January 23, 1869

The SPEAKER. The regular order is the motion of the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Boutweij,,] to reconsider the vote by which the bill (H. Ii. No. 1607) to secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the United States, and to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the amendments to the Constitution, and the resolution (H. R. No. 402) proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, were recommitted to the Committee on the Judiciary. The gentleman from Massachusetts now calls up that motion, and is entitled to the floor.

Mr. BOUTWELL. I do not think it necessary for me to consume the time of the House in discussing the conversation which I had with the gentleman from Wisconsin, [Mr. Eldridge.] My object was not to make any arrangement by which the business of the House should be improperly controlled, but as the gentleman was a member of the Committee on the Judiciary, and was engaged upon a sub committee in the service of the House, and desired to speak upon this subject, it was, of course, natural and proper for me to seek to so arrange the conduct of this measure as to give him an opportunity to be heard. That is all I designed to do, and I beg the gentleman from California [Mr. Higby] to take notice of it. For the future conduct of the bill I can only say that it is my desire that the gentleman from Wisconsin shall have an opportunity to be heard on Thursday or Friday; but if the House judges otherwise, and takes control of the measure, the House will be responsible for its own action.«

This measure, or these two measures Which have been reported together by the J udViary Committee, are the last as far as 1 can foi se of a series of great measures growing out the rebellion, and necessary for the reorganization and pacification of the country, with which the Republican party to a large extent, through their Representatives and Senators in the Thirty Eighth Thirty Ninth and Fortieth Congresses, has been charged. I say that this measure, as far as X can foresee, is the last of those great measures, and for this reason: if we secure to all the people of the country, without distinction of race or color, the privilege of the elective franchise, we have then established upon the broadest possible basis of republican equality the institutions of the country, both state and national.

I am persuaded, by my experience upon those other questions and by tho circumstances in which we are now placed, that it is impossible, whatever may be the desire of individual members of the House, whatever may be the wishes, or the hopes, or the prejudices of any portions of the people of the country, for us to escape this issue as a Congress and as a party. I shall speak to day with great freedom upon the responsibility of the Republican party to the country. 1 know it is not customary in a legislative assembly to present measures in what is called a party aspect, and 1 will therefore state to the House very briefly the reasons for the course I now pursue.

Those reasons are largely based on the declaration that the Republican party stands in a relation to the country and to certain great questions and interests differently from any other party that has existed since the revolutionary era. During all previous time since the close of the revolutionary war parties have divided upon questions of administration, upon a difference of ideas as to what the public policy of the country should be. During the revolutionary war the differences between the Whigparty and the Tory party were more comprehensive and fundamental. One party maintained the right of the Colonies to a separate and independent existence as a nation, and the other denied that right. We stand to day in an analogous position. The Democratic party of this country as a party organization, from the opening of the war to the present time, has been identified with all those ideas and measures which were calculated in their nature and in their operation to prevent the restoration of the Union by and through the agency of war for the suppression of the rebellion. It is a noticeable fact, which we do not to day sufficiently appreciate, that this nation is indebted to the Republican party for its existence. Therefore, I say that the Republican party organization is responsible, and it cannot escape being responsible, for the consummation of those measures which are necessary to the perpetuity and to the peace of a nation which the Republican party has saved from overthrow. One of the measures reported by the committee is a bill to secure equal privileges and immunities to citizens of the United States, and to enforce the provisions of article fourteen of the amendment to the Constitution. The other is a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. I am aware that there are persons who believe that all that is necessary to be done should be done by an act of Congress. There are others who are of opinion that the subject is not within the proper scope of legislative power, and that the only way to secure equality of suffrage to the people of this country, without distinction of race or color, is by an amendment to the Constitution.

As I proceed I shall state the reasons why I am not willing to rely exclusively upon a law of Congress, and also the reasons why I think it not wise to submit a constitutional amendment without the aid of legislation. For the present I only desire to say that the committee, I believe—certainly in speaking for myself I am able to say it—invite examination and criticism injegard to the phraseology as well as to the objects proposed by the bill and by the constitutional amendment, it being our purpose to make the two measures as perfect as possible without regard to the paternity of the words employed. I shall direct my remarks generally to the provisions of the bill. The first section of the bill is in these words:

That no State shall abridge or deny the right «f any citizen of the United States to vote for electors of Presidentand Vice President of the United States or for Representatives in Congress, or for members of the Legislature of the State in which lio may reside, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; and any provisions in the laws or constitution of any State inconsistent with this section are hereby declared to be null and void.

The second and third sections are remedial and punitive, and are not necessary to be considered particularly in the discussion in which I am now engaged. The fourth section of this bill is framed in accordance with and by authority of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. It is in these words:

That any person disqualified jby section three of article fourteen of the amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and from whom such disability shall not have been removed by act of Congress, who shall exercise the powers and duties of any otlieo therein specified, shall bo deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall bo imprisoned and kept at hard labor for the term oflwoyearx; and an indictraentforthesarncmaybe found at any time within ten years from the commission ot the offense.

The purpose of this section is clear. There are in many of the States, those that have been reconstructed, those that are still under military government, as well as in the State of Kentucky, and perhaps in some other States that were not engaged in the rebellion, men who by the fourteenth article of amendment are disqualified from holding office. While, as I shall have occasion to say, wc are not in our legislation to be governed by any feeling of resentment or malice, I still think it is due to the supreme and solemn character of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution that Congress should enforce it against every man who by that provision is disqualified; and after having enforced it, we may then consider whether those men should be relieved of their disqualifications. But f hold it to have been a duty on the part of every man who professes now to be loyal to the Government of his country and who was holding office when the fourteenth amendment was adopted to resign his office, and thereby recognize the supremacy of the Constitution of the United States.

It will be seen that the first section of this bill, which contains all the essential provisions with reference to the right of suffrage, limits the operation of the law to elections for President and Vice President, Representatives in Congress, and to members of the State Legislatures. It will also be seen, by the argument which I shall submit, based upon the Constitution of the United States, that the powers of Congress are probably broader than those set forth and asserted in the section of the bill which 1 have just read; but inasmuch as I believe all the objects which we are jiow seeking can be accomplished by the legislation here proposed, and the right of every citizen, whether black or white, native born or naturalized citizen, can be secured within a reasonable period of time. 1 am in favor of Isgislating so f«P o6 as iriaybe n ecfissaryto secure those object s not waiving, however ori® any way: qualifying the assertion of the eanatata tional. right ia Congress to .legislate upon ithe giibjectof the franchise* even ni reference to (lie election Qf officers not named in thissecr section of <Jje .Mil,. Th« e who are familiar with the ■debates which -toukplaee in .the; eoayen-, tion that framed the Constitution of the United States, and especially those who have read the debates that took place in the, several Sfcte eoHvemtions u po the subject of ratifying the, Constitution of the United States, must have, been struck with .the circumstance that all the friends of .the Constitution asserted that there was power ia tii Constitution over the elective franchise to an extent which would enable the national Government to preserve its own existence independently of any .action on. the part of the States. If this Government b not a mere confederacy, held together by uW, merest thread, this must be true a e in the nature of the case. ;If the declaration ia the preamble that we are a people has any meaning; if the Constitution which the people of the United States as one people established has any virtue or any force, any power to accomplish the purposes of a Government, then in this. Government there must be constitutional means by which those charged with, the administration can provide for its preservation and continuance.

