A Native of Virginia, Article I

Section 1. All legiſlative powers herein granted, ſhall be veſted in a Congreſs of the United States, which ſhall conſiſt of • Senate and Houſe of Repreſentatives.

IT is neceſſary to obſerve that, Congreſs conſiſts only of• Senate, and Houſe of Repreſentatives. The Preſident make no part of it; for his negative only amounts to a reconſideration of the public meaſures; as notwithſtanding his diſapprobation, a bill becomes a law, if two thirds of each Houſe agre• to it.

Sect. 2. The Houſe of Repreſentatives ſhall be compoſed • members choſen every ſecond year by the people of the ſever• States, and the electors in each State ſhall have the qualification requiſite for electors of the moſt numerous branch of the Sta• Legiſlature.

It will be aſked by ſome,—Why ſhould the Repreſentative to Congreſs be elected for two years, when in Virginia and th• other States, the State Delegates are annually choſen? I anſwer to this queſtion a variety of reaſons occur; ſuch as tha• they will have a great diſtance to go: That the purpoſes • their Legiſlation being purely federal, it will take them ſom• time to become acquainted with the ſituation and intereſts • the reſpective States, as well as the relative ſituation and intereſt of the whole Union: That it would be difficult to g• men of abilities to ſerve in an office, the re-election to whic• would be ſo frequent. If the election had been once in thr• years, it would perhaps have been an improvement. The u•ſtable councils, the feeble laws, the relaxation of governme•• which afflict this, and almoſt every State in the Union, ma• juſtly be attributed to the frequent changes which take pla•• among the rulers in all the American governments.

Repreſentatives and direct taxes ſhall be apportioned among a ſeveral States which may be included within this Union, ac•••ing to their reſpective numbers, which ſhall be determined, 〈◊〉 adding to the whole number of free perſons, including thoſe ••nd to ſervice for a term of years, and excluding Indians not ••xed, three-fifths of all other perſons. The actual enumeration •hall be made within three years after the firſt meeting of the •ongreſs of the United States, and within every ſubſequent term •f ten years, in ſuch manner as they ſhall by law direct. The ••mber of Repreſentatives ſhall not exceed one for every thirty •houſand, but each State ſhall have at leaſt one Repreſentative: And until ſuch enumeration ſhall be made, the State of New Hampſhire ſhall be entitled to chooſe three; Maſſachuſetts, eight; Rhode-Iſland and Providence Plantations, one; Connecticut, 〈◊〉, New-York, ſix; New-Jerſey, four; Pennſylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, ſix; Virginia, ten; North-Caro••na, five; South-Carolina, five; and Georgia, three.

EVERY free perſon counts one, every five ſlaves •ount three. •y this regulation our conſequence in the Union is increaſed, 〈◊〉 an increaſe of numbers in the Congreſs. But ſome objectors •gue that this arrangement is unjuſt; and that it bears hard •on the ſouthern States, who have been accuſtomed to con••der their ſlaves merely as property; as a ſubject for, not as •ents to taxation; and therefore by adding three fifths of our •ves to the free perſons, our numbers are increaſed; and con••quently by how much is that increaſe, by ſo much is the in•••aſe of our federal burthen. It is true, that ſlaves are pro••rty,—but are they not perſons too? Does not their labour •••oduce wealth? And is it not by the produce of labour, that 〈◊〉 taxes muſt be paid? The Convention juſtly conſidered 〈◊〉 in the light of perſons, rather than property: But at the 〈◊〉 time conceiving their natural forces inferior to thoſe of 〈◊〉 whites: knowing that they require freemen to overlook them, and that they enfeeble the State which poſſeſſes them, they equitably conſidered five ſlaves only of equal conſequence with three free perſons. What rule of federal taxation ſo equal, and at the ſame time ſo little unfavourable to the ſouthern States, could the Convention have eſtabliſhed, as that of numbers ſo arranged? Suppoſe the value of the lands in the reſpective States had been adopted as the meaſure: Let us ſee what then would have been the conſequence. The northern States are comparatively ſmall to the ſouthern, and are very populous; whilſt to the ſouthward, the inhabitants are ſcattered over a great extent of territory. Any given number of men in the latter States poſſeſs much greater quantities of land, than the like number in the former. It is true the lands to the northward ſell for a greater price than thoſe to the ſouthward, but the difference in price is by no means adequate to the difference in quantity; conſequently an equal number of men to the ſouthward would have to pay a much greater federal tax than the like number to the northward.

BY the 8th article of Confederation, the value of lands is made the meaſure of the federal quotas. Virginia in conſequence is rated ſomething above Maſſachuſetts, whoſe number of white inhabitants is nearly double.

AFTER all, this point is perhaps of no great conſequence The Congreſs probably will rarely, if ever, meddle with direct taxation, as the impoſt duties will in all likelihood anſwer al• the purpoſes of government, or at any rate the poſt-office which is daily increaſing, and a tax upon inſtruments of writing, will ſupply any deficiency.

