Debates in the House of Representatives on the Fifteenth Amendment, 1869

January 27, 1869 (3)

sufmage again.33 min read
1: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 1 (House1869.Jan27c.1)

Mr. ELDRIDGE. Mr. Speaker, the decree may have been pronounced, the hat may have gone forth commanding another invasion of the jurisdiction and rights of the States by the Federal authorities. Partisan statesmen, with wisdom superior to the framers of the Constitution, may probably have discovered another opportunity to increase and prolong their party power by another usurpation, by another encroachment of the Federal Government upon the proper rights of the States. If so, I have not the vanity to suppose that anything I can say will cause them to hesitate or consider. Party ends must be accomplished, party purposes must be carried out even though it should revolutionize the Government, overthrow the Constitution, and destroy the Republic.

2: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 2 (House1869.Jan27c.2)

The time was when the suggestion of grave doubts of constitutional warrant would cause the advocates of a pending measure to hesitate, to reflect; when want of constitutional power would insure defeat; when even unquestioned powers which had been long unused were approached with reserve and exercised only after much deliberation and careful debate. Innovation and reform, however specious and desirable, were rejected at once and finally unless clearly sanctioned by constitutional authority. That no error might be committed, that the provisions of the Constitution might be comprehended in all the fullness of their import, resort was freely had to the opinions of its framers, the debates upon its consideration and adoption, and the contemporaneous history of the country and the times. It was no disparagement to the statesman or his argument that it was based upon the Constitution. It was the highest authority, both in its powers and limitations. It was truly considered not only the bond of our Union and the grant of all the powers that could be rightfully exercised by the Federal Government, but it was the palladium of American liberty. I will not stop now to point out the changes that have taken place in this respect, or to give the different views of modern Solons upon it. My friends on this side of the House will not soon forget the' manifestations of scorn and contempt with which their arguments, baSed upon the Constitution, have been met by the majority. We shall remember long the charges of disloyalty to our country, of treason to our Government, and of sympathy with its enemies, based only upon the fact that we would not join them in violating and disregarding its provisions.

3: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 3 (House1869.Jan27c.3)

But, sir, I shall not be driven from the line of my duty; I shall not shrink from the like argument upon this or any other measure because of any such attacks from those who contemn and despise our Constitution of Government.

4: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 4 (House1869.Jan27c.4)

I shall not attempt to analyze this bill or to examine its provisions in detail. The main feature and purpose of the bill are to take from the States the right to determine the qualification of voters. It provides—

5: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 5 (House1869.Jan27c.5)

That no State shall abridge or deny the right of any citizen of the United States to vote for electors of Presidentand Vice Presidentof the United States, or for Representatives in Congress, or for members of the Legislature of the State in which he may reside, by reason of race, color, or previous condition of slavery; and any provisions in the laws or constitution of any State inconsistent with this section are hereby declared null and void.

6: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 6 (House1869.Jan27c.6)

Thus it is proposed by this bill to invade the jurisdiction of State authority and subject all the States of the. Union to Federal control. This long conceded right of the States to determine for themselves who of their citizens shall exercise the right of suffrage within their respective jurisdictions is now for the first time to be taken away by act of Congress from all the States of this Union. It would seem that the exercise of this power by the States, almost unquestioned ever since and before the adoption of the Constitution, for more than eighty years, would cause gentlemen to hesitate before taking such a step. Is not the argument that the Federal Government, the people, and all the States have acquiesced so long in the exercise of this power by the several States almost conclusive? No two of the States have adopted provisions by which the same and all the same class or classes of their citizens vote. Some even have not confined the right to citizens at all. Aliens having declared their intentions only are in several of the States permitted to exercise the right of suffrage. There can scarcely be said to be any uniformity. The laws on the subject are as variant and diversified as the climate and the productions of the States themselves. And yet the right and power of the several States to determine this question of the qualification of voters can hardly be said to have been doubted. I do not ignore the fact that some one or more honorable gentlemen on this floor and in the other branch of Congress, together with some pseudo commentators upon the Constitution, blinded, as I think, by the heated passions of fanaticism and war, have professed to believe and have declared that Congress has the constitutional power necessary to pass this bill. But the conclusions of these gentlemen are, I apprehend, more from the desire that a Congress composed of their friends should intervene and control the suffrage of the States in the interest of the party to which they are attached than from any settled conviction of constitutional warrant. Their views and opinions are confused, and they seem uncertain upon what provision of the Constitution to rest them, i They base them more upon what they consider the necessity of the times, the wants of the nation, and the will of the people, as expressed through the party to which they adhere, than upon any express or implied grant of power to the Federal Government in and by the Constitution itself. The Constitution declares that—

7: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 7 (House1869.Jan27c.7)

The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people the several States, and the electors in each State snail have tae qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous- branch of the State Legislature. —Constitution, art. 1, sec. 2, clausc 1.

