A Native of Virginia, Article II

Sect. 1. The Executive power ſhall be veſted in a Preſident of the United States of America. He ſhall hold his office during the term of four years, and together with the Vice-Preſident, choſen for the ſame term, be elected as follows:

Each State ſhall appoint, in ſuch manner as the Legiſlature thereof may direct, a number of Electors, equal to the whole number of Senators and Repreſentatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congreſs: But no Senator or Repreſentative, or perſon holding an office of truſt or profit under the United States, ſhall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors ſhall meet in their reſpective States, and vote, by ballot, for two perſons, of whom one at leaſt ſhall not be an inhabitant of the ſame State with themſelves. And they ſhall make a liſt of all the perſons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which liſt they ſhall ſign and certify, and tranſmit, ſealed to the ſeat of the government of the United States, directed to th• Preſident of the Senate. The Preſident of the Senate ſhall, in the preſence of the Senate and Houſe of Repreſentatives, open a• the certificates, and the votes ſhall then be counted. The perſon having the greateſt number of votes ſhall be the Preſident, if ſuch number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed and if there be more than one who have ſuch majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the Houſe of Repreſentative ſhall immediately chuſe, by ballot, one of them for Preſident and if no perſon have a majority, then from the five higheſt o• the liſt the ſaid Houſe ſhall in like manner chuſe the Preſiden• But in chuſing the Preſident, the votes ſhall be taken by State the Repreſentation from each State having one vote; a quoru• for this purpoſe ſhall conſiſt of a member or members from tw• thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States ſhall be n•ceſſary to a choice, In every caſe, after the choice of the Preſ•dent, the perſon having the greateſt number of votes of the Electors, ſhall be the Vice-Preſident. But if there ſhould remain two •or more who have equal votes, the Senate ſhall chuſe from them, ••y ballot, the Vice-Preſident.

IT has been urged by many, that the Preſident ſhould be continued in office, only a given number of years, and then •e rendered ineligible. To this it may be anſwered, were •hat to be the caſe, a good officer might be diſplaced, and a •ad one ſucceed. Knowing that he could not be continued, •e might be more attentive to enrich himſelf, ſhould opportunities offer, than to the execution of his office. But as his con•inuance in office, will depend upon his diſcharging the duties •f it with ability, and integrity, his eligibility will moſt pro•ably be the beſt ſecurity for his conduct. The longer a man •f abilities and virtue, fills an office, the better, and eaſier •ill the duties of it be diſcharged: The whole ſyſtem of adminiſtration becomes well arranged; and every department in •e government well filled. An election to this office once in •very four years, is a ſufficient curb upon the Preſident: The •lectors hold the reins. If he has miſconducted himſelf, he •ill not be re-elected; if has governed with prudence, and •bility, he ought to be continued.

THE Vice-Preſident will probably be a candidate to ſucceed •e Preſident. The former will therefore be a perpetual cennel over the latter; will be a ſtimulus to keep him up to his ••ty, and afford an additional ſecurity for his upright conduct.

NOTWITHSTANDING theſe reaſons, and the powerful •ecks oppoſed to the powers of the Preſident, the enemies of •e Conſtitution has ſounded the alarm with great violence, •on the ground of his eligibility for life. Some tell us that will be the means of his becoming the hereditary ſovereign of •e United States; whilſt others hold up to our view the dan••rs of an elective monarchy.

IT is pretty certain that the Preſident can never become the ſovereign of America, but with the voluntary conſent of the people: He is re-elected by them; not by any body of men over whom he may have gained an undue influence. No citizen of America has a fortune ſufficiently large, to enable him to raiſe and ſupport a ſingle regiment. The Preſident's ſalary will be greatly inadequate either to the purpoſe of gaining adherents, or of ſupporting a military force: He will poſſeſs no princely revenues, and his perſonal influence will be confined to his native State. Beſides, the Conſtitution has provided, that no perſon ſhall be eligible to the office, who is not thirty-five years old; and in the courſe of nature very few fathers leave a ſon who has arrived to that age. The powers of the Preſident are not kingly, any more than the enſigns of his office. He has no guards, no regalia, none of thoſe royal trappings which would ſet him apart from the reſt of his fellow citizens. Suppoſe the firſt Preſident ſhould be continued for life: What expectations can any man in the Union have to ſucceed him, except ſuch as are grounded upon the popularity of his character?