INDIANS are mentioned in this clauſe becauſe there are nations of Indians within the limits of ſeveral of the States.

When vacancies happen in the Repreſentation from any State, the Executive authority thereof ſhall iſſue writs of election to fill ſuch vacancies.

THE Convention attentive to the preſervation of the conſequence of each State, have intruſted to the Executives thereof, the power of iſſuing writs of elections when vacancies happen. An additional ſecurity to the independance of the individual States.

The Houſe of Repreſentatives ſhall chooſe their Speaker and ther officers; and ſhall have the ſole power of impeachment.

THE Repreſentatives in Congreſs poſſeſs the ſole power of •mpeachment: But here it may be obſerved, that they cannot •mpeach one of their own body; but have the power of expul•on, when two-thirds of their body ſhall agree.

Sect. 3. The Senate of the United States ſhall be compoſed of •o Senators from each State, choſen by the Legiſlature thereof, 〈◊〉 ſix years; and each Senator ſhall have one vote.

THE inequality of the repreſentation of the Senate, has ••en made a great ground of objection.

WE ſhould never forget that this is a government propoſed ••r thirteen independent States, unequal in population, and ••tent of territory, and differing in a variety of other circum••nces. It will not be denied that the ſmall, have an equal ••ght to preſerve their independence with the large States; •••d this was their only means of preſerving it. The juſtice of •is is acknowledged by moſt of the objectors and amenders of 〈◊〉 plan.

WE ſhould here alſo recollect, that under the Confederation ••ich at preſent exiſts, the ſmall States have a vote in all reſpects equal to the large, even to Virginia; and it certainly was a great point gained by the large ones, to get their conſequence increaſed in the Houſe of Repreſentatives in proportion to their numbers. In the United Provinces each of the ſeven States has but one vote in their Congreſs, and in that Confederation the diſproportion between the States is much greater, than in ours; for the Province of Holland pays rather more than one half of the whole federal quota. Yet ſo great are the evils which would ariſe from a diſunion, that this wealthy Province readily ſubmits to ſo unequal a repreſentation.

Immediately after they ſhall be aſſembled in conſequence of the firſt election, they ſhall be divided as equally as may be, into three claſſes. The ſeats of the Senators of the firſt claſs ſhall be vacated at the expiration of the ſecond year; of the ſecond claſs, at the expiration of the fourth year; and of the third claſs, at the expiration of the ſixth year; ſo that one third may be choſen every ſecond year: And if vacancies happen by reſignation, o• otherwiſe, during the receſs of the Legiſlature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the Legiſlature, which ſhall then fill ſuch vacancies.

No perſon ſhall be a Senator who ſhall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who ſhall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State fo• which he ſhall be choſen.

NOTWITHSTANDING the Senators are to be choſen by the Legiſlatures of the reſpective States, who ſurely are competent judges of thoſe who are moſt capable of filling this important office: Notwithſtanding one third of them are re-choſen every two years: Yet the enemies to the Conſtitution affect to call this an ariſtocratic body: And endeavour to excite viſionary fears in the minds of men, that they will form a diſtinct order in the State, and become formidable to the libert• of America. I am not gifted with the ſpirit of prophecy, and therefore cannot ſay what will happen; but this I will boldly aſſert, that if power cannot be truſted in the hands of men ſo appointed, it can be truſted no where. The different States will be well acquainted with the characters of thoſe whom they elect to the Senate; their time of duration when elected is too ſhort to enable them to form dangerous intrigues, or bring about important revolutions. It is a well eſtabliſhed principle in rhetorick, that it is not fair to argue againſt a thing, from the abuſe of it. Would you ſay there ſhould be no Phyſicians becauſe there are unſkilful adminiſters of medicine: No Lawyers becauſe ſome are diſhoneſt: No Courts becauſe Judges are ſometimes ignorant; nor government becauſe power may be abuſed? In ſhort, it is impoſſible to guard entirely againſt the abuſe of power. Annual elections will not do it. The Delegates of Virginia are annually elected, yet it is a fact, that there has not been an Aſſembly ſince the government was framed, wherein the Bill of Rights and the Conſtitution have not been infringed. The inſtances have been of no great importance and therefore notwithſtanding the danger of the principle, they have been overlooked.

The Vice-Preſident of the United States ſhall be Preſident of the Senate, but ſhall have no vote, unleſs they be equally divided.

The Senate ſhall chooſe their other officers, and alſo a Preſident pro tempore, in the abſence of the Vice-Preſident, or when ••e ſhall exerciſe the office of Preſident of the United States.