I am now dealing with general principles, and not with the text of the Constitution, to which I shall come ere long- Upon general principles there must be power in the national Government to provide whatever is necessary for its own preservation. But if the doctrine of those who maintain that the whole question of suffrage is vested in the States be true, then the States may refuse to choose electors; they way refuse to send members to this House; they may refuse to choose Senators by their Legislatures, and thus the Governmentof the United States would come to ao end, There would be no ProskleBt; there would be no Senate; there would be no House of Representatives, and the Governmentwould consequently cease to exist. Sir, I know not in the darkest days of the Republic, .when State rights were triumphant, I know not of any theory more destructive to national existence and public liberty more directly opposed to the nature of. our Government than that which is now avowed. It is a remnant of ancient and false traditions not supported by the Constitution. I shall ask the House to consider what the Constitution does declare upon the subject of suffrage. It will be found that there is no word or phrase in the instrument which tolerates the idea that the existence of this great Government, continental in its dimensions, is at thewerpy of the States through defects in o u r fundamental law. I come now to the provisions of .the Constitution of the United States bearing upon the question of suffrage. J read first that pro? vision on which I suppose much reliance is placed to sustain the doctrine that the power over the question of suffrage ia, to a certain extent, vested absolutely in the. States.• The second section of the first article of the Constitution is in these words:

the House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." It has been assumed, upon this section of the Constitution, that each State has the power absolutely to fix the qualifications of electors of the most numerous branch of the Legislalature, and that therefore thepower of Congress, if it existed at all in reference to the election of .Representatives to Congress, was controlled by what the State might have done in reference to electors for members of the most numerous branch of its Legislature. But if gentlemen will look at the phraseology of this section as it stands they will see that, it does not give power to the States in reference to -the qualification of voters; that it does not give power to the United States in reference to the qualifications of voters; that it does not take pcKwes from the States nor does it take power; from the U nitfed States.'--- Ji merely declares itliefact that the -voters for fiepBesentatiyesi«-Co Congress shall possess the qualifications-. of 'voters for members ®f the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. it is an injunction toithe States if tbey have the power to prescribe thequalifications ioS voters; it is an -injunction to the national Government if the national Government hasthat power. But there is no declaration in this section that either has the power, arid certainly not that either has the power to the exclusion of the other. But the fourth section of the same article of the Constitution further provides .that-—'

"Thettmes, places, and manner of holding elections forSena tors and Representatives, shall beprescnb e4 in each .State by the Legislature thereof."

If the provision, ended here, the theory jvhich is maintained by gentlemen who deny- the propositions contained in this :bill would be

supported by the Constitution:

"The times, places and manner of holding elections for Senators and -Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof."

The word" manner," in this connection ;Qf course becomes important. All writers upon words have considered the power and scope of three words which have a great similarity of meaning," ‘‘mode,’’ method," and "manner;" and it is uniformly agreed that "manner" is the largest and most comprehensive of the three in its scope. Patrick Henry, of Vir: ginia—rand I shall read his declarations to the House—gave his view of the meaning of the word manner," which coineideswith the view that I now take. It includes, as I. maintain, everything relating to an election, from the qualification of the elector to the deposit of his ballot in the box. Here is set forth the power of the State. By the Constitution a State has original jurisdiction of the" times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives;" and it is from this provision, of the Constitution that the State gets its power over the subject, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned.

Either otve or the otherof two things is true: either these words as herein employed in their scope and meaning cover the entire subject of elections, from the qualifications of the voter to the deposit of his ballot in the box, or else, by necessary legal inference, the States have not the power which they have been in the habit of exercising; for if this be a qualified and limited grant or recognition of authority, then what is not granted or recognized they do not possess. But the history of the facts from the first, and the recognition by Congress of the powers of the States, go to the extent of conceding to them entire scope and original control of the whole matter of voting, including the qualifications of the voter, his registration, and the deposit of his ballotin the bo®

Mr. ELDRIDGE. Will the gentleman allow me to ask him a question?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. I wish to inquire of the gentleman from- Massachusetts whether he means to affirm that the States possess no powers except those which are granted to them in and by the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I have not said that.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. I supposed the rule to be entirely the other way; that the United States Government has no powers except those which have been granted to it. I understood the gentleman to declare that the States cannot possess the power which we claim they have of regulating the qualifications of voters, because the Constitution contains no grant of the power to them. That is the way in which I understood the gentleman.

Mr. BOUTWELL. The gentleman misunderstaodavmej-• This is a declaration in the Constitution of the power of the States over the subject of voting. If it is a full and complete power .over the whole subject it is what we maintain; but if it be not a full and complete power, then inasmuch as here is a declar atiffio ff the extent the powers of the States, then; the States are limited necessarily by the interpretation that is sppt :upon this language; for ifjthe Constitution <jf the United Sitatessaya that States have certain powers, even t iough there be no negative jn -the declaration, they cannot ;go beyond thefpowers thus -defined. Let me read what, remains of this provision:

But the Congress may .at any ti«H o by law majto"—

Very broad language—

or alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosingSonators."

Now, sir, taking the language of the Constitution itself, divested of all theories and traditions concerning the meaning put upon it by State rights men. can anything be more clear than that .the Congress of the United States has all the power which the States could exercise, except merely as to declaring where the Senators shall be chosen?. Can the e be any doubt, that the powers granted tq or recognized as existing in .Jfce, whatever, the Jextent of those powers may he, is the measure of, .the powers which Congress may exercise?, And therefore, when a State rights man proves that by the Constitution of the United States a State has a right to decide who shall exercise tjw elective franchise, he has proved also that Congress may do the same thing under this pro vis* ion of the Constitution which says that Congress may make any regulations .it .chooses relating to tks .subject or may alter such regulations as have been made by the States.

This is no new doctrine. It was asserted, as I have already stated, in most of the conventions which ratified the Constitution of the United States. It was declared again and again in the Convention which framed the. Constitution of the United States.

