January 23, 1869

Sir, there can bo no safety while we continue the wrong. Ifone hundred and lil ty thousand black men may be disfranchised in ten States of this Union, if hundreds or thousands of naturalized citizens may be disfranchised in Rhode Island, where is the security 1 The foreigners naturalized in this country have acted under an opinion or impulse or prejudice against enfranchising the negroes; but when they see that their own class may be disfranchised, what security have they better than the negro who in Maryland is disfranchised? Some day or another the foreigners may desire to settle in South Carolina. South Carolina lias a majority of black people. Suppose they disfranchise the natives of Ireland, or Germany, or the Scandinavian States. In view of such a contingency will the foreign citizens hesitate in this crisis when they have the power to settle this great question of human rights, not for negroes merely, but for white men? To white men born in this country, to white men born in other countries and coming here, as well as to negroes, there is no security while this great wrong continues. If we fail to act, and if, sir, there be a day of retribution for our omission to do our duty, as there has been a day! of retribution for those men who omitted to[ do their duly upon another great question in-! volvlng public crime, there can be no defense! for us.

Mr. WELKEll. I desire to inquire whether! there is anything in this bill that will prevent' any of the States from requiring of voters a property or an educational qualification?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I do not suppose there is.

Mr. WELKER. Then the States may, under this bill, require such a qualification?

Mr. BOUTWKLL. 1 suppose they may. Mr. Speaker, there is a special duty which we. owe to these black people. There is a special j duty which we owe to the white people of the South. To day the blacks in the South are ii

40th Cuxg. 3d SEiS —No 36. laboring under special disadvantages due to the circumstance that in Ohio and in other States of the North their kindred are not allowed to vote. When we shall have established universal manhood suffrage for the whole country we shall have given the black people in the South a position in the affairs of their respective States which they cannot command while their race is the subject of an unjust discrimination in other States of the Union. This question goes home as well to the white people of the South. Many of this class have been before a committee of this House askingfor the removal of their political disabilities. I, for one, am not influenced by any resentment, by any malice, by any desire conceivable to myself, to delay for one moment their restoration to all the rights they formerly enjoyed. But, sir, I do not see how this House or this country can consent to relieve these men from their disabilities while those with whom they associate, and for whose conduct they are in some degree responsible, are oppressing our friends, the loyal men of the South.

Whenever we do justice to the black man in the North we improve his position, his capacity to take care of himself in the South. 1 know very well, from personal interviews with conservative men of the South, that to daythey are influenced in their opposition to negro suffrage by the fact that negro suffrage is not established in the old free States of the Union. The measures before us are a part of the great work of harmonizing the country, of pacifying all classes, of reconciling all interests.

Mr. Speaker, the Republican party must, abide the judgment of posterity upon what it has done, but it must still move forward and consummate the great works it has undertaken. We need only courage, a fixed purpose to be just, with economy and honesty iu administiation. Jf to preserve our power in the country we are unjust we shall become timid. ‘‘Conscience doth mike cowards of us all," and, becoming timid, the people will abandon us. Justice, honesty, economy, power on one side; injustice, timidity, ruin on the other.

Mr. BROOKS. I move the following amendments to the bill and joint resolution, ill older to carry out the principles of the gentleman from Massachusetts and to do justice to millions of women:

Strike out the word "citizens" and insert "persons;" mid insert before the word l r iou "his or her;" ami after the same word insert." sex, nativity, or age when over twelve searsto the joint resolution and bill will read as follows; Joint resolution proposing nn amendment to the

Constitution ot tho United Static.

Be it resu vctl by the. Semite told ITomc of Jlcpre ihipft of the United States, of A marina in CotU t fHH ushvinbied, (two thirds of both Houses concurring,) That the following article bo propot ed to the Legi atui es of the several States an amendment to the Con fi tution of the United States, which* when ratified by three fourths of Legislatures, shall be held as part of aid Constitution, namely:

AimoLK—.

Section 1. The right of any person of the "United States to vote shall not be dcriie l or abiid red by the United States or any State by reason of his or her race, sex, nativity, or age when over twelve years, color, or previous condition oft in very of any citizen or class ot citizens of the United States.

Sec. 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provision!* of this article. A bill to secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the United Si tto°, uud to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the amendment* to the Constitution.

Be i> enacted by the $enat>- and [fount: of Rf rchfiiin iives of the Cdiftil ^statfinof America in ori r w aisarmbled. That no State shall abridge oi deny thought of any per on of the United States to vote for elector?.! of President and Vice President of the United States, or for "Representatives m Congress, or for members ot the Legislature ot tho State in which:> he may reside, by reason of his or lier jace, color, h sex, nativity, or uge when over twelve year*, or|| previous condition of slavery; and any provisions in the iaua or constitution of any State inconsistent,| with this section aie hereby declared to be nuli and<\ void, jj Sec. 2. Andbc it farther enacted. That every person■' Livviuiiy en£ ijred ni preparing a regibtjy of voieis, or m holding or conduct nig an election ior any of the officers named in the fir t section of this act, who shall willfully refuse to register the name or to re-;! ceiv«, count, return, or otherwise give the proper j Legal effect to the vote of any person entitled to vote!; for any officer named in the first section of this act, on account of his or her racc, color, nativity, sex, or age, when over twelve years, or previous condition of slavery of such citizen, shall bo punished by a fine of not more than 4 000 or by imprisonment for not more than two years.

Sec. 3. And be it farther cnaetcd, That any person, who shall willfully hinder or obstruct, or attempt to hinder or obstruct any person on account of his or her race, sex, nativity, or age when over twelve year-, color, or the previous condition of slavery of xl 1 y citizen, hi the exercise of his right to vote for the officers n s named in the first section ol this act, shall be punished by a line of not more than 3 000 or by imprisonment for not more than one year.

SivC. h And be it further awctcd, That any person disqualified by section three ot article fourteen of the amendments to theConstituuonof thcllnited States, and from whom such disability shall not have been removed by act of Congress, who shall oxcreiso the powers and duties, of any office therein specified, shall bo deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be imprisoned and kept at hard labor for the term of two years; and an indictment for the same maybe found at any time within ten years from the commission of the offense.

Sec. 5.( And be if further enacted, That the district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses committed against this act, and the district attorneys, marshals and deputy marshals of the United_ States shall, and they are hereby specially authorized and required, at the expense of the U nited States, to institute proceedings against any person who .shall violate the provisions of this act.

The amendments were ordered to be printed. Mr. liGBlNSOST. I move the following amendments:

Injoint resolution, line nine, strike out the words citizen of the" and insert in lieu thereof" inhabitant of and who has no residence other than in."

In the bill, section one, line three, strike out the word “citizen’”’ and insert "inhabitant," and in line four, after the words" United States,”’ insert "having no residence elsewhere than in tiie United States,” The amendment was ordered to be printed.