THE Vice-Preſident has been introduced from the State Government of New York. This uſeful, though ſurely inoffenſive officer, has been made by ſome objectors the bugbear of the Con•titution. It is a ſtrong proof of want of argument in the enemies to it, when they hold up this officer as dangerous. He is •lected by the ſame perſons as the Preſident, and in the ſame manner. He preſides in the Senate, but has no vote except when they are divided. This is the only power incident to his office whilſt he continues Vice-Preſident; and he is obviouſly introduced into the government to prevent the ill-conſequences which might otherwiſe happen from the death or removal of the Preſident. This is the purpoſe for which a ſimilar officer has been introduced into the Conſtitution of New-York.

The Senate ſhall have the ſole power to try all impeachments. When ſitting for that purpoſe, they ſhall be on oath or affirmation. When the Preſident of the United States is tried, the Chief Juſtice ſhall preſide: And no perſon ſhall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of the members preſent.

Judgment in caſes of impeachment ſhall not extend further than to removal from office, and diſqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, truſt or profit, under the United States but the party convicted ſhall nevertheleſs be liable and ſubject t• indictment, trial, judgment and puniſhment, according to law.

I CONCEIVE that the Senators are not impeachable, an• therefore Governor Randolph's objection falls to the ground I am ſurprized that a man of that gentleman's abilities ſhoul• have fallen into this miſtake. The Senators having a powe• over their own members, have the right of expulſion. Wh• then ſhould they be impeachable? For upon impeachment the puniſhment is only removal from, and incapacity to hol• offices. Expulſion amounts to the ſame thing. Beſides, th• Senators are elected by the people, though mediately, as we as the Houſe of Repreſentatives, and therefore have not th• ſame degree of reſponſibility annexed to their characters, the officers of government; and for this obvious reaſon,—t•• former are ••pointed by the people themſelves to ſtand their places, and they are the beſt judges of thoſe who are mo•• fit to ſerve them; but the latter are appointed by the ſervan• of the people. It is a generally received maxim among writers on government, that the Judiciary and Legiſlative departments ſhould be kept diſtinct. The poſition is true to a certain extent; but this like moſt other general rules, is liable to exceptions. In the Engliſh government, which is certainly the freeſt in Europe, the Houſe of Lords not only try impeachments, but is the higheſt civil court in the kingdom. In that Conſtitution the Houſe of Commons are the impeachers, the Houſe of Lords the triers: But no members either of the Houſe of Commons or Houſe of Lords, was ever impeached as ſuch: But whenever members of either Houſe have been impeached, it was as great officers of State. Under the federal government this is impoſſible, becauſe the members of neither Houſe can hold any office of State.

IF this reaſoning be not concluſive, the fourth ſection of the ſecond article puts it out of doubt, viz. "The Preſident, Vice Preſident, and all civil officers of the United States, ſhall be removed from office on impeachment, &c." The Senators are repreſentatives of the people; and by no conſtruction can be conſidered as civil officers of the State. If this be the caſe, in whoſe hands can this power be lodged with greater propriety, or with greater ſafety, than in thoſe of the Senate? Or how •an a better court be appointed? To impeach either the members of Senate or Houſe of Repreſentatives, would be to impeach the repreſentatives of the people, that is the people •hemſelves, which is an abſurdity.

Sect. 4. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Repreſentatives, ſhall be preſcribed in each State by the Legiſlature thereof; but the Congreſs may at any •ime, by law, make or alter ſuch regulations, except as to the •laces of chuſing Senators.

The Congreſs ſhall aſſemble at leaſt once in every year, and ſuch meeting ſhall be on the firſt Monday in December, unleſs they ſhall by law appoint a different day.

Sect. 5. Each Houſe ſhall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications, of its own members, and a majority of each ſhall conſtitute a quorum to do buſineſs; but a ſmaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of abſent members, in ſuch manner, and under ſuch penalties as each Houſe may provide.

Each Houſe may determine the rules of its proceedings, puniſh its members for diſorderly behaviour, and with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel a member.

Each Houſe ſhall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publiſh the ſame, excepting ſuch parts as may in their judgement require ſecrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either Houſe on any queſtion, ſhall, at the deſire of one-fifth of thoſe preſent, be entered on the journal.

Neither Houſe, during the ceſſion of Congreſs, ſhall, without the conſent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two Houſes ſhall be ſitting.

EXPERIENCE and a change of circumſtances may render it neceſſary that the Congreſs ſhould have the power of regulating the elections: But as the Senate is elected by the State Legiſlatures, the place of ſuch election muſt be the place where they meet. Beſides which, this power was neceſſary leſt ſome of the States from obſtinacy, or ſelfiſh views, ſhould alter the time and place of holding the elections in ſuch a manner, as might impede the operation of the federal government.

Sect. 6. The Senators and Repreſentatives ſhall receive a compenſation for their ſervices, to be aſcertained by law, and paid out of the treaſury of the United States. They ſhall in all caſes, except treaſon, felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arreſt during their attendance at the ſeſſion of their reſpective houſes, and in going to and returning from the ſame; and for any ſpeech or debate in either Houſe, they ſhall not be queſtioned in any other place.

