A Native of Virginia, Article VI

All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Conſtitution, ſhall be as valid againſt the United States under this Conſtitution, as under the Confederation.

This Conſtitution, and the laws of the United States which ſhall be made in purſuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which ſhall be made, under the authority of the United States, ſhall be the ſupreme law of the land; and the Judges in every State ſhall be bound thereby; any thing in the Conſtitution or laws of any State, to the contrary notwithſtanding.

The Senators and Repreſentatives before mentioned, and the members of the ſeveral State Legiſlatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the ſeveral States, ſhall be bound by oath or affirmation, to ſupport this Conſtitution; but no religious teſt ſhall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public truſt under the United States.

THAT treaties ſhould be the ſupreme law of the land is warmly oppoſed by the enemies of the Conſtitution. This power, ſay they, may be converted to the moſt arbitrary and deſtructive purpoſes.

TREATIES ought of right to be conſidered in the light, tha• the Convention has here viewed them. For why ſhould they be made, if due obedience is not to be paid them? The negative can only be ſupported by thoſe who feel it their intereſt that they ſhould be diſregarded.

THE objects of government are protection and ſecurity Many national circumſtances may ariſe wherein theſe object cannot be effected, without the obſervance of treaties.

WHEN we conſider who it is that has the power of making treaties, the manner of his election, the checks that the Conſtitution has interpoſed to guard againſt his poſſible abuſe o• power, among which his liability to impeachment is no• the leaſt: When we conſider the ſubject matter of treatie• are always of national import, and can not affect the intereſt of individuals, we have no reaſon to fear that they will b• made improvidently, or converted into inſtruments of oppreſion: They may be unwiſe, but can never be intentionall wicked.

THIS, like every other article of the Conſtitution, was th• ſubject of long and ſerious deliberation; and it was ultimatel• and rightly determined, that as the power of making treatie• was neceſſary, it could no where ſo properly, or ſo ſafely b• placed for the intereſts of the Union as in the hands of th• Preſident: And if when made they were not to have the e•fect of law, the power of making them would be nugatory The following paſſage from Blackſtone's Commentaries, will •nd to illuſtrate this ſubject, "It is alſo," ſays that elegant •ommentator, "the King's prerogative to make treaties, leagues, and alliances, with foreign States and Princes. For it is by the law of nations eſſential to the goodneſs of a league, that it be made by the ſovereign power, and that it is binding upon the whole community: And in England the ſovereign power, quod hoc, is veſted in the perſon of the King. Whatever contracts therefore he engages in, no other perſon in the kingdom can legally delay, reſiſt, or annul. And yet leſt this plenitude of authority ſhould be abuſed, to the detriment of the public, the Conſtitution (as was hinted before) has here interpoſed a check by means of Parliamentary impeachment, for the puniſhment of ſuch Miniſters, as from criminal motives adviſe or conclude any treaty, which ſhall afterwards be judged to derogate from the honor and intereſt of the nation." 1 Bl. p. 257. I might •e all the political writers in ſupport of the general doctrine 〈◊〉 laid down. The Convention conſidered it juſt. They •w the neceſſity of entruſting the power to the Preſident; but •oy alſo knew that in this, as in every other exerciſe of power, is the Miniſter of the people; and that whenever in making •reaty he ſhall be governed by corrupt motives, he will be •le to impeachment.

HAVING thus gone through the different articles of the Con••ution. I will now endeavour to anſwer two other objections 〈◊〉 have been made to it. The firſt is, "that the liberty of 〈◊〉 preſs is not ſecured." The ſecond, "that it will annihilate 〈◊〉 dependence of the different States."

ON the firſt objection I ſhall only obſerve, that as the Con••• can claim the exerciſe of no right which is not expreſsly 〈◊〉 them by this Conſtitution; they will have no power to reſtrain the preſs in any of the States; and therefore it would have been improper to have taken any notice of it. The article reſpecting the habeas corpus act corroborates this doctrine. The Convention were ſenſible that a federal government would no more have the right of ſuſpending that uſeful law, without the conſent of the States, than that of reſtraining the liberty of the preſs: But at the ſame time they knew that circumſtances might ariſe to render neceſſary the ſuſpenſion of the habeas corpus act, and therefore they require of the States, that they will veſt them with that power, whenever thoſe circumſtances ſhall exiſt. But they alſo knew, that no circumſtances could make it neceſſary that the liberty of the preſs ſhould be entruſted to them, and therefore they judged it impertinent to introduce the ſubject. But ſtill there are fears for the diſtrict which may become the ſeat of Congreſs, and which may be ten miles ſquare.