1 connection
8: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 8 (House1869.Jan27c.8)

This, as I believe, is the only prevision of the Constitution in any manner dictating or prescribing the qualifications of electors. "And the electors of each State shall have the qualifications requisite, for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature." Can any candid, fair-minded man pretend that this provision is a grant of power to Congress to intervene and prescribe the qualification of electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature? Is it not all that Congress can do to insist or require that the same body or class or classes of persons who are allowed to vote or qualified as electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature shall be the electors of members of the House of Representatives? Arid are they not to be the same persons who are by the State laws declared qualified electors of the most numerous branch of the Legislature of the State? It seems to me nothing can be clearer. No language can make it more explicit. All is left to the State except only that the persons the State designates as its electors ot the most numerous branch of its Legislature shall be the constitutional electors of the House of Representatives. The Constitution provides that the State may determine the persons who shall be electors of members of the House of Representatives by its act of determining who shall be the electors of its most numerous legislative branch. This right of the State to determine the qualification of the electors of the members of its Legislature is older than the Constitution. The State derived the power from the people of the State before the Constitution was adopted. The power, therefore, remains in the State until it is taken away.' There is nothing in the Constitution, nothing in the provision quoted certainly, granting the power to the Federal Government or prohibiting it to the State.

1 connection
9: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 9 (House1869.Jan27c.9)

In No. 52 of the Federalist, the authorship of which is claimed by both Hamilton and Madison, the following language is used with reference to this subject and the provision of the Constitution referred to:

10: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 10 (House1869.Jan27c.10)

"To have reduced the different qualifications in the different States to one uniform rulewouid probably have been asdissatisfaetory tosomeoftheStates as it would have been difficult to the Convention. The provision made by the Convention appears, therefore. to be the best that lay within their option. It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is coni ormable to the standard already established or which may bo established by the State itself. It will bo safe to the United States because being fixed by the State constitutions it is not alterable by the State governments; and it cannot be feared that the peordo of the States will alter this part of their constitutions r i such manner as to abridge the rights secured to them by the Federal Constitution."

11: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 11 (House1869.Jan27c.11)

It appears thus clearly by the opinion of these most distinguished statesmen, written in advocacy of the Constitution at a time when no passion or partisan prejudice influenced theirjudgment or clouded their understandings, that it was the intention of the framers to leave the qualification of electors as established or to be established by the State itself. And this provision they declare "was the best within the option of the Convention."

12: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 12 (House1869.Jan27c.12)

Judge Curtis, in his History of the Constitution, shows that what was then feared most was universal suffrage in its most unrestricted sense, or that foreigners might be admitted. And he uses the following language:

13: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 13 (House1869.Jan27c.13)

The adoption of this principle avoided the necessity of disfranchising any portion of the people of a State by a system ol qualifications unknown to their laws. As the States were the best judges of the eireumstahe s and temperof their own people it was ecrtai- ly best to conciliate them to the support of the new Coustitution by this concession —CartU v History of the Constitution, vol. 2, p. 200.

14: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 14 (House1869.Jan27c.14)

Further along, in the same connection, Mr. Curtis says:

15: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 15 (House1869.Jan27c.15)

"Accordingly, although very strenuous efforts were made to introduce into the Constitution of the United States particular theories with regard to popular suffrage, some of the members being in favor of one restriction and some ot another, the rule which referred the right in each State to its domestic law was sustained by a large majority of the Convention —Page 202.

16: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 16 (House1869.Jan27c.16)

In this view all the commentators that I have been able to consult agree. It was a reference of the whole question to the domestic law—to the law of the State. The House of Representatives was to be composed of members chosen every two years by the people of the several States, the requisite qualifications of the electors of whom were expressly referred to the law established by the State itself. And this provision was sustained by a large majority of the Convention. The advocates of this bill must therefore look to some other provision of the Constitution for the power to pass it. There is no grant here to the Federal Government. It only authorizes the same electors to elect members of the House of Representatives who by the laws of the State are qualified electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature. This is what was intended, and all that can be claimed for it.