No Senator or Repreſentative ſhall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which ſhall have been created, or the emoluments whereof ſhall have been increaſed during ſuch time; and no perſon holding any office under the United States, ſhall be a member of either Houſe during his continuance in office.

SAY the objectors,—Why are not the ſalaries of the members of Congreſs aſcertained by the Conſtitution? I will anſwer them by another queſtion,—Why are not the ſalaries of every officer of the United States aſcetained by it? Or rather, why ſhould the Convention have deſcended into ſuch minutia? Can it be ſuppoſed, for a moment, that in the preſent ſituation of America, when there are ſtill left many men of talents and virtue, from amongſt whom the Congreſs will doubtleſs be choſen, that they will paſs a law to give themſelves immoderate ſallaries? But even ſhould they, what would be the mighty evil to this extenſive continent, from eighty or ninety perſons having ſalaries larger than perhaps their ſervices might merit?

IT is proper that Congreſs ſhould have the regulation of this matter for another reaſon. It is a fact well known in the commercial world, that, from one certain cauſe, the quantity of ſpecie is inſenſibly increaſing: This of conſequence leſſens its value: Therefore a ſalary which now would be ſufficient forty years hence, would be wholly inadequate.

IN the latter part of this ſection there is an admirable check upon the members of both Houſes; as nothing can tend in a greater degree, to preſcribe their independence of conduct, and prevent intriguing, than that no member ſhall be eligible to any office which has been created, or whoſe emoluments have been increaſed, ſince the time of his election, and during the time for which he has been elected.

Sect. 7. All bills for raiſing revenue ſhall originate in the Houſe of Repreſentatives; but the Senate may propoſe or concur with amendments as on other bills.

IN this the Conſtitution is an improvement upon that o• England: There all money bills muſt not only originate bu• muſt be perfected in the Houſe of Commons: Here though• the Senate cannot originate ſuch bills, yet they have the powe• of amending them, and by that means have an opportunity o• communicating their ideas to the Houſe of Repreſentatives upon the important ſubject of taxation.

Every bill which ſhall have paſſed the Houſe of Repreſentatives and the Senate, ſhall, before it become a law, be preſente• to the Preſident of the United States; if he approve he ſhall fig• it, but if not, he ſhall return it with his objections, to that Houſ• in which it ſhall have originated, who ſhall enter the the objection at large on their journal, and proceed to reconſider it. If after ſuch reconſideration two-thirds of that Houſe ſhall agree 〈◊〉 paſs the bill, it shall be ſent, together with the objections, to t•• other Houſe, by which it ſhall likewiſe be reconſidered, and approved by two-thirds of that Houſe, it ſhall become a law. B• in all ſuch caſes the votes of both Houſes ſhall be determined 〈◊〉 yeas and nays, and the names of the perſons voting for a• againſt the bill ſhall be entered on the journal of each Hou•• reſpectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the Preſide•• within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it ſhall have been pr•ſented to him, the ſame ſhall be a law, in like manner as if he had ſigned it, unleſs the Congreſs by their adjournment prevent 〈◊〉 return, in which caſe it ſhall not be a law.

THIS power in the Preſident is derived from the State government of Maſſachuſetts and New-York, though in the latter the Chancellor and Chief Judges are added to the Governor. This power goes only to a reconſideration of the public meaſures; and the Preſident's diſapprobation, or negative, is nugatory, when two-thirds of each Houſe concur in any meaſure after it has undergone his inſpection. The Convention wiſely judged that the Preſident would in all probability be a man of great experience, and abilities, and as far as his powers extend, ought to be conſidered as repreſenting the Union; and conſequently would be well acquainted with the intereſts of the whole. Great utility is therefore likely to ariſe to Congreſs from his knowledge, and his reaſoning upon their acts of Legiſlation. Farther, the experience of all ages prove that all popular aſſemblies are frequently governed by prejudices, paſſions, and partial views of the ſubject; nay ſometimes by •ndecent heats and animoſities. The ten days therefore given •o the Preſident for his opinion of their meaſures, is wiſely in•erpoſed to prevent the miſchiefs which might enſue from thoſe common faults of ſuch aſſemblies.

Every order, reſolution or vote, to which the concurrence of •he Senate and Houſe of Repreſentatives may be neceſſary (except •n a queſtion of adjournment) shall be preſented to the Preſident •f the United States; and before the ſame shall take effect, shall 〈◊〉 approved by him, or, being diſapproved by him, shall be re••ſſed by two-thirds of the Senate and Houſe of Repreſentatives, ••cording to the rules and limitations preſcribed in the caſe of bill.

THE reaſoning upon the laſt clauſe applies alſo to this.

