November 24, 1803

The consideration of the report on the amendment to ibe Constitution being taken up; the amendment as directed to be printed on ibe preceding day, was taken up, and read, as follow:

Saohed, by the Senate and House of Repramt't- iicet of l/u VaUed Slaiei of America in Congress atlembUd, two-thirds of both Houses amatrring. That the foUaning amendment be proposed to the Legislatures of the aevcrol States bb an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purjxueg, as apart of the said Constitution, all future elections of President and Vice Preai' dent, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in distinct ballots, the pciBOn voted for as Vice President, of whom one al least ahoJl not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the President, and if no person have such majority, then from the three highest on the list, of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose the President in the manner directed bj the Constitution. The person having the greatest number of toUs as Vice President, shall be Vice President; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more person* tot the Vice President, they being the highest on the hst, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the Constitution; but no person Constitutionally ineligible to the office of President, shall be eligible to that of the President of the United Stales.

Mr. Bradley did not approve of the amend- 'Stood; he could not see why the Vice President should m >l be chosen bya majority, as well as the President. He considered the possibility of the Vice President becoming President bv any casualty, as a fpod reason for both being chosen by the same ratio of numbers. If it should be carried aa (he amendment now stands, the office of Vice President would be hawked about a( market, and siven as change for votes for the Presidency. And what would be the effect 1— that it onighi so happen that a citizen chosen only for the office of Vice President might, by the death of the President, though chosen only bya plurality, become President, and hold the office for three years eleven months and thirty days. He did not approve of many arguments which he had heard on (he preceding dav, and however disposed Co concur io the principle of designation for the two offices, he coolil not give it his vote in the present shape. He would, in order lo render the report more congenial with his wishes, move lo strike out the following words beginning with the words thaU, ia the thirteenth line, to Constitution, in the eighteenth. The motion was seconded.

Mr, TiucT opposed the striking out, as not id order, it being an amendment to an amendment already received by the House. He thought however it would be in order lo reconcile the whole, and then any part might be amended.

The Phesidgnt said that the motion for amending the amendment was not in order ; but if the member from Vermont, or any other gentleman of the majority on the question yesterday, chose to move for a recommittal, or even to refer (he report to a select committee, it would be in order. Mr. Bradley said that he held it to be a sound truth that in legislating we ought not to be afraid of using words to express our meaning as far as language could go ; he thought that there was a deficiency of words and a deficiency of meaning which if suffered to go abroad would be attended by great inconvenience. He would move for the reference of the report to a select committee, and that they be instructed to insert in the room of (he words he before proposed to omit, the words, "if such number be the majority of the whole number of Electors appointed ; and if no person have a majority, then from (he two highest on thelist the Senate shall choose the VicePresident." He would also move that the committee be in- 5(ruc(ed to insert after the word President, in the tenth line, the following words: "But in choosing the President the votes shall be taken by States, the. Representatives from each State havingpne vote; and there shall be two-thirds of the representation of the States to form a quorum."

Mr. Whiqht, (0 give the gentleman an opporlunity to discuss his subject, as one of the majority on (he question of yesterday, moved for a reconsideration of the whole report.

Mr. Bradley was not disposed to favor reconsideration ; (he custom he took was borrowed from (he town-meetings to the Eastward; if this practice were to be pursued, we should be called opon at the end of a session to reconsider the proceedings of the first, and reduce the Senate evenbelow a New England town-meeting.

Mr. Adams had no objection to a recommitment, as he considered that one or two further alterations were extremely necessary. He could foresee a probable case which he thought ought to be provided against; and one or two simple expressions would answer the end. He could conceive no election to take place under the form proposed, and (he election of a Chief Magistrate was not in his mind a matter of small moment. He would suppose that there should not be three persons voted for; or that, though three or more should be voted for, that nonesbonld have an acI be another case, (bat there were two who should have the highest, and yet an equal number of votes, and that there were to be a third and fourth who should have equal numbers alst^^how could the three highest be found in this ease, when the third and fourth persons were equally high in votes?