1 connection
17: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 17 (House1869.Jan27c.17)

Can authority for this bill be found under article one, section four, clause one of the Constitution?

1 connection
18: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 18 (House1869.Jan27c.18)

"The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in euoh State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter -ueli regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators."

1 connection
19: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 19 (House1869.Jan27c.19)

The times, places, and manner of holding the elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof. The times, places, and manner; "but the Congress may at any time make or alter such regulations." What regulations may Congress make or alter? Clearly, the times, places, and manner, and nothing else: the times when and the places where the elections shall take place. This is clear and unmistakable. And is there any more room for doubt as to the import of the term "manner?" It seems to me not. It cannot relate to the qualification of the electors. This is left where it was at the adoption of the Constitution—with the States themselves. Manner must relate to the manner of conducting the election, whether by ballot or viva voce, to the mode or manner in which the elector shall signify his choice, shall express his will. This was the opinion of Mr. Justice Story, in his able and most exhaustive commentary on the Constitution, where we should almost suppose he had these bills under consideration. He says:

1 connection
20: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 20 (House1869.Jan27c.20)

What would be said of a clause introduced into the national Constitution to regulate the State elections of the members of the State Legislatures? It would be deemed a most unwarrantable transfer of power, indicating a premeditated design to destroy the State governments. It would be deemed so flagrant a violation of principle as to require no comment —Story on the Constitution, sec. 8X9.

21: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 21 (House1869.Jan27c.21)

This bill proposes to regulate the State elections of members of the State Legislature; precisely what Story says would indicate an unmistakable design to destroy the State governments. Again Justice Story says:

22: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 22 (House1869.Jan27c.22)

Nor can it be said with correctness that Congress can m any way alter the lights or qualifications of voters —Ibid section 820.

23: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 23 (House1869.Jan27c.23)

Mr. Story seems to liaveadopted very nearly the language of Hamilton on the same subject in No. 5 9 of the Federalist, where he most emphatically condemns the idea even of introducing such au article into the Constitution. He says:

24: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 24 (House1869.Jan27c.24)

"Suppose an article had been introduced into the Constitution empowering the United States to regulate the elections for the particular States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an unwarrantable transposition of power and as a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments

25: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 25 (House1869.Jan27c.25)

Ill those days no man would have hesitated to condemn it. The Constitution could never have been adopted if it had contained the grant of power to Congress to determine the qualification of voters for officers of (he States. Such a work is left for these days of revolution and usurpation—to the mad fanatics who for partisan ends would destroy our Republic of States. These authorities not only show that the power to regulate the qualification of electors is not granted to the Federal Government, but that it ought not to be possessed by it.

27: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 27 (House1869.Jan27c.27)

"It would be a most unwarrantable transfer of power, indicating a premeditated design to destroy the State government."

29: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 29 (House1869.Jan27c.29)

"An unwarrantable transposition of power,"* "a premeditated engine for the destruction of the State governments."

30: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 30 (House1869.Jan27c.30)

Sir, for myself I most heartily indorse and believe this This measure originated in hostility to the States, and most certainly menaces their existence. Every step in the direction of this bill and joint resolution is a step toward centralization and consolidation. It evinces a premeditated design upon the life of the States —a design to concentrate all the powers of government in the Federal head. And with this scheme consummated, and the others contemplated by the party in power, there will be very little left of the States; the rights, powers, and all the vast interest confided to them by the people will be crushed and destroyed under the advancing foot of empire. The States cannot long stand against the grasping and growing power of the Federal Government.