Sect. 8. The Congreſs ſhall have power

To lay and collect taxes, duties, impoſts and exciſes, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, impoſts, and exciſes, ſhall be uniform throughout the United States;

IT is here to be obſerved, that all taxes, impoſts, &c. are to be applied only for the common defence and general welfare, of the United States. By no poſſibility will the words admit of any other conſtruction. Yet ſeveral popular declaimers have attempted to ſound the alarm by their illeberal and ill-founded ſuggeſtions of peculation, bribery, and corruption, and of the probability of the public Treaſury being converted to the uſe of the Preſident and Congreſs. But how will this be poſſible? They will have all fixed ſalaries, and perquiſites. The public accounts of receipts and expenditures will be regularly kept and regularly publiſhed, for the public inſpection: Beſides which, the public offices will always be open for the ſearch and inquiries of every individual. I doubt if human wiſdom could deviſe any better mode of ſecuring a juſt application of the public money.

AS ſcarcely any article of the propoſed plan has eſcaped cenſure, there are objections made to the grant of the impoſts to Congreſs. But when we conſider that the purpoſes for which the impoſts are to be applied are merely national, and falls directly within the deſign of the Union, that of making all America one State for great political purpoſes, the objection falls; for in this view America compoſes but one great republic, all the ſubjects of which ſtand preciſely upon the ſame ground, and pay only in proportion to their conſumption of foreign articles. To this we may add, that thoſe States which export the chief of the produce of their labour, and in conſequenec of that circumſtance, import more than thoſe which manufacture, receive a compenſation for the increaſed import, by the exported produce being free from duties. And beſides, we may fairly conclude, that the conſumption of foreign articles throughout America, is nearly in proportion to the enumeration, which is the meaſure of the reſpective quotas.

To borrow money on the credit of the United States;

THIS power is lodged with the preſent Congreſs.

To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the ſeveral States, and with the Indian tribes;

THE power of regulating commerce gives great alarm to the enemies of the Conſtitution. In this, as in moſt other inſtances, they forget that this is a government for thirteen 〈◊〉; and think only of the immediate intereſts of Virginia; as if ſhe had a right to dictate to the other twelve, and as if her intereſts alone were to be conſulted. Be not deceived my countrymen. However important we may be in the ſcale of Union, there are other States which are equally ſo. The conſequence of this power, ſay they, will be, that the eaſtern and northern States will combine together, and not only oblige the ſouthern to export their produce in their bottoms, by prohibiting foreign bottoms; but will alſo lay ſuch duties upon foreign manufactures as will amount to a prohibition, in order to ſupply us themſelves.

UPON accurately inveſtigating this point, we ſhall find the reaſoning to be as falſe, as the ſuppoſition is illiberal. It is true the eaſtern States can build and equip ſhips, upon better terms than the ſouthern: Nay, I believe I may go farther, and ſay, that they can upon better terms than any nation in Europe. This ariſes from their having all the materials for ſhip-building within themſelves, except canvas and cordage, whilſt moſt of the maritime powers of Europe, depend upon foreign countries, not only for theſe articles, but alſo for timber and maſts. A great extent of ſea coaſt, a cold climate, a barren ſoil, and above all, the fiſheries, furniſh an infinite number of ſeamen, who from neceſſity are willing to navigate for very moderate wages. If this be the caſe, is their any reaſon to ſuppoſe that the eaſtern States will not carry our produce upon as reaſonable terms as any of the European powers? I believe it is a fact, that before the war, they were the principal carriers to the Britiſh Weſt-Indies; ſo low were the terms upon which their veſſels could be chartered. And the ſame cauſes ſtill exiſts, why they ſhould take freight upon terms equally moderate. But this is not all. The eaſtern States are not ignorant that the ſouthern poſſeſs even better materials for ſhip-building, than they do; and therefore will take care not to excite their jealouſy, nor ſtimulate them to build ſhips and become their own carries, by exacting unreaſonable freightage. But admitting that the eaſtern Delegates ſhould be ſo diſhoneſt as well as unwiſe, to combine againſt thoſe of the ſouth—I will venture to aſſert, that not a man in America, who is acquainted with the middle States, can ſuppoſe that they would join in ſuch a combination. New-York is rather a country of farmers than of ſailors: It poſſeſſes large tracts of fertile ſoil, but no fiſheries, and before the war, for one ſhip built in that State, either for freightage or ſale, there were thirty in New-England. All that ſhe will aim at, therefore, will be ſhips of her own, ſufficient to carry her own produce. Her intereſts, therefore will not induce her to enter into this formidable combination.

JERSEY, from her local ſituation, and a variety of peculiar circumſtances, has fewer ſhips and ſeamen than even any of •he ſouthern States. Her intereſts, therefore, will lead her •o adhere to them.

THE ſame reaſoning applies to Pennſylvania that does to New-York; and ſtill more emphatically; becauſe this State is ſtill more employed in huſbandry. And as to the State of Delaware, it does not own ſix ſhips.

LET us then ſee how this queſtion will ſtand in point of numbers. The four eaſtern States will have ſeventeen voices, which will be oppoſed by the nineteen voices of the middle States and the twenty-nine of the ſouthern.

