Edmund Randolph, Letter of October 10, 1787

THE Conſtitution, which I incloſed to the General Aſſembly in a late official letter, appears without my ſignature. This circumſtance, although trivial in its own nature, has been rendered rather important to myſelf at leaſt, by being miſunderſtood by ſome, and miſrepreſented by others —As I diſdain to conceal the reaſons for with-holding my ſubſcription, I have always been, ſtill am, and ever ſhall be, ready to proclaim them to the world. To the legiſlature therefore, by whom I was deputed to the Foederal Convention, I beg leave now to addreſs them; affecting no indifference to public opinion, but reſolved not to court it by an unmanly ſacrifice of my own judgment.

As this explanation will involve a ſummary, but general review of our foederal ſituation, you will pardon me, I truſt, although I ſhould tranſgreſs the uſual bounds of a letter.

Before my departure for the Convention, I believed, that the confederation was not ſo eminently defective, as it had been ſuppoſed. But after I had entered into a free communication with thoſe, who were beſt informed of the condition and intereſt of each ſtate; after I had compared the intelligence derived from them, with the properties which ought to characterize the government of our union, I became perſuaded, that the confederation was deſtitute of every energy, which a conſtitution of the United States ought to poſſeſs.

For the objects propoſed by its inſtitution were, that it ſhould be a ſhield againſt foreign hoſtility, and a firm reſort againſt domeſtic commotion: that it ſhould cheriſh trade, and promote the proſperity of the ſtates under its care.

But theſe are not among the attributes of our preſent union. Severe experience under the preſſure of war—a ruinous weakneſs, manifeſted ſince the return of peace—and the contemplation of thoſe dangers, which darken the future proſpect, have condemned the hope of grandeur and of ſafety under the auſpices of the confederation.

In the exigencies of war indeed the hiſtory of its effects is ſhort; the final ratification having been delayed until the beginning of the year 1781. But howſoever ſhort, this period is diſtinguiſhed by melancholy teſtimonies, of its inability to maintain in harmony the ſocial intercourſe of the ſtates, to defend Congreſs againſt incroachments on their rights, and to obtain by requiſitions ſupplies to the foederal treaſury or recruits to the foederal armies. I ſhall not attempt an enumeration of the particular inſtances; but leave to your own remembrance and the records of Congreſs, the ſupport of theſe aſſertions.

In the ſeaſon of peace too not many years have elapſed; and yet each of them has produced fatal examples of delinquency, and ſometimes of pointed oppoſition to foederal duties. To the various remonſtrances of Congreſs I appeal for a gloomy, but unexaggerated narrative of the injuries, which our faith, honor and happineſs have ſuſtained by the failures of the ſtates.

But theſe evils are paſt; and ſome may be lead by an honeſt zeal to conclude, that they cannot be repeated. Yes, ſir; they will be repeated as long as the confederation exiſts, and will bring with them other miſchiefs, ſpringing from the ſame ſource, which cannot be yet foreſeen in their full array of terror.

If we examine the conſtitutions, and laws of the ſeveral ſtates, it is immediately diſcovered, that the law of nations is unprovided with ſanctions in many caſes, which deeply affect public dignity and public juſtice. The letter, however of the confederation does not permit Congreſs to remedy theſe defects, and ſuch an authority, although evidently deducible from its ſpirit, cannot, without a violation of the ſecond article, be aſſumed. Is it not a political phaenomenon, that the head of the confederacy ſhould be doomed to be plunged into war, from its wretched impotency to check offences againſt this law? And ſentenced to witneſs in unavailing anguiſh the infraction of their engagements to foreign ſovereigns?

And yet this is not the only grievous point of weakneſs. After a war ſhall be inevitable, the requiſitions of Congreſs for quotas of men or money, will again prove unproductive and fallacious. Two cauſes will always conſpire to this baneful conſequence.

1. No government can be ſtable, which hangs on human inclination alone, unbiaſſed by the fear of coercion; and 2. from the very connection between ſtates bound to proportionate contributions,—jealouſies and ſuſpicions naturally ariſe, which at leaſt chill the ardor, if they do not excite the murmurs of the whole. I do not forget indeed, that by one ſudden impulſe our part of the American continent has both thrown into a military poſture, and that in the earlier annals of the war, our armies marched to the field on the mere recommendations of Congreſs But ought we to argue from a conteſt, thus ſignalized by the magnitude of its ſtake, that as often as a flame ſhall be hereafter kindled, the ſame enthuſiaſm will fill our legions? or renew them, as they may be thined by loſſes?