Mr. Hamilton, in the Federalist, says, speaking of the fourth section of the first article

"I am greatly mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the whole plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that every Government ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation."

Again he says:

"Nothing can be more evident than that an exclusive power o f regulating elections for the national Government, in the hand^ of the State Legislatures, would leave the -existence of the Union entirely at their mer cy They could at .any, moment, annihilate it by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons to administer its affairs."'

In the several -State conventions the" ablest opponents of the Constitution based their objections to it upon the very ground that it gave to Congress the power which I am now advocating; and the defenders of the Constitution, so far as I have been able to ascertain, never denied the soundness of the theory on which those objections were based. Hear what Patrick Henry says. In the second volume of Elliott s Debates, page 149, Patrick Henry, speaking of the first section of the fourth article, giving to -Congress power over the time, place, and manner of choosing officers, ss ys "According to the mode prescribed. Congress may tell you that they have a right to make the vote of one [gentleman go as far as the votes of one hundred poor men."

Can there be any broader declaration as to the power of Congress than that made by Patrick Henry in these words? Again, he continues:

"The power over the manner admits of the most dangerous latitude. They may modify it as they please. They may regulate the number of votes by the quantity of property without involving any repugnancy to the Constitution."

That was Patrick henry s objection to the Constitution and to this particular provision. Replying to that objection Mr Madison, in the same volume, while he does not admit in terms the doctrine laid down by Patrick Henry, does not deny it, but asserts that the existence of this power is absolutely necessary to the existence of the Government He says:

"With respect to the other point, it was thought that the regulation of the time, place, and manner of electingKepresen tatives should be uniform throughout the continent. Some States might regulate the elections on the principles of equality, and others Wig regulate them otherwise."-.

This is exactly th# condition in which we ate to day "Some States," sayshe, u may regulate the elections upon the principles of equality, and some States mayregulate them otherwise." "This diversity would be obviously unjust. Elections are regulated now unequally in some States, partieul irly South Carolina, with respect to Charleston, which has a representation of thirty uieinbeis." Thirty members were in the Legislature of South Carolina from the city of Charleston, What was the theory of Madison? That that provision of the Constitution enabled the Congress of the United States to go into South Carolina and decide that the city of Charleston should not have more members iu the Legislature of South Carolina than she was entitled to on the principle of equality.

Mr. Madison says:

Should the people of any State by finy means be deprived of the right of suffrage, it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General Government."

Forty thousand citizens of the United States are deprived of the right of suffrage in the State of Kentucky. What is here suggested by Mr. Madison is what the committee propose to day There are at least one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of this country who are denied the right of suffrage. Mr. Madison says that "it was judged proper that it should be remedied by the General Government." He says further:

"It was found impossible to fix the time, place, and manner of the election of Representatives in tho Constitution. It was found necessary to leave the regulation of this, iu the first place, to the State governments, as being best acquainted with the situation of the people, subject to ttie control of the General Government, in order to enable it to produce uniformity and prevent its own dissolution. And considering the State government -and General Government as distinct bodies, acting in different and independent capacitiobforthopeople, itwas thought the particular legulationsshould be submitted to the former and the general regulations to the latter. Were they exclusively under the control of the State governments the General Government might easily be dissolved; but if they be regulated pioperlyby the State Legislatures, the congressional control will ven probablyncvcrbcexereisod. The power appears to me satisfactory and as unlikely to be abused as any part ot the Constitution."

He says again, on page 305:

With respect to the time, place, and manner of elections, I cannot think, notwithstanding the apprehensions of the honorable gentleman, that there is any danger, or, if abuse should take place, that there is not sufficient security. If all the people of ttie United States should be directed to go to elect in one place the members of tbeGovcrnment would be execrated for the infamous, regulation. Many would go to trample tbcm under foot for their conduct, and they would be succeeded by men who would remove it. They would not dare to meet the universal hatred and detestation of the people, and run the risk of the certain dreadful consequences. Wc must keep with in the compass of human probability. If a possibility be the cause of objection wo must object to every Government in America. But the honorable gentleman may say that better guard* maybe provided. Let us consider the objection. The power of regulating the time, place, and manner of elections must bp vested somewhere. It could not bo fixed in the Constitution without involving great inconveniences. They could then have no authority to adjust the regulations to the changes of circumstances, ihequestion then is, whether it ought to be fixed unalterably in the State governments or subject to the control of the General Government. Is it not obvious that the General Government would be destroyed without this control?"

Mr. James Wilson, ofPennsylvania, was one of the ablest of the statesmen engaged in framing the Constitution of the United States. He ■was also a member of the convention of Pennsylvania that ratified the Constitution. Tn the latter body he gave his opinion upon the question now under debate. He said:

441 hope, sir, that it was no crime to sow the seed of self preservation in the Federal Government. Without this clause it would not possess selt pro serving power. Bvthis clause the times, places, and manner of holding elections shall be prescribed m ci each State by the Legislature thereof. I think it highly proper that the Federal Government should throw the exercise of this power into the hands ot the State Legislatures, but not that it should be placed there entirely without control.

Again be says, in support of the powers of Congress:

But there ii an additional reason f till that shows the necessity of this pro visionary clause, lne member of the Senate are elected by the State L<;gi latuies. If those Legislatures possessed uncontrolled, the power of presenbing the times, places, and manner ■;i electing members of the House of Representatives the members of one br meh of the General .Legislature would be the tenants at will of the electorsof tbeothor branch, and the General Government would He prostrate at the mercy of tho Legislatures of the several States."

I do not intend, to follow the discussion in all of the States. 1 have read what was said by Patrick Henry and Mr. Madison in the Virginia convention, and by Mr. Wilson in that of Pennsylvania. There were in Massachusetts two very distinguished men Caleb Strong, from the western part of that State, and Theophilus Parsons, from Essex county, both distinguished persons, and the latter among the most eminent jurists of his time in this country, and, indeed, I think it not extravagant to say one of the most eminent jurists of modern times. He said, speaking of this very power:

"But a State Legislature, under the influence of tlioir Senators, who would have their fullest confidence, or under the influence of ambitious or popular characters, or in times of popular commotion and when faction and party spirit ran high, would introduce such regulations as would render the rights of the people insecure and of little value. They might make an unequal and partial division of the States into districts for the election of Representatives, or they might even di qualify one third of the electors. Without these powers in Congress the people can have no remedy. But the fourth section provides a remedy, a controlling power, in a Legislature, composed of Senators and Representatives ot twelve States, without the influence of our conventions and factions, who will hear impartially and preserve and restore to the people their equal and sacred rights." What was said by Caleb Strong is substantially the same as that uttered by Theophilus Parsons.