Mr. KNOTT. Mr. Speaker, as the other provisions of this measure will no doubt bo fully and ably discussed by other gentlemen on this side of the House, I will confine myself in what 1 shall have to say, to the consideration of the fourth section of the bill, in connection with the third section of the fourteenth amendment proposed to the Constitution of the United States, under which its enactment is not only sought, to be justified, but claimed to be necessary. It is not my purpose, however, to enter into any discussion of the manner in which that amendment is said to have been rati lied. 1 shall forego any remark upon the singular political phenomenon presented in the duplex character which has been ascribed to ten States of this Union—sovereign and coequal States when the concurrence of their will has been necessary to effect an alteration in the Federal compact, but subjugated provinces, prostrate and powerless at the feet of the conqueror, when it has suited the caprice, or the interest of a majority in Congress to annul their constitutions, dissolve tlieirgovernmenls, abrogate their laws, destroy the harmony of their domestic relation-', and rob their citizens of every guarantee in the Bill of Rights, i shall say nothing of the extraordinary means resorted to by the power which proposed this amendment, to secure its ratification according; to the letter of the Constitution, and shall leave it to casuists of more subtlety and astuteness than I possess, to determine whether the spirit of that instrument, has been consulted in the employment of those means. 1 slwll not inquire whether Congress, for the purpose of procuring the formal ratification of a proposed amendment to the Fedeinl Constitution, can either justly or legally trample under foot the rights of agiven number of States, throttle their governments, suspend or destroy their constitutions, strip their electors of the habiliments of citizenship, invest others with the elective franchise, create Legislatures. subservient to its will, and compelthose Legislatures to give their assent to the amendment proposed under the penalty of having their respective States debarred from all participation whatever in the General Government, besides being deprived of the republican State governments guarantied to them in the Gonstirution.

1 shall not attempt to ex io e the sources of constitutional an thorny to ascertain whence itis claimed that the Federal Legislature derives such extraordinary powers; nor seeek to determine the effect which such a condition of moral duress should have upon the validity of an amendment to the Constitution procured in such a manner. Still less shall I undertake to say that the course pursued toward several ofthe States of this Union to compel their ratification of this amendment has been consistent in every particular with the cardinal doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, that Governments derive their, just powers from the consent of the governed. But waiving a consideration of nil these questions which have been already so often and so elaborately discussed by abler intellects than my own, I will concede for the purposes of the argument I now propose to submit that this amendment has been duly ratified in accordance with both the letter and the spirit of the Constitution, and is to all intents and purposes, as much a part of that instrument as if it had been inserted in the original draft. As such it is nothing more nor less than a part of the lex scripta—simply a portion of the written law ofthe country; no more sacred, no more binding, and no more mysterious, either in effect or construction, than any other statutory provision passed in pursuance of the Constitution, although enacted by a different power and in a different mode from those pertaining to ordinary legislation, and it is consequently subject to the same rules that apply in the interpretation of all other statutes, and to no others.

1 propose therefore to examine the third section of this amendment by the light of those long settled canons of legal interpretation, which were recognized in the earliest dawn of our system of jurisprudence, and which have been adhered to and enforced by almost every enlightened jurist who has had occasion to advert to them from that time to the present moment. These rules are of the very essence of natural reason, and strict morality. They were ordained by the Divine Power when it endowed mankind with the capacity of discriminating between right and wrong. They are indicated by the plainest dictates of simple justice; and I undertake to say, sir, that no rational and unprejudiced mind can make a fair and impartial application of them to this section, without being satisfied that it has no retrospective operation at all, that it has no reference whatever to any person who was engaged in the late rebellion against the Government of the United States, but was intended to apply to those only, who should engage iu rebellion or insurrection after its ratification. At any rate it so appears to my mind, and it is the truth of this particular proposition that I now desire to prove.

It is remarked by Dr. Lieber, in his Legal and Political Hermenutics, that "every man, or body of persons making use of words does so in order to convey a certain meaning; and to find this precise meaning is the object of all interpretation." Hence the most natural and obvious of all the rules by which the rational mind seeks to ascertain the intention of the law maker in the enactment of a particular statute, is the one so familiar to every member of the legal profession, that in construing a statute recourse must in the first instance be had to the words in which the legislative will lias expressed itself. If they are plain and unambiguous, there investigation ceases. No matter what our own feelings, or convictions as to the policy, or expediency of the law may be; no matter what conclusions extraneous consideration might lead to, we are compelled to presume that the legislator meant what his words plainly imply, and we are not at liberty to go beyond them to determine the legislative intent, unless a rigid adherence to them would result in an absurdity, or palpably conflict with the context. This principleis abundantly sustained by authority. Vattel, in discussing the rules for the intei pretation of treaties, book 2, chapter 17, section 2G2, says:

The firstgeneralinaxim of interpretation is, that it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation. When a deed is worded in clear and precise terms, when its meaning is evident and leads to no absurd conclusion, there can be no reason for refusing to admit th& meaning which, such deed naturally presents. To go elsewhere in search of conjunctures, in order to restrict or extend it, is an attempt to elude it."

The same rule was clearly, and concisely stated by the Supreme Court of the United States as a cardinal principle of legal construction in the case of the United States vs. Fisher and others, reported in 2 Granch, page 858, in this language:

Where a law is plain and unambiguous, whether itbeexpressed in genoralor limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently there is noroom left for construction."

But, sir, in all the vast number of cases, both in this country and in England, which I have examined upon this point, and which affirm the rule as I have stated it, I have nowhere found it more beautifully, more fully, or more forcibly and clearly expressed than by the court of appeals of New York in Newel vs. The People, 3 Sold., 97; from which I will read the following.

The court says in this case:

"Whether we are considering an agreement between parties a statute ora constitution with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases, is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If thus regarded, the words embody adefinite meaning which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between different parts ot the same writing; then the meaning apparent on the face of the instrument is the one which alone wo are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare, is the meaning of the instrument, and neither courts, nor Legislatures have a right to add to, or take away from that meaning." But, sir, this principle has frequently been declared by the highest judicial authority known to our Government, to apply to the Constitution of the United States, as well as to every other statute, or instrument of writing what- 'ever; for, as I said awhile ago, there is no good reason why the Constitution should be interpreted according to any other rules than those which apply to all other statute law. Chief Justice Marshall, the great original expounder of the Constitution of the United States, the splendid judicial luminary whose effulgence gilded the morning of our constitutional history and whose lingering beams will fringe the twilight of its existence, himself repeatedly so applied it. Here, in the case of Sturgis vs. Crowninshield, Wheaton, 202) he says;

It is well settled, that the spirit of the Constitution is to be respected no loss than its letter, yet that spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words, and neither the practice of legislative bodiesnor extrinsic circumstances can control its clear language."

Again, the same illustrious juristand statesman, in the later case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, (9 Wheaton, 188) says:

"As men whose intentions require no concealment, generally employ words, which most directly, and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the patriots who framed our Constitution, and the people who adopted it, must bo understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have meantwhat they said."