31: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 31 (House1869.Jan27c.31)

Mr. Speaker, after the most careful examination and inquiry, I venture the assertion that, no friend or advocate of the Constitution at the time of its adoption by the Convention and ratification by the States can be found to have claimed even that the power to prescribe the qualification of voters in the States was conferred upon the Federal Government. It is true that the opponents of the Constitution argued against it on the ground that it might be so construed; that Congress—some future Congress—might undertake to exercise the power of determining what persons should exercise the right of suffrage. The gentleman from Massachusetts [Mr. Boutwell] admits, as I understood him, that this was the charge made against the Constitution by its opponents. Patrick Henry was one of them. He made every argument which his great genius could suggest to stir up hostility to it. But who but thegentleman from Massachusetts would argue a constitutional grant of power against the plain letter of the instrument on the suggestions of those opposed to it and seeking to defeat its adoption merely because those suggestions were undenied by its friends? ‘The gentleman, however, is mistaken when he says that the friends of the Constitution did not deny that this power was conferred upon the United States Government, or that the friends did not deny this construction of those who were opposed to it. It was not only denied in the discussions in the Convention, but it was deliberately denied by Hamilton and Madison in the passage already quoted from the Federalist. What denial can be more explicit than this?

32: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 32 (House1869.Jan27c.32)

"The provision made by the Convention appears therefore to be the best that lay within their option. It must bo satisfactory to every State, becnuuo it is conformable to the standard already established or which may be established by the State itself."

33: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 33 (House1869.Jan27c.33)

And again, (No. 60 of the Federalist,) Mr. Hamilton makes the most emphatic denial, and refers to another previous occasion when he had done so. He says:

34: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 34 (House1869.Jan27c.34)

“The truth is, that there is no method of securing to the rich the preference apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either for those who ni iy elect or be elected. But this forms no part of the power to bo conferred upon the national Government. Its authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, tiie places and the manner of elections. The qualifications ol the persons who may choose oi be chosen, as has been remarked upon another occasion, ai e defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are unalterable by tile Legislature" [ot the Union.]

35: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 35 (House1869.Jan27c.35)

By reference to the fifth volume of Eliot s Debates it will be seen that the denials and statements in the debates were no less clear and definite. First by—

36: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 36 (House1869.Jan27c.36)

"Mr. Wilson. This part of the report was well considered by the committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations, he thought, too, should be avoid'- d.

37: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 37 (House1869.Jan27c.37)

"Air. Ellswoehi thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the national Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best judges of the circumstances and temper of their own people.

38: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 38 (House1869.Jan27c.38)

"Mr. Mapison. The right of "uffrftge is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican government. and oucrb t not to bo left to be regulated by the Legislature" [of the Union 1

39: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 39 (House1869.Jan27c.39)

Mr. George Nicholas, in his opening speech in the Virginia convention, (vol. 3 Eliot s De bates, p. 42,) made these remarks, showing his construction of it:

40: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 40 (House1869.Jan27c.40)

"As the qualifications of electors are different in the different States, no particular qualifications, uniform through the States, would have been politic, as it would have caused a great inequality in the electors, resulting from the situation and circumstances of the respective States. Uniformity of qualificationa would greatly affect the yeoniany in the State?, as it would either exclude from this inherent right some who are entitled to itby the laws of some States at present, or be extended so universally as to defeat tlie admirable end of the institution of representation.

41: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 41 (House1869.Jan27c.41)

Iti view of these emphatic and distinct avowals of the members of the Convention, how is it possible for the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts to claim that the construction put upon the Constitution by Patrick Henry and others who opposed it was not denied? And will gentlemen still contend that the power exists in the Federal Government to regulate the qualification of electors in the States by the silence and acquiescence of the friends of the Constitution? The passage quoted from fiie debates and attributed to Mr. Madison can have very little weight when compared with his more deliberate and solemn written declarations. In my judgment, the evidence that tliq power to regulate the qualification of voters was left with the States, and that the Convention so intended from its language, from the declaration of the members, from the concurrenthistory, from all respectable commentators, is conclusive and overwhelming. Any other conclusion will do violence to the plain letter of the Constitution, and be a falsification of the history and debates upon it.

42: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 42 (House1869.Jan27c.42)

The argument that if this power is with the States, and not subject to the ultimate control and regulation of the national Government, the States have it in their power to refuse to act upon the question, and thereby fail or neglect to send Representatives to Congress and thus destroy the Government, has very little force. Congress having the power to regulate the time, place, and manner of holding the elections, has all the power that was thought necessary, all that is necessary. This being done, the persons qualified to vote for members of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature can and will meet and elect Representatives. It can make no difference that the electors are determined by the State. Electors qualified to elect and having the right to vote for members of the State Legislature exist, and must always exist so long as the State itself, as such, exists; and Congress can require them to meet, at the time and place and cast their ballots in the manner it may see fit to designate.