Mr. Tavloii was against the recommittal, because he had do doubt that the ingenuity of gentlemen would, upon amendment id a committee, discover new defects and motives for amendment. does not require a majority in the choice of a Vice President, after ibe choice of President shall have been made, but saf s "in every case, after the choice of a President, the person having the greatest number of votes shall be the Vice President"—purposely omitting "a majority of the whole," as id the case of the President ; but the gentleman, who disapproves of amending, wishes to carry amendment farther and to render the difficulty more difficult! He would oppose recommitment, for if this new principle were necessary the gentleman could introduce it ia the shape of a new amendment to the Constitution. With respect to the simple expressions which the gentleman from Massachusetts proposed to insert, and which appeared to him lo promise with so much facility such great advantages, be should be glad to see them introduced. But he thought that in one case as well as in the other, of those which he had suggested as necessary to provide against, i difficulty whatever existed. For it appeared plain enough, to him that if only two had the highest numbers and equal, that one of ibe two would be preferred to an extension of choice to a third who had not an equal number of votes, and that the selection of one of the two would be in fact a choice from one of the three highest; so in the case of the third and fourth, though they might have also an equal number of votes, he could perceive no difficulty; if there were even four of them, the choice out of any three of the four would be a correct choice.

Mr- Davton— Oentlemen appear lo forget that the Chair has decided that no words can be introduced into the amendment already adopted, and consequently that a recommitment is the only course left. The gentleman from Virginia (Mr. TayLor) objects to the proposition of the gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. Bradlbv,) upon the ground that it seems too sacred to touch il, as there exists already a different principle in the Constitution; but though he considers it too sacred, he nevertheless recommends as a remedy the introduction of a new resolution separably and in opposition to that sacred principle. We have been hitherto trammelled by incongruous rules, but here an amendment is proposed to be got rid of by a side wind.

Mr. Tracy could not see why a Vice President should not be chosen by a majority instead of a plurality as well as President— he was for the recommitment.

Mr. S. Smith supposed that if the motion of the gentleman from Vermont should be lost, it would then in order to move a reconsideration. He could not see, with that gentleman, anything exceptionable in town-meetings, nor could he discover that town-meetings in New England were more exceptionable than elsewhere, unless there was anything specially wrong transacted at them. The practice of reconsideration was familiar in all Legislative bodies ; and it was ia the nature of legislation that it should be so ; for new knowledge as well as new circumstances render it necessary to reconsider and revive long established

The motion for referring lo a select committee was then lost — yeas 15, nays 16.

Mr. Wbiobt then renewed his motion for a reconsideration.

Mr. BoTLERdinapprovedof the rule of the House which authorized this mode of reconsideration in so loose a way ; he thought that no subject discussed should be reconsidered, without an unanimous vote ; if that practice was pursued it would prevent a. great abuse and waste of time. In the present mode it matters not whether it is a thin or a full House; any member of the majority has the House at his mercy.

Mr- Tb«cv did not comprehend the meaning of the gentleman in demanding a reconsiderationdid he mean to reconsider the whole day's work 1

Mr. S. Smith said his colleague meant, as be meant, to reconsider the amendment made yesterday to the report of the committee.

Mr. Tracy did not suppose that the House was lo reconsider the rule of order as to the majority ; nor six or seven other motions ; but unless the gentleman specifies the subject to be reconsidered, the motion will necessarily comprehend the whole day's work.

Mr. Dayton understood il to be confined to the amendment of the resolution.

Mr. Plumer requested the motion to be committed to writing; which was doae,and the motion was carried.

Mr. Bhaulev then renewed his motion as before, for striking out and inserting after the 13th line; this amendment he thought of great importance, as under the Constitution as it nowsiands the Vice President must be a person of the highest respectability, well known, and of established reputation throughout theUnited States; but if the discriminating principle prevails without some precautions such as the amendment proposed, that assurance would be lost ; and he should not be surprised to hear of as many candidates for Vice President as there are States, as the votes for President would be offered in truck for votes for Vice President, and an enterprising character might employ hisemissa* through all the States to purchase them, and r amendment lays the foundation for intrigues. was desirous that he who is to be set up aa candidate for the Vice President should aa at presbe equally respectable, or that there should be e — that at least heshould be the second man in the nation ; adopt the designating principle, without ihemost guarded precautions, and you lose that assurance.