I might go on, sir, and cite authorities to this effect almost indefinitely; but taking it for granted that no impartial legal mind will question the correctness of the principle I have stated, that the meaning of a written law must in the first place be determined, if possible, from the words in which it is expressed, and that when they are plain, we are not at liberty to resort to extrinsic facts and circumstances to discover what the law maker might have intended, I will ask attention to the words of this particular section, and see if we cannot, without the aid of any extraneous circumstance whatever, ascertain from them the idea they were intended to convey. The section reads as follows:

"No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, Qr hold any office, civil or military, under the United States or under any State, who having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State Legislatureror as an executive or judicial! otteer of any State to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or re bellion against the same, or given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two thirds of each House, remove suoh disability."

Now, sir, if there is any obscurity in this language, it is not in the signification of the terms employed, but results, if atalf, from the great number of words which the draftsman thought it necessary to use in enumerating the several positions and offices from which certain persons shall be excluded, and the various circumstances under which such persons are, supposed to have taken an oath to support the Constitution of the United States. When the text is analyzed the words will be found to have a plain and definite meaning, about which there can be no dispute; and, sir, it should be distinctly observed that the terms here made use of to denote the tiine of the commission of the criminal act for which the guilty party is to be disfranchised under this section, are the words "shall have," for these two words afford a key by which we can determine infallibly, whether this section was intended to be an ex post facto law or, not. If in their plain and ordinary acceptation they denote an action which had taken place before the time at which they were employed in this connection, then this section was manifestly intended to operate retrospectively, but if, on the contrary, they signify, as here used, an action which is to transpire after they are made use of, then the section is as clearly prospective, and can have no reference to any one who had engaged in rebellion before it was enacted

They must, however, refer to one or the other—the past or the future. They cannot refer to both. For, sir, in every mind capable of forming a conception of time at all, there are three distinct ideas—as distinct, in fact, as three things can possibly be—under one or the other of which the mind naturally and instinctively ranges every action, event, or condition of things of which it is capable of taking notice. I mean the ideas of the past, the present, and the future; and as words are the means devised by human reason, whereby the ideas of ono mind may be clearly and distinctly manifested to another, every language spoken upon the earth must of necessity furnish signs by which these ideas of the past, the present, and the future may be unmistakably distinguished from each other, and these signs can no more be confounded with each other than the ideas themselves, if they could be, language would cease to have any definite signification, and degenerate into simply unmeaning jargon. Particularly is this true of written language, which may be said to lie crystalized thought—ideas not only manifested but fixed, and made tangibleand permanent so as to reflect themselves without extraneous aid in whatever mind may be sufficiently instructed to read them, and more especially when those ideas are designed, as in this instance, to affect the most valued interests of the citizen, and the highest concerns of society.

What then, sir, does the expression "shall have engaged," as used in this section, mean? Does it refer to an action which had taken .place before the enactment of this amendment, or to one that was to take place after its ratification? Now, if we assume that the intentions of those who proposed, as well as those who ratified this amendment required 110 concealment, that they aimed to use the words which would most directly and aptly express the ideas they intended to convey, and that they meant what they said, we are forced to the conclusion that they had no reference to past transactions at all; because if they had they would have said "no person shall be a Senator, &c., who has engaged in rebellion, &c.," or if they had intended to limit it to the late rebellion they would have said "no person shall be a Senator, Jc., wiio engaged in the late rebellion, &c.," or if they bad intended that the section should embrace both the past and the future, they would naturally have said "no person shall be a Senator, &c., who has engaged or may hereafter engage ia rebellion," &c. And in either case their language would have been so plain "that the wayfaring man, though a fool, need not err therein." The simplest child in the land could not mistake it.

But here, sir. instead of using any of these plain mid simple expressions, which the most ordinary intellect in the country could not fail to understand as relating to the past, they employ a term to express the time of the criminal action which common usage, the established practice of our best speakers and writers, the authority of every standard author upon the philosophy and etymology of the English language, and the very nature of the language itself, concur in appropriating exclusively to the expression of our ideas of future action, and which never has been, and never can be employed to denote a past transaction without violating the plainest principles of common reason. Lindley Murray, and every other standard, or even respectable writer on English grammar, tell us in substance, if not in so many words, that" shall have" is the sign of the second future tense, which "denotes a future action, or event which will be accomplished at or before the time of some other future action or event;" and I challenge the production of a solitary instance in the entire range of our standard literature in which these words "shall have" have been used convertibly with any of the past tenses. And moreover, sir, if you will search I he classic literature of any other cultivated language, ancient or modern, you will not find an instance in which the equivalent of these words has ever been used to express the idea of a past action; they always denote the future, and can no more be used to denote the past, than to morrow can be employed to signify "yesterday," or the word" black" to convey the idea of" white." It is not only idle, but insulting to the reputation of those who framed this amendment, to say that they were so ignorant of the plainest principles of our language that they could not have made this section so clearly retroactive that it could not have been misunderstood by any child ill the country if such had been their intention. To show that they could have done so if they had desired to, I would simply call attention to the very section for which this was finally adopted as a substitute. I will read it:

"Tlntil the Uii tiny of July, 1870, all persons who voluntarily adhered to the late insurrection, giving it. aid and eomloit, shall bo excluded from the right to vote for ttepre entatives ill Congress and for electors for l': evident and Vice President of the United States"

This is the language of one who had nothing to conceal, who meant, what he said—the language of Thaddeus Stevens. No one can mistake it, however simple he may be. But why, I would ask, was not the section under consideration, made to refer to the past in like pointed, plain, and unmistakable terms, if such iiad been the intention of the learned and distinguished men who framed it?

Now, had the framers of this section said "no person shall be a Senator, &c., who shall engage in rebellion, c they would have expressed their idea it is true, but not with the strictest grammatical accuracy, for the word "shall" as there used refers to the unlimited future, without reference to any other future action or condition whatever; so that a man might really be a Senator and be guilty of rebellion, both in the future, for lie might rebel after being a Senator, which although not within the intent is within the meaning of the language used. But if we will keep in mind the true definition of the second future tense, as laid down bv all our grammarians and functioned by universal usage, that the words "shall have," when prefixed to a word denoting an action, indicate that the action will take place in future, and at or before the time of some other future action; and then imagine a wise and just legislator who would frame an act to disfranchise persons guilty of rebellion, in terms of the strictest grammatical accuracy, and at the same time avoid the most unjust, odious, and detestable of all tyrannical acts, ex ■post facto or retrospective legislation, we shall find him using language like this: "No person shall be a Senator, &c., who shall have engaged in rebellion," &c. For the expression "shallhave engaged," c conveys two distinct ideas: one that the party to be disfranchised shall commit the offense for which his disqualification is to be the penalty, after the enact: of the law, and before another ftnure act or condition, namely, his offer to assume the position or office for which his offense disqualifies him.