NONE of its citizens poſſeſs diſtinct principalities, from whence money may be drawn to purchaſe, or armies raiſed to intimidate the votes. Fortunately for America, ſhe has no neighbouring Princeſs to interfere in her elections, or her councils: No Empreſs of Ruſſia to place the Crown upon the head of her favorite Powniotowſky.

IT has alſo been objected, that a Council of State ought to have been aſſigned the Preſident. The want of it, is, in my apprehenſion, a perfection rather than a blemiſh. What purpoſe would ſuch a Council anſwer, but that of diminiſhing, or annihilating the reſponſibility annexed to the character of the Preſident. From the ſuperiority of his talents, or the ſuperior dignity of his place, he would probably acquire an undue influence over, and might induce a majority of them to adviſe meaſures injurious to the welfare of the States, at the ſame time that he would have the means of ſheltering himſelf from impeachment, under that majority. I will here once for all obſerve, that deſcended as we are from the Engliſh, converſant as we are in the political hiſtory of that country, it is impoſſible not to derive both political opinions, and prejudices, from that ſource. The objectors probably conſidered, that as in the Engliſh government, the firſt Magiſtrate has a Council of State; there ſhould be one alſo in the American. But they ſhould at the ſame time have recollected, that the King of England is not perſonnally reſponſible for his conduct; but that her Conſtitution looks up to his Miniſters, that is, to his Council, to anſwer for the meaſures of the Sovereign. But in the American Conſtitution, the firſt Magiſtrate is the efficient Miniſter of the people, and as ſuch, ought to be alone reſponſible for his conduct. Let him act purſuant to the dictates of his own judgment; let him adviſe with his friends; let him •onſult thoſe of whom he has the higheſt opinion for wiſdom; but let not his reſponſibility be diminiſhed by giving him a Council.

The Congreſs may determine the time of chuſing the Electors, and the day on which they ſhall give their votes; which day ſhall 〈◊〉 the ſame throughout the United States.

No perſon, except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States, at the time of the adoption of this Conſtitution, ſhall be eligible to the office of Preſident; neither ſhall any per••• be eligible to that office who ſhall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a reſident within 〈◊〉 United States.

In caſe of the removal of the Preſident from office, or of his death, reſignation, or inability to diſcharge the powers and duties of the ſaid office, the ſame ſhall devolve on the Vice-Preſident; and the Congreſs may by law provide for the caſe of removal, death, reſignation, or inability, both of the Preſident and Vice-Preſident, declaring what officer ſhall then •ct word• Preſident, and ſuch officer ſhall act accordingly, until the diſability be removed, or a Preſident ſhall be elected.

The Preſident ſhall, at ſtated times, receive for his ſervices, a compenſation, which ſhall neither be increaſed nor diminiſhed during the period for which he ſhall have been elected, and he ſhall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enters on the execution of his office, he ſhall take the following oath or affirmation: I do ſolemnly ſwear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of Preſiden of the United States, and will, to the beſt of my ability, preſerve, protect, and defend, the Conſtitution of the United States.

THE firſt of theſe clauſes is intended to prevent intrigue and tumult in chuſing the Electors: And the reaſons already offered, why Congreſs ſhould have the right of altering "the times and manner of holding the elections for Senators," apply why they ſhould have the power of determining the time of chuſing Electors. The fifth is an additional check upon the Preſident.

Sect. 2. The Preſident ſhall be Commander in Chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the ſeveral States, when called into the actual ſervice of the United States: He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the Executive departments, upon any ſubject relating to the duties of their reſpective offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences againſt the United States, except in caſes of impeachment.

THE powers veſted in the Preſident by this and the ſubſequent clauſe, belong, from the nature of them, to the Executive branch of government; and could be placed in no other hands with propriety.