HiLLRonaE accorded with the gentleman's amendment, as il naturally grows out of the prin- ■iples of the report. There was not a word ia the Constitution about voting for the Vice President, vote in fact is given for such an office ; the alteration to designation alien (he whole thing; and as Ihegeollemen has expressed, will send the Vice President’s office into market to be handed about as change kr the candidate supported by larger States; ; he would prefer leaving the choice of President and Vice President at once to the larger States than lake it in this way. In calm times any governmentmay work well, but he wished in calm times to provide against storm. If we designate any, then designate both and on equal terms.

Mr. Wii[aHT'a object was the discriminating principle, or the designating principle in its mobi simple and efficacious form ; but this by no means authorized the abridging of the rights of the small States; nor could it be shown in argument that the designating principle would baresucb an effect. The provision that doI more than one of the two candidates should be voted for in theseveral States, showed that the lesser States were equally guarded with the rest: upon the incidental election in the House of Represents lives the same guardianship of the smaller States was conspicuous — the Union was the result of a fair compromise, and the designation in no way departs from it. The amendment proposed, so laras it went to decide the choice of Vice President by a majority instead of a plurality, as the Constiiuiionnowsiands. he approved, as it was the principle most consonant with the spirit of representative democracy, that no officer should be elected but by a majority; as it now stands, admitting a choice by a plurality, there were contrary principles received. He saw no difficulty in the event of an election of Vice President not being made, as it might be done by this House. The idea he acknowledged he had borrowed from the resolutions of March 4, 1800, passed by the Legislalureof Massachusetts, and forwarded to their repre sen la lives in Congress; the recommendation of an alteration in this part of the Constitution originated in Vermont, but was adopted and forwarded by Massachusetts.

Commonwealth of Maaaehuielli.

U 8i5tTE, Feb. 28lh, 1800. Whereas the Legislature of the State of Vermont, on the fifth day of November, last, passed two leeolTea in the words following, viz ;

"State or VaanDfrT. In General jttembiy Nov. 6, 1799, Raohed, That the Senators mid Representatives of this State in the Congress ot the United States be, and the; hereby are, requested to use their best endeavors that Congress propose to the Legislatures of the several States the following amendment to the Constitution of the United States, vii; That the Electors of President and Vice President in giving in their votes, atudl respectively distinguish the person whom they desire to be President from the one ths; desire to be Vice President, by annexing the word President or Vice President, as the case may require, to the proper name voted for; and the personhavingthe greitestnumber of votes for Vice President, if such niuntwr be ■ majority of the whole number of Electors chosen, shall be Vice President; and if there be no choice, and two or more persons shall have the highest number of votes, and those equal, the Senate shall immediately choose by ballot one of them for Vice President; and if no person have a majority, then from the five highest on the list, the Senate shall in Uke manner choose the Vice President ; but in choosing the Vice Present, the votes shall 1m taken by States, the Senator* from each State having one vote. A quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members tram two third* of the States ; and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And in case the Senators and Representatives of this State in Congress, shall find that the aforesaid amendment is not conformable to the sentiments of k Constitutional ma}OnXY ofboth branches of the National Legislature, they are hereby requested so to modify the same as to meet ^e sentiments of such majority.

Provided, however. That any amendment which may be agreed on, shall oblige the Electors to designate Iho person they desire to be President, from the one whom they desire to t»e Vice President.

Resolved, That his ' Excellency the Governor be requested forthwith to transmit the same to the Supreme Executives of the several States."

Which resolves have been communicated b; the Sapreme Executive of the State of Vermont to the Supreme Executive of this Commonwealth.

Eetohtd, That the Legislature of this Coounonwealth have a high sense of the wisdom and patriotism of the Legislature of the State of Vermont, and accord with them in the opinion, that it is expedient that the Constitution of the United States be amended in the manner contemplated in the aforesaid resolves of the Legislature of the State of Vermont.

Jiaolvcd,ftirlktr That the Senators and Representatives of this State in the Congress of the United States be and they are hereby requested to adopt the necessary measures to effect the amendment aforesaid.

ReMbied, further. That his Honor the Lieutenant Governor be and he is hereby requested to communicate the foregoing resolves to the Supreme Executive of tlie State of Vermont, and also to transmit copies thereof to the Senators and Representatives of this Commonwealth in the Congress of the United States.

Approved, March 4th, IBOO.