If not, where ſhall we find protection? Impreſſions, like thoſe, which prevent a compliance with requiſitions of regular forces, will deprive the American republic of the ſervices of militia. But let us ſuppoſe, that they are attainable, and acknowledge, as I always ſhall, that they are the natural ſupport of a free government. When it is remembered, that in their abſence agriculture muſt languiſh; that they are not habituated to military expoſures and the rigor of military diſcipline, and that the neceſſity of holding in readineſs ſucceſſive detachments, carries the expence far beyond that of inliſtments—this reſource ought to be adopted with caution.

As ſtrongly too am I perſuaded, that requiſitions for money will not be more cordially received. For beſides the diſtruſt, which would prevail with reſpect to them alſo; beſides the opinion, entertained by each ſtate of its own liberality and unſatisfied demands againſt the United States, there is another conſideration, not leſs worthy of attention. The firſt rule for determining each quota was the value of all land granted or ſurveyed, and of the buildings and improvements thereon. It is no longer doubted, that an equitable, uniform mode of eſtimating that value, is impracticable; and therefore twelve ſtates have ſubſtituted the number of inhabitants under certain limitations, as the ſtandard according to which money is to be furniſhed. But under the ſubſiſting articles of the union, the aſſent of the thirteenth ſtate is neceſſary, and has not yet been given. This 〈◊〉 of itſelf leſſen the hope of procuring a revenue for foederal uſes; and the miſcarriage of the impoſt almoſt rivets our deſpondency.

Amidſt theſe diſappointments, it would afford ſome conſolation, if when rebellion ſhall threaten any ſtate, an ultimate aſylum could be found under the wing of Congreſs. But it is at leaſt equivocal, whether they can intrude forces into a ſtate, rent aſunder by civil diſcord, even with the pureſt ſolicitude for our foederal welfare, and on the moſt urgen intreaties of the ſtate itſelf. Nay the very allowance of this power would be pageantry alone, from the want of money and of men.

To theſe defects of Congreſſional power, the hiſtory of man has ſubjoined others, not leſs alarming. I earneſtly pray, that the recollection of common ſufferings, which terminated in common glory, may check the ſallies of violence, and perpetuate mutual friendſhip between the ſtates. But I cannot preſume, that we are ſuperior to thoſe unſocial paſſions, which under like circumſtances have infeſted more ancient nations. I cannot preſume, that through all time, in the daily mixture of American citizens with each other, in the conflicts for commercial advantages, in the diſcontents, which the neighborhood of territory has been ſeen to engender in other quarters of the globe, and in the efforts of faction and intrigue—thirteen diſtinct communities under no effective ſuperintending controul (as the United States confeſſedly now are notwithſtanding the bold terms of the confederation) will avoid a hatred to each other deep and deadly.

In the proſecution of this inquiry we ſhall find the general proſperity to decline under a ſyſtem thus unnerved. No ſooner is the merchant prepared for foreign ports with the treaſures, which this new world kindly offers to his acceptance, than it is announced to him, that they are ſhut againſt American ſhipping, or opened under oppreſſive regulations. He urges Congreſs to a counter-policy, and is anſwered only by a condolence on the general misfortune. He is immediately ſtruck with the conviction, that until excluſion ſhall be oppoſed to excluſion and reſtriction to reſtriction, the American flag will be diſgraced. For who can conceive, that thirteen legiſlatures, viewing commerce under different relations, and fancying themſelves, diſcharged from every obligation to concede the ſmalleſt of their commercial advantages for the benefit of the whole, will be wrought into a concert of action in defiance of every prejudice? Nor is this all:—Let the great improvements be recounted, which have inriched and illuſtrated Europe: Let it be noted, how few thoſe are, which will be abſolutely denied to the United States, comprehending within their boundaries the choiceſt bleſſings of climate, ſoil and navigable waters; then let the moſt ſanguine patriot baniſh, if he can, the mortifying belief, that all theſe muſt ſleep, until they ſhall be rouſed by the vigour of a national government.