Here, sir, it seems to me, the whole argument might rest; for if the principles I have stated be true, that men whose intentions require no concealment, will naturally imply the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, especially when those ideas are to constitute anewruleof civil action by which the highest interests of individuals and the gravest concerns of society are to be regulated and controlled, and that therefore the law-giver, where his words are plain, must be presumed to have intended what he said, regardless of whatever conclusions extraneous considerations might lead to, we are compelled to conclude that this section was intended to operate prospectively, and not as a a cx post facto enactment. There is no possible escape from this, unless we are to assume that our language—the language of Shakspeare and of Milton, of Burke and of Webster, of Locke and of Bacon, of Blackstone and of Kent, the language of poetry, of eloquence, of philosophy, and of law—after all, furnishes us no adequate means of discriminating between the past and the future, but in its exceeding paucity exhibits the pitiablo paradox of expressing two ideas as dissimilar as day and night by the use of the same term.

I must be pardoned, sir, for dwelling at such length upon a point which to the intelligent mind, it seems to me, mustbetoo obvious to demand more than a simple statement; but I have deemed it necessary in this instance, because so many highly cultivated minds have hurried to the conclusion, that this provision is ex post facto, without having apparentiy had due regard, if indeed any whatever, to the peculiar veibiage in which it. is expressed, and because 1 find, in a case to which 1 shall piesently more particularly advert, that one of the barons of the exchequer, by a singular inattention to the rudiments of our language, was led to say that the expression" shall have" referred to the past tense; while another was guilty of the still stranger inaccuracy of supposing that they expressed the idea of both the past and future; notwithstanding which, however, the court held the language to be prospective only, and not retrospective.

Jjut. sir, suppose we admit, for the sake of the argument, what is as absurd as to say that the same word may convey the idea of hot or cold, black or white, north or south, or any two opposite extremes, namely, that" shall have" may mean the past or the future, the question still recurs, which does the expression mean in this instance, the past or the future? iiad this question been asked of some proud old civilian who gloried in venerating the remnants of right and justice which had survived the wreck of the ancient republic, at a lime when the will of the prince under the despotism of the lioman empire was paramount to every obligation whatever, he would have gathered his toga around him in the conscious dignity of a just and upright man, and answered it in the language of the code:

"Leiteset constitutionos futuris certum est dare formam nesotiis, nort ad facta prmte ritarovocari nisi numimitim ct jucetcrito tempore etadlmc pendentibus ne otns cautum sit.”

Had it, been asked of Bracton, when our own system of jurisprudence was yet in its infancy, ami the great cardinal principles of right, ami justice which have since made it the pride and glory of the Anglo Saxon race, were struggling with ignorance, with despotism, and rapine and outrage of every kind, he would have answered it in the words of that maxim, which wise and conscientious jurists have esteemed a fundamental rule of construction from that time to the present moment:

iN ova ccmstitatis futuris fornmm debetimponero, non preterit is."

How, then, should it be answered by the jurist and statesman of America, who, in the advanced civilization of the nineteenth century, feels a just pride in the purity of his country s Constitution and the justice of her laws? Sir, the reply is obvious. There is something so repugnant to the commonest instincts of justice, so contrary to all our notions of morality, so revolting to every sentiment of honorable manhood, in the idea of inflicting a penalty upon our fellow man by retroactive legislation, that even to deprive him by such means of the most insignificant right has ever been regarded as the very essense of the accursed spirit of despotism. It has, therefore, become a settled rule of legal construction, steadily adhered to both in England and this country, that no law is to have a retrospective operation, unless the intention of the legislator that it should so operate appears so plainly upon the face of the statute that it cannot possibly have any other meaning. This is no now principle peculiar to the jurisprudence of this country. It. was plainly and emphatically recognized in the civil law, as is evident from the very maxim I have just quoted from the code:

It, is certain that, rho laws and constitutions are to present, a form for future, transactions, and not to be referred to matters already finished, unless specially named and [as] of a pi eeedinf? time as a caution to those wuich are yet pending —Cod L 1 tit., xiv,. sec. 7.

It was also an article in the constitution established for the French republic in 1795, that no law, criminal or civil, could have a retroactive cfl ect and the same limitation was laid down as a fundamental truth in the code in force under the sanction of the empire which succeeded, atrocious as the despotism of that empire is said to have been. It is no matter of wonder, then, that Sir Kdwnvd Coke should have reaffirmed the aphorism of Bracton, which is a substantial embodiment of the same great principle, as ho did m his commentary upon the statute of Gloucester, or that the English courts, which so frequently thrust themselves as the last, defense between the aggressions of the Government and the rights of the citizen, should have so constantly and persistently insisted upon the doctrine I have asserted as a cardinal rule of construction.

Blackstone, in his commentaries, treats it as a first principle, that all laws shall com nienee in fulu ro arid operate prospectively; and if we go back to the reign of Charles II, in 1078, we will find the court of king s bench, in the case of Giimore vt. Hhuter, unanimously refusing to give a retrospective effect to a provision in the statute of frauds, because such a construction would make the act, repugnant to common justice.

Again, if we examine the more modern case of Couch ®s. Jeffries, in -1 Burred, 1M00, we will find the same court unanimously refusing to give a retrospective effect to a statute, because by so doing they would punish the plaintiff with costs. It is true, sir, there seems to have been an apparent departure fioui the principle in one or two casesiu the Common Pleasand at JSrfsi Pritis, but those cases were all reviewed in a comparatively recent ease decided in the court of Exchequer, in which they are not only severely criticised but emphatically declared to be erroneous. I allude to the case of Moon vs. Durden, reported in the second Exchequer reports, page 22, which fully sustains the doctrine for which i contend. This was an action brought on a wager, but before the trial an act of Parliament was passed providing—

"That no suit shall he brought or maintained in any court of law or npu v i 'r recovering any money or valuable thing alleged to be won upon aiiywn?®, or which shall have been deposited in the hands oi any neison to abide the event on which any wager shall have been made."

I road the very words of the statute, sir, because, it will be observed, they present a very nearly parallel to that of the section ure are considering; and- it was contended that this statute operated to defeat the action. The court held, however, that it did not. But some of the learned barons lay down the rule I have stated so much more clearly and forcibly than I can myself, I will read from their .opinions. Baron Rolfe says, after reciting the clause, I have read from the statute:

"The effect of this clause is to make void all wagers, and to prevent the bringing or maintaining ,&riy action for the recovery of money won on any wager; and the only question is whether its operation is retrospective, so as to affect past transactions and existing suits. The general rule is stated by Lord Coke in the second Institute—" JVovaeonstitutiofutu- 1 in formam imponere debet nan proetertiii and the principle is .one of such obvious convenience and justice, that it must always bo adhered to in the construction of statutes, unless in cases where there is something on the face of the enactment putting it •fefigond doubt that the Legislature meant it to operate retrospectively."

Baron Alderson says, in the same case:

"In construing statutes the general rule, as it scorns to me, which ought to guide us in their construction is that which has boon stated. They are not to be supposed to apply to a past but a future state of circumstances."