The propriety of this House choosing its Ptesisident he considered as perfectly conformable to the principles of the Constitution. The House of Representatives never vote by States but when the election of President devolves upon them ; the Senate never ; but he did not see why it should not be so in the event of a non-election of Vice President by the want of a majority. As to the number from which the choice was to be made, he cared not whether it were three or five — he considered the principle of designation as everything, and the number but as trimmings to the cloth. He would recommend it to the gentleman from Vermont so to alter his amendment as to render an election in the House the resort, in the defect of a majority; be was for the choice being made not in the numerical capacity of the members, but by States.

Mr. Braolev considered the provision of voting in the House of Representatives by States, as a good one in the particular case. But he did not think it necessary here, because this House already represents States equally ; a member or members, may, it is true, be absent, but then that is a great neglect of duty, and subjects to heavy responsibility the absent member. Under the present order of things a State may have no vote, though < both its Representatives are present, (or A and B nutf vote differently; if five or six States were in ifae same predicament, a case not very unreasonable to suppose, then there would not be a majority.

Theqiie«tioD was then put,aTidMr.BBADLtT's motion earriml.

Mr. Bbadlgt t))«tt moved his amendment in the 16th line as above cited, to be inserted io the place of the words, "io the manner directed bjr the Constitution.” He observed this amendment would tender it necessary in order to avoid confiision to repeal the section which cornea within its purview; if no manner of election is pointed am, it will be impossible to tell what construction to ptit upon i(; and instruments of this Important nature cannot be expressed in language too explicit. If a provision, such u is offered, should not be adopted, might not the House of Representaiires consider themselves at liberty to choose by the numerical vote? Tl is true that any vote we may here give will not alter (he principle, but it is proper that provision be now made that no mistaken interposition take place at a future time. Mr. Adahb said, if he understood the state of the question, the principle relates in the most iTnportant degree to the numbers from which the choice should be made—as it now stood he could not say whether three or five was the number to be chosen from ; he hoped the Senate would dotermiae whether (he choice was to be made from tbe highest numbers in all eases; or Io make proTision specially for either case of five or three; if the choice was to be fixed by the number five, then be conceived tbat (be words from the whole number, if less than five, should be introduced. He was himself in favor of the number fire, because by taking three you reduce the power of thesmall Stales, and their chances in the House of Representatives ; for certainly it is a much higher power to elect from five than from three. He questioned whether (be House of Representatives! woold part from that number, for in general populatjbodies are very tenacious of power; it is in their nature, and so in a degree are Senates.

Mr. Dayton said, the remarks of the gentleBLan (Mr. Adaks) in favor of small States were too precious to be lost ; but he wished they had beea reserved for the proper place ; with resard to number likewise, it was out of place, as there was no reference to numbers in the motion of (he gentleman from Vermont.

The second amendment of Mr. Bbadlgv was then put and carried.

Mr. Cocke called for a consideration of the vote of the preceding day on (he number in the 15(h line, which he moved to strike out, in order to afford gentlemen the opportunity they seemed to wish for to discuss the number.

The motion was carried, and a blank left for the number.

Hr. CocK>. — Qentlemen had now full latitude (brdiacussion. and he wished it would be settled so hr as concerned the number, this day ; he could not but express his sorrow, however, to hear gendemen making such a stir about supposed dangers W the imall States ; this kind of clamor is worn Sth Con.— 4 thread-bare, and could not pass muster much longer; on all occasions we hear in one shape or another this opposition of States brought forward ; lately it was the West was in danger ; at other times the South is arrayed against the East ; and now we are called upon to believe the large are going to swallow the small States; gentlemen must have a large swallow indeed who can take in these things. Another gentleman, from Con* necticat, (Mr. Hillbousb,) presents us another horrid spectacle; he tells us that those States must be merged in blood, and truly the remedy by which all this bloodshed is to be prevented, he tells us, is the election of a Federal Vice President ! He was not snrprisedal this kind of remedy being recommended, but he thought it little better than a quack medicine. He believed that if the remedy was accepted, the day would not be far distant 'when they would come forward with another, and tell us that a Federal President was necessary to our existence. He for one was not for taking the remedies of those who, when disorder prevailed, instead of curing them, created new ones. Gentlemen would not a few years ago listen to any advice or even complaints of a minority; they think now, as they said then, that there was no talents or virtue in the country but what they possess ; and they now tell us that minorities should govern. While he stood in that House be would never submit to be governed by a minority, especially a minority which, when a part of the majority, declared the then minority deserved a dungeon. We shall not treat them in that way : they shall experience no persecution; we will even endeavor to make their situation comfortable for them ; but they ranst not expect out aid to set aside majorities, or to depart from the principles of the Constitution.

