſtate about lands lying out of the bounds thereof, or when a trial is to be had between the citizens of any ſtate and thoſe of another, or the government of another, the private citizen will not be obliged to go into a court conſtituted by the ſtate, with which, or with the citizens of which, his diſpute is. He can appeal to a diſintereſted foederal court. This is ſurely a great advantage, and promiſes a fair trial, and an impartial judgment. The trial by jury is not excluded in theſe foederal courts. In all criminal caſes, where the property, liberty or life of the citizen is at ſtake, he has the benefit of a jury. If convicted on impeachment, which is never done by a jury in any country, he cannot be fined, impriſoned or puniſhed, but only may be diſqualified from doing public miſchief by loſing his office, and his capacity to bold another. If the nature of his offence, beſides its danger to his country, ſhould be criminal in itſelf—ſhould involve a charge of fraud, murder or treaſon—he may be tried for ſuch crime, but cannot be convicted 〈◊〉 a jury. In trials about property in the foederal courts, which can only be as above ſtated, there is nothing in the new conſtitution to prevent a trial by jury. No doubt it will be the mode in every caſe, wherein it is practicable. This will be adjuſted by law, and it could not be done otherwiſe. In ſhort, the ſphere of juriſdiction for the foederal courts is limited, and that ſphere only is ſubject to the regulations of our foederal government. The known principles of juſtice, the attachment to trial by jury whenever it can be uſed, the inſtructions of the ſtate legiſlatures, the inſtructions of the people at large, the operation of the foederal regulations on the property of a preſident, a ſenator, a repreſentative, a judge, as well as on that of a private citizen, will certainly render thoſe regulations as favorable as poſſible to property; for life and liberty are put more than ever into the hands of the juries. Under the preſent conſtitution of all the ſtates, a public officer may be condemned to impriſonment or death on impeachment, without a jury; but the new foederal conſtitution protects the accuſed, till he ſhall be convicted, from the hands of power, by rendering a jury the indiſpenſible judges of all crimes.

The influence which foreign powers may attempt to exerciſe in our affairs was foreſeen, and a wholeſome proviſion has been made againſt it; for no perſon holding an office under the United States is permitted to enjoy any foreign honors, powers or emoluments.

The apprehenſions of the people have been excited, perhaps by perſons with good intentions, about the powers of the new government to raiſe an army. Let us conſider this point with moderation and candor. As enemies will ſometimes inſult us, invade our country and capture our property, it is clear a power in our government to oppoſe, reſtrain or deſtroy them, is neceſſary to our honor, ſafety and exiſtence. The military ſhould, however, be regarded with a watchful eye; for it is a profeſſion that is liable to dangerous perverſion. But the powers veſted in the foederal government do not go the length which has been ſaid. A ſtanding army is not granted or intended, for there can be no proviſion for its continuing three years, much leſs for its permanent eſtabliſhment. Two years are the utmoſt time for which the money can be given. It will be under all the reſtrictions which wiſdom and jealouſy can ſuggeſt, and the original grant of the ſupplies muſt be made by the Houſe of repreſentatives, the immediate delegates of the people. The Senate and Preſident, who alſo derive their power from the people, appoint the officers; and the heads of the departments, who muſt ſubmit their accounts to the whole legiſlature, are to pay and provide them, as ſhall be directed by the laws that ſhall contain the conditions of the grant. The militia, who are in fact the effective part of the people at large, will render many troops quite unneceſſary. They will form a powerful check upon the regular troops, and will generally be ſufficient to over-awe them—for our detached ſituation will ſeldom give occaſion to raiſe an army, though a few ſcattered companies may often be neceſſary. But whenever, even on the moſt obvious reaſons, an army ſhall be raiſed, the ſeveral ſtates will be called, by the nature of things, to attend to the condition of the militia. Republican jealouſy, the guardian Angel of theſe ſtates, will watch the motions of our military citizens, even though they will be the ſoldiers of a free people. There is a wide difference however between the troops of ſuch commonwealths as ours, founded on equal and unalterable principles, and thoſe of a regal government, where ambition and oppreſſion are the profeſſion of the king. In the firſt caſe, a military officer is the occaſional ſervant of the people, employed for their defence; in the ſecond, he is the ever ready inſtrument to execute the ſchemes of conqueſt or oppreſſion, with which the mind of his royal maſter may be diſturbed.