Then further down, after giving instances in which a departure from the rule would work great mischief, he says, in conclusion:

Here, no doubt, the Legislature were desirous of putting an end to gaming and wagers; but unless the words imperatively require it, we ought not to make their prohibition retrospective, for it is contrary to the first principles of justice to punish those who have offended against no law, and surely to take away existing rights without compensation is in the nature of punishment."

t will simply pause, sir, to ask if this principle is so sacred and important that one of the most learned courts that ever graced the English bench refused to give a statute a retrospective meaning, simply because by so doing they might deprive a set of gambling sharpers of the gains of their nefarious calling, we, as statesmen, are to consider this section in such a light as to sweep away without trial, the most important rights that can pertain to the citizen ■in society?*

But, sir, a still more determined opposition, if possible, to giving ijjjitutes a retrospective effect has been manifested by the courts of this country than by those of Great Britain. The judges of the Supreme Court of the United States have several times spoken in the strongest terms of disapprobation of all retrospective laws which may affect a right. In the case of Calderaud wife vs. Bull and wife, (3 Dal., 386,) the first, I believe, in which a distinction was drawn by that court between e c post facto laws and other varieties of retrospective legislation, Mr. Justice Patterson uses this language:

/"I had an ardeufcdesiro to have extended the provision of the Constitution to retrospective laws in general, for there isneithor policy nor safety in such laws, and therefore I have always had a strong aversion against them. It may, in general, be truly observed of retrospective laws of every description that they neither accord with sound legislation nor the fundamental principles of the social compact."

And in the later case of Ogden tw Blacklege reported in 2 Crancb, page272, they considered t ie point too plain for argument that a statute could not retrospect so as to take away a vested civil right. The same doctrine was laid down by Chief justice Story in Prince vs. United States, reported in 2 Gallison, 204, and has been affirmed in a great number of cases in the supreme courts of the various States in the most unequivocal terms. For instance inMaiue in the case of Hastings vs. Lane, reported in 3 Shepley, page 134; in New Hampshire, in Woart vs. Winnick, 3 N. H., 481, and in Clark VS. Clark, 10 N. II 386 in Vermont, inBrigps vs. Hubbard, 3 Vt., 86; in Massachusetts, in Somerset vs. Dighton, 1$ Mass 383 Medford vs. Learned, 10 Mass 215 among others; in Connecticut, Perkins vs. Perkins, 7 Con., 558; Plumb vs. Sawyer, 21 Coil., 351; and severai other cases; in New York, in the case of Dash tAS VanKieek 7 John 477 Watkinsos Haight 18 John., 138; Sayer vs. Wisner, 8 Wend., 661, and quite a number of others; in Pennsylvania, in the case of Tyson vs. School Directors, 51 Penn, State R., 9. in Ohio, in the case of Allbyer vs. State, 10 Ohio 1ST. 8., Indiana, State vs. Barber, 3 Ind., 258; in Illinois in Thompson vs. Alexander, 11 Ills., 54; Price vs. Schuyler, *1 Oilman, 221; in Wisconsin, in the State vs. Atwood, 11 Wis., 422; in Iowa, in Bartruff vs. Benny, 15 Iowa, 257.

Of course, sir, I cannot in the limited time allowed me advert particularly to all of these cases, nor do I deem it necessary. I mention them merely that those who have a mind to, may examine them for themselves and see how sedulously our courts have adhered to the rule 1 am endeavoring to discuss. But there is one of them to which I will ask attention, because it has been cited as a leading case in many of the others into which the language of the distinguished judges has been copied, but mainly because the most profound and elaborate opinion in it was delivered by one of the purest men, as well as one of the most learned and upright judges that ever adorned the bench of this or any other country—a man whose memory will be revered and whose genius and acquirements will be admired as long as enlightened jurisprudence has a votary on earth. I allude to Chancellor Kent, who was then Chief Justice of the court, and the case is that of Dash vs. Van Kleek, reported in 7 Johnson, page 477.

It is not necessary that I should enter into a statement of the facts of the case, and besides I have not time if I would, but I desire to read simply the principles laid down by the learned judges, for they confirm and place beyond controversy the view for which I am now contending. Mr. Justice Thompson, after having reviewed to considerable extent the authorities upon the very point I am now endeavoring to discuss, says:

"If such bo the light in which retrospective laws ought to bo received, how unjust the imputation against the Legislature that they intend a law to be of that description unless the most clear and unequivocal expressions are adopted!"

And Chief Justice Kent says in the same case, page 502:

The very essence of a new law is a rule for future cases- The construction here contended for would make the statute operate unjustly. It would make it defeat a suit already brought upon a right already vested. This would be punishing an innocent party with costs as well as divesting luna of a previously acquired right. Nothing could be more alarming than such a subversion of principle. A statute ought never to receive such a construction, if it be susceptible of any other, and the statute before us can have a reasonable object and full operation without it. We are to presume, out of respect to the law-giver, that the statute was not meant to operate retrospectively, and if wc call to our attention the general sense of mankind on the subject of retrospective laws it will afford us the best reason to conclude that the Legislature did not intend, in this case, to set so pernicious a precedent. How can we possibly suppose that in so unimportant a case"**** the Legislature coolly meant the prostration of a principle which has become venerable for the antiquity, and the universality of its sanction and is acknowledged as an element, of jurisprudence?

"It is a principle in the English common law as ancient as the law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent Parliament is not to have a retrospective effect.

Again, further over, on page 504, he says, after reviewing the authorities furnished by the civil law:

Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed bythoPvoman prince, and the principle wo are considering is now to be regarded as sacred. It is not pretended that wo have any constitutional provision on the subject, nor have we for numerous other rightsdear alike to freedom and justice. An expost facto law, in the strict technical term, is usually understood to apply to criminal cases, and this is its meaning when used in the Constitution of the United States. Yet laws impairing previously acquired civil rights are equally within the reason of that prohibition and equally to be condemned.

"Wo have seen that the cases in the English and in the ©ml law apply td such rights; and we shall find upon further examination that there is no distinction in principle nor any recognized in practice between a law punishing a person criminally for a past ianoeen t act, or punishing him civi 1 ly by depriving him of a lawfully acquired right. The distinction consists only in the degree of the oppression, and history teaches us that the Government which can deliberately violate the one right will soon cease to regard the other. There has not been, perhaps, a distinguished jurist or elemontary writer within the last two centuries who has had occasion to take notice of introspective laws, either civil or criminal, but has mentioned them with caution, distrust, and disapprobation,"

Then further down, after a most elaborate aad critical review of the authorities upon the poii t he concludes:

"This train of authority, declaratory of the common sense and reason of the most civilized States, ancient and modern, on the point before us. is sufficient, I apprehend, to put it at rest, and to cause not only the judicial but the legislative authority to bow to such a sanction."

And ih this conclusion I presume every intelligent and impartial mind will concur.