1 connection
43: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 43 (House1869.Jan27c.43)

Mr. BOUTWELL. As the gentleman has appealed to me, he will permit me to say a word. lie has declared that I was in error in affirming that the debates show no denial by the friends of the Constitution of the position taken by Patrick Henry. I desire to say that I was familiar with the quotations which the gentleman has cited and which, taken by themselves, do certainly imply that the authors of those remarks did not understand the power for which I contend as being vested in the General Government; but 1 believe it will be found that in all those cases they were discussing the question of primary jurisdiction, not that of ultimate jurisdiction, for which 1 have contended.

44: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 44 (House1869.Jan27c.44)

Mr. ELDRIDGE, I cannot yield further; the gentleman has already occupied a couple of hours on this question.

45: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 45 (House1869.Jan27c.45)

But the gentleman from Massachusetts, my colleague on the committee, made one other argument which cannot fail to notice. He claimed, as 1 understood him, that the powerof Congress to make or alter such regulations as the State might prescribe, was coextensive with the power granted to the State, and that if the Congress could not regulate the qualifications of electors the States did not possess the power to prescribe them. This is a fundamental error—I had almost said blunder. It is basing the argument upon the most fatal heresy of these times—the heresy out. of which the evils have grown that threaten the very life of the Republic of States. It reverses the entire order and system of our Government. The gentleman must have forgotten that the Federal Government is a Government of delegated powers—

46: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 46 (House1869.Jan27c.46)

"Thai the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people —TevJ lt Amendment of Constitution.

1 connection
47: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 47 (House1869.Jan27c.47)

The power to determine the qualifications of electors was, in the States, conferred, as we have before stated, by the people of the States, in most if not all of them imbedded in their constitutions when the Federal Constitution was formed and adopted. And that power has never been delegated to the General Government, and has not been prohibited to the States. It rests, therefore, where the people of the States placed it: in the States themselves. Sir, the powers and rights and liberties of the States and people do not come down from Congress or the Federal Government. There are some powers with which Congress has not been entrusted. Congress cannot determine just how much of liberty the people shall enjoy, just how they shall speak and move and breathe. All the powers of the Federal Government come up from the States and people, and it never had 'and never can have the rightful authority to exercise any power not granted in and by the Constitution. The exercise of any other is rank usurpation. I do not suppose it is seriously believed, or will be seriously contended, that the passage of this bill is warranted under the clause of the Constitution, The United States shall guaranty to every State in this Union a republican form of government." For Congress to intervene under the pretense that the States to which the bill is to apply have not now a republican form of government is to decide that there are no States now in the Union that have a republican form; for the bill applies alike to all the States. It is to decide that there never have been any States of this Union that have had a republican form. If there be any State that has a republican form, that State ought to be excepted from its operation. I am not aware of any one who has the hardihood to claim that the original States were not republican in form, and if they were, that settles the question of the power of Congress to interfere with them under this provision.

1 connection
48: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 48 (House1869.Jan27c.48)

The United States is not to guaranty any particular form of republican government, The States certainly have the right to select or choose for themselves the form, only so that it is republican. All are not by the Constitution required to be Massachusetts. Ohio s form may at least suit her people better, and the United States has no power to dictate or guaranty the one or the other as a choice of particular republican forms.

49: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 49 (House1869.Jan27c.49)

