December 2, 1803

The order of the day being the amendment proposed in the House of Representatives, to be made to the Constitution of the United States, and the report of the committee being under consideration,

Mr. Taylor, of Virginia, desired to withdraw his motion of the preceding day. in order to accommodate the terms of his proposition to the wishes of gentlemen. His only object was to obtain the principle, and provided that was obtained in .'■uctt a manner as to promisean accomplishment of the good intended thereby, he should consider the words in which the provision was to be couched of inferior moment. In lieu of the addition which he offered before, he now proposed to insert after the word choice, in the 37lh line, the following " And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the 4lh day of March next following, then the Vice President ^all act as President, m ui case of the death or other Constitutional disability of the President."

Mr. Adams had no sort of objection to this addition to the paragraph; it reached his ideas as far as it went; but he conceived that though this made a very necessary provision for the case of the President, it did not go far enough, inasmuch as no provision was made in case there should be no Vice President. He would submit this case to gentlemen, that if there was no Vice President existing nor any more than a President chosen, itt the event of a high state of party spirit, would it be difficult to foresee that there would be much roomleft for contention and evil? Unless provision should be made against the contingency, therefore, the amendment would be imperfect, in his mind. Like the gentleman from Virginia, he was not tied to words, but he thought it worth while to employ two lines to provide against the danger.

Mr. HiULRODSB concurred inlbeamendmpnt of the gentleman from Virginia but he hoped the idea of the gentleman from Massachusetts would also be adopted.

Mr. PicKERtNO objected to the length of time allowed for the House of Re presents lives to decide. We hare been told that the small States, from the amaller number offotes, are exposed loeorruptioD; he wished no time to be left for corruption to operate, and he therefore desired that the period for .the House of Representatives to decide should be limited to forty-eight hours or three days.

Mr. Wdioht approved of the amendment that had been offered m all its parts ; and the more so as it in effect supplies a deficiency which exists in the Constitution even as it now stands.

The amendment was agreed to — yeas 23, nays 10. as follows :

Yeii — Mean. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenritltfe, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin. Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith, Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright

Naib — Measn. Adams, Butler, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, WeUa, and While, Mr. Adams offered another amendment, of the following effect, to be added to the provisions concerning the election of Vice President :

"And if there shall be no Vice President duly elected within ten days after the fourth of March, ibsD the power and duties of the President of the United Sutee shall be diachuged by aucb person as ahatl be by law invested with that power, until such time as a new election by Elector! shall take place."

Mr. Tract wished to know why ten days was the period fixed?

Mr. AoAMs. — Because the amendment proposed gives theHouse of Representatives until the fourth of March, during which time the old Vice President continues in office ; and ten days appeared 10 him a reasonable period ; but he was not tied to any particular number of days.

Mr, Tract would prefer the word “vacant,” suggested yesterday, to the words "not duly elected." Mr. HiLLBonsE was not disposed to concur with the proposed amendment; ; he did not think a period of agitation a proper one to make choice of an officer of so much power; he would prefer making provision by law before the happening of the event; ; for, in a high state of party he could see no likeliboodofanagreemenl.andout of disagreement confusion might arise. His wish was to have some person designated who should discharge the Executive duties until an election should take J place, and that this officer should be previously fixed upon, so that party spirit should have no room for agitation.

Mr. Jackson could not discern the necessity of the proposition now offered ; the case proposed to beprovidedagainsi, he thought so extreme as likely never to happen. Besides, the mover appeared not to have taken it into consideration that one-third of the Senate f^o out at the close of the second session of every Congress by rotation, and would he have only two-thirds to make the law which was to provide for this choice ? Upon the principle of up his convictions, but the amendment adopted had removed his doubts, and he thought this addition to this amendment unnecessary. He hoped the Senate would abide by that they had already agreed to, and preserve the right of choice to the people.

Mr. Wrioht. — There was another difficulty which the gentleman from Massachusetts appears not to have foreseen. To make a law it is not enough that ilfb Senate are present even if complete; the House of Representatives is necessary to an act of legislation, and that body can have no existence after the fourth day ofMarch, nor within the ten days suggested, for ibey could not, if all elected, be calledeven by proclamation within that lime ; and further, if there should be no election of President, there would be no power to convene Congress; so that the proposed addition is iin< proper altogether.

Mr. Adam9 did not feel extremely solicitous for the proposition ; when the Constitution is proposed to'be amended, however, he was disposed to offer every suggestion which might appear to him calculated to render it more perfect. The objections offered by thegentleman from Georgia, highly as he respected his opinion, did not appear to him conclusive ; for his calculations of lime and circumstances do not entirely correspond with experience past. The President has at all times heretofore been inaugurated after the House of Representatives had closed its session by limitation, and the Senate had been uniformly assembled for the dent chosen, they can and must proceed to choose one, and that choice would of course fall, as proposed, upon one of the candidates. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Hillhopse) Tiad mistaken his view, concerning thechoice of a person by law ; his intention certainly was to provide for the future contingency by a previous law.

Mr. Jackson still conceived the gentleman's proposition founded in mistake; for it would be impracticable for the Senate to act, since, according to the rules of the Senate, two-thirds of the whole are necessary to form a quorum; one third must Constitutionally go out of that body at the time, and the absence of a single member would disable the Senate from business.

Mr. Adams. — There would remain still twothirds of the Senate, and it would be the duty of the Executive to call them together, as had been done in some cases; and as to the deduction of the third by rotation, there are several of the small States that elected their Senators several months before the period. To argue that they would neglect it, would be to argue that the States are indifferent to their representation on this floor. Mr. Jackson— We know that vacancies do occur from other causes than indifference or neglect of States; we know that at this moment New York has but one Representative on this floor, and that New Jersey had but very lately been so much embarrassed by a faction as to leave her for '— - without more than one Senator.

The question on the amendment of Mr. Adams was then put and lost without a division.

Mr. PicEERtNo. — The case which ihe gentleman from Georgia founded his arguments upon applies 10 a non-election, and thought such a case ; he thought differently, and the it now stands has made a provision for such I ligencf. Some provision should be made for s I a case; he would therefore move an amendment, i dent:

" But if on the 4lb of March the office of Vice President shsU be vacant, then the powers which devolve by the Constitution on the Vice President, shall be exercised by such persons as the Ian shall direct, until a new election." Mr. HiLi.BousE. — This amendment would supjlya j all that was proposed by the allowance of ten days a a former amendment, and it seemed to 1 indispensable, because as the non-election of both President and Vice President may happen, there should be some organ to keep the wheels'of Government in motion. It appeared to him to be necessary to provide for this contingency as for ' It of the death of the President or Vice President.

The amendment

The main question recurring,

Mr. White, of Delaware, r e and addressed the Chair as follows:

Mr. President, it may be eip< ;d that we, who especially those of us who belong to the smaller States, and who think the interests of those States will he most injuriously affected by its adoption, shall assign some reasons for our opinion, and for the resistance we give it: I will lor myself endeavor to I know well the prejudices of many in of this proposed amendment to the Constitution; I know too, and acknowledge with pleasi weight of abilities on the other side of (he House by which those prejudices, if 1 may so be permitted to call them, will be sustained ; (I perhaps be sufficient to create em bat silence on my part, but for ihi feel in the rectitude of my views, my full reliance on the talents of those with < (he honor generally to think and e subject of the nature and importance before us a great diversity of sentiment expected, and is perhaps necessary to the due and proper investigation of it. Without detaining the Senate with further preliminary remarks, presuming upon that patience and polite indulgence that are at all times body to gentlemen I ^.i.iu. >„c.. a..i:uijuii, j will proceed immediately to the subject of the resolution ; barely premising that notwithstanding the opinions of the gentleman from Virginia fMr. TATLORJand the gentleman from Georgia, (Mr. JacKson,) whose opinions I highly respect, 1 must Jet think with my honorable friend from New ersey (Mr. Datton) that the Constitution of the United States bears upon the face of it thestronge!>t marks of its having been made under the in* fluence of State classiG cations. It was a work of compromise, though not formed, as stated by the gentleman from Virginia, by the large States yielding most, but by the smaller States yielding much more to the general good.

It will be recollected that, previous 10 the adoption of the Constitution, on all Legislative subjects, in fact,on every measure of (heConstimtioD, each Slate had an equal voice ; but very different is the case now, when, in the popular branch of. your Government, you see one State represented by twenty-two members, and another by but one, voting; according to numbers. So that, notwithstanding the ideas of those gentlemen, and the declaration of an honorable member from Maryland, on my right, (Mr. Smith,) that, during his ten years' service in Congress, he had never seen anything like State jealousies. State divisions, or S(atecl*Esi(icB(ioii, I must be permitted to predicate nan of my argument upon this business. Should any gentleman be able to show that the foundation is unsound, the superstructure of course will be easily demolished. Admitting, then, sir, for the sakeof argument, that there were no very great objections to this proposed alteration in the mode of electing a President and Vice President, and that it were now part of the Constitution, it might be unwise to strike it out; unless much stronger arguments had been urged against than I have heard in favor of it, yet f would not now vote for its adoption. What appears specious in theory, may prove very inconvenient and embarrassing in practice, and my objections go To any alteration ohheConsdtulion at (his time; we have not given it a fair experiment, and it augurs not well to the peace and happiness of the United States to tfe so much increasing discontent upon this subject, so many projected alterations to the great chanerof our Union and our liberties; not less than four are now upon our tables, and which, if adopted, will materially change the most valuable features of the Constitution. The first alters the mode of electing :ting(l; (he President and Vice President; the second changes the ground upon which the Vice President is to be appointed by the Senate, in case one is not elected by the Electors, according to iheConsdtution ; the third extends the powers of the Senate in the choice of this latter officer beyond what was ever con tern plated by the people of this country ; and the fourth, which is not now immediately before us, goes to incapacitate any citizen from being eligible to the office of President more than a certain number of years. All these important changes we are about to introduce into the Constitution at once ; and, indeed, were attempted to be forced into a final vote Upon them, in little more than the space of one day from the moment they were submitted to us. Are we aware of what we are about? Is this the way in which the Constitution was formed 1 Was it put together with as much facility and as little reflection as we are tearing it to pieces? No, Mr. President, it was constructed after much thought, after long and mature deliberation, by the collected wisdom and patriotism of America, by such * set' touch U. The fewer changes we make in ii, itie longer ilreraaiDs; the older it grows the higher its will respect it than him who saw its birth ; he will regard it not only as the great bulwark of his liberties, but as the price of the blood of his ancestors — as a sacred legacy from his father, deposited with him for the benefit of himself, and in trust for his posterity. But if, in this way, every succeeding Congress, every party enjoying the short-lived triumph of a day, shall be mutilating it with alterations, from whatever motives, either to thwart their political opponents, or to answer particular purposes, ere loD^ no trace of the original insti '"

main -■■'■' an unhappy moment of popular phrenzy, may make the last change, by trampling upon its ruins, and substituting the strong arm of power in its place.

What, sir, let me ask, are the objects of these proposed amendments? The first, we are told, will so mark, so designate the man to be President, as to close forever the doors upon that subject ! Could this be the effect, the adoption of it would indeed be wise and provident ; but I fear a directly contrary tendency, that will open a new and immense field for intrigue. , The United States are now divided, and will probably continue so, into two great political parties; whenever, under this amendment, a Presidential election shall come round, and' the four rival candidates be proposed, two of them only will be voted for as President — one of these two must be the man ; the chances in favor of each will be equal. Will not this increased probability of success afford more than double the inducement to those candidates, and their friends, to tamper with the Electors, to exercise intrigue, bribery, and corruption, as in an election upon the present plan, where the whole four would be voted for alike, where the chances against each are as three to one, and it is totally uncertain which of the gentlemen may succeed to ibe high office ? And there must, indeed, be a great scarcity of character in the United Slates, when, in so extensive and populous a country, four citizens cannot be found, either of them worthy even of the Chief Magistracy of the nation. But, Mr. President, I have never yet seen the great inconvenience that has been so much clamored about, and thai will be provided against in future by substituting this amendment. There was, indeed, a time when it became necessary for the House of Representatives to elect, by ballot, a President of the United States from the two highest in vote, and they were engaged here some days, as I have been told, in a very good-humored way, in the exercise of that Constitutional right; they at length decided ; and what was the consequence t The people were satisfied, and here the ' thing ended. What does this prove 1 that the Constitution is defective 7 No, sir, but rather the wisdom and efficiency of the very provision intended to be stricken out, and that the people are acquainted with the nature of their Government ; and give me leave to say, if fortune had smiled upon another man, and that election had eventuated in another way, the consequence would have been precisely the same ; the great mass of the people would have been content and quiet; and those factious, restless disorganizers, that are the eternal disturbers of all well administered Governments, and who then talked of resistance, would have had too much prudence to hazard their necks in so dangerous an enterprise. I will not undertake to say that there was no danger apprehended on that occasion. I know many of the friends of the Constitution had their fears; the experiment however, proved them groundless but what was the danger apprehended pending the election in Ihe House of Representatives 1 Was it that they might choose Colonel Burr or Mr. Jefferson President? Not at all; they had, notwithstanding what had been said on this subject by the gentleman from Maryland. (Mr. Wbiobt,W clear Constitutional right to choose either of them, as much so as the Electors in the several States had to vote for them in the first instance ; the particular man was a consideration of but secondary importance to the country; the only ground of alarm was, lest the House should separate without making any choice, and the Government be without a head, the consequences of which no man could well calculate. The present attempt, to say the least of it, as has been well observed by my honorable friend from Jersey, (Mr. Dayton.) is taking advantage of a casualty to alter the Constitution that astonished every one when it happened, and that no man can imagine, in the ordinary course of events, will ever arise again. Sir. every hour that is added to the age of our Government, every day's increasing population of our country, every State admitted into the Union, renders still more remote even this improbable contingency. Gentlemen have urged, with exulting confidence, and particularly the honorable gentleman from Maryland, (Mr. Smith.) that the people have long thought on ibis subject, and prepared for the amendment, and expect its adoption. I respect the sentiments of the people as highly as any man when they are well digested and clearly expressed; but in my mind this is a dangerous ground to advance far upon, without examining it well for ourselves; it is an argument that will apply alike to almost every question of importance, and goes to preclude debate upon them ; for it is well known that there are few such submitted to us that have not been previously the subject of thought and speculative conversation out of doors. Ours is a country of politicians, and from the nature of our Government must continue so; every member of society feels such a portion of interest in the affairs of the nation as to excite Inquiry ; be his lot humble or exalted, be his sentiments right or wrong, he expresses them, as he is entitled to do, wiih freedom; but is it abroad in the country that the most important measures of the Government are to be matured and decided upon 1 Is it in private circles, in caucuses, in clubs, in coffeehouses, streets, and bar-rooms, that great Constitutional questions are lo be settled 1 And are we convened here but to register the crude decrees of such assemblages, or only for the humble purpose of answering to the call of our Secretary with a yea or nay 7 If the argument proves any thing, it amounts to this. Would the gentleman from Maryland, or any other honorable member, be content to hold his seat upon such terms? If so, he may indulge himself in one consolation, that no private citizen would envy him the place ; but for myself I claim the exercise of higher and more responsible privileges of thinking and acting for myself, holding it my duty, so far as 1 am canable, to assign to my constituents the reasons that govern my public conduct.

It hasof late, Mr. President, become fashionable to attach very little importance to the office of Vice President, to consider it a matter but of .small consequence who the man maybe; to view bis post merely as an idle post of honor, and the incumbent as a cypher in the Government; or according to the idea expressed by an honorable member from Georgia, (Mr. Jackson,) quoting, I believe, the language of some Eastern politician, as a fifth wheel to a coach; but in my humble opinion this doctrine is both incorrect and dangerous. The Vice President is not only the second officer of Government in point of rank, but of importance, and should be a man possessing, and worthy of theconfidenceofthenation. I grant, sir, should this designating mode of election succeed, it will go very far to destroy, not the certain or contingent duties of the office, for the latter by this resolution are considerably extended, but what may be much more dangerous, the personal coo sequence and worth of the officer ; by rendering the Electors more indifferent about the reputation and qualification of the candidate, seeing they vote for him but as a secondary character; and which may occasion this high and important trust to be deposited in very unsafe, hands. By a provision in the first section of the second article of the Constitution, "in case of the removal of the President ' from office, or of his death, resignation or inabil- ' ity to discharge the powers and duties of the said ' office, the same shall devolve on the Vice Presi- ' dent" — and he is Constitutionally the President. not until another can be made only, but of the residue of the term, which may be nearly four years: and this is not to be supposed a remote or improbable case. In the State to which I have the honor to belong, within a few years past, two ■tan ces have happened of the place of Governor becoming vacant, and the duties of the office, according lo the constitution of that State, devolving upon the Speaker of the Senate. We know well too, generally speaking, that before any can acquire a sufficient share of the public c dence to be elected President, the people must have long been acquainted with his character and his merit; he must have proved himself a good and faithful servant, and will of course be far advanced in years, when the chances of life will be much against him. It may indeed, owing to popular hypocrisy, shall for a time dishonor tt Presidential chair, or it may be the fortune of some young man to be elected, but those will rarely happen. The Convention In constructing this part of the Constitution, in settling the first and second offices of the Government, and pointing -jt the mode of filling, aware of the probability of the Vice President succeeding to the office of " idem, endeavored to attach as much impor- 1 and respectability to his office as possible, by makingituncertainat the time of voting, which of the persons voted for should be President, and which Vice President; so as to secure (be election of the best men in the country, or at least those in whom the people reposed the highest confidence, to the two offices — thus filling the office of Vice President, with one of our most distinguished citizens, who would give respectability to the Government, and in case of the Presidency becoming vacant, having at his post a man Constitutionally entitled to succeed, who had been honored with the second largest number of the suffrages of the people for the same office, and who of consequence would be probably worthy of the place, and competent to its duties. Let us now, Mr. President, examine for a moment the certain effect of the change about to be made, or what must be the operation of this designating principle, if you introduce it into the Constitution; now the Elector cannot designate, but must vote for two persons as President, leaving it to circumstances not within his power lo control which shall be the man : of course he will select two characters, each suitable for that office, and the second highest in vote must be the Vice President; but upon this designating plan the public attention will be entirely engrossed in the election of the President, in making one great man. The eyes of each contending party will be fixed exclusively upon their candidate for this first and highest office, no surrounding object can be viewed at the same time, they wiilbeloat In his disc The office of President, is in point of honor, profit, trust, and influential patronage so infinitely superior to any other place attainable in this Government, that In the pursuit and disposal of it, all minor considerations will be forgotten, every thing will be made to bend, in order to subserve the ambitious views of the candidates and their friends. In this angry conflict of parties, against the heat and anxiety of this political warfare, the Vice Presidency will either be left to chance, or what will be much worse, prostituted to the basest purposes ; character, talents, virtue, and merit, will not besought after, in the candidate. The question will not be asked, is he capable? is he honest? But can he by his name, by his connexions, by his wealth, by his local situation, by his influence, or his intrigues, best promote the election of a President? He will be made the mere stepping-stone of ambition. Thus, by the death or other Constitutional inability of the President to do the duties of the office, you may find at the head of your Governmeat as First Magistrate of the nation, a man who baa either smuggled or bought himself into office. Who not having the confidence of the people, or feeling the Constitutional responsibility of his place, but alirihuling his elevation merely : to accident, and conscious of the superior claims of others, will be without restraint upon his con' ' duct, wiiboui that strong inducement to consult the wishes of the people, and to pursue the true interests of the nation, that the hope of popular applause, and the prospect of re-election, would oner. Such a state of things might be productive of incalculable evils ; for it is, as I fear time will show, in the power of a President of the United Slates to bring this Government into contempt, and this country to disgrace, ifnot to ruin. Again. sir, if this amendment succeeds, if you designate the person voted for as President, and the person voted for as Vice President, you hold out an irresistible temptation to contracts and compromises among the larger States for these offices; it will be placing the choice of the two highest officers in the Government so completely in their power, that the five largest States, viz; Massachusetts. New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, may not only act in every previous arrangement relative to the appointment of these officers without the necessity of consulting the Other twelve, but may lotaliv exclude them from any participation in the election. The whole number of Electors, accord ins to the present representation in' Congress, will be one hundred and seventy-seven ; these five States will have ninetysix of them, a clear majority of eight, and should they agree among themselves they can say absolutely whoshall be thePresiclent. Theother twelve States will not have even the humble privilege of choosing between their candidates; for their whole number of votes being but eighty-one given to the candidate for the Vice Presidency as President, would be but thrown away, since the other would still have his designated majority of eight for that place. Should it be said that such a coalition is improbable, I answer that my opinion is different, and it is enoughfor methat it is possible. Again, sir, counting only the States of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, these four will be found to be entitled to eighty-two Electors, Wantiogsevenof a majority of the whole number; 80 that, leaving North Carolina among the smaller Stales, if they unite, and can by any species of influence, by promises of offices, bribery, or corruption, gain over to their interest but seven of the Electors belonging to the other Slates, they can in like mannerappoint who they please. I might go on to show that lopping even Massachusetts from the list, the other four, viz : New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, could with very little difficulty effect the same object, since tbey are entitled to seventy-seven Electors. And now let me ask gentlemen representing the twelve smaller States, il they are prepared to yield up not only the high and honorable ground upon which the Constitution has placed them in the House of Representatives in case of an election for a President to be had there, but to vest in the five larger States, or even in a smaller number of them, whenever they shall he pleased to exercise it, the exclusive power of appointing the President and Vice President the United States?

Again, Mr. President, admitting these coalitions of the larger States, of which 1 have been speaking, for the purpose of appointing a President and Vice President by themselves, may none of them ever take place under this amendment, if adopted, notwithstanding its strong and natural tendency to such an effect, (and this is certainly admitting much more than gentlemen on the other side oT the House could in argument have any right to demand of me.) yet there is one other which I am sure, in candor, they must grant me, is not only possible, but very probable, indeed, upon a subject of this kind— I mean the States of Virginia, North and South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, together with the Territories upon the waters of Mississippi, that are every day growing into States. And such is the rapidly increasing population of that country, that, after the next census, it will be forever in their power, upon this designating plan of election, to appoint the President and VicePresidenlof the United States. The other ten Middle and Eastern States will have only to acquiesce in the choice, without, as I before observed, the power even of electing between the candidates, and much less the right of being consulted, in the first instance, as to the suitable and proper characters. Gentlemen will, 1 hope, do me the justice to believe that 1 mention these coalitions as likely to be entered into, only in relation to this particular object. I have no doubt but that these States are as well disposed, and as much attached to the Union, as any that belong to it; but who does not know the indissoluble bonds that will bind together the citizens of that Southern and Western country, in the pursuit of an object of this kind? Their similarity of manners, of habits, of laws, of civil institutions, of local interests, added to their native prejudices and ties of consanguinity, unite them inseparably, and make their views the same. Yet gentlemen, to my u tier astonishment, tell us that iliis amendment is intended to preclude intrigue. Sir, no other measure could be adopted that would so effectually produce It. It will create ill blood between the smaller and the larger States — between one part of ihe Union and another. It will give rise to local prejudices, to envious territorial distinctions, to Slate schisms ; and 1 should not wonder if, in the endj it were to be the means of plunging this country into a civil war, and of producing a separation. As to the second and third alterations proposed in this resolution, that of enlarging the ground upon which the Vice President may be appointed by the Senate, by giving them authority to elect from the two highest, whenever no person has a majority of the whole number of votes, whereas now they can choose but in the case of two persons being upon a vote, and thus extending the powers of the Senate in [he election of this officer, they would, at first view, seem to be mere mailers of speculation, introduced for the sake of change only, 01 for llie want of something else to employ ourselves about. No tended lo have been experienced under those provisions of the Constitution, as they now stand; yet we, in the plenitude of our wisdom, are about to recommend to the several State Legislatures an alteration of them ; and so every successive ConSess, which will no doubt in the same ratio as e present be more wise, more learned , more enlightened, and more patriotic, than their predecessors, will improve upon our example, until the Constitution shall be entirely regenerated. But thegentlemanfrom Vermont (Mr. Bradley) now tells us— and [believecorrecily— that theseamendments, though not before contemplated, result necessarily from the introduction ot the designating principle into the Constitution. Does not this showus, most clearly, the danger of meddling with the Constitution at all ? Out of the single amendment proposed by the gentleman from New York, (Mr. Clinton.) that of designating the person voted for as President, and the person voted for as Vice President, these two other very important changes have already grown — have forced themselves upon our consideration ; and another of still shortly follow— that of abolishing entirely the office of Vice President. Several honorable members have told us that their minds have long been made up on this subject ; that they had long since seen the necessity of introducing this change in the mode of electing a President and Vice President; but never before saw its operation upon other parts of the Constitution, or that any other alterations must be the necessary consequence of its adoption. The honorable mover of this subject, from New York, who, according to his own account, had been two years maturing it in bis mind, and who pressed the immediate adoption of it, with even more than his usual eloquence, had never before seen the bearing of his own resolution upon the Constitution, and was himself one of the first to vote for .striking out part, and to second a motion of a gentleman from Vermont, (Mr. Bradley,) who I do not now see in his place, for K very important amendment to another part, of it. Indeed, sir, after all the deep deliberation bestowed upon it by the learned mover, the resolution, as at first introduced, provided very carefully for an impossible case, that in the nature of things could never happen— that of two candidates, upon the designating plan of election, having each a majority of the whole number of votes for President. Added to all this, sir, recollect the awkward and embarrassed situation of the Senate for have several times been so completely lost in the mazes of our own amendments as to be under the necessity of adjourning, in order to have them printed, that we might see what we had done ; and no sooner were they laid before us, than they directed our eyes to some other part of the Constitution where an unexpected injury had been sustained; and all this has arisen from the attempt toiatroduceLhedesignating principle into the Constitution. The favorers of the amendments have been alternately at variance with themselves and with each other, and sometimes so scattered that no two of them could agree; at other times, all were entirely lost. These are the most irresistible arguments, the strongest circumstances, to show how dangerous it is to attempt any alteration ia the Constitution ; and that, as has been urged on a former occasion, every comma has its meaning. You cannot strike out a word from one section, without inflicting a wound upon some other. So nicely has it been woven together, that no thread can be spared. Every principle it contains is a keystone, and no one of them can be removed without endangering the edifice. No man can tell how these amendments may operate — how they enfeeble and shackle other parts of the CooslitutioD — or what other alterations they may render necessary. Look at this paper now. and recollect what it nas been. At different times it has assumed different shapes— at one time proposing but one alteration ; at another, four or five. Thus, one alteration will beget the necessity for another, and so we shall have to go on in this work ad m- finitum. as the regular series of cause and effect. It may be said that this second amendment, so far as it goes to extend the powers of the Senate in the election of the Vice President, if adopted, may prove advantageous to the smaller States. I grant the possibility, but such advantage is too casual, too remote and unimportant, to induce me, as a Representative from one of the smaller States, to vote for any alteration in the Constitution. It is the true interest of the smaller States, especially, to preserve sacred and untouched the Constitution, and not be weakening it by alterations — expecting temporary advantages that may or may never arise; and which, if attained, would be little — would be less than insignificant — compared with (he infinite importance of this instrument to those States, as it stands at present. Their independence, nay, their very existence, as States, baugs upon their preservation of it. They could never get such another, and they should be the last to tamper with it : when they do so, they t'nk their only stake. And now let me entreat gentlemen representing the twelve smaller States in the Senate (for it is here, and here only, they are felt in the Government) to weigh well their amendments before, by their affirmative votes, they do an act that may encroach upon the Constitutional rights of those States. I know well that, with some of* the States, it is the highest source of mortification that the Constitution has placed the larger and smaller ones so nearly upon an equality in certain respects. The pride of some of the larger States will, for instance, never submit that, by any possible contingency, the State of Delaware, of Rhode Island, of Vermont, or New Hampshire, should have an equal voice with them in tne choice of a President, as in case of an election by the House of Representatives. This is an evil that must be cured ; and if alterations shall prove insufficient, a more effectual remedy, I fear, will be prescribed, the moment that the national pulse can be prepared for the application.

Dbceubbb, II AmtndiMiU to the Cmvtilutitm. So rar,Mr.Prestdent,tsh)]inaD wisdom. or rather human frailty, might be permiited to judge of ibe future from the past and the present, I should think it no actof rashness to foretell that the next dieration attempted. will be to destroy the influence of the smaller States in this branch of the Legislature, not directly by expunging that proTision of the Constitution which gives to each State an equal representation upon this floor, for that cannot be done with the cousctii of every State, but indirectly in conformity with the idea of the gentleman from Kentucky, (Mr. Bi BiDOB,) ex ■ -■ -■ ' ' ' the period and which, in effect, will amount to the same thing. I know too well the weightand influence of the gentleman from Kentucky in this Government at present, to treat lightly what says upon a subject of such magnitude, and must consider tbechargeofarislocracy.which he has been pleased to bring against the Senate as the denunciation of this body. Indeed, sir, I shall not be surprised to hear at the next session, that the people are prepared for the change, or even that some of the smaller States have recommended it, for such is at present the infatuated confidence of many of them in those who, I fear, are encompassing their ruin, that they seem to be constantly acting under instructions, and to have resFffoed both themselves and the Constitution to the guardianship of others. The gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Taylob,) order to lull our fears and divert our attention from the threat uttered by him to the smaller States, has very artfully called the alarm sounded on that subject by my honorable friend from New Jersey, (Mr. Dayton,) at one time a stratagem, and at another an ambuscade; and asked, how he, as a general, could lay an ambuscade so unconcealed, so exposed to the enemy 7 Bit. we resort to no stratagems or ambuscades, our opposition is public, and our movements undisguised ; and it was on the part of my friend only a prompt attack upon an ambuscade laid by the gentleman from Virginia himself, who has been entrusted with the chief command in this campaign, and which by him had been incautiously too soon uncovered ; whilst gentler means succeed so well, threats are unnecessary.and might be dangerous. I was not a little surprised, Mr. President, to hear an honorable member from Ma ryland, fMr. Smith,) after reminding us that he belonged to a small State, come out on this occasion the mighty champion of the large ones, and Whilst exhibiting himself to the greatest possible advantage in this new and enviable character, calling upon my friend from Massachusetts before me, (Mr. Adams,) to know why he, representing a large State, had been pleased to give himself any concern about the interests of the small States, intimating that such conduct concealed views not intended to be discovered, or, in the courtly language of the day, that it was siraiBgem ; I wonder it had not been an ambuscade too. The honorable member from Virginia (Mr. Tatlob) has prudently attempted to conceal again ^ ambuscade that had been so much annoyed by the fire of my friend from New Jersey, endeavoring to soften down and explain' away an expression used by him, and which; by a very natural construction, was considered a threat to bound to accept his explanation. I not scrutinize his meaning, especially after what the honorable member has said ; but let us see how far the gentleman from Maryland was correct, when he declared that his friend from Virginia had used no language that could amount to a threat to the smaller States. If, sir, the language, I will say the menacing language of the gentleman from Virginia used on this subject, taken according to its common import, was not sufficient to rally and unite the smaller States, then the rancor of party has stifled more noble sentiments, we are a house divided against itself, and our day has passed.

After reproaching us with our weakness, the gentleman proclaimed in the language of triumph, (for I will give his very words as noted down by myself and others at the time.) " Let the smaller States beware how they rouse the resentment of the larger ones. What," asked he, "must become of them in such a collision T And is this no threat 1 Sir, I answer, we might sink ; but it is to avoid this very collision that I resist, with my feeble efforts, the present measure. We are now safely entrenched behind the barriers of the Constitution, and shall we ourselves demolish this great bulwark of our defence 7 Shall we not rather make our stand here, whilst the means of protection and resistance are within our power? Ambition is insatiable ; the more we give up the more will be demanded of us, and every inch of ground we yield, the less tenable does the rest become. The honorable member from Virginia has told us, that the present mode of electing the President and Vice President was the road to Monarchy. I have often, sir, heard it intimated, that the Qovernment of the United States had a tendency to Monarchy, a doctrine I could never accede to, (I mean as the Government is at present organized.) I speak and judge from things as they now present themselves; what effect these many speculative changes that are at present taking place in the Constitution may have, 1 know not, t presume not to foretell. But one thing was, years since, foretold and denied, and I now call it up to the recollection of gentlemen on the other side of the House, not to upbraid or offend them — but short-sighted man feels a kind of pleasure, (it is indeed though, Mr. President, on this occasion a melancholy one,) in having foretold truly the events of futurity. It was foretold that the Constitution would not suit those who were coming into power ; that it was obnoxious to them, or to to their leaders, which is in effect the same, and that the moment they should lay their hands upon it, if they could not get rid of it entirely under the pretence of amending and altering, they would fritter it away, until but the shadow, the empty shadow, should remain. How far the proceedings of this session, which is thefiist that the resent majority ever consisted of two-thirds of both branches of the Legislature, will go to Justify this prediction, I will leave the world and the consciences of those honorable gentlemen on the other side of the House to judge. But such was the anxiety on this subject, that scarcely had we convened before the long wished for, hallowed work, was commenced, and the order of almost every day since has been a resolution to alter the Constitution. If, sir, the Constitution was suf fered to remain as it is, I have no idea, from my acquaintance with the people of this country, and from the nature of our civil institutions, that any set of men, entrusted with the management of our public affairs, could ever, by a system of measures tending to such an end, succeed in the subversion of our rights and liberties. The people watch their servants with a jealouseye. Iflhej err at all, it is on this side, and this is the shfi side. No, Mr. President, what we have most ii fear to our Government, and our liberties, must come from another and a very different source, fromthelicentiousnessof democracy. Thisiswhai Republican Governments have forever to guard against; this is the vortex in which they are most likely to be swallowed up. God grant it may never be the case with ours, and I fear nothing else. By the licentiousness of democracy, I mean no imputation or offence to any portion of this community ; I refer not to the political sentiments ' ' of any honorable gentlemen, or to the sentiments of their constituents — but to that wild infuriated spirit that we have seen in France, under the prostituted name of liberty, anarchizing the world, and rioting in the destruction of everything dear and valuable to society ; and after having sported itself in all the wantonness of excess with the terrors, the crimes, the miseries and the murders of mankind, has seated a Corsican adventurer upon the high and dignified throne of the Bourbons— has riveted the manacles of tyranny upon a great, a brave, but a deluded people, and is now reclining in the shade of a military despotism.

Mr. Cocke. — The gentleman last up has, to be sure, in a well studied speech, as often times before, sounded the tocsin of alarm, and called in even the aid of prophecy to enforce his fears. But. sir, this Senate has been so much accustomed to these false alarms, that it appears to me the only danger we are in is that of going wide of the subject, and taking up our time with matters of imagination, instead of sticking to matter of fact. The object of this amendment to the Constitution is only one thing, one plain and simple principle, to enable the people to discriminate in the choice of their fellow-citizens for the offices of President and Vice President. Gentlemen tell us of large and small Slates, but is this amendment more in favor of the large than small; is this not such an amendment as will induce the large States to promote the election by the people'! Is it not such an amendment as will prevent that corruption which so manyeenilemen on all sides apprehend, ifitgoesinto the House of Representatives T Where is the use of gentlemen sounding an alarm of danger which they do not really believe themselves? Why will gentlemen talk of the danger of confusion — threaten us with it, when the whole confusion arises from the acta of gentlemen themselves T We have listened here with patience for weeks together to the arguments of gentlemen ; they have had every fair opportunity to give their opinions, and it is now time to come to a conclusive vote. We hear nothing now but a repetition in fine dressed words of what we have heard from day to day for weeks; and for what purpose? to excite our fears, fears which it is our wish to guard against in reality. Gentlemen tell us, first, they suppose the )w>- ple may not elect a President and Vice President. Upon what ground do they pretend to believe this possible? Are the people so disgusted with their liberties ; are they so little attentive to their rights — are they tired of a Government that every day makes them more happy? No, sir.

They then tell us that they do not wish that the election should go into the House of Representatives; and then that that House may not elect; and then our very honorable selves are recommended to make up all deficiencies ! Do gentlemen doubt themselves, or can they compel Congress to pass such a law as they require for the election of a dictator, without a voice from the people ? If gentlemen fear that the people will not elect, and that the other House will not elect, with equal reason they may fear that the other House would notmake the law they wish for. But it is said that some of us are governed by a fear that the people may not have choice in the election of Vice President. If it will afford gentlemen any satisfaction, I tell them that it ia my wish that the people should elect the Vice President as well as the President. I say, I do not understand the principle of minorities governing majorities. The law of the minority is not the law of the ConsliiutioD.and it is not the'law for me. How gentlemen can pretend to advocate the Constitution, and talk of the minority giving law, is to me very surprising; they say loo Ine Constitution is very sacred to them, and it should not be altered; so it is 100, every word, sacred to roe; but among its most sacred parts, I find that the Constitution provides for its own alteration and amendment; nut indeed by a minority, but by a large majority in both Houses, and by a much larger majority of Slates. Gentlemen are not willing that a majority should elect a Vice President, but they are not willing that three-fourths of the States should amendthe Constitution ; they pass by the open door on the right hand to get in at a private passage.

Mr. White— lo order — the gentleman is not surely using any arguments of mine ; they are of his own making.

Mr. Cocke.— The gentleman from Delaware thinks the minority should govern — that is bia argument, however he may 'disguise it. I think the majority should govern ; I like to speak onl — Idonoi wish to have a man put upon us contrary to our wishes. What! shall 1 the majority abandon the right of choosing a man whose opinions are conformable to theirs, and suffer a man of principlea hostile to ibeire to be put upon iheiD? I am. sir, for a government of the people, whether well bom or born bjr accident; ; I am for a eoTerDmeDl not of checks and balances, but one that will not Miffera bad check upon good principles.

But we are once more told of a Gallic Cesar, and our fears are to be provoked this way too — but this more than the rest of alarms will not do ; we fear no Cesar, foreign or domestic. We have indeed seen the day when we were near getiiDg- a President not of our choice; but because we have escaped from the danger and the intrigue of that day , are we to take no precaution against such measures again. It is to guard against such danger we wish to amend this Constitution. But gentlemen tell us we have not given it a fair trial. 1 think we have, and found it defective. Here we have been a week and upwards, laboring and bewildered in every kind of discussion, and what have we come to? exactly where we set out. Not one of ns has altered our opinions — we have argued and listenedanddoneooihing. Why Because gen tiemen have been attempting impossibilities; there is Itosuch thing as moving either side from their principles. One side thinks the minority should give the law; we think with the Constitution the right is in the majority, and we will submit to no other law. I am for the amendment, and for adii ' '

Mr. Plvher said that he had generally contented himself with expressing his opinion by a silent vote, but on a question which affected the rights of the smaller Slates, (one of which he bad the honor to Represent,) be requested the indulgence of the Senate to a few observations.

He said the Constitution had provided only two methods for obtaining amendments, and both are granted with great caution. If two-thirds of the several Stale Legislatures apply. Congress shall call a convention who are to propose amendments, which, when ratified by the conventions of three-fourths of the States, will be valid. If this mode is adopted, Congress have nothing to do but to ascertain the fact, whether the necessary number of States requires convention. If they do, B convention must be called. The State Legislatures are only lo apply for a convention. They can neither propose nor decide the amendments. The other mode is, if two-thirds of both Houses of Congress deem it necessary to propose amendments, and three-fourths of the Stale Legislatures ratify them, they are valid. This is the present mode. The Stale Legislatures have nothing to do till after Congress has proposed the aroeodmeDts, and then it is their exclusive province either to ratify or reject them. But they have no authority to direct or even request Congress to propose particular amendments for themselves to ratify. Instructions on this subject are therefore improper. It is an assumption of power, not the exercise of a right. It is an attempt to create an undue influence over Congress. It is prejudging ihequestion before it is proposed by the only authority that has the Constitutional right to move it. If these instructions are obligatory, our votes must be govamed, not by the convictions of our own judgments,

Is, or the propriety and fitness of the measure, but by the mandates of other Legislatures. This would destroy one of the checks that the Constitution has provided against innovation. State Legislatures may, on some subjects, instruct their Senators ; but on this, their instructions ought not to influence, much less bind us, to propose amendments, unless we ourselves deem theta The Senate consists of two members from each State ; and in this case, the concurrence of twothirds of all the Senate are necessary. A majority of the Senate constitutes a quorum to do business, but that quorum is a majority of all the Senators that all the States are entitled to elect. ) with equal force to the term " twothirds ! Senate." But in cases where from speedy decision is requisite, and where nee of two-thirds is required, the Constitution is explicit in confining that two-thirds to the members present) as in cases of treaties and impeachments; -and also a fifth of the mem beta present requesting the yeas and nays. If amendments can be Constitutionally proposed by twothirds of the Senate present, it will follow that twelve Senators, when only a quorum is present, may propose them against the will of twentytwo Senators.

Mr. P. observed, that he had said the Constitution had provided for amendments, but with great caution. In some cases, they cannot, in the nature of things, be ever made. For instance, the equal representation of each State in the Senate cannot be abridged without iisown consent. Other partsofthe Constitution cannot be amended tillaftera certain period, to wit : those relating to slaves, and theapportionment of direct taxes. The United States are bound to guarantee to each Statea Republican form of government, and to protect each against invasion. Can these stipulations be expunged? They cannot. Because a change here would introduce new principles into the Constitution. That instrument is a compact formed by each individual State with the United States, and it may be difficult to ascertain how far a new principle, introduced into the Constitution, would operate as releasing the dissenting States from the compact. Nothing but imperious necessity can justify the introduction of new principles. The specious term of " amendments," will be falsified by applying it to forms and proceedings, without extending ii to the principles and substance of the Constitution.

In an elective government mnehdependsupon public opinion. It is important that the Constitution should be stable and permanent as the standard to direct that opinion. A Constitution frequently changed, cannot command the esteem or veneration of any people. The proposing of amendments has a tendency to infuse a spirit of fickleness and love of novelty into the public mind. One change prepares the way for another. How many constitutions have There, within a few years, been established in France, each of which was thought better than the one that preceded it 1 Have not their frequent changes rendered everything dear to man so precarious and uncertain, as to induce them to establish ■ military despotism, in preference to a free Government? Their fate should serve asa solemn warning to us DOC to change our Constitution, unless compelled by absolute necessity.

It has been said, the people require this amendment; but of this fact we have no evidence.

This amendment affects the relative interest mod importance of the smaller States. TheCi Constitution requires the Electors of each State to vote for two men, one of whom to be President of the United States. This affords a degree of security to the small States against the views and ambition of the large Slates. It gives them weight and influence in ilie choice. By destroying this complex mode of choice, and introducing the simple principle of designation, the large States can with more ease elect their candidate. This amendment will enable the Electors from four States and a half to choose a President, against the will of ibe remaining twelve States and a half. Can such a change tend to conciliate and strengthen the Union?

This amendment has a tendency to render the Vice President less respectable. He will be voted for not as President of the United States, but as President of the Senate, elected to preside forms in this House. In electing a subordinate officer the Electors will not require (base qualifications requisite for supreme command. The office of Vice President will be a sinecure. It will be brought to market and exposed to sale t procure votes for the President. Will the ambitious, aspiring candidate for the Presidency, will his friends and favorites promote the election of man of talents, probity, and popularity for Vice President, and who may prove his rival? No! They will seek a man of moderate talents, whose ambition is bounded by thatoffice.and whose influence will aid them in electing the President. This mode of election is calculated to increase corruption, promote intrigue.andaid inordinateambition. The Vice President will be selected from some of the large States; he will have a casting vote in this House; and feeble indeed must his talents be, if his influence will not be equal to that of a member. This will, in fact, be giving to that State a third Senator.

In the Southern States the blacksare considered as property, and the States in which they live are thereby entitled to eighteen additional Electors and Representatives. A number equal to all the Electors and Representatives that four States and a half are entitled to elect. Will you, by this amendment lessen the weight and influence of the Eastern States in the election of your first officers, and still retain this unequal article in your Constitution '7 Shall property in one part of the Union give an increase of Electors, and be wholly excluded in other States 1 Can this be right 1 Will it strengthen the Union 1

This amendment is designed to prevent the evils that occurred at the last Presidential election. That was an extraordinary event ; it was a eainaliy that can seldom happen. Two men had a majority of all the electoral votes, but neither of them was chosen. But what was the consequence? Why, the House of Representatives in a peaceable manner completed the choice, and that, fourteen days before the President could enter upon the duties of his office. It may be desirable to prevent the choice being carried into the House of Representatives, but this amendment will -not do it. It expressly provides for such an event. And if two or more candidates of different parties are carried there, (and if the stale of parties should be nearly equal it will happen,) the House must then decide between candidates

Mr. P. said that the amendment appeared cal. culated to give power to the strong ; enfeeble and weaken the small States; ; to lessen the respec lability of the Vice President, and not to prevent the evil it was designed to remedy ; and therefore that he should vole against it. )

Mr. jACKSon.— The gentleman last up and another who had preceded him (Messrs. Whitb and Plcmgb) bad taken a ground which he did not expect to hear in the elective Senate of a free people. They questioned not only the propriety of the present amendment but of all amendments. This he considered as of no great consequence, but he thought it merited notice, be* cause the dislike of amendments is expressed bjr gentlemen who wish to have it believed that they are mote strongly attached to the Constitution than others; anil though the Conslitulion which they so ardently admire provides expressly for its own amendment. Gentlemen liked the Constitution, but they disliked all amendment, forgetting that as long as human society exists, it must be subject to human frailties ; nothing that comes from the head of man can be perfect ; and though we may fail to correct imperfections in human institutions, it is our duty to persevere and employ every means which time and experience point out to us, to render our state as secure from evil as possible.

Why is it that gentlemen constantly refer us to France ? Do gentlemen, by referring uii to that unfortunate country, expect to impress a belief on us that there is any resemblance of situation or circumstances between the two countries ? — or are they so blind as not to see that the state of liberty in that country should be a most earnest motive with us to provide such amendments to our Constitution as may secure us against the danger of usurpation 1 Our situation has never resembled that of France, but during our Revolution. That nation had not the opportunity of sitting down after the overthrow of her enemies, and forming a free constitution in peace, as we had. It was in the conflicts of faction excited by foreign enemies, that the state of France was changed; hot she had been always different from us. France was always one and indivisible. In that country we have seen the conflicts of faction, and (be frantic zeal of adherents convulsing the nation ; have we not had any similar transactions during our own Revolution? Were there no factions even in our Revolutionary councils? Hare ire had no ambitious men since seeking to destroy our liberties t Are there none now who would, if they could hope for success, attempt it 1 Thanks to our better lorEuoe, though we bare encountered many a storm, and though bad pilots bad nearly foundered us, the vessel of State is still safe, and her liberties are not gone by ibe board. Thanks tothesouDd senseof the people, unbounded thanks to (be able pilot who now holds the helm, we have escaped a wreck, and are now more prosperous and happy than at any former period. The exalted character who is now at the head of affairs defies tbeshalluw railings and little-minded attacks of tiia enemies; his character stands too high above their reach to be affected by the'insecis that crawl beneath him ; his conduct is above their censure, and bis ^ood deeds have rendered him dear to his fellow-citizens. His countrymen had fixed their eyes upon him, but arts had been employed to frustrate their wishes. The effect, however, had been fortunate; and if it had not been for accidental circumstances, there never would have been room for the alarming contest which took place in the House of Representatives. He had the best reason to know, that it never was intended to make any other man President. He was at that period at the head of the government of Georgia, and happened to be present when a letter -was received, directed to some of the Electors, the contents of which were communicated to him. ter was from an influential gentleman in South Carolina, pressing them to give all their votes equal, as it was alleged that ifthey were not given, a character not acceptable to the people would be ■ Vice President. It was therefore to secure for Mr- Burr the Vice Presidency that those two votes were given, which would not have been given if the least suspicion had been entertained of what subsequently happen ed.

But it is asserted that there may be a coalition of the large States, and thus this amendment is intended todepressthe small States. These things gentlemen said only because they could say nothing to the purpose. Will any gentleman say that Massachusetts and Virginia have united ? Look to their representatives, and ask them if such is the case. Will those States be ever likely to coalesce in parly views? Never; there is one point only upon which they could be united — the defence of a common country. Tear a leaf from the Constitution and they will rally together, and the small States will cling around them.

But why is this jealousy of Virginia eicited — when and where has she domineered over her sister States? Sbeisasincapableof the attempt as of submission to an insulting and insidious domination. From whence do you derive your Consiitviioo? From Virginia. When your small States refused to submit to a paltry five per cent, impost on foreign goods, what was then your situation 1 Whostoodforwardi Virginia; she saw the situation of their common country, she saw the glories of the Revolution and the liberties of the people endangered by the blind and selfish policy of the small States ; and she with her accustomed sagacity found out the remedy, by proposing a convention, in which your Constitution originated. To whom are you indebted for the Revolution! To the brave State of Massachusetts, the gratitude of America is due for her valor, her constancy, and her sufferings. But it is to Virginia you owe the instructive spirit and the manful determination of the first resolve and first determination 10 be free, sovereign, and independent. Why then is this jealousy attempted ? Is it because she had given us Washington in our Revolution, and Jefferson now 1 Is it to the superiority of her patriots and statesmen we must attribute this unworthy envy 1 It has been asked why we do not resort to a convention, if we wish to amend the Constitution! For his part he was averse to calling conventions, but when no other remedy was provided ; bodies of that description are invested with boundless power; the physical and political powers of the State are in their hands ; and they are therefore more exposed to the zeal and the intrigues of the ardent and ambitious. The Constitution has provided means more simple, and fully adequate; and, even though we might err in our determinations, the check of three-fourths of the Legislatures will be an adequate protection against the invasion of the public rights.

We are told we shall give up everything if we pass this amendment. Shall we, really, have more or less power than before ; or, has there been any coalition which is under an apprehension of losing everything by its passage?

We are told that the candidates, on a former occasion, had an equal claim and equal pretensions to the office of President. He did not wish to make comparisons ; but he could not but recollect that the attempt to supersede one of the candidates, and to place the other in his station, had endangered the Government ; and, from what he had already said, he believed it would not be questioned that, so far as concerned Georgia, it never was intended to give them an equal chance ; and small and obscure as that little corner called Georgia is, had the measure been pursued to consummation, which had been attempted on that occasion, she would have flown to arms, and South Carolina would have joined ber to do justice to the interest of the nation.

The gentleman from Delaware (Mr. Wbite) had talked of intrigues. The days of intrigue are past, they are gone, and the intriguers with them ; the people have got the man of their choice; Mr. Jefferson baa nooccasion for intrigue were he disposed to employ it ; the Administration has none; the policy of the Executive is above all intrigues; the affections of the people are his, and justly, for, under his Ad ml nist ration, they are the happiest people that ever existed. Never will there be a Federal President or Vice President again elected, to the end of time ; if there should ever be any other chosen out of the line of the present politics, it must be from some new sect, which, assuming the principles of the republicans, may succeed by carrying their zeal for liberty farther.

He did not wish lo discuss largely the allusion of the gentleman to a fifth wheel. Were the subject lo oe confined lo «ut own country, he should go fully into that subject; he wished not to -afford any handle for the disrespect of foreign nations towards any part of our institutions. But he would spurn the insinuations of those who would suggest that we shall not choose a man of integrity for the office of Vice President. The people, sir, will solicit a man worthy of their confidence, and honored abroad and at home.

The amendment to the Constitution, he considered necessary and salutary ; and he was in hopes, when gentlemen saw the benefits, they