I have not exemplified the preceding remarks by minute details; becauſe they are evidently fortified by truth, and the conſciouſneſs of United America. I ſhall therefore no longer deplore the unfitneſs of the confederation to ſecure our peace; but proceed, with a truly unaffected diſtruſt of my own opinions, to examine what order of powers the government of the United States ought to enjoy? how they ought to be defended againſt incroachment? whether they can be interwoven in the confederation without an alteration of its very eſſence? or muſt be lodged in new hands? ſhewing at the ſame time the convulſions, which ſeem to await us from a diſſolution of the union or partial confederacies.

To mark the kind and degree of authority, which ought to be confided to the government of the United States is no more than to reverſe the deſcription, which I have already given, of the defects of the confederation.

From thence it will follow, that the operations of peace and war will be clogged without regular advances of money, and that theſe will be ſlow indeed, if dependent on ſupplication alone. For what better name do requiſitions deſerve, which may be evaded or oppoſed, without the fear of coercion? But although coercion is an indiſpenſable ingredient, it ought not to be directed againſt a ſtate, as a ſtate; it being impoſſible to attempt it except by blockading the trade of the delinquent, or carrying war into its bowels. Even if theſe violent ſchemes were eligible, in other reſpects both of them might perhaps be defeated by the ſcantineſs of the public cheſt; would be tardy in their complete effect, as the expence of the land and naval equipments muſt be firſt reimburſed; and might drive the proſcribed ſtate into the deſperate reſolve of inviting foreign alliances. Againſt each of them lie ſeparate unconquerable objections. A blockade is not equally applicable to all the ſtates, they being differently circumſtanced in commerce and in ports; nay an excommunication from the privileges of the union would be vain, becauſe every regulation or prohibition may be eaſily eluded under the rights of American citizenſhip, or of foreign nations. But how ſhall we ſpeak of the intruſion of troops? ſhall we arm citizens againſt cititizens, and habituate them to ſhed kindred blood? ſhall we riſque the inflicting of wounds, which will generate a rancour never to be ſubdued? would there be no room to fear, that an army accuſtomed to ſight, for the eſtabliſhment of authority, would ſalute an emperor of their own? Let us not bring theſe things into jeopardy. Let us rather ſubſtitute the ſame proceſs, by which individuals are compelled to contribute to the government of their own ſtates. Inſtead of making requiſitions to the legiſlatures, it would appear more proper, that taxes ſhould he impoſed by the foederal head, under due modifications and guards: that the collectors ſhould demand from the citizens their reſpective quotas, and be ſupported as in the collection of ordinary taxes.

It follows too, that, as the general government will be reſponſible to foreign nations, it ought to he able to annul any offenſive meaſure, or inforce any public right. Perhaps among the topics on which they may be aggrieved or complain, the commercial intercourſe, and the manner, in which contracts are diſcharged, may conſtitute the principal articles of clamour.

It follows too, that the general government ought to be the ſupreme arbiter for adjuſting every contention among the ſtates. In all their connections therefore with each other, and particularly in commerce, which will probably create the greateſt diſcord, it ought to hold the reins

It follows too, that the general government ought to protect each ſtate againſt domeſtic as well as external violence.

And laſtly it follows, that through the general government alone can we ever aſſume the rank, to which we are entitled by our reſources and ſituation.

Should the people of America ſurrender theſe powers, they can be paramount to the conſtitutions, and ordinary acts of legiſlation, only by being delegated by them. I do not pretend to affirm, but I venture to believe, that if the confederation had been ſolemnly queſtioned in oppoſition to our conſtitution or even to one of our laws, poſterior to it, it muſt have given way. For never did it obtain with us a higher ratification, than a reſolution of Aſſembly in the daily form.

This will be one ſecurity againſt incroachment. But another not leſs effectual is, to exclude the individual ſtates from any agency in the national government, as far as it may be ſafe, and their interpoſition may not be abſolutely neceſſary.