The reporter of the Massachusetts debates makes this note:

"Several other gentlemen went largely into the debate on the fourth section, which those in favor of it demonstrated to be necessary: first, as it may bo used to correct a negligence in elections; secondly, as it. will prevent the dissolution of the Government by designing and refractory States; thirdly, as it will operate as a check in favor of the people against any designs of the Federal Senate and then constituents cause, not have it in its power to appoint a place where the citizens thereof may meet to choose their Federal Representatives.”

Similar debates took place in North Carolina, New Hampshire, South Carolina, Rhode Island, and New York. The opponents of the Constitution objected to the fourth section of the first article upon the ground that it gave to Congress complete jurisdiction of this whole subject; and its friends never denied, so far as 1 can ascertain, that such was its scope and design. What happened next? Four StatesNew Hampshire, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and New York—in ratifying the Constitution, demanded the amendment of the article relating to the powers of Congress over the subject of suffrage. I read the resolution adopted by Massachusetts:

That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them by the fourth section of the first, article, but 111 cases where a State shall neglect or refuse to nuke the regulations therein mentioned, or shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the people to a free and equal representation iu Congress, agreeably to the Constitution."

In seven of the conventions, at least, this provision of the Constitution had been assailed f y most eminent men. What was done? 'I he First Congress submitted twelve amendments to the Constitution, and neither of them touches the question raised by the four States.

What is the conclusion, then, of the whole matter upon the text of the original Constitution in reference to the question of sufrage. Why, first, that the power to make regulations concerning elections is vested in the States, and secondly, that the power of the General Government upon the subject of the franchise is just as comprehensive as the power of the States, and that we may make regulations, and that wo may alter such regulations as the States have made. This view is supported, first by the necessary theory of the Government that it cannot exist independently of the States if this power iu the General Government is denied. It is also supported by !'the debates iu the Convention that framed the Constitution itself, it is supported by the debates in the State conventions which ratified the Constitution, where the issue was distinctly made npoti that qwstion between the friends of the Constitution and its opponents. The opponents of the Constitution charged that it coittemplated precisely what we now say it means; the supporters of the Constitution did deny that it contemplated precisely what we say it means, and upon that ground th ey advocated the provision. The opponents of the provision in four of the States sought the submission of an amendment to the people giving a different and more limited construction to the article. The Congress of the United States refused to submit such an amendment. This is conclusive evidence that all the men who participated in framing this Government were of opinion that the power to regulate elections was in the States, subject, to the supreme control of the General Government; and this without any inquiry into other provisions of the Constitution, which give us ample basis for all the legislation we now propose.

I come next to the consideration of a provision of the Constitution on which I might safely rest for the exercise of this power, certainly as far as several -States are concerned, even if all that is granted to Congress in the provisions relating to representation were wanting. 1 refer now to the provision of the Constitution by which the United States are to guaranty t o each State a republican form of government. 1 read from the Federalist what is old and very well known. Mr. Hamilton says:

In a confederacy founded upon republican principles and composed of republican members the superintending Government ought clearly to possess authority to defend the system against aristocratic and monarchical measures."

I take it nobody will deny this. In the Pennsylvania convention Mr. Wilson treated the guarantee clause asjustifyingsubstantially what is now proposed. He says:

In this system it is declared that the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. This being made the criterion ot the right of suffrage, it is consequently secured, because thesamo Constitution guaranties to every Si ate in the Union a republican form of government. The right of suffrage is fundamental to republics."

It isnot necessary for my purpose to go further. What is the nature of the difficulty with which we are now dealing? Is it a difficulty in harmony with republican institutions and a republican form of government, or is it a difficulty which is antagonistic to republican institutions? What is the essence of an aristocracy? How is it distinguished from a republic The essence of an aristocracy is in this, that the Government is in certain families made hereditary to the exclusion of others. That is all there is of it. You may limit this aristocracy to twelve men, you may enlarge it to a hundred, to a thousand or to ten thousand; butif limited, if certain persons are included and certain others excluded, not for themselves merely but for all their posterity, you have an aristocracy. There is, 1 submit, to this House, no otherpossibledefinition of an aristocracy; there is no other possible honest distinction between an aristocratic and a republican form of government.

Mr. NIBLACK. I desire to ask the gentleman this question: will not the position which he assumes require us, in order to make a State government republican in form, to confer suffrage also on females to the same extent that we do upon males?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Well, Mr. Speaker, I have myself been rather broad and generous in times past in maintaining the right of people to vote. I see that there is a party coming which promises to go very far in advance ot myself, with more rapid strides than I have been able to take. I am willing, for one, that the gentleman from Indiana [Mr. Nibi vck for the present should maintain the doctrine which ho suggests in the question he puts to me, because I suppose it carries with it as an incident, the result which I seek by this bill. If lie will go with nie in granting suffrage to all male citizens of this country twenty one year of age, without regard to race or color, I will listen most attentively to any argument be shall make here, or anywhere else within njy reach, in. favor of the right of women .to vote.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. The question is, -will you vote for it? We are doing precisely the same thing for you listeriing to ,'your argument; but we do not propose to go with you on this question, and we do not expect you will go, with us on the other question.

Mr. BOUTWELL. I :was proceeding, to consider the distinction between an aristocracy and a republic! I say without hesitation that none of those States in which men are denied the elective franchise for themselves and for all their posterity are republican. They tire aristocracies more or less, offensive to republican -institutions and to republican government, and inasmuch as by the Constitution .the United States has power, and it is made: its duty to. guaranty a. republican form of government to each State, if upon observation we find, as I think we do find in Delaware, in Kentucky in Maryland, in Ohio, and in Pennsylvania, that the .governments are not republican, it becomes our duty to exercise the power vested in us by the Constitution and make those governments republican by law.

Mr. JONES, of Kentucky. I would like to ask the gentleman a question just here. I would ask if he holds that the Constitution of the United ;States prohibits any State from regulating the right of suffrage? And if so, X ask the gentleman how he construes the tenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, I believe, was suggested by his own State of Massachusetts? 1 think when Massachusetts met in State convention to ratify the Constitution of the United States she instructed her delegates not to cease tbeirefforts in the Federal Convention until they had ob tained that amendment, which I will read:

The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people."

Mr. BOUTWELL. I must claim the floor,

Mr. JONES, of Kentucky. I should be very glad to he«xthe gentleman answer iny question.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. We will give the gentleman further time- to answer it. I will move that the House give him further time.

Mr. BOUTWELL. Well, I will answer the question.

Mr. JONES, of Kentucky. If the power is not prohibited by the Constitution to a State, then it exists in the State.