Mr. Hii.t.HoitBe. — If the gentleman alludes to me, he is mistaken.

Mr. Cocke.— No gentleman in this House can be a stranger to my meaning — be had propooed to insert the number five in the blank.

Mr. Dayton seconded the motion, but not for the reasons offered by the gentleman from TenMr. CooKB.— As I cannot pocket that gentleman's superior reason, I must be content to make use of that plain reason God has given me. He had heard it said on that floor, that the object of our amendment was to prevent a Federal Vice President being elected. For his personal feeling on that subject he could account; he entered into no examination of other gentlemen's feelings, but for himself he would avow that he was actuated by a strenuous wish to prevent a Federal Vice President being elected to that Chair; he could not subdue his memory, and he would iK>t wish to see any man chosen whose attachment to Republican Government he doubted; he was against the election of any man who differed from the majority ; he was as adverse to persecution as any mm; he could not persecute, but he would, while he had brenb, guard against all men and all parties that countenance or practise persecution for opinion's sake. He would assert the right of the majority, and entertained ni thrown out bv some Eeolleinen, and which betrays the rancor which rankles in some geoilemen's breasts, who judge of others by themselves, and furnish the strongest argument against truslinf to them. He disdainea persecution, but he would guard a^inal ii. He would follow the letter and the spirit of the'Constilution, which excluded the choice of minorities ; which'fras adYmntaeeous to the minority, if it was not their own ^nli. We are called upon to make a choice or we are not. Will gentlemen tell us that we make a choice, if we admit what is contrary to are sentiments of right and wrong. What is the object of the amendment 1 To put it in the power of the people to choose those whom they think most entitled to confidence and respect. If we furnish an amendment which they do not approve they will send it back to us.

Mr. Tavlob. — This appears to be a subject of much importance, a Dd the matter introduced into the debate had given it a more serious air than it at first assumed. To estimate a measure of a public kind we must look to the conseouences which it is intended, or may incidentallr produce. If the measure had the tendencies, or would produce such effects as some gentlemen surmise, it would be Tery serious indeed. But he would be bold to say that it was never contemplated to countenance or encourage a classification of States. No man he believed who advocated the amendment would submit to a classification of States any more than a classification of men, or the establishment of patrician and plebeian orders. Are gentlemen who hold forth these delusions conscious that the course they pursue is the onlv mode to excite that jealousy and distraction which they say ihey deprecate 7 Do gentlemen wish to eicite an hostility of this kind, to inculcate the idea of discriminating the States into patrician and plebeian 1 Are they regardless of the consequencesj or have they ever considered tbem 1

How, he would ask, is this amendment to favor the large at the expense of the small Statesi Gentlemen have not shown. Have they considered that nothing is so faUl to freedom as the existence of orders and distinctions in society 1 Could the eflecl be less pernicious if you attempt with any effect to stir up rivalry of Statesi Are fron prepared to estimate the consequences of vioence and the conflict of weakness against strength 1 Can any gentleman reflect on it without horror 7 Is it to be presumed that if you set die furious inssioai in agitation, that the large States will sit patiently and bear unmerited reproach and outrase 1 Do yon not perceive that these menaces and clamors proceed exclusively from those who affect so much concern for the small States? Are gentlemen aware of the responsibility which they attach to thetrntelves — that of exciting resentment and animosity, and that kind of animosity which a weak man injured always feels towards the strong; for it it of do consequence whether the weak man is deceived and insulted by the imposition put upon him, it he is really deceived into the pernicious belief?