SO long as laws can not provide for every caſe that may happen: So long as puniſhments ſhall continue diſproportionate to crimes, the power of pardoning ſhould ſome where exiſt. With whom could this power, ſo precious to humanity, be better entruſted, than with the Preſident? An officer who, from his age and experience, will ſeldom be miſled in the exerciſe of it; and who leſs liable to the influence of prejudice and paſſion than a popular aſſembly, will moſt probably be guided by diſcretion in the uſe of it.

WHY Governor Randolph ſhould wiſh to take from him this power, at leaſt in caſes of treaſon; and why he ſhould have made a diſtinction between the power of pardoning before, and after conviction; I am at a loſs to conceive; and ſhall therefore attempt no further anſwer to an objection which appears to me, unſupported by reaſon.

He ſhall have power, by and with the advice and conſent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators preſent concur; and he ſhall nominate, and by and with the advice and conſent of the Senate, ſhall appoint Ambaſſadors, other public Miniſters and Conſuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States, whoſe appointments are not herein otherwiſe provided for, and which ſhall be eſtabliſhed by law. But the Congreſs may, by law, veſt the appointment of ſuch inferior officers, as they think proper, in the Preſident alone, in the Courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

THE Conſtitution has here leſſened the authority of the Preſident, by making the aſſent of two-thirds of the Senate neceſſary in the important caſes of making treaties, in appointing Ambaſſadors, the Judges of the Supreme Court, and the great officers of State.

WRITERS upon government have eſtabliſhed it as a maxim, that the Executive and Legiſlative authority ſhould be kept ſeparate. But the poſition ſhould be taken with conſiderable latitude. The Executive authority here given to a branch of the Legiſlature, is no novelty, in free governments. In England, the Executive, or Cabinet Council, is taken indifferently from either Houſe of Parliament. In the States of New York and Jerſey, the Senate not only act as an Executive Council, but alſo form a part of the Court of Appeals.

THE following reaſons ſuggeſt themſelves in ſupport of the propriety of veſting the Preſident and Senate with the power of making treaties.

THE Preſident is the Repreſentative of the Union: The Senate the Repreſentatives of the reſpective States. The objects of treaties muſt always be either of great national import, or ſuch as concern the States in their individual capacities; but never can concern the individual members of the State. Secrecy and diſpatch are neceſſary in making them: For without ſecrecy and diſpatch, they are ſeldom made to purpoſe. Hence ariſes the impropriety of conſulting either the Repreſentatives of the people, or the different States. If the former were conſulted, the intereſts of the ſmall States might be ſacrificed; if the latter, almoſt inſurmountable obſtacles would be thrown in the way of every negotiation.

IN the Dutch Republic the States-General are obliged to conſult their conſtituents, upon this, as upon every important occaſion, however urgent may be the neceſſity. This vice in their Federal Conſtitution has more than once brought them to the brink of ruin.

The Preſident ſhall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the receſs of the Senate, by granting commiſſions which ſhall expire at the end of their next ſeſſion.

THIS inoffenſive clauſe is made a ground of objection by Governor Randolph! I wiſh he had informed us wherefore.

Sect. 3. He ſhall from time to time give to the Congreſs information of the ſtate of the Union, and recommend to their conſideration ſuch meaſures as he ſhall judge neceſſary and expedient: He may on extraordinary occaſions, convene both Houſes, or either of them, and in caſe of diſagreement between them, with reſpect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to ſuch time as he ſhall think proper: He ſhall receive Ambaſſadors and other public Miniſters: He ſhall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and ſhall commiſſion all the officers of the United States.

THE powers given by this ſection are ſuch as in all governments, have always been, and muſt neceſſarily be, veſted in the firſt magiſtrate.

Sect. 4. The Preſident, Vice-Preſident, and all civil officers of the United States, ſhall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treaſon, bribery, or other high crimes and miſdemeanors.

THE perſons ſubject to impeachment, are the Preſident Vice-Preſident, and all civil officers of the United States, and no others.