Mr. BOUTWELL. I have already argued that point upon the provision of the Constitution which gives to the States power over the time, places, and- manner of holding elections. I cannot add anything to the statement I made upon that point.

Mr. JONES, of Kentucky. My question is, does the Constitution prohibit the States from regulating the matter .of suffrage?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Thereis a power recognized in the States by the fourth section of the first article, and there is a power in the same section granted to the, General Government concerningthe matter of elections, and the tenth amendment to the Constitution, to which the gentleman refers, doesnot touch this case at all. The power given to the States to regulate the time, places, and manner of holding elections is a specified and distinct power, and it is not disturbed by the tenth amendment. The power given to Congress in the same article to alter those State regulations is a specific power also, and that is not touched by the tenth amendment to the Constitution.

I leave now that portion of my argument based upon the guarantee clause and proceed to the consideration of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States If there were any doubt remaining in the mind of any person as to the power of Congress over this whole subject, as derived from the three provisions of the original text of the Constitution to which I have referred, I believe that every doubt must disappear upon an analysis of the fourteenth, amendment. The first clause? of th 3 ftrst sectioii is in ttesewoids:* "All persons born or naturalized in -the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citiaensiaf theUnitedStates and of the States wherein they reside."

Mark the words I Then comes the inhibition on the States:

N o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."

By the first clause citizens of the United States are citizens of the States in which they reside. One of the immunities, then, and privileges of a citizen of the United States is that he shall be a citizen of the State where he resides, and the inhibition applies as well to the deprivation of rights derived directly from the States as to those rights derived directly from the United States Government. It is a comprehensive inhibition upon the States. They cannot deprive a citizen of the United States of any privilege or immunity which he may enjoy as a citizen of the United States; they cannot deprive him of any privilege or immunity which he may enjoy, or which any other citizen may enjoy as a citizen of the State in which he resides. This declaration in reference to the rights of citizens is for all or it is for nobody. We have certain privileges in this House, the two chief of which are, first, privilege from arrest in certain cases during the sessions and while traveling to and from our respective residences; and the other is, that we are not held answerable elsewhere for anything that we may say here.

Mr. Speaker, consider what is covered by the word "privileged," as used in the Constitution, not interpolated by me for the purpose of this debate. The rights to which I have referred are declared to be the privileges of members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. They are distinctions by which, under the Constitution, we are recognized and set apart from other men. They are privileges, in the language of the lexicographers "peculiar benefits, advantages, immunities." They are for all of us equally. We are characterized in the Constitution as" members."' We are as members' endowed with certain privileges, and under that provision of the Constitution we are peers. What are the privileges under the Constitution of one member are the privileges of every other member. [Here the hammer fell.]

The SPEAKER. The hour of the gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Boutwell] has expired.

Mr. Knott obtained the floor; butyielded to

Mr. ELDRIDGE, who said: I hope the time of the gentleman from Massachusetts will l o ovfonHorl

The SPEAKER. For how long?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I cannot say howlong.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. I do not propose any limitation of the time.

No objection was made.

Mr. Boutwell resumed the floor.

Mr. WARD. Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Very well.

Mr. WARD. I find by reference to the bill now before the House that it proposes to affect the question of suffrage not only in reference to the election of members of Congress, but also in reference to the election of the presidential electors. I have no difficulty in relation to members of Congress, for I believe that we possess that power. But I would ask the gentleman whether this bill is not in violation of that provision of the Constitution which prescribes that presidential electors shall be appointed in such manner as the Legislatures of the several States may respectively direct?

Mr. BOUTWELL. So far as the features of this bill are concerned I would prefer to defer their consideration for the present.

I was saying, Mr. Speaker, when my time expired, that under the Constitution the privileges of members of this House are for us all or they are for none of us. When you have established the righfrof One member here to the benefit of these privileges you have established the right of all the members of the House to the same privileges.

Now, what is the language of the section which I am considering?

"No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridgetbe privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States."

I inquire how are you to distinguish between the various classes' of persons in the several States? By the first clause of this section" all persons born or naturalized in the United States are citizens of the United States." They may have been born in Africa, in Denmark, in Ireland; they may be white, they may be black; but by the Constitution they are citizens of the United States, and by that same Constitution it is declared that the privileges and immunities of citizens of the united States shall not be abridged by any State of this Union. I say again, therefore, that that provision of the Constitution is for all the people or it is for none of them. Under that Constitution we cannot select and say that a man born in this country shall be entitled to certain privileges as a citizen to which a man born elsewhere and naturalized shall not be entitled. We cannot say that a white citizen shall enjoy privileges which are denied to a black citizen or to a naturalized citizen, white or black.

Next, is the right to vote one of the privileges of the citizen? I have here in my hand an authority from the State of Kentucky in which the characteristics of citizens are laid down by the supreme court of that State in most satisfactory and conclusive language, and I am willing to indorse it.

The opinion was given upon questions arising in an action of tort brought by a colored woman named Amy against a man named Smith, who claimed her as his slave. The action was in 1822, and the circumstances of the case were these: the woman was born a slave in the State of Pennsylvania, where she remained until the abolition of slavery was decreed in that State. She then went to Virginia, as I assume, before the admission of Kentucky. .The man Smith, who claimed to be her master, used some brutality toward her for which she commenced an action against him.

The defense was that he washer master, that she was his slave. Her counsel maintained that, inasmuch as she was born in Pennsylvania, and was there when slavery was abolished in that State, she from the moment of the abolition of slavery there became not only free but a citizen of the United States; thathaving obtained in Pennsylvania the rights of a citizen, she was entitled to the benefit of that provision of the Constitution which says that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States. How did the court meet this position? And this is the part of the opinion to which I wish to call the attention of the House. The court say:

It was not, however, of that clause of the Constitution of the United States that the act of 1808 was contended by the plaintiff s counsel to be an infraction, but of the clause which provides that' the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privilege® and immunities of citizens in the several States.' first clause, second section, and fourth article.' To entitle the plaintiff to the benefit of this clause it is obviously necessary that she should be a citizen of some one of the United States; and it is accordingly urged by her counsel, in support of her title to that character, that she was before her removal from Pennsylvania a citizen of that State, and that by her removal to Virginia she become iv citizen of the latter.

"Before we can determine whether she was a citizen or not of either of those States, it is necessary to ascertain what it is that constitutes a citizen. In England, birth iu the country was alone sufficient to make any one a subject. Even a villain or a slave born within the king s allegiance is, according to the principles of the common law, asubject; but it never can be admitted that he is a citizen. One may, no doubt, be a citizen by birth as well as a subject, but subject and citizen are evidently words of different import, and it indisputably requires something more to make a citizen than it does to make a subject. It is. in fact, not the place of a man s birth, but the rights and privileges he may be entitled to enjoy which make him a citizen.