But now, fir, permit me to declare, that in my humble iudgment the powers by which alone the bleſſings of a general government can be accompliſhed, cannot be interwoven in the confederation without a change of its very eſſence; or in other words, that the confederation muſt be thrown aſide. This is almoſt demonſtrable from the inefficacy of requiſitions and from the neceſſity of converting them into acts of authority. My ſuffrage, as a citizen, is alſo for additional powers. But to whom ſhall we commit theſe acts of authority, theſe additional powers? To Congreſs?—When I formerly lamented the defects in the juriſdiction of Congreſs, I had no view to indicate any other opinion, than that the foederal head ought not to be ſo circumſcribed. For free as I am at all times to profeſs my reverence for that body, and the individuals, who compoſe it, I am yet equally free to make known my averſion to repoſe ſuch a truſt in a tribunal ſo conſtituted. My objections are not the viſions of theory, but the reſult of my own obſervation in America, and of the experience of others abroad. 1. The legiſlative and executive are concentred in the ſame perſons. This, where real power exiſts, muſt eventuate in tyranny. 2. The repreſentation of the ſtates bears no proportion to their importance. This is an unreaſonable ſubjection of the will of the majority to that of the minority. 3. The mode of election and the liability to be recalled may too often render the delegates rather partizans of their own ſtates, than repreſentatives of the union. 4. Cabal and intrigue muſt conſequently gain an aſcendancy in a courſe of years. 5. A ſingle houſe of legiſlation will ſome times be precipitate, perhaps paſſionate. 6. As long as ſeven ſtates are required for the ſmalleſt, and nine for the greateſt votes, may not foreign influence at ſome future day inſinuate itſelf, ſo as to interrupt every active exertion? 7. To crown the whole, it is ſcarcely within the verge of poſſibility, that ſo numerous an aſſembly ſhould acquire that ſecrecy, diſpatch, and vigour, which are the teſt of excellence in the executive department.

My inference from theſe facts and principles is, that the new powers muſt be depoſited in a new body, growing out of a conſolidation of the union, as far as the circumſtances of the ſtates will allow. Perhaps, however, ſome may meditate its diſſolution, and others partial 〈…〉

The firſt is an idea awful indeed and irreconcileable with a very early, and hitherto uniform conviction, 〈◊〉 without union we muſt be undone. For before the voice of war was heard, the pulſe of the then colonies was tried and found to beat in uniſon. The 〈◊〉 labour of our enemies was to divide, and the policy of every Congreſs to bind us together. But in no example was this truth more clearly diſplayed, than in the prudence, with which independence was unfolded to the ſight, and in the forbearance to declare it, until America almoſt unanimouſly called for it. After we had thus launched into troubles, never before explored, and in the hour of heavy diſtreſs, the remembrance of our ſocial ſtrength not only forbade deſpair, but drew from Congreſs the moſt illuſtrious repetition of their ſettled purpoſe to deſpiſe all terms, ſhort of independence.

Behold then, how ſucceſsful and glorious we have been, while we acted in fraternal concord. But let us diſcard the illuſion, that by this ſucceſs and this glory the creſt of danger has irrecoverably fallen. Our governments are yet too youthful to have acquired ſtability from habit. Our very quiet depends upon the duration of the union. Among the upright and intelligent, few can read without emotion the future fate of the ſtates, if ſevered from each other. Then ſhall we learn the full weight of foreign intrigue—Then ſhall we hear of partitions of our country. If a prince, inflamed by the luſt of conqueſt, ſhould uſe one ſtate, as the inſtrument of enſlaving others— if every ſtate is to be wearied by perpetual alarms, and compelled to maintain large military eſtabliſhments—if all queſtions are to be decided by an appeal to arms, where a difference of opinion cannot be removed by negotiation— in a word, if all the direful misfortunes, which haunt the peace of rival nations, are to triumph over the land—for what have we contended? Why have we exhauſted our wealth? Why have we baſely betrayed the heroic martyrs of the federal cauſe?

But dreadful as the total diſſolution of the union is to my mind, I entertain no leſs horror at the thought of partial confederacies. I have not the leaſt ground for ſuppoſing, that an overture of this kind would be liſtened to by a ſingle ſtate; and the preſumption is, that the politics of the greater part of the ſtates flow from the warmeſt attachment to an union of the whole. If however a leſſer confederacy could be obtained, by Virginia, let me conjure my countrymen well to weigh the probable conſequences, before they attempt to form it.

On ſuch an event, the ſtrength of the union would be divided into two or perhaps three parts. Has it ſo increaſed ſince the war as to be diviſible?—and yet remain ſufficient for our happineſs?

The utmoſt limit of any partial confederacy, which Virginia could expect to form, would comprehend only the three ſouthern ſtates, and her neareſt northern neighbour. But they, like ourſelves, are diminiſhed in their real force, by the mixture of an unhappy ſpecies of population.