If it were claimed that no State is repub lican in form that does not allow all its citizens to vote, then we should have no republican States, because no one of the States does allow all its citizens to exercise this privilege. It will not be claimed, I suppose, that the State has not a republican form of government for the reason only that it denies to its negro citizens what it also denies to our citizens' wives and daughters. And if citizenship alone confers the right to vote, and a State is not republican that denies the right to an uneducated, half civilized colored man, how mncn more is the State not republican in form that denies the educated, cultivated, and refined woman the right. But, sir, citizenship does not necessarily carry with it the right to vote or hold office under our system. Nor can the denial to a citizen of the right to vote by a State destroy the republican form of its government. It was not so understood at the adoption of the Constitution, and has never been so claimed by any sane man. That the question of who shall exercise the right of suffrage is a delicate and most important question 1 admit. That the power of determining it ought to he dispassionately and wisely exercised is equally true. On its being so used depends greatly the welfare and happiness of the body politic and the permanence and endurance of our republican Government and institutions. But that this power rests in the States, and ought to rest there, I have no doubt, That the rights and liberties of the people are safer with this, power in the control of the States than in the control of the Federal Government I certainly believe. And, sir, without meaning any disrespect to the gentleman from Massachusetts, [Mr. Bociwell,] I must say that it seems to me that his bill and resolution for the amendment of the Constitution, and his "cumulative remedies, as he styled them, for the evils which exist in his judgment with reference to the persons who ought to exercise the right of suffrage, is a felodese■ If the power exists in the Federal Government to pass this bill, whether under any one or all the provisions referred to, then I admit that Congress has the right to control the whole question of suffrage and the qualification of electors for all officers, State and national. There can be no reason for its entering the State and determining the qualification of those who are to elect the officers named in the bill that will not apply to every officer of the State so far as the question of power is concerned. The electors of President and Vice President are not named in section four of the first article. The power claimed, therefore, under the word" manner" in this section can no more apply to them than to the Governor of the State or any other State officer. So that if it covers electors it may as well cover, and does as necessarily cover, all that is contemplated by the amendment proposed by the joint resolution.' The amendment is, then, worse than useless. If it be necessary for the purpose it contemplates it must be a most pregnant admission that the bill is unconstitutional.

1 connection
50: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 50 (House1869.Jan27c.50)

I submit, however, without stopping to consider it at any length, that so far as the election of electors of President and Vice President is concerned, the bill is in direct violation of clause two, section one, article two of the Constitution, which provides:

1 connection
51: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 51 (House1869.Jan27c.51)

"Bach State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors," &o.

1 connection
52: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 52 (House1869.Jan27c.52)

If" manner’’ be the broad term contended for' by the gentleman the whole subject belongs to the State, under this provision:

53: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 53 (House1869.Jan27c.53)

"Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct," ic.

1 connection
54: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 54 (House1869.Jan27c.54)

And yet by this bill the whole power with reference to the electors is to be substantially taken away from the State Legislature. It "manner," in the clause previously referred to, allows the United States to prescribe the qualification of electors, 1 submit the same construction should be given to it in this, and that therefore Congress has no power by this bill to take it away or prescribe qualifications different from those the State may determine.

55: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 55 (House1869.Jan27c.55)

Sir, I do not think the gentleman from Massachusetts gave a proper consideration to the fourteenth amendment, as it is called. I will not consider the question of whether this amendment is a part of the Constitution; for myself I do not believe it is. The gentleman treated it as though he thought otherwise. I will remark, however, that if it was properly ratified and adopted I know of no palliation of the guilt of those gentlemen who have denied the representation of those States without whose action it never could have become and never can be considered as a part of the Constitution. The gentleman denied that there is in this amendment i ny recognition of the right of the States to determine the question of suffrage or who should exercise it. It seems to me nothing could be plainer. Section two provides—

1 connection
56: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 56 (House1869.Jan27c.56)

"Representation shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers. &c. But when the right to vote C at any election"****" is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, &c., the basis of representation therein shall be reduced," &e.*

1 connection
57: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 57 (House1869.Jan27c.57)

But when the right to vote at any election is denied or abridged in such State;" can there be any doubt or mistake that this language recognizes and expressly admits the power to be in the State to abridge or deny the right to some of its inhabitants to vote, subject only to have the basis of its representation reduced thereby? What other meaning can be attached to or constructio i put upon i.|? tlie gentleman candid when be denied it? It is too plain to admit of demonstration. It was understood to concede this power in the States at the time it was considered in this House, as every gentleman then on this floor must bear me witness. The gentleman says it was only a punitive provision, in case the States should violate its duty and be otherwise beyond the reach of Congress. This is an absurdity. I assert it was intended as a fundamental provision of this Government, and devised for the very purpose of compelling the States, wherein the power to determine the qualification of voters was conceded to rest, to grant suffrage to negroes. It was understood to be optional with the State to grant this right of suffrage to its negroes or have its representation in Congress proportionately diminished. Hon. Thaddeus Stevens, the late leader of the Republican party in this House, urged this view of the matter with peculiar emphasis. He thought the love of power and the desire for representation in the House of Representatives would be sufficient guarantee that the right of suffrage would not be long withheld from the colored men of the States. The power of the States to regulate and determine the qualification of voters was not questioned, except perhaps by one member on this floor, and no gentleman can truthfully deny the fact. And, sir, I assert that no man who voted for that amendment can consistently contend that the power to determine the qualifications of voters in the States does not exist in the State itself. And no lawyer can doubt that the amendment does distinctly recognize the power to be in the States. The gentleman argues that the State might refuse to obey a law of Congress regulating or prescribing the qualification of voters, and that this section was intended to punish the State for such refusal. How is this possible, I asked the gentleman, and he failed to answer. If Congress has the constitutional power to enact a law, and does so, declaring who shall vote in a State, any act of the State Legislature in conflict with it would be no law; it would be absolutely null and void. The act of Congress in pursuance of the Constitution is the supreme law, and must necessarily annul the act of the State. The question, therefore, recurs, how can the State incur the penalty? And the answer must be, it is impossible. The law of Congress executes itself by destroying and blotting out the act of the State and leaving the citizen free to exercise the right conferred upon him by the law of Congress. This is too plain for argument, and I will not pursue it.