"The term citizen is derived from the Latin word cmis, and in its primary sense signifies one who is vested with the freedom and privileges of a city. At an early period after the subversion of the Roman empire, when civilization had again begun to progress, the cities in every part of Europe, either by usurpation or concession from their sovereigns, obt uiH d extraordinary privileges in addition to those which were common to the other subjects of their respective countries; and one who was invested with th se extraordinary privileges, whether he was an inhabitant of the city or not, or whether ho was bom nt t, or not, was deemed a citizen. (See Ree s Cyclopaedia, under the word citizen.) In England a citizen is not only entitled to all the local privileges of theciiy io which he belongs but hehas also therighfc of electing and being elected to Parliament, whiohis itself rather an extraordinary privilege, since itdoes not belong to every class of subjects, (Com. X Dig. Parliament, 1"). 6, i Inst. 6.)

If we co back to llome. whence the term citizen has its origin, we shall find in the illustrious period of her republic, that citizens were the highest class of subjects to whom the jus cloLtatix belonged, and that the jus civitatis conferred upon those who were in possession ot it all rights and privileges, civil, political, and religious. Butler s Ilorce Juridical. 2fi, 27.)

When the term came to be applied to theinhabifcants of a State, it necessarily carried with it the same signification with reference to the privileges of the State which had been implied by it with reference to the privileges of a city, when it was applied to the inhabitants of the city; and it is in this sense that the term citizen is believed to bo generally, if not universally, understood in the United States. This indeed evidently appears to be the sense in which the term is used in the clause of the Constitution which is under consideration; for the terms 4 privileges and immunities,' which are expressive of the object intended to be secured to the citizens of each State in every other, plainly import, according to the best usages of our language, something more than those ordinary rights of personal security and property which by the courtesy of all civilized nations are extended to the citizens or subjects of other countries while they reside among them.

No one can, therefore, in the correct sense of the term, bo a citizen of a State who is not entitled, upon the terms prescribed bytheinstitutions of the State, to all the rights and privileges conferred by those institutions upon the highest class of society. It is true that females and infants do not personally possess those rights and privileges in any State of the Union, but they are generally dependent upon adult males, through whom they er ioy the benefits of those rights and privileges; and it is a rule of common law, as well as of common sense, that females and infants should in this respect partake of the quality of those adult males who belong to the same class and condition in society, and of course they will or will not be citizens as the adult males of the same class are or are not so.

Nor do we mean to say that it is necessary even for an adultto bo a male citizen that ho should be in the actual enjoyment of all those rights and privileges wichh belong to a citizen. He may not only not be in the actual enjoyment of those rights and privileges, but he may even not possess those qualifications of property, of age, or of residence which most of the States prescribe as requisites to the enjoyment of some of their highest privileges and immunities, and yet be a citizen. But to be a citizen it is necessary thatheshould be entitled to theenjoyment of those privileges andimmunitiesuponthesame terms upon which they are conferred upon other citizens, and unlef s ho is so entitled he cannot. in the proper sense of the term, be a citizen.”

Here is a fall and[ believe a fair statement of what constitutes a citizen. He must be in the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges of any other citizen.

Mr. NICHOLSON". Will the gentleman yield to me for a question?

Mr. BO ITT WELL. Yes, sir.

Mr. NICHOLSON". I desire to inquire whether, when the fourteenth article of the amendments of the Constitution was under discussion in the Thirty Ninth Congress, the gentleman himself, and other members of his party who took part in that discussion, did not concede the distinction between civil and political rights and privileges: and whether they did not also concede that this fourteenth article would not confer political rights upon the class intended to be benefited?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I have no recollection of anything of that sort, though it may be that some persons did make such a concession, I believe that gentlemen on the other side of the House generally claimed that it would confer such rights; and I cannot say but that some members on this side of the House may have disavowed that construction; but I was not one of them.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. Will the gentleman allow me to inquire in this connection whetherit was not conceded at that time that this fourteenth article recognized the existence on the part of the States of the right to regulate suffrage without the control of Congress, subject to the penalty that their representation in Congress might be curtailed if they should exclude from suffrage persons of a certain class?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I will state my views on that point. Of course, I should not omit, in an argument upon this subject, the question suggested by the inquiry of the gentleman from Wisconsin, [Mr. Eldiudgb.] I say, then, considering the first section of the fourteenth article of the amendments, that that section runs entirely in harmony with the previous provision of the Constitution concerning the rights of citizens. It is in harmony with the declaration made by the supreme court of the State of Kentucky, in the opinion from which I have just read, that it is an essential quality of citizenship that the citizen should enjoy the highest privileges that appertain to citizenship in the State or city of which he is a citizen. Therefore, when you prove to me that one man in the State of Kentucky votes for President, or for a Representative in Congress, or for members of the State Legislature, you have proved that every man having like qualifications of education or property has the same right. If you deny it to him you deny that to which by the Constitution he is entitled: the enjoyment of equal privileges and immunities as acitizen of the United States, and as a citizen of Kentucky in the State of Kentucky. Then, sir, by the fifth section of the fourteenth article, Congress has power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of the article. Does anybody doubt—in the presence of this provision of the Constitution, in view of the unlimited power under the fourteenth article to legislate so as to secure to citizens of the United States the privileges and immunities of citizens of any one of the States— does anybody doubt our duty?

Mr, BECK. I desire to ask, if by the first section of the fourteenth amendment it was intended to prevent the States from determining who should and who should not vote, why, when it provides that 4 no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States," it did not add, nor make discriminations among the citizens of the State itself in the exercise of the right of suffrage?

Mr. BOUTWELL. There was the plainest reason in the world. It was not necessary. The article provides, as it stands, that there can be no discrimination by the States among the citizens of the United States, who are as well citizens of the several States and entitled equally to the privileges of citizens.

1 come now to the second section, upon which I know reliance will be placed by the opponents of the bill. It is there provided—

"Sec. 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of eleetoislor President and Vice President of the UnitedStatos, Representatives Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitant.-, of such State, being twenty one years of age and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the ba ns of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty one years of age in such Stato."

If gentlemen will consider these two sections together they will see how entirely in harmony they are with each other, and how wholly unsupported h the doctrine that there is in this second section any concession to a State to abridge or deny to a citizen the right to vote. By the second section there is a political penalty for doing that which in the first section it is declared the State has no right to do. I read the first section:

Sec. 1. AH persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they re ide No State shall make or i enforce any biw which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States: nor shall any State deprive atly person of life, liberty, i iy, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pru „oction of the laws."