Again may I aſk, whether the opulence of the United States has been augmented ſince the war? This is anſwered in the negative by a load of debt, and the declenſion of trade.

At all times muſt a ſouthern confederacy ſupport ſhips of war, and ſoldiery. As ſoon would a navy move from the foreſt, and an army ſpring from the earth, as ſuch a confederacy, indebted, impoveriſhed in its commerce, and deſtitute of men, could, for ſome years at leaſt provide an ample defence for itſelf.

Let it not be forgotten, that nations, which can inforce their rights, have large claims againſt the United States, and that the creditor may inſiſt on payment from any one of them. Which of them would probably be the victim? The moſt productive and the moſt expoſed. When vexed by repriſals or war, the ſouthern ſtates will ſue for alliances on this continent or beyond ſea. If for the former, the neceſſity of an union of the whole is decided. If for the latter, America will, I fear, re-act the ſcenes of confuſion and bloodſhed, exhibited among moſt of thoſe nations, which have, too late, repented the folly of relying on auxiliaries.

Two or more confederacies cannot but be competitors for power. The ancient friendſhip between the citizens of America, being thus cut off, bitterneſs and hoſtility will ſucceed in its place. In order to prepare againſt ſurrounding danger, we ſhall be compelled to veſt ſomewhere or other power approaching near to a military government.

The annals of the world have abounded ſo much with inſtances of a divided people, being a prey to foreign influence, that I ſhall not reſtrain my apprehenſions of it, ſhould our union be torn aſunder. The opportunity of inſinuating it will be multiplied in proportion to the parts, into which we may be broken.

In ſhort, ſir, I am fatigued with ſummoning up to my imagination the miſeries, which will harraſs the United States, if torn from each other, and which will not end, until they are ſuperſeded by freſh miſchiefs under the yoke of a tyrant.

I come therefore to the laſt and perhaps only refuge in our difficulties, a conſolidation of the union, as far as circumſtances will permit. To fulfil this deſirable object, the conſtitution was framed by the Foederal Convention. A quorum of eleven ſtates, and the only member from a twelfth have ſubſcribed it; Mr. MASON of Virginia, Mr. GERRY of Maſſachuſetts and myſelf having refuſed to ſubſcribe.

Why I refuſed, would, I hope, be ſolved to the ſatisfaction of thoſe, who know me, by ſaying that a ſenſe of duty commanded me thus to act. It commanded me, ſir, For believe me, that no event of my life ever occupied more of my reflection. To ſubſcribe ſeemed to offer no inconſiderable gratification; ſince it would have preſented me to the world, as a fellow-labourer with the learned and zealous ſtateſmen of America. But it was far more intereſting to my feelings, that I was about to differ from three of my colleagues; one of whom is, to the honor of the country, which he has ſaved, imboſomed in their affections, and can receive no praiſe from the higheſt luſtre of language; the other two of whom have been long inrolled among the wiſeſt and beſt lovers of the commonwealth; and the unſhaken and intimate friendſhip of all of whom I have ever prized, and ſtill do prize, as among the happieſt of all my acquiſitions. I was no ſtranger to the reigning partiality for the members, who compoſed the convention; and had not the ſmalleſt doubt, that from this cauſe, and from the ardor for a reform of government, the firſt applauſes at leaſt would be loud, and profuſe. I ſuſpected too, that there was ſomething in the human breaſt, which for a time would be apt to conſtrue a temperateneſs in politicks into an enmity to the union. Nay I plainly foreſaw, that in the diſſenſions of parties, a middle line would probably be interpreted into a want of enterprize and deciſion. But theſe conſiderations, how ſeducing ſoever, were feeble opponents to the ſuggeſtions of my conſcience. I was ſent to exerciſe my judgment, and to exerciſe it was my fixed determination; being inſtructed by even an imperfect acquaintance with mankind, that ſelf approbation is the only true reward, which a political career can beſtow, and that popularity would have been but another name for perfidy, if to ſecure it, I had given up the freedom of thinking for myſelf.

It would have been a peculiar pleaſure to me, to have aſcertained, before I left Virginia, the temper and genius of my fellow citizens, conſidered relatively to a government, ſo ſubſtantially differing from the confederation, as that, which is now ſubmitted. But this was for many obvious reaſons impoſſible: and I was thereby deprived of what I thought the neceſſary guides.