58: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 58 (House1869.Jan27c.58)

But right or wrong, constitutional or unconstitutional, whether for the best interest of the Republic or jeopardizing in an untried and doubtful experiment the happiness and prosperity of the whole people, the measure must be passed into a law. And the gentleman makes his final appeal upon party grounds— an appeal—I say it without intending disrespect toward him—unworthy of himself, unworthy the discussion of grave constitutional questions, and unworthy to be heeded by the honorable gentlemen of this House. It is an appeal not without influence upon the selfish and unprincipled partisan, npon the political gamester who postpones his country to his party. He tells us that the passage of this bill will add one hundred and fifty thousand voters to his party—seventeen hundred in Connecticut, ten thousand in New York, five thousand in New Jersey, fourteen thousand in Pennsylvania, seven "thousand in Ohio, twenty four thousand in Missouri, forty five thousand in Kentucky, four thousand in Delaware, and thirty five thousand in Maryland, and he wishes to know if the service of these men who are ready to do battle with his party at the ballotbox are to be declined. Was everbelbre such an appeal made by statesman to a great political party just coming victoriously out from a great political contest? Is it a confession that the course of the party is to be such in its administration that this vast accession of recruits will be necessary to preservers power? Is it a confession in advance that it is to be discarded by those who fought and helped it to win its last great victory, and that its future success and power must depend upon the negro vote? The gentleman felt the reproach of his appeal in support of his bill, and boasted that he was a plain spoken as he showed he was a bold man in braving criticism upon this part of his speech. I confess I thought him bold, not so much in daringthe criticism of this side of the House, as in presuming so unworthy an appeal to gentlemen on that.

59: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 59 (House1869.Jan27c.59)

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from Massachusetts started out by telling us this is" the last of the series of great measures growing out of the rebellion and necessary for the reorganization and pacification ofthecountry" with which the Republican party has been charged. I think I express the universal sentiment of the people of the country when I say that I thank God and the Republican party that this is the last. But I would like to have gentlemen inform this House and the country how the party became charged with this measureand by what authority they undertake to "reorganize the country;" how the rebellion has invested the Republican party in Congress with the authority to go into the States of Pennsylvania and Ohio and the other northern States with its bills of reorganization? I expected it to do so; I did not suppose it would be satisfied with reorganizing the southern States. I am not disappointed, but where did the party obtain its power, its commission, its charge to reorganize the States that did not rebel? It was not by the election of General Grant, for he was elected upon no such platform. Oneofthe planks of the platform laid down by the convention that nominated him laid down the same doctrine that I have endeavored to maintain—

60: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 60 (House1869.Jan27c.60)

"That the question of suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to thepeople of those States." The Republican party was charged, if charged at all, by this resolution to let the loyal States alone—to let the people of those States regulate the question of suffrage for themselves. The convention unanimously declared that" the question of suffrage in all the loyal States properly belongs to the people of those States," and thereby virtually that Congress had nothing to do with it. What has caused the party to change front? If the question properly belonged to those States during the elections of last fall, what have the States done since to deprive themselves of the right? If the question did not properly belong to Congress then how has it become invested with the propriety now of disposing of it in those States?