I WILL not endeavour to anſwer the other objection.—The fear of a northern combination to furniſh the ſouthern States with manufactures. This I conceive, has ariſen either from •gnorance of the ſubject, or an abſolute enmity to all confederation. The only manufactures which the northern States poſſeſs and with which they can furniſh others, are ſhoes, cotton cards, nails, hats, carriages, and perhaps paper and refined •ugars may be added; and ſhould the whale-fiſhery be ever revived, train oil and ſpermacaeti candels. The two firſt articles may be in a great meaſure confined to Maſſachuſetts. Their ſhoes are as good and as cheap as thoſe imported from Great-Britain, at leaſt as the ſale ſhoes. And as to the ſecond article, the exportation of them from thence is prohibited by act of Parliament. Both New-York and Pennſylvania manufacture leather in all its branches, and hats; but not more than ſufficient for their own conſumption. Connecticut has no manufactures to export; nor has New-York, unleſs perhaps ſome refined ſugar. Jerſey has only domeſtic manufactures. Pennſylvania manufactures nails, refined ſugar, cotton cards, carriages, and, of late, paper for exportation. The Delaware State has only domeſtic manufactures.

IF Maſſachuſetts can furniſh us with ſhoes, cards, train oil and ſpermacaeti candles; Pennſylvania with nails, white ſugar carriages, and paper, as cheap as we can procure them from beyond the Atlantic, why ſhould not ſuch European article be probibited? There is no probability that either the northern or ſouthern States, will in many years become extenſive manufacturers. The price of labour and cheapneſs of land will prevent it; and the daily migrations from all the States to the weſtern parts of America, will keep up the one, and keep down the other. I have been informed, and I believe rightly informed, that the amount of the imports from Europe, is a great or greater in the eaſtern or middle States, as in the ſouthern, in proportion to their numbers. This, to many, may appear doubtful; but I believe it, becauſe I have good reaſon to think, that the domeſtic manufactures of the ſouthern States particularly of Virginia, are of greater value than the dome•tic manufactures of the northern and middle States, in the ſam• proportion. This has ariſen from the cultivation of cotton which will not come to perfection to the northward; and tha• article is manufactured with much leſs trouble than eithe• flax or hemp.

IF this account be juſt, what have the ſouthern States 〈◊〉 fear? But admitting ſome of the eaſtern and middle State ſhould enter into this illiberal, unjuſt, and impolitic combination: Let us ſee how the numbers would ſtand. New-Hampſhire, Maſſachuſetts, New-York, and Pennſylvania, the only manufacturing States, may combine: Their numbers will amount to twenty-five in one Houſe, to be oppoſed by forty; and in the other the numbers will be eight, to be oppoſed by ſixteen.

AFTER all, ſuppoſe theſe objections are founded in fact: Had we not better ſubmit to the ſlight inconveniencies which might ariſe from this combination; than the ſerious evils that muſt neceſſarily follow from diſunion?

To eſtabliſh an uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform •aws on the ſubject of bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign •oin, and fix the ſtandard of weights and meaſures;

To provide for the puniſhment of counterfeiting the ſecurities •nd current coin of the United States;

To eſtabliſh poſt-offices and poſt roads;

To promote the progreſs of ſcience and uſeful arts, by ſecuring •r limited times, to authors and inventors, the excluſive right their reſpective writings and diſcoveries;

To conſtitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;

To define and puniſh piracies and felonies committed on the ••gh ſeas, and offences againſt the law of nations;

To declare war, grant letters of marque and repriſal, and •ake rules concerning captures on land and water;

MOST of theſe powers, the preſent Congreſs poſſeſs, and •ne of them have been objected to, except what relates to Courts, which will be taken notice of hereafter.

To raiſe and ſupport armies, but no appropriation of money to that uſe ſhall be for a longer term than two years;

BY this regulation every Houſe of Repreſentatives will have a ſhare in the appropriations; and no miſchief can enſue from appropriations of two years, ſince the proceedings of each Houſe of Congreſs are to be publiſhed from time to time, as well as regular ſtatements and accounts of the receipts and expenditures of all public money.

To provide and maintain a navy;

To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces;

THE preſent Congreſs poſſeſs the powers given by theſe clauſes.

To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, ſuppreſs inſurrections and repel invaſions;

To provide for organizing, arming and diſciplining the militia, and for governing ſuch part of them as may be employed in the ſervice of the United States; reſerving to the States reſpectively, the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the diſcipline preſcribed by Congreſs.

BY theſe clauſes, the appointment of the militia officers, and training the militia, are reſerved to the reſpective States; except that Congreſs have a right to direct in what manner they are to be diſciplined, and the time when they are to be ordered out.

THESE clauſes have been extremely miſunderſtood, or purpoſely miſconſtrued, by the enemies to the Conſtitution. Some have ſaid, the abſolute unqualified command that Congreſs have over the militia may be made inſtrumental to the deſtruction of all liberty, both public and private, whether of a perſonal, civil, or religious nature.