I ſaw however that the confederation was tottering from its own weakneſs, and that the fitting of the convention was a ſignal of its total inſufficiency. I was therefore ready to aſſent to a ſcheme of government, which was propoſed, and which went beyond the limits of the confederation, believing, that without being too extenſive it would have preſerved our tranquility, until that temper and that genius ſhould be collected.

But when the plan which is now before the General Aſſembly, was on its paſſage through the convention, I moved, that the ſtate-conventions ſhould be at liberty to amend, and that a ſecond general Convention ſhould be holden to diſcuſs the amendments, which ſhould be ſuggeſted by them. This motion was in ſome meaſure juſtified by the manner, in which the confederation was forwarded originally, by Congreſs to the ſtate-legiſlatures, in many of which amendments were propoſed, and thoſe amendments were afterwards examined in Congreſs. Such a motion was doubly expedient here, as the delegation of ſo much more power was ſought for. But it was negatived. I then expreſſed my unwillingneſs to ſign. My reaſons were the following.

1. It is ſaid in the reſolutions, which accompany the conſtitution, that it is to be ſubmitted to a convention of Delegates, choſen in each ſtate by the people there of, for their aſſent and ratification. The meaning of theſe terms is allowed univerſally to be, that the Convention muſt either adopt the conſtitution in the whole, or reject it in the whole, and is poſitively forbidden to amend. If therefore I had ſigned, I ſhould have felt myſelf bound to be ſilent as to amendments, and to endeavor to ſupport the conſtitution without the correction of a letter. With this conſequence before my eyes and with a determination to attempt an amendment, I was taught by a regard for conſiſtency not to ſign.

2. My opinion always was, and ſtill is, that every citizen of America, let the criſis be what it may, ought to have a full opportunity to propoſe through his repreſentatives any amendment, which in his apprehenſion tends to the public welfare—By ſigning I ſhould have contradicted this ſentiment.

3. A conſtitution ought to have the hearts of the people on its ſide. But if at a future day it ſhould be burthenſome, after having been adopted in the whole, and they ſhould inſinuate, that it was in ſome meaſure forced upon them, by being confined to the ſingle alternative of taking or rejecting it altogether, under my impreſſions and with my opinions I ſhould not be able to juſtify myſelf had I ſigned.

4. I was always ſatisfied, as I have now experienced, that this great ſubject, would be placed in new lights and attitudes by the criticiſm of the world, and that no man can aſſure himſelf, how a conſtitution will work for a courſe of years, until at leaſt he ſhall have heard the obſervations of the people at large. I alſo fear more from inaccuracies in a conſtitution, than from groſs errors in any other compoſition; becauſe our deareſt intereſts are to be regulated by it, and power, if looſely given, eſpecially where it will be interpreted with great latitude, may bring ſorrow in its execution. Had I ſigned with theſe ideas, I ſhould have virtually ſhut my ears againſt the information, which I ardently deſired.

5. I was afraid, that if the Conſtitution was to be ſubmitted to the people, to be wholly adopted or wholly rejected by them, they would not only reject it, but bid a laſting farewell to the union. This formidable event I wiſhed to avert, by keeping myſelf free to propoſe amendments, and thus, if poſſible, to remove the obſtacles to an effectual government. But it will be aſked, whether all theſe arguments were not well weighed in Convention. They were, ſir, and with great candor. Nay, when I called to mind the reſpectability of thoſe, with whom I was aſſociated, I almoſt loſt confidence in theſe principles. On other occaſions I ſhould chearfully have yielded to a majority; on this the fate of thouſands, yet unborn, enjoined me not to yield, until I was convinced—

Again may I be aſked, why the mode pointed out in the Conſtitution for its amendment, may not be a ſufficient ſecurity againſt its imperfections, without now arreſting it in its progreſs?—My anſwers are, 1. that it is better to amend, while we have the Conſtitution in our power, while the paſſions of deſigning men are not yet enliſted and while a bare majority of the ſtates may amend, than to wait for the uncertain aſſent of three fourths of the ſtates. 2. That a bad feature in government becomes more and more fixed every day. 3. That frequent changes of a Conſtitution even if practicable ought not 〈◊〉 be wiſhed, but avoided as much as poſſible: and 4. That in the preſent caſe it may by queſtionable, whether, after the particular advantages of its operation ſhall be diſcerned, three fourths of the ſtates can be induced to amend.