61: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 61 (House1869.Jan27c.61)

Mr. Speaker, if it be possible that the Republican party can commit itself to anything, it is in its support of the so called fourteenth amendment, and in and by its action in national convention, committed solemnly to the doctrine that the people of the several States have properlythe right to control the question of suffrage in their respective States. And, in my judgment, the Republican members of this House cannot force this measure upon the country at this time without covering their party with another dishonor, without a shameful violation of party pledges and party faith. Was this declaration of principle the honest sentiment of the party at the time it was incorporated in the platform, or was the placing it there an intended premeditated fraud to induce support of the candidates and to be ignored and disregarded when the victory should be achieved? How many States would the party have carried upon the measure^ now being ui tfed With the provisions of this bill in the platform where would have been Pennsylvania and Ohio and Indiana? It alone would have defeated your candidates for President and Vice President with all their great personal popularity.

62: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 62 (House1869.Jan27c.62)

The gentleman from Massachusetts affected some sympathy with foreigners, and intimated that this measure was in the interest of the white man as well as the black, and that it would be a protection of the Irishman, the German, and the Scandinavian. These crocodile tears for the white foreigner will be duly appreciated by us all, and especially by the foreigner, when the gentleman shall have made his speech and cast his vote on the bill being prepared by his party friends to prevent, obstruct, or embarrass naturalization.

63: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 63 (House1869.Jan27c.63)

The gentleman seemed to deplore his inability to present the principles involved in these great measures except in what he called "a party aspect." It is some satisfaction to know that gentlemen are not utterly insensible of the low plain upon which these schemes are urged and advocated. Party aspect, indeed 1 These measures have their origin and support in the most intense partyism. Party, party! It is the infernal spirit of party that has controlled, sunk, and degraded so much of the legislation of Congress during and since the war. It was the fell spirit of party against which the almost dying words of Washington warned his countrymen. Party! What crimes have not since that day been committed in its name and by its relentless demand 1 Party has kept the dissevered fragments of the Union asunder ever since the war ended. Insatiate party has destroyed the republican character of ten States of the Republic and established over them despotisms that would put to shame the most frightful and grinding despotisms of any age or any country. Party has persistently for the last four years sought to subvert or change the form of our government, both State and Federal. It is at the demand of party that Congress has assaulted the executive and judiciary, and endeavored to usurp the powers belonging to these coordinate Departments or force the President and the judges to bow down and do its bidding. It is at the demand of party and in its interest alone that power is sought to be taken from the intelligent and cultivated while man and given to the ignorant, uneducated, and servile negro. It is the inexorable demand of party that is bringing the white and black laces in this country in fatal antagonism and conflict, which must end in the utter extermination of the weaker race or in the degradation of the other. It is party that is keeping alive the animosities, the malignant and bitter passions engendered by the war, and preventing that forgiveness, reconciliation, and harmony dictated and enjoined by the spirit of Christian charity.

64: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 64 (House1869.Jan27c.64)

Mr. Speaker, I am consoled at my want of preparation and failure to discuss this measure fully and in all its bearings by the fact that there are able gentlemen on this side of the House who will present the objections to it more fully and ably than I could have hoped to. I wish this measure coming from the Judiciary Committee might have been presented and advocated by my distinguished colleague on the committee upon high legal and constitutional grounds only. I wish that party and party considerations might have been ignored in its discussion. The subject is of too much importance, the changes proposed in our system of government vastly too great and farreaching in their effects, to be carried upon party grounds or for party ends. Parties, at the longest, do not live long. They are changingand evanescent: they pass away and others take their places; they serve their purpose and are gone. It is doubtful if they do not more evil than good. 0 Our Constitution we hope may live forever. Its blessings have been manifold and showered upon us without stint or measure. Let no partisan parricide lift his hand against it." Conscience" should" make cowards 'of you all. The ghost of the slain Constitution will not down at your bidding,"

65: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 65 (House1869.Jan27c.65)

Peace, reconciliation, unreserved submission and obedience to the written Constitution, liberty, prosperity, happiness," on one side;" strife, malignity, party license regulated bv no law, anarchy, despotism, "on the other."

66: House, January 27, 1869 (3), ¶ 66 (House1869.Jan27c.66)

Mr. MUNGEN asked and obtained leave to have printed, as a part of the debates, a speech upon the pending question. [See Appendix.]

Connections graph

Enter all results↑ ↓ then Enter to open oneTry “Federalist 51”, “Article I, Section 8”, “Amendment 14”

Where you've been

    The places you have read, newest first, kept in this browser only. Nothing is sent anywhere.