He had persuaded himself a mode of argument so pernicious could not be employed on this occasion ; he had expected that the question would be examined and decided upon its true grounds. But beside this we find an attempt to defeat the amendment by its form. Let us examine this amendment. By filling up the blank with five, yon carry the election into the House of Representatives ; and why do we wish to keep the election out of the House of Representatives? Because experieoce teaches us to avoid the danger of diets, . which are always exposed to intrigue and corruption, as we avoid elections by mobs, from thetr liability to be misled by the sudden impulse of passion and violence. We wish to avoid both, because each by different paths leads to the same consequence. One or two elections by a diet would repay the small States — with what? with monarchy. Elections by diets always lead to monarchv. It is for this reason, then, that we wish to keep the elections where they should be, in the hands of the people, where, from very obvious cause, neither intrigue nor corruption can operate. It is by diets that Great Britain has been ruined in her prosperity and liberties. By placing the election in the House of Representatives, you expose the small States to the evils which Great Britain has suffered through her rotten borouglia. The small number of Representatives in the small States will expose them to the allurements agaiast which humanity is not always fortified. Tlie danger of temptation must be guarded against, else the minority may be through corruption made to govern. The small boroughs where there are few electors have given the rule over the majority in England for more than a century ; corruption has been the Prime Minister, and the Parliament has been in fact the mere registers of the monarchical edicts.

But it will be asked, do we lessen the chance by lessening the number? Yes, sir; the greater the scope is which you^ive the House of Representatives, vonr chance is the erealer for a number of candidates; if you fill the blank with twenty, you will have twenty ; if with five, you wilt have fire within the scope of that power; and the greater numbers the electors may have to nominate, the greater division of sentiment, and more numeroua will be the inducements to corruption.

Limit the number to three and you reduce the danger, and by condensing public sentiment, you will then have the watchfulness of ambition on one side and of virtue on th* other, directed without distraction to the limited number; he would, therefore, prefer three

Mr. Di ■ ■"

that when the rights of the small States maintained, the large States would threaten us with their power. The same threats had been heard in the old ConSess, but Ihey were laughed at, for the votes of e States were eqaal ; iney were heard in the conveotioD, but they were spurned at, for the votes were equal there also; the large States must be cautious here, for in thU body, too, the votes are equal. The gentleman hail talked of a classification of States as a novelty, but he would Mk if that gentleman pretended to be wiser than the CoDslitDlion? Loox through that instrument from beginning to Cod, and you will doi find ao article which is not founded oa the presumption of » clashing of interests. Was this fine process iDslilnttd for nothing? Was derelopisg the election in particular circumstances in the House of Representatires intended fornoihin^l Was nothing meaol by Ihe provision of the CoDstitution, that no amendment should ever deprivetlieStaIe!i of ibe equality of votes in this HouKeT Yet, it was that jealous caution which foresaw the necessity of guarding against (he encroachments of large States. The States, whatever was their relative magnitude, were equal under the old Confederation, and the small States gave up a part of their rights as a conipromisA fur a better form of government and secnrily ; but they cautiously preserved their equal rights in the Senate and in Ihe choice of a Chief Magistrate. The same voice that now addresses you made the solemn claim, and declared there was no safety in association unless the small States were protected here. The warning was taken, and you Und in that part, as in all others, a classification governs every line of the Constitution.

Mr. Jackson said, that though coming from a small State he had sot been instructed, and was therefore at perfect liberty to act according to the best of his judgment ; though his State was now, in regard to population, small, and though it were to remain so, ne could have but one opinion on this subject. He saw abundance of reason for preferring three to five. The Constitution under the present form has directed the choice to* be made from five. But the reason qf this was consistent with the result to be produced ; the Electors were to vote for two persons indiscriminately, but with the restriction of voting for one onlv belonging to the Stale where the vote was given. The voting for two would necessarily bring forward four candidates, and a fifth possibly, for we saw in the two elections before the last that there was one more than the four, though in each case the fifth had but one vote ; ne alluded to the vote for Mr. Jay, In the amendment proposed you are called upon to designate for each office, and there can he little apprehension of having more than two or three principal candidates ; and for twenty years to come he had no apprehension of a greater number of candidates if this amendment prevails. Now, supposing that, as on the first and second elections, there were to be five candidates, and that there should be a candidate with one vote like Mr. Jay, and that the oumber were five; that there was an equal number of voles for two candidates as at the last election, two others with inferior numbers, and the fifth only with one vote, the election would devolve upon the House of RepreaeniBtives,aiid thus would have them place him, who had only one vote, on the same footing with turn who had seventy-three.