Now, this section can have a prospective construction perfectly consistent with reason and justice, and in full harmony with the sense of all eminent and enlightened jurists for centuries past. If it is to be considered as applying only to the future, it may be with propriety regarded as a wise and just measure by which no one can be injured, for whoever shall engage in rebellion hereafter, will do so with full notice of the consequences beforehand, and if he sees proper to hazard these consequences, he can complain of no one but himself should they be visited upon him. Admitting, then, that the language of this section may be ambiguous, and may be considered as referring to the past or the future indifferently, to which, in the light of all the authority to which I have adverted, will we limit it? Will we assume to say for the Legislatures of twenty seven States of this Onion, as well as two thirds of each House of the Thirty Ninth Congress, that they deliberately intended to prostrate a great principle, recognized as one of the fundamental elements in every enlightened system of jurisprudence upon the earth, and venerable not only for its antiquity, but the universality of its sanction? And shall we do (his, too, in defiance of their plain words, in the face of all the authorities I have adduced, and in violation of the plainest dictates of natural justice, or will we give this section such a construction as accords with reason, with authority, with humanity and justice?

But, sir, these principles I have stated, and which I presume no intelligent mind will dispute, founded as they are in reason, and verified by such an irrefragable array of authority, acquire an accumulated weight when we come to consider this section in the light of another rule, which is as familiar to every legal mind as the alphabet, and which applies in this instance with peculiar force. I mean the well settled rule, that penal statutes are always to be construed strictly, so that no one shall incur a penalty, unless the act which subjects him to it is clearly within both the spirit and the letter of the statute imposing it. For I imagine no one will have the hardihood to deny that this section is highly penal in its character. To say that a man may be deprived of all right to participate in the Government of his country, either State or Federal; that he maybe singled out from his fellow men and degraded in the political scale below the horse thief, the highway robber, and the midnightassassin, and yet suffer no punishment from his degradation, is worse than absurd; it is an insult to common sense. We had as well say that it would be no punishment to him to rob him of his property, deprive him of his liberty, or deny him any of the privileges of a member of society. So sacred has this rule ever been held that &s far back as the reign of Edward VI we find it settled, that the law will rather endure that a particular offense should escape without punishment than it should he violated, and for the soundest reason too: for, as Chief Justice Best says in the case of Fletcherrs. Lord Sondes, (8 Bingham, 880:) If these rules be violated the fate of accused persons is decided by the arbitrary discretion of the judge, andnotby the express authority of the law.' And must this rule, so wise, so just, so essential to the safety of the citizen, and so long established, be swept away with everything else in order to give this section a retrospective effect contrary to its plain meaning and the common sense of all mankind?

But, sir, passing from a consideration of the mere letter of the law, should we find that ambiguous, the next most obvious and natural means of ascertaining the will of the legislator is to explore the context and construe the whole instrument together, so that its various provisions may harmonize with each other; c, as Blackstone expresses it in the first book of his Commentaries, page GO:

"If the words happen to bo still dubious wo may establish their meaning trom the context, with which itinay boot singular use to comparea word or a sentence whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus the proem or preamble is often called 111 to help the construction of an act of Parliament. Of the same nature and use is the comparison of a law with other laws that are made by thesame legislator that have some affinity with the subject or that expressly relate to the same point.”

Considering this section, then, as a part of the Constitution, let us examine it by the light of other provisions contained in that instrument. I have already alluded to the unqualified disapprobation, and diegust with which the wisest statesmen, and most enlightened jurists of all civilized countries have universally regarded every variety of retrospective legislation affecting previously acquired or existing rights; and, sir, it is not surprising that the people of these States after they had out themselves loose from the monarchies of the Old World, and come to lay the foundations of a Federal Union, and Government, in which liberty should be protected, and justice administered according to the most enlarged views of enlightened jurisprudence, sought to protect themselves and their posterity from the detestable and dangerous engines of tyranny which had so often cursed the country from which they had just separated. With the long list of bloody attainders, and atrocious instances of retrospective legislation, which had disgraced the history of many of the older Governments of the world, fresh in their memories, they undertook to demonstrate the great problem that a Government mightbeestabiished and sustained for the benefit of the governed, without a resort to any of those barbarous and inhuman measures justified under the specious plea of necessity by tyrants who claimed their prerogative by divine right. Consequently we find the wise and patriotic statesman to whom they assigned the duty of draftingthe Constitution of the Government they designed to establish providing in the ninth section of the first article of that instrument, that—

"No bill of attainder or cx post facto law shall be passed."

This was intended as a limitation upon the powers of the General Government, they were proposing to erect; but so thorough was their abhorrence and detestation of this iniquitous character of legislation that they provided in the very next section that No State shall pass any bill of attainder or expost facto law;" and when the people of the several States ratified the Constitution they, by that act, pledged their faith to each other, in the most solemn and emphatic manner, not only that the Federal Government should never enact such odious and despotic laws, but that the individual States would not themselves. And more than this, sir, as if this were not a sufficient safeguard to the rights of the citizen, or a sufficient expression of the utter detestation in which they held such inhuman acts, thirty of the States whose constitutions I have examined, and possibly some others whose constitutions I have not seen, have incorporated the same prohibition in the most pointed and emphatic terms in their own organic laws.

Now, I do not pretend to say, sir, that the Legislatures of three fourths of the States of this Union have not the power, according to the letter of the Constitution, to pass an ex post facto law under the guise oi' a constitutional amendment, should such a thing be proposed by two thirds of both Houses of Congress. They might even go further, and in the same manner abrogate the entire Bill of Rights, rob the people of a whole section of the country of their property without compensation, destroy the coordinate departments of the Government, and concentrate all its powers and functions in the same person, or do any other despotic and revolutionary act, and there would be no remedy for those affected by such tyrannical action except resistance, to be resorted to at their peril. But I do say, sir, that no such thing could be done without a most palpable and infamous breach of the faith solemnly plighted by the people of the several States to each other in their ratification of the Federal Constitution. And I say further that no ex post facto law could thus be passed unlesstwo thirds of both Houses of Congress should ask the States to do what the Constitution declares they shall not do, and which they severally, by their ratification of that instrument, pledged themselves not to do.