IS this the reſult of reaſon, or is it the dictate of reſentment? How can the command of Congreſs over the militia be either abſolute or unqualified, when its officers are appointed by the States, and conſequently can by no poſſibility become its creatures?

THEY will generally be men of property and probity: And can any one for a moment ſuppoſe that ſuch men will ever be ſo loſt to a ſenſe of liberty, the rights of their country, and their own dignity, as to become the inſtruments of arbitrary meaſures? Whenever that ſhall be the caſe, we may in vain contend for forms of government; the ſpirit of liberty will have taken its flight from America, and nothing but an arbitrary government will be fit for ſuch a people, however accurately defined the powers of her Conſtitution may be. But ſo long as there ſhall be a militia ſo officered, or the majority of the people landholders, America will have little to fear for liberty. Congreſs have the power of organizing the militia; and can it be put into better hands? They can have no intereſt in deſtroying the perſonal liberty of any man, or raiſing his fortune in the mode of organization: They can make no law upon this, or any other ſubject, which will not affect themſelves, their children, or their connexions.

CAN any one ſeriouſly ſuppoſe, that Congreſs will ever think of drawing the militia of one State out, in order to deſtroy the liberties of another? Of Virginia, for inſtance, to deſtroy the liberties of Pennſylvania? Or ſhould they be ſo wicked, that an American militia, officered by the States, would obey ſo odious a mandate? The ſuppoſition is monſtrous.

To exerciſe excluſive legiſlation in all caſes whatſoever, over ſuch diſtrict (not exceeding ten miles ſquare) as may, by ceſſion of particular States, and the acceptance of Congreſs, become the ſeat of the government of the United States, and to exerciſe like authority over all places purchaſed by the conſent of the Legiſlature of the State in which the ſame ſhall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arſenals, dock-yards, and other needful buildings.

So great is the jealouſy of ſome of our citizens, that even this clauſe has excited their fears. This little ſpot is to be the centre to which is to be attracted all the wealth and power of this extenſive continent: The focus which will abſorb the laſt remains of American liberty. Such are the viſionary phantoms of the antifederaliſts.

THE Congreſs is to govern, as they ſhall ſee fit, a diſtrict not more than ten miles ſquare. And what poſſible miſchief can ariſe to the United States from hence? This diſtrict muſt either be purchaſed by Congreſs, or yielded to them by the inhabitants of that particular ſpot, which they may conceive moſt convenient for them to aſſemble at, and for which the conſent of the State is neceſſary. If the firſt, there will be few or no inhabitants; they will therefore induce people to ſettle it, by eſtabliſhing a mild government. If the ſecond, the inhabitants of any particular diſtrict certainly have a right to ſubmit to whatever form of government they may think agreeable, provided the State within which the diſtrict lies, conſents; without giving offence to Virginia, or any other of the States. We are told that the wiſe Franklin has recommended to 〈◊〉 Philadelphians to offer their city and its environs as the ſeat of Congreſs. Can it be ſuppoſed that he would recommend this meaſure to his favorite city were he not well aſſured that the government of Congreſs will be a good one? I have no doubt but this diſtrict will flouriſh; that it will increaſe in populaton and wealth: Becauſe I have no doubt but moſt people would think it a happineſs to live under the government of ſuch men as will compoſe the Congreſs; or under ſuch a government as ſuch men will frame for that diſtrict.

And—To make all laws which ſhall be neceſſary and proper for carrying into executiont the foregoing powers, and other powers veſted by this Conſtitution in the government of the United States, or in any departmen or officer thereof.

BY this clauſe, Congreſs have no farther legiſlative authority than ſhall be deemed neceſſary to carry into execution the powers veſted by this Conſtitution. This regulation is neceſſary; as without it the different States might counteract all the laws of Congreſs, and render the Federal Government nugatory.

Sect. 9. The migration or importation of ſuch perſons as any of the States now exiſting ſhall think proper to admit, ſhall not be prohibited by the Congreſs prior to the year one thouſand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be impoſed on ſuch importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each perſon.

THIS clauſe is a proof of deference in the members of the Convention, to each other, and of conceſſion of the northern to the ſouthern States. There is no doubt but far the greater part of that Convention hold domeſtic ſlavery in abhorrence. But the members from South-Carolina and Georgia, thinking ſlaves abſolutely neceſſary for the cultivation and melioration of their States, inſiſted upon this clauſe. But it affects not the law of Virginia which prohibits the importation of ſlaves.

The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus ſhall not be ſuſpended, unleſs when in caſes of rebellion or invaſion the public ſafety may require it.

BY this clauſe the Congreſs have the right of ſuſpending the habeas corpus in the two caſes of inſurrection and rebellion—a power which follows from the neceſſity of the thing.

No bill of attainder or•ex poſt facto law ſhall be paſſed.