I confeſs, that it is no eaſy taſk, to deviſe a ſcheme which ſhall be ſuitable to the views of all. Many expedients have occurred to me, but none of them appear leſs exceptionable than this: that if our Convention ſhould chooſe to amend, another federal Convention be recommended: that in that federal Convention the amendments propoſed by this or any other ſtate, be diſcuſſed; and if incorporated in the conſtitution or rejected, or if a proper number of the other ſtates ſhould be unwilling to accede to a ſecond Convention, the conſtitution be again laid before the ſame ſtate-conventions, which ſhall again aſſemble on the ſummons of the Executives, and it ſhall be either wholly adopted, or wholly rejected, without a further power of amendment. I count ſuch a delay, as nothing in compariſon with ſo grand an object; eſpecially too as the privilege of amending muſt terminate after the uſe of it once.

I ſhould now conclude this letter, which is already too long, were it not incumbent on me from having contended for amendments, to ſet forth the particulars, which I conceive to require correction. I undertake this with reluctance; becauſe it is remote from my intentions to catch the prejudices or prepoſſeſſions of any man. But as I mean only to manifeſt, that I have not been actuated by caprice, and now to explain every objection at full length would be an immenſe labour, I ſhall content myſelf with enumerating certain heads, in which the conſtitution is moſt repugnant to my wiſhes

The two firſt points are the equality of ſuffrage in the Senate, and the ſubmiſſion of commerce to a mere majority in the legiſlature, with no other check than the reviſion of the Preſident. I conjecture that neither of theſe things can be corrected; and particularly the former; without which we muſt have riſen perhaps in diſorder.

But I am ſanguine in hoping, that in every other, juſtly obnoxious clauſe, Virginia, will be ſeconded by a majority of the ſtates. I hope, that ſhe will be ſeconded 1. in cauſing all ambiguities of expreſſion to be preciſely explained: 2. in rendering the Preſident ineligible after a given number of years: 3. in taking from him either the power of nominating to the judiciary offices, or of filling up vacancies which therein may happen during the receſs of the ſenate, by granting commiſſions which ſhall expire at the end of their next ſeſſion: 4. in taking from him the power of pardoning for treaſon, at leaſt before conviction: 5. in drawing a line between the powers of Congreſs and individual ſtates; and in defining the former; ſo as to leave no claſhing of juriſdictions not dangerous diſputes: and to prevent the one from being ſwallowed up by the other, under the cover of general words, and implication: 6. in abridging the power of the Senate to make treaties the ſupreme laws of the land: 7. in providing a tribunal inſtead of the Senate for the impeachment of Senators: 8. in incapacitating the Congreſs to determine their own ſalaries: and 〈◊〉 in limiting and defining the judicial power.

The proper remedy muſt be conſigned to the wiſdom of the convention: and the final ſtep, which Virginia ſhall purſue, if her overtures ſhall be diſcarded, muſt alſo reſt with them.

But as I affect neither myſtery nor ſubtilty, in politics, I heſitate not to ſay, that the moſt fervent prayer of my foul is the eſtabliſhment of a firm, energetic government; that the moſt inveterate curſe, which can befal us, is a diſſolution of the union; and that the preſent moment, if ſuffered to paſs away unemployed, can never be recalled. Theſe were my opinions, while I acted as a Delegate; they ſway me, while I ſpeak as a private citizen. I ſhall therefore cling to the union, as the rock of our ſalvation, and urge Virginia to finiſh the ſalutary work, which ſhe has begun. And if after our beſt efforts for amendments they cannot be obtained, I ſcruple not to declare, (notwithſtanding the advantage, which ſuch a declaration may give to the enemies of my propoſal,) that I will, as an individual citizen, accept the conſtitution; becauſe I would regulate myſelf by the ſpirit of America.

You will excuſe me, ſir, for having been thus tedious. My feelings and duty demanded this expoſition: for through no other channel could I reſcue my omiſſion to ſign from miſrepreſentation, and in no more effectual way could I exhibit to the General Aſſembly an unreſerved hiſtory of my conduct.

I have the honor, Sir, to be, with great reſpect, your moſt obedient ſervant,