Suppose the result to be the same as the last election, when the votes were, for Thomas Jefferson 73, Aaron Burr 73, John Adams 65, C. C. Pinckney 64, J. Jay 1 ; here the unequal numbers would be placed under the power of the HoUse upon equal terms.

What would you do, sir, if there was not barely five who had not the highest numbers? — your difficulties would increase with your numbers. He bad no apprehensions on the score of the present election ; every member of that House must be satisfied that there can be no doubt of his being the man of the people above all competition ; he believed, too, he was the man of the Legislature. All considerations as to the next election could have no influence heref we must look to the future, when we may not be so fortunate. He was sorry to hear gentlemen talk of separate interests; be knew of no separate in teresla, but felt himself bound to maintain the interests of the great whole. This, he thought, could not be done but by the choice from the number three. You had best avoid the danger which experience has shown you narrowly escaped. You must keep the election out of the House of Representatives, if you wish to keep the Government from civil war, from the danger of having a man not voted for by the people proposed lobe placed over your head, aa you are plainly told bad been proposed. We are but the servants of the people, and it is our duty to study their wishes. Separate interests do not exist ; and the agitation of such ideas should not he countenanced. It is all a cant,a mere factions pretence i he had never known any separate or hostile interests in this country but that of Whig and Tory ; though he had heard much less said about these reafenemies than the imaginary adverse interests so much talked of as the Eastern and Southern States; then the Eastern and the Western; then come the federalists and anti-federalists; subsequently, federalism and republicanism ; and now. it is the large .and small States. Presently, besnouldnot be surprised to hearof the hostility of the rats and anti-rats: the danger from one is as real as from the other. He hoped to see all this delusion banished; he was well satisfied it would not make any impression on the people. By fixing on the number three, division and pa»- siog will be more effectually prevented, and intrigue will have less room for operation.

Mr, WBioBT.~We need not be told in this House, that the Constitution was the result of a compromise, or that care was taken to guard the rights of each State; these things we must be very ignorant, indeed, not to know. But does it therefore follow that it is not susceptible of amendment or correction under experience? Does it follow, because, for mutual interest and security ' this compromise was made, that we are precluded from effecting any greater good ? No man would accuse him of a wish to see the interest of any Stale impaired. But we can preserve the spirit and intention of the Constitution in full vigor, without impairing any interests. And this is to be done, by the discriminating principle ; it fulfills the intention, and it foiefenda the recurrence of that danger from which you have once escaped. By this principle, each elector may name his man for each office, and this can be done whether ibe number be three or five. Fcr the latter number be was disposed, because already adopted by (he other House, and he did not wish to delay its progress. If we were to form a constitution, he would provide that there should be only two caotjjdates presented lo the House. But be did not rely oq any number so much as on the discriminating principle.

Mr. Nicholas. — Several gentlemen profess much reluctance to make any change in the Constitution ; he would make no such profession ; and Ibougb he should be as jealous of improper alterations, or the introduction of principles incompatible with Republican Government, he would not hesitate lo make any alteration calculated to promote, or secure the public liberty upon a firmer Dasisj nay, if it could be made better he would expunge ine whole book. Gentlemen who are for adnering so closely to the Constitution, appear not to consider that a choice of President from the number three, is more in the spirit of the Constitution than from five ; and preserves the relation that the election of two persons, under the present form, holds to the numberfive. A reason equally forcible with him was, that, by taking the number three instead of five, you place ibe choice with more certainty in the people at large, and render Ibe choice more consonant to their wishes. With him, also, it was a most powerful reason for E referring three, that it would render the Chief [agisirale dependent only on the people at large, and independent ofany party or any State interest. The people hold the sovereign power, and it was intended by the Constitution ihai they should have the election of the Chief Magistrate, li was never contemplated as a case likely to occur, but in an extreme case, llial the election should go lo the House of Representatives. What, he asked, would have been the effect, had Mr. Jay been elected when he had only one vote 1 What, be would ask, would be the impression made upon our own people, and upon foreign nations, had Mr. Aaron Burr been chosen at the last election, when ibe universal sentiment was lo place the present Chief Magistrate in that station 7 He did, not mean anything disrespectful or invidious* towards the Vice President, he barely stated I'hf fact, so well known, and asked, what would bt the effect? Where would be the bond of attachment to that Constitution which could admit of no investiture in a case so important, in known Opposition to the wishes of the people? The effect would be fatal lo the Constitution itself; it would weaken public attachment to it, and the affectation, if alone for the small States, would not have been heard of in the deep murmur of discontent. Gentlemen, who pretended to feel. for be would not enter into their conceptions, if they had any real apprehensions on the subject of the danger of ibe smaller States, forget that this i( not a project of the large States; ; they ought to have considered that it has originated with the small States; and that, in tbeUoa*e of Representatives, two-thirds of the representation is tbu of the smaller Sialex. Have gentlemen forgotten that the amendment has been twice recommended from South Carolina, afterwards by Vermont, then by New Hampshire, and finally by Tenneasee? Are these large or small States? Away with such groundless pretences! ! The allempl to excite jealousy in the small States cannot succeed. The people knowjhat it is calculated to prevent a crisis which was long apprehended, and which the experience of the last election proved to be well founded.