CAN it be for a moment ſuppoſed, that Congreſs will not preſerve the liberty of the preſs in the government of that diſtrict? Or that there exiſt American citizens ſo loſt to a ſenſe of liberty, as to reſide under a govenment where it ſhall be taken away?

AS to the other objection, I will admit, that by this Conſtitution, the ſeveral States will be abridged of ſome of their powers; but of no more than are neceſſary to make a ſtrong federal government. Sufficient ſtill remains with the State Legiſlatures to preſerve the quiet, liberty, and welfare, of their citizens. To them is left the whole domeſtic government of the States; they may ſtill regulate the rules of property, the rights of perſons, every thing that relates to their internal police, and whatever effects neither foreign affairs nor the rights of the other States. Powers weighty enough to be entruſted to moſt men; and which good and modeſt men would think ſufficient to be entruſted to them. Beſides we ſhould remember that every State has its proportionate ſhare in the national government; and that the Conſtitution has not only guaranteed to them a republican form, but has made their independence neceſſary to its own exiſtence.

THE adoption of this government will not only preſerve our Union, and thereby ſecure our internal happineſs; but will reſtore that conſequence and reſpectability abroad, which have been loſt ſince the days of Saratoga and York. The firm confederation of thirteen States, inhabiting a fertile ſoil, and growing rapidly in population and ſtrength, will give them an importance in the world, which they never can acquire when diſunited: And we are aſſured from the beſt authority, that the link of the preſent Union is but a thread. An energetic government will give a ſpring to every thing: New life will be •nfuſed throughout the American ſyſtem. Our credit will be •eſtored; becauſe the propoſed Conſtitution at the ſame time •hat it will give us vigour, will inſpire foreign nations with a confidence in us. The reſtoration of credit, will be the revival of commerce. The ſound of the hammer will be again heard in our ports. The ocean will once more be covered with our ſhips, and the flag of the United States be reſpected by the nations.

BUT once diſunited, theſe bright proſpects immediately va•iſh• Our weſtern hemiſphere is clouded over; and deſtructive ſtorms ariſe. Our inactivity and torpor produced by th• relaxation of our laws will become inveterate, unleſs our internal quarrels ſhall rouſe us into action; the ſeeds of whic• have been long ſown, and diſunion will make the harve plentiful. Maſſachuſetts and New-Hampſhire have more tha• a pretext of quarrel in their pretenſions to the province • Main; and their mutual interference in the fiſheries will ſ••• to increaſe the diſpute. Connecticut and New-York may ••vive their old quarrel reſpecting boundaries. Pennſylvan•• will not forget that the territory of Delaware was once unit• to her; and will probably caſt thither a longing eye. Ma• land and Virginia may diſpute the right to the Shores of P•• towmack, and the latter may readily revive with Pennſyl••nia, the old diſpute reſpecting the northern boundings: 〈◊〉 diſpute which terminated unfavourably to Virginia, and wh• from the peculiarity of it, was difficult to ſettle. When ſuch cauſes of diſſention, we add the commercial regulatio• of the individual States, the ambitious views of their leads and the ill-grounded, though rooted, prejudices of the wh• have we not abundant reaſon to fear the moſt ſerious calam•ties from a diſunion? Then will open a new ſcene in A••rica; the ſword is then drawn not againſt foreign foes, 〈◊〉 againſt each other: The ſword is then drawn never to ſheathed, till ſome State more powerful or more fortun• than the reſt, ſhall ſubjugate the whole.

EXAMINE then, my countrymen, diſpaſſionately the p••poſed plan of federal government, and you will find that far from being full of defects, it is a ſyſtem well calculated preſerve the liberty, and enſure the happineſs of Ame• and that it reflects additional honor on the names of a D•ck• •n, a Franklin, and a Waſhington. You can not for a mo•ent ſuppoſe that ſuch men would deceive you! If human •ature were capable of falling at once from the height of vir•e to the depth of depravity; even then you were ſafe—for ••ey could conſtruct no government which would oppreſs you, ••at would not equally oppreſs themſelves, and their poſterity.