It is here provided that there shall be no abridgment of the privileges and immunities of citizens; and in the second section there is a penalty provided for a .State that disregards the inhibition. We were then acting in the presence of the fact that many States of the Union were doing that which the first section declared they had no right to do. It was uncertain when Congress would exercise the power conferred by the fifth section of the fourteenth amendment, and in order that the States should not take advantage of their own wrong during the period while Congress might be inactive a penalty was provided. We knew that Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware were doing what they were inhibited from doing by the first section of the article, and wo said that they should suffer in representation for so doing. Power was given to Congress to remedy this evil, and that power Congress is now called upon to exercise.

But, sir, consider the anomalous feature in our Government if the doctrine be successfully maintained that we cannot legislate on this subject. There are citizens in Kentucky and Maryland who, if the doctrine set forth by the opponents of this bill be a sound constitutional doctrine, are eligible to the office of President or Vice President of the United States, and yet who cannot vote for Representatives in Congress or even for a State, county, or town official. What is the qualification for the office of President? He must be a native citizen of the United States and thirty five years of age. Nothing more. These are the only qualifications for the office of President. By the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution we have declared that all the black men in Maryland and other States shall be citizens of the United States. Certain State governments have for the present denied those people the right to vote, and yet one of them may be elected President of the United States and another Vice President. Is there such an anomaly in our Government? Are we prepared to admit its existence unless the Constitution imperatively requires it? The Constitution provides that any one twenty live years of age, who has been a citizen for seven years, may be elected a Representative upon this floor, and colored men, although denied the right of suffrage in their own States, may be elected to legislate for the whole country. Thus is the General Government put iu an anomalous and inconsistent position.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. The gentleman from Massachusetts has entirely ignored the question I put to him in regard to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The question I desire to put is this: whether there is not in that amendment a distinct recognition of the existence of the power to regulate suffrage in the States themselves?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Oh, no; not the leastMr. ELDIilDGE. Then I do not understand it.

Mr. BOUTWELL. ,If the right to vote for certain officers be denied or abridged, then certain political consequences follow; but in the first section there is a distinct declaration that this cannot lawfully be done. We only recognized the existing facts. We knew there were some States in which the wrong existed. It might require time before Congress could exercise its powers under the fifth section, and the country meant to say that while this state of things continued—a state of things unjust and contrary to the Constitution—the States should not have the benefit of their wrong doing.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. In view of the gentleman s position task him how it is possible that a State can disfranchise any citizen?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I think they cannot properly or lawfully.

Mr. ELDRIDGE. How can they ever cause this penalty to attach? How can they lessen their representation by any acts of their own?

Mr. BOUTWELL. A Legislature may do a thing which as matter of fact they are capable of doing, but which, considered in the light of the Constitution they have no right to do; and while we may have the power by which we caB e0TWet-tbat*«<k i g, still notbeing itt a condkkwrto pafc that p owsr in force wa say meanwhile you shall not take advantage of your own Wrorfg doing .1-•'

T fes bill;- then, is' defensible, first on the original text of theCo«stitutian in which the subject of suffrage is considered it is defensible upon the guarantee clause Of the Constitution; it is defensible upon the fourteenth article of amendmenttothe Constitution; aildk is defensible Ms the exercise «f necessary power in the Government. The power is essential to the existence and preservation of tbe Government, itselfv and "Was- so regarded by tbe men who fraraed the Constitution of 1787.

Leaving the argument I come now to the presentation of certain reasons why we should pass "the bill, and also submit the proposed amendment to the Constitution to the Legislatures of the several States.

Mr. PRUYN. I dislike to interrupt the gentleman, but as he has just stated that he has passed i, in to view another of his point, re cent declaration, I would like on to what ask grounds the bill is defeasible—whether he means that those grounds are cumulative or whether he would rest th^ whole on the original Constitution without the fourteenth article of amendment?

Mr. BOUTWELL. What I mean to say is, if either one of the three positions, which 1 have taken is sound then the bill is defensible; that is- to say, if my construction of the original provisions of the Constitution concerning the power of the national Government over the time, place, and manner of holding elections be correct, or if the power given to us under the guarantee clause of the Constitution be what I assert it to be, or if we rely exclusively upon the fourteenth article of amendment, that either of these constitutes a sufficient justification for what we now propose to do. But when we have the cumulative power— if it be possible to conceive of an accumulation of power in the Constitution—wben we have the cumulative power of those three great provisions added to the supreme necessity of the case that the national Government should have the right to exercise those powers necessary for its own existence, I hold that there remains no longer a constitutional or logical reason why we should: hesitate to acfc.

Mr. PK UYN The statement is not quite satisfactory.

Mr. SHELLABARGER. Before the gentleman proceeds tq the consideration of the other matter I desire to have the benefit of his views upon a difficulty that occurs to my mind in his argument; not because! antagonize with the views he has presented, but simply that I may s have the benefit of his views touching that difficulty. I understood the first proposition of the gentle mart s argument to be substantially this: that■ if the Constitution bad reposed in the States the unlimited power to regulate the matter of voting for Federal officers it would involve this mischief, to wit: that thereby the power, would be- placed in the States to. withhold from the Government the election of Federal officers at all, and that that mischief might be fatal to the Government itself* Am f right in that statement?

•Mr BOUTWELL Yes, sir.

Mr. SHELLABARGER. -Then the gentleman in passing to what is called the guarantee clause of the Constitution• as the third point to be discussed, maintains that the clause operates as a limitation upon the power of the States to prohibit them from Creating what the gentleman calls an aristocracy; in other words, prohibits them from confining the right to vote to such a number of people as that it would not be a republic. Now the question that wish to ask, and the difficulty in my mind that I wish the gentleman to remove is this whether his last proposition does not destroy his first one, and whether, taking the two -together, there is not found in the Constitution, in the guarantee clause, that very check upon the reduction of the representative franchise to such an extent as in his first proposition, be says, would or might overthrow- the Government.

Mr. BOUTWELL. I have no difficulty in my own mind upon that point.- The pro vision in the Constitution in the first article referred to relates exclusively to the subject of suffrage, and the second of the provisions which I have feadras I interpret it, gives to the General Government precisely that power over the subject of voting which the States themselves possess. When a difficulty arises in a State,: relating solely to the matter, of suffrage, we may legislate under and by virtue of these provisions of the Constitution and remedy that particular evil, but the provision in the Constitution in relation to the guarantee by the United States of a republican form of government to each State is a broader authority. It not only relates to the question of suffrage, including that, of course, but it also includes many other possible anti-republican evils or difficulties in a State. As for example the very case which the Supreme Court in the Rhode island controversy suggested, that a State might establish a military government". Suppose they did so, as was done in France, by universal suffrage, it. would be none the less an anti-republican proceeding, a military government antagonizing, superseding a republican government. We might not be able to reach it under the provisions of the first section of the Constitution relative to suffrage, and then we should be obliged to act under the great power vested in the United States to guaranty to each State a republican form of government. We could exertour power, political and military if necessary, to dispossess those people who through universal suffrage had taken military control of the State.