Mr. Maclay said, he believed that, as it concerned one more than another State, it was perfectly immaterial whether the number five or three were chosen. He conceived that it involved no question but wbal was common to all the States; and he wished this clannish spirit could be laid aside on occasions of this important nature : and that the general interest of the whole should be considered. In this point of view, the present amendment cannot affect the political rights of any State, for, being on a perfect equality, in the choice of one from three as well as one from five, no danger of rights can exist, though other dangers may be apprehended. If any rights can be at all affected, they must be civil rights. But here he found it difficult to convey, with the clearness he could wish, his ideas on the application of the amendment to civil rights; ; he would, therefore, endeavor to do that by comparison, which was not so easily explained by itself. He would compare the States of the Union, in their collective capacity, lo individuals in society ; wealth, in society, is power; and he who has wealth poasesses a more extensive influence than he who is poor ; in this respect, perhaps it may be said,lhef are not upon a perfect equality,' because one man possesses an equal direct power wiib the poor roao, and an overplus of indirect power, which the poor man does not possess. But the same men, in their civil capacity as citizens, are upon complete terms of equality, possessing equal rights and power, as in the right of suffrage, and in the sight of the law, they are equally units in the mfl!'5 of society.

Extent of territory, occupied by a numerous population, is, in a Stale, what wealth is to the private individual. The State of small extent, or of comparatively small population, stands in the same relation to society as the poor man. Notwithstanding this disparity of political or physical power, the rich and the poor man, the large and Ibe small State, are equally interested in supporting their actual or personal rights. But they may he considered as equally interested in supporting those personal rights which connect themselves with the security of their wealth, in which they have but unequal interest. The wealthy have, besides their civil rights, their properly mt stake, and may therefore besupposed more vigilant and watchful of innovations which might weaken 01 destroy that security by which they hold their rights and privileges. If this reasoning be correct, let us apply it to the case under consideration ; why attempt to alarm and raise jealousies in the small States, trben il i* evident that the interest of the large States will be coDSlaot protection to the smaller Sulesl The idea might be carried failber, and ii might be shown that, if there is anything in tbisamendtnentthat hasaay tendency to alter the relative power and influence of any States in the Union, the danger would be lo ever; State, in proportion to its extent and population. It was probable, that on this subject he entertained opinions diBVrenl from gentlemen whose talents and information he highly respected; on such occasions he always offered his sentiments with diffidence, and he was willing to hear and be convinced if mistaken; but from every view be had taken of the amendment, it did not appear to him that it could alter the principle in the Constitution, nor chance in any way the relative rights and situation of the States. In simple truth, it is only alteration in the detail of the elective process, calculated to assimilate the election of President and Vice President of the United States to the modes already in practice in the election of the Executive of several of the States. He could not see that it would be attended with any danger to any of the States; if there was danger, ibe danger would be greater lo the larger States, as their interest is the greatest. But danger of this kind cannot and does not exist ; for it cannot be shown that this amendment has or can produce any effect on the law-making power in this country, and it is in this power that we are lo seek for the nature and the protection of all our rights, civil and political; and, with this impression, he would vote for Iheameodmeni wilh the number three.

An adjoninmenlwai now called for and carrieil.