Shall it be said then, sir, that Congress has placed itself in the questionable attitude of asking the State Legislatures to violate the faith thus solemnly plighted, or tliattlie Legislatuies of three fourths of the States have violated that faith by acceding to the proposition? Who will say that those who proposed, and those who ratified this amendment have deliberately said to the despotisms of the Old World, our plan of a just and free Government is a mistake, and a failure? Your engines of oppression, your sanguinary bills of attainder, your atrocious c x post facto laws are all right, in proof of which and that the fact may never be disputed we have placed upon the face of our Constitution one of the most glaring instances of sweeping retrospective legislation the annals of the entire wot Id can produce. Who will ha\ e the hardihood to contend that the Legislatures of twentv scven States of this Union deliberately intended to do what their own State constitutions, the Constitution of the United States, and the common sense of mankind concur m condemning as immoral, unjust, and oppressive? Who will saythat the American people ever consented to see one of the most conspicuous and venerable landmarks of liberty and justice thus removed from their Constitution? Yet, sir, we must admit all this if we insist that this section shall have a retroactive operation. For if retrospective at all, it comes clearly within the definition of an expost facto law, as understood by the profession for centuries past; and if its Iraincrs meant that it should be so construed, they deliberately intended to incur all the imputations 1 have mentioned—imputations which for one I can never get my consent to make. But again, sir, if we turn to section two of article second of the. Constitution we will find that it confers upon the President the unlimited power of granting reprieves and pardons forall offenses against the United States except in casesof impeachment. This provision sprang from the noblest impulses of the human heart, the heaven bora sentiments of mercy and forgiveness, the remnants of pristine purity and perfection which survived the fall of the human race; and a similar power has been exercised bv every Government that has ever existed on earth, savage or civilized, free or despotic. We know, too, that the President, in the exercise of this benign prerogative, extended the full and unconditional clemency of the Government, both by special pardons, and by proclamations of amnesty, issued in pursuance of acts of Congress, to many of those who will be affected by this amendment, if it is to be construed retrospectively, long before it was even proposed, much less ratified by the States; and we know, moreover, that many of such persons have accepted and now hold offices under thenrespective States. Now, what the effect, of such pardon was upon the political and social status of the recipient I will let the Supreme Court of the United States say. If gentlemen will turn to the case ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, page 380, they will find the language which I will now read:

The inquiry ariico os to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on till.; point all iho authorities agree. A pardon l cachc both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender, and when the pardon is full it reloases the punistimentand blots out of existence the guilt, so that m the eye of the law the offender is ax innocent n« it ho had never committed the offense. It granted before conviction it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon con\ ictiou h from attaching. If nmt nl after conviction it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil right*. It makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.*-'

Or if this will not do I will read from another authority, which I presume, will not bo questioned in this House. I will quote from one who was the acknowledged autocrat of his party, whose intellect was always clear and incisive, and whose words were always deliberate and pointed. 1 allude to the late Hon. Thaddeus Stevens. In the debate upon the resolutions reported from the joint Committee on Reconstruction, for which this amendment was finally adopted as a substitute, Mr. Stevens said, in answer to a question by the honorable gentleman from Maine, [Mr. Blaine:]

"I will answer that question. I do not know if the gentleman is a lawyer, but I suppose he has examined this question. A pardon, whether by the President having power or specially by act of Parliament or Congress, extinguishes tlio crime. After that there is no such crime in the individual. A man steals; he is pardoned: hois not then a thief, ami you cannot, call himorio; or if you do you are liable to an action for slander."

Again, he says:

The law says that a man convicted of felony shall not, testify. ~^-<>u call him as a witness; the objector shows his conviction, and he shows his pardon, unci ho is no felon.”

But, sir, we find no exception made in this section, of any recipient of executive clemency whatever. If it applies to one. it. applies t o all of the class mentioned, without a solitary exception; and if retrospective in its operation it, amounts to a cool and deliberate recantation of the forgiveness extended under the beneficent power of pardon, in the name of the people of the United States, and in which their honor was most, solemnly pledged. This is the conclusion, sir, from which no logic can absolve you. You cannot escape from it. The people of the United States, through their constitutional agent, extended their gracious pardon to these persons, saying: Here, accept this; it destroys your guilt; it gives you a new credit, in society; it, makes the past oblivion; it restores to you every right of the most unoffending citizen," Yet if this section is retrospective it reaches out the strong hand of despotic and vindictive power, and snatches from the poor, defenseless recipient the priceless boon of forgiveness bestowed upon him by a generous and magnanimous people.

it may not be unjust, to the reputation of the mob who howled around the palace ol Pontius Pilate, clamoring for the blood of our Saviour, to suppose that they, in the heat ol excitement, might have done such a thing; but who will dare to make such an insinuation against, the honor and manhood of the Congress of the United States and of the Legislature^ of twentyseven States of this Union? 1 imagine, sir, that, those who voted for iliisamendmeiitwould exclaim, willl indignant scorn upon such a foul allusion, What! is thy servant a dog that, he should do this thing?" Yet, sir, every man who contends that, this amendment is retrospective accuses all who were concerned in its enactment of this atrocious disregard of moral obligation and plighted faith; but as for roe, I never can believe they intended thus to incur the reproachful criticism of mankind through all coming time. Never, sir; never!

But, sir, if we will go back to the preamble we will find the people of the United States solemnly declaring that the very first great object for which the Constitution was ordained, after the formation of a more perfect union, was" to establish justice." And now I would ask if this amendment was intended to give the lie to this solemn protestation of a great and virtuous people? Or did those who enacted it have such a contemptible opinion of the common sense of mankind as to suppose they would believe that justice is to be established by overthrowing, and trampling under foot its most cardinal principles? Did the Legislatures of twenty seven States mean to say, that justice was to be established by the enactment of just such a law as is twice condemned in the Con st itution of the United States, and again in the constitutions of thirty States of this Union, as unjust and oppressive? Did the Legislature of New Hampshire mean to say that the twentythird section of their own bill of rights, which .declares .that "retrospective laws are highly Injurious, oppressive, and unjust, and no such laws, therefore, should be made, either for the decision of civil causes or the punishment of crimes" is a lie, and that the way to establish 'justice and "secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" is by enacting just such laws as this clause in their own State constitution declares to be "highly injurious, unjust, and oppressive?" Did the Legislature of Massachusetts intend to say that this declaration in their own State constitution was a mistake:

Laws made to punish for actions done before the existence of such laws, and which have not been 4eclarB4 crimes by preceding laws, are unjust, oppressive, and. inconsistent with tlio fundamental principles of a free Government?"

I repeat, sir, did the framers of this amendment, or any of those who ratified it, suppose that the way to "establish justice" was to place upon the face of the Constitution itself an instance of injustice and tyranny excelling in atrocity even the despotic freak of Caligula, when he wrote his laws in small characters and hung them on high pillars, the better to ensnare the people? I say excelling in atrocity this strange freak of oppression, for the subjects of the Roman despot might by extraordinary means have ascertained the legislative will and governed themselves accordingly; but here the tyrant s vengeance, locked in his own bosom until the auspicious moment, is launched like a thunderbolt from a clear sky upon the unsuspecting victim while he is reposing with confidence under the segis of his country s pardon.*

But, sir, I never will believe that the makers of this law intended it to operate retrospectively. The reasons against such a conclusion are to my mind so overwhelming that, whatever others may choose to do, 1 will not do such injustice to their integrity and wisdom as to entertain it for a single moment.

X will not do them wrong; I rather choose

To wrong thedcad, to wrong myself and you,

Than I will wrong such honorable men."

But, sir, notwithstanding the words of this section have clearly a prospective meaning, and cannot be otherwise construed without a gross violation of the plainest principles of our language; notwithstanding the well settled rule of legal construction, which compels us to abide by the words of a statute when they are plain; notwithstanding the universally recognized rule, that where the words leave it in doubt whether the law was intended to be retrospective or not we must out of respect to the lawgiver and the general sense of mankind always construe it as prospective; notwithstanding we cannot construe this section retrospectively without making it shamefully inconsistent with other provisions in the Constitution, as well as with the entire scope and genius of our Government; notwithstanding we cannot so construe it Without making it the engine of the grossest injustice and oppression; notwithstanding we cannot give it such a construction without violating the pledged honor of the people of the United States, and ignoring the plainest dictates of common humanity—notwithstanding all this, I say, I may still be told that we know, and th j country knows that this section was designed to disfranchise those who were engaged in the late rebellion; but, sir, this is simply a plain petitio principiis—a mere begging of the question. For How do wo know it? And how can wc determine the intention of its makers, except by the means I have indicated? I may be told that the necessity of the occasion demanded that it should be so; but, sir, I deny it. I can well see how the experience of the late civil war may have taught our people the necessity of providing more stringent penalties for those who may engage in rebellion in future, for the dread of such penalties may tend topreventtbe commission of the offense; but it is impossible for me to conceive how it can be necessary to create a new punishment for an offense which has already been committed. It cannot cure the wrong already done, nor will it tend to prevent its repetition in future. On the contrary, with rfo interest in or affection for a Government which deprives him of" the rights which it accords to the felon reeking with crime, fresh from the cells of the penitentiary, and exasperated by the manifest injustice of such a punishment, the victim of it would only have fresh reasons for revolt. Besides, sir, in a Government like ours, whose paramount object it is "to establish justice," it can never be necessary to do injustice to any one.

'Twill bo recorded for a precedent.

And many an error, by the same example,

Will rash into the State."

Gentlemen should not forget that the inventor of the guillotine was himself a victim to the offspring of his own ingenuity, and that the precedents they establish may recoil upon themselves or their posterity.

Again, sir, I may be told that we know this section was intended to operate retrospectively, because such is the prevalent opinion in the country, which nobody disputes but myself. I am aware that the passions of the human heart have been stirred to their lowest depths by the late terrific civil war, and that the troubled deep has not yet been calmed. I know, too, in the general expectation of witnessing a grand exhibition of vengeance, the still small voice of justice is to a great extent unheeded; but are we, sir, to close our eyes upon the language of the written law of the country, and seek the legislative will in the crude impressions of the excited multitude? If so, I have nothing more to say. We are already in the vortex of anarchy, and it is idle to talk of law.

But, sir, it may bo said that the debates upon thisamendmentin Congress show itto be retrospective. Iapprehend; however, that no lawyer will take such a position, for although I have not time now to analyze the cases which verify it, I presume no gentleman of any respectable attainments in the profession will dispute me when I state it as a well established rule, that for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature, no extraneous fact prior to the passage of the bill which is not itself a rule of law, or an act of legislation, can be inquired into, or in any way taken into view. If the speeches made in the Legislature which enacts a law are to control the plain words of the statute, then it is nonsense to reduce laws to writing at all, but all should be left to collect the legislative intent from the debates. And besides, while we may ascertain the views of those who participate in the discussion from the speeches made by them, we must at last rely upon the words of the statute itself for the ideas of those who take no part in the debate, for in that way only they choose to express their will. But it is a sufficient answer to all this to say that Congress did not make this law. It required the concurrent action of the Legislatures of twenty seven States, embracing, perhaps, over two thousand different minds to give it the effect it has; and how have these Legislatures expressed their wills except by the simple words of the section itself?

And finally, sir, it may be insisted that this section should be regarded as having a retrospective effect because this Congress has so considered and acted upon it in numerous instances; but if gentlemen will recur to a passage I read a while ago, from the case of Sturgis vs. Crowninshield, they will find this point already answered by Chief Justice Marshall. I will repeat what he says:

"It is well settled that thespiritof the Constitution is to be respected nolessthanits letter, yet that spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words, and neither the practice of Legislatures, nor other extrinsic circumstances can control its clear language.”

He made use of this language in reply to the position that the State insolvent laws did not conflict with the constitutional prohibition upon laws impairing the obligation of contracts, because such laws were supported by the unbroken practice of the State Legislatures for thirty years. And he says further:

"But if, in any case, the plain meaning of s, provision, not contradicted by any other provision in the same instrument, is to be disregarded because we believe the framersof that instrument did not intend what they say, it must be one in which the absurdity and injustice of applying the provision to the case would be so monstrous that all mankind would without hesitation unite in rejecting the application."

That is to say, sir. no difference what we may believe to have been the motives and intentions of the framers of this section, from extrinsic circumstances, if the language of the section is plainly prospective in its terms, and if giving it such a construction will not render it inconsistent with other provisions of the Constitution, we are bound to regard it as prospective unless such a construction would be unhesitatingly pronounced by all mankind to be unjust, absurd, and monstrous.

Now, sir, if my reasoning has been correct, it must follow as an inevitable conclusion that the fourth section of the bill under consideration is not only unnecessary, but that it must lead to the most mischievous consequences, as it must of necessity, should it become a law, subject a large number of our citizens, who I consider it no disparagement to the gentleman from Massachusetts to say are as honorable and as well disposed toward this Government as c t either he or myself, besides cumbering our courts with a vast number of irritating and vexatious actions which cannot fail to promote discord, bitterness, and bad feeling wherever they exist without producing any good results. And I will add, sir, without any disrespect to any one, that it seems to me to be singularly cruel and unjust to subject men who honestly and conscientiously believe they have a perfect legal right to the offices they now hold, to a criminal prosecution for discharging the duties of those offices before their right to do so has been judicially denied.

I have now, sir, endeavored to discuss this question strictly from a legal stand point to consider it as I hope and trust it will be considered by a wise and upright judiciary should it ever be brought before the courts of the country. And if I have been tedious in the array of legal principles I have attempted to make it is because those principles are" like apples of gold in pictures of silver —the calm and dispassionate opinions of wise and just men whose positions elevated them, above the influence of passion and party strife, and who expressed them under every obligation which honor, morality, and religion could impose to speak the truth, maintain justice, and defend the right. Some of these principles may have occasionally been departed from, it is true, at a time when the division line between the great powers of Government were but feebly drawn and imperfectly understood, but such departures have never failed to be severely reprehended by all just and good men, and I think I may safely say that I have stated no legal proposition that may not now be considered the settled law of the land.

But I know, sir, that few if any, have had the temerity to venture upon theground I occupy in regard to this question, and 1 may beiidiculed for groping amid the somber catacombs of the law while others are basking in the blaze oi' new and brilliant theories of government, but like Richelieu, "I appeal to time." When the passions and the prejudices of this hour shall have been forgotten, when some subject of the future empire shall look back upon the days of the old Republic when liberty was protected and justice administered by law, or when, as I would rather hope, our Government shall have reared again the ancient landmarks of the Constitution, and

"Returning Justice lift aloft her scales,"

then, and perhaps not till then, will my position on this question be vindicated.

Mr. Cullom obtained the floor.