Mr SHELLABARGER Still, Mr. Speaker, I fail to sec how the difficulty is met by the proposition now suggested. If I understand what is now suggested, it is that the guarantee clause was meant to prevent more mischief or other mischief than the mere matter of the curtailment of the right of suffrage.

Mr. BOUTWELL. But includes that.

Mr. SHELLABARGER. And includes that too. But the difficulty still remains,"! suppose, and I will repeat it; .it is this: the first argument or proposition of the gentleman* which has exceeding force, taken by itself, is that if the power to regulate the matter of suffrage be left in the States unlimitedly, then he says the States have the power of the continued existence of the Government iu their hands.

Mr. BOUTWELL. I think I see more distinctly now what point the gentleman has in view.

Mr. SHELLABARGER. My point is this: is not that difficulty in your construction of this clause met and overcome by that which you concede to be included in the other clause?

Mr. BOUTWELL. I have no doubt about that; but then I can understand that ia the work of framing machinery for a Government the Convention of 1787 could very properly have said: we will provide a special remedy for particular grievances or wrongs, to wit, we will give power of the General Government to make or alter any State regulation relating to the times', places, and manner of holding elections. The idea of investigating all the institutions of a. State for the purpose of ascertaining whether its government is republican in form involves larger consequences than a mere inquiry as to whether the ballot is equally enjoyed by all the citizens of a State. They provided in the Constitution a special remedy for these particular difficulties, but in providing a larger remedy for other and greater difficulties they were in the nature of the case led to the use of language which included the subject of suffrage. But for the purposes of the particular inquiry in which we are now engaged, if the provision of the Constitution relating to the times, places, and manner of holding elections had been omitted and the guarantee clause included, we still should have had the necessary authority; or if the .guarantee clause had been omitted and the provision relating to the times, places, and manner of holding elections had been included, we still should have constitutional power sufficient for the present exigency.

If I have made myself clear upon this point I desire now to pass to the consideration of those reasons operating upon my mind in favor of the passage of a bill, and the submission by joint resolution, also, of an amendment to the Constitution of the United States. And I must speak very plainly, though my words may, as Ianticipatethey will, give opportunity for those who atfe opposed to this measure to indulge in criticism upon what I may say. Our object is to secure universal suffrage to all adult male citizens of this country. The power is in our bands, 'first, as a Congress, and secondly as a party responsible for what this Congress does. If we submit a constitutional amendment alone, we in a certain sense admit that the power for which I ara now contending is wanting. More than that; there are but twenty five States to which we at the present time could look for the ratification of this amendment. We have then to secure three other Statesin support of the proposition. We are to enter upon that work with a certain amount of prejudice against and traditionary opposition to negro suffrage. Sir, I doubt not that nine tenths of the Republican party of the country are in favor of manhood suffrage. One tenth of the party are not in favor of it, and they constitute the great obstacle in the way of perfecting this benign measure. For one, I am in favor of taking the responsibility of the position which we occupy. We are responsible for universal suffrage as one of the crowning measures of an administrationof eightyears' duration, to be continued for four years by the judgment of the people already pronounced. The great majority of the people—and in this connection 1 will say that by *‘the people’’ I mean those who on the 3d of November last supported General Grant for the Presidency—the great majority of them expect of us the consummation of this plan. We have at this moment the right and thepower on our side. Why, then, not submit a bill alone? Because there is no provision in the Constitution by which the United States is denied the power of abridging the right of citizens to vote There is, in the fourteenth article of amendments to the Constitution, a limitation upon the power of the States in that respect, but none upon the power of the United States. The amendment which we propose secures the people against any abridgment of their electoral power, either by the United States or by the States. In that alone there is sufficient reason to justify the amendment.

In the next place, although I am myself persuaded of the existence of the power, and that it covers all State officers, still a different argument may be made against the proposition to legislate in reference to State officers from that which can be made against the proposition contained in this bill. Exercising the power which we possess, we provide that members of the State Legislatures shall be elected by all the adult male citizens in the several States.

Mr. BINGHAM. Will the gentleman yield to trie at this point for a moment?

Mr. BOUTWELL. Certainly.

Mr. BINGHAM. If I have heard the gentleman aright, in the progress of his remarks he has said repeatedly that the drift of this proposition was to secure political power to the male adult citizens of the United States. Now, I would ask the gentleman if the proposed amendment as printed contains any such provision at all? l oI understand the gentleman aright as saying that the object is to secure the political power in the several States of this Union to the adult male citizens of the United States?

Mr. BOUTWELL. That is the purpose of the amendment.

Mr. BINGHAM. Then I would call the attention of the gentleman to the fact that this joint resolution as printed does not relate to the adult male citizens of the United States.

Mr. .BOUTWELL, It does not. speak of them as such. I do not desire now to discuss that particular provision of the proposed amendment. I will, however, listen at another time to any suggestion on that point the gentleman may desire to make, either in public or in private.

Mr. BINGHAM. I hope I shall have the opportunity to move an .amendment to this joint resolution, to improve its language.

Mr. BOUTWELL. Opportunity will certainly be given for amendment, as we desire to perfect this proposition.

If we rely exclusively upon a bill which when enacted is merely a law, and subject to congressional control and to all the vicissitudes of politics and changes of opinion, we cannot be assured of its fate in some future Congress. Therefore, if we have power to do what is contemplated in this bill, let us act. Having given to the colored people in several of the States the power to vote we have put into the politics of the country an element by which the amendment itself can be carried. I speak very plainly, because I have no processes in my own mind in reference to this or any other public measure which I am not at all times willing to disclose. There are one hundred and fifty thousand citizens of the United States who by this bill will be entitled to the elective franchise but who are now disfranchised— seventeen hundred in Connecticut, ten thousand in New York, five thousand in New Jersey, fourteen thousand in Pennsylvania, seven thousand in Ohio, twenty four thousand in Missouri, forty five thousand in Kentucky, four thousand in Delaware, thirtyfive thousand in Maryland—who will rally to the support of this constitutional amendment if by the law they are enfranchised. These men have by the Constitution and by the judgment of the people of this country been declared citizens and entitled to all the rights of citizens. Now, in this struggle for the establishment of manhood satiVage in the country are we to decline the services of one hundred and fifty thousand men who are ready to do battle for us at the ballot box in favor of human rights: not of their own rights merely, but of the rights of all men on this continent?