IT is extraordinary that Mr. Maſon ſhould have made a part of this clauſe a ground of objection. 'Till that gentleman denied it, I had ſuppoſed it an univerſally received opinion that ex poſt facto laws were dangerous in their principle, and oppreſſive in their execution. And with reſpect to bills o• attainder, a very ſlight acquaintance with the hiſtory of tha• country in which alone they are uſed, is ſufficient to diſcove• that they have been generally made the means of oppreſſion.

No capitation, or other direct tax, ſhall be laid, unleſs in proportion to the cenſus or enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

THIS clauſe is a confirmation of the third clauſe of the ſecond ſection of the firſt article.

No tax or duty ſhall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference ſhall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State, over thoſe of another Nor ſhall veſſels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

ALL writers upon finance hold taxes upon exports to be impolitic. Yet there are doubtleſs ſome articles which will with propriety bear an export duty; ſuch as tobacco and perhaps indigo. But then theſe articles are of the growth of only five of the States; and it would be a manifeſt injuſtice that the produce of ſome States ſhould be taxed for the benefit of others. The latter part of the clauſe provides that all Naval Officers fees and port charges ſhall be the ſame throughout the United States; and that a veſſel bound to one State from another, and calling at any intermediate State, ſhall not be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duty, in ſuch State. This tends to facilitate the intercourſe among the States, and may produce many commercial conveniencies.

No money ſhall be drawn from the Treaſury, but in conſequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular ſtatement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money, ſhall be publiſhed from time to time.

AS all appropriations of money are to be made by law, and regular ſtatements thereof publiſhed, no money can be applied but to the uſe of the United States.

No title of nobility ſhall be granted by the United States:— And no perſon holding any office of profit or truſt under them, ſhall, without the conſent of Congreſs, accept of any preſent, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

THE firſt part of this clauſe proves the Convention had no ariſtocratical views, nor any idea of eſtabliſhing an order in the State, with rights independent of the people. The latter part of it is introduced to prevent the officers of the Federal Government being warped from their duty.

Sect. 10. No State ſhall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and repriſal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and ſilver coin a tender in payment of debts; paſs any bill of attainder, ex poſt facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

THE States, in their individual capacities, ſhould be reſtrained from the exerciſe of the powers enumerated in this clauſe, for a variety of reaſons. If any State ſhould have a right of making treaties, granting letters of marque, and the like, America might be perpetually involved in foreign wars. By exerciſing the right of coinage and of emitting bills of credit, a State might, by the former, debaſe the currency of the United States, by mixing great quantities of alloy, and by that means defraud the Federal Treaſury; and by the latter it might defraud not only its own citizens, but the citizens of other States. But this is not all. An exerciſe of theſe rights would materially interfere with the exerciſe of the like by the Congreſs; and therefore the particular, ſhould give way to the general intereſt. The making any thing but gold and ſilver a tender in payment of debts, and the impairing the obligation of contracts, is ſo great a political injuſtice, that the Conſtitution here requires of the States, that they will forever relinquiſh the exerciſe of a power ſo odious. This part of the clauſe would probably never have been introduced, had not ſome of the States afforded too frequent inſtances of unjuſt laws upon theſe ſubjects.

No State ſhall, without the conſent of the Congreſs, lay any impoſts or duties on imports and exports, except what may be obſolutely neceſſary for executing its inſpection laws; and the nett produce of all duties and impoſts, laid by any State on imports or exports, ſhall be for the uſe of the Treaſury of the United States; and all ſuch laws ſhall be ſubject to the reviſion and controul of the Congreſs. No State ſhall, without the conſent of Congreſs, lay any duty of tonnage, keep troops, or ſhips of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war; unleſs actually invaded, or in ſuch imminent danger, as will not admit of delay.

IF the individual States might lay duties upon the imports, it would be counteracting the ſame right in Congreſs, and ruin the great fund out of which the preſent federal debts are to be paid, as well as the future federal expences defrayed. And with regard to exports, it was highly reaſonable that one State ſhould be prohibited from laying an export duty on the articles of a ſiſter State, which may be ſhipped through that State.

THE exigencies of the Union may however require direct taxes. By this clauſe, a door is open to the States, to raiſe their reſpective quotas, in lieu of direct taxes; by laying a duty upon exports; or even duties upon imports. But as the amount of theſe duties are to be paid into the public Treaſury, no inconvenience can, on the one hand, ariſe to the general welfare from them; and, on the other, the power of reviſion in the Congreſs will be the means of ſecuring a due attention to the intereſts of all the States, in the mode of laying the duty, as well as in the application of it. The latter part of the clauſe is no more than a confirmation of principles antecedently eſtabliſhed, and of powers before veſted in the Congreſs; but ſuch as are abſolutely neceſſary for the good order, dignity, and harmony of the whole; and are ſuch as the States have already yielded to the preſent Congreſs.