Obſervations have been made on the power given to the foederal Government in regard to the elections of Repreſentatives and Senators. The regulations of theſe elections are, by the firſt part of the clauſe, to be preſcribed by the ſtate legiſlatures, who are certainly the proper bodies, if they will always execute the duty. But in caſe the union or the public ſafety ſhould be endangered by an omiſſion of this duty, as in the caſe of Rhode-Iſland, then the legiſlature of the United States can name for the people a convenient time, and do other matters neceſſary to enſure the free exerciſe of their right of election. The exception, in regard to the places of chuſing Senators, was made from due reſpect to the ſovereignty of the ſtate legiſlatures, who are to elect the Senators, and whoſe place of meeting ought not to be preſcribed to them by any authority, except indeed, as we always muſt, by the authority of the people. This power given to the foederal legiſlature is no more than what is poſſeſſed by the governments of all the ſtates. The conſtitution of Pennſylvania permits two-thirds of ſuch cities and counties, as ſhall elect repreſentatives, to exerciſe all the powers of the General Aſſembly, "as fully and amply as if the whole were preſent," ſhould any part of the ſtate neglect or refuſe to perform their duty in this particular. In ſhort, it is a power neceſſary to preſerve the ſocial compact of each ſtate and the confederation of the United States.

Beſides the ſecurities for the liberties of the people ariſing out of the foederal government, they are guarded by their ſtate conſtitutions, and by the nature of things in the ſeparate ſtates. The Governor or Preſident in each commonwealth, the Councils, Senates, Aſſemblies, Judges, Sheriffs, Grand and Pettit Juries, Officers of Militia, Clergy and Lay Officers of all churches, ſtate and county Treaſurers, Prothonotaries, Regiſters, Preſidents and other officers of Univerſities, Colleges and Academies, Wardens of ports and cities, Burgeſſes of towns, Commiſſioners of counties, County Lieutenants, and many other officers of power and influence, will ſtill be choſen within each ſtate, without any poſſible interference of the foederal Government. The ſeparate ſtates will alſo chooſe all the members of the legiſlative and executive branches of the United States. The people at large in each ſtate will chooſe their foederal repreſentatives, and, unleſs ordered otherwiſe by the ſtate legiſlatures, may chooſe the electors of the Preſident and Vice-Preſident of the Union. And laſtly, the legiſlature of the ſtate will have the election of the Senate, as they have heretofore had of the Members of Congreſs. Let us then, with a candor worthy of the ſubject, aſk ourſelves, whether it can be feared, that a majority of the Repreſentatives, each of whom will be choſen by ſix thouſand enlightened freemen, can betray their country?—Whether a majority of the Senate, each of whom will be choſen by the legiſlature of a free, ſovereign and independent ſtate, without any ſtipulations in favour of wealth or the contemptible diſtinctions of birth or rank, and who will be cloſely obſerved by the ſtate legiſlatures, can deſtroy our liberties, controuled as they are too by the houſe of repreſentatives? or whether a temporary, limited, executive officer, watched by the foederal Repreſentatives, by the Senate, by the ſtate legiſlatures, by his perſonal enemies among the people of his own ſtate, by the jealouſy of the people of rival ſtates, and by the whole of the people of the Union, can ever endanger our Freedom.

Permit me, my fellow-citizens, to cloſe theſe obſervations by remarking, that there is no ſpirit of arrogance in the new foederal conſtitution. It addreſſes you with becoming modeſty, admitting that it may contain errors. Let us give it a trial; and when experience has taught its miſtakes, the people, whom it preſerves abſolutely all powerful, can reform and amend them. That I may be perfectly underſtood, I will acknowledge its acceptance by all the ſtates, without delay, is the ſecond wiſh of my heart. This firſt is, that our country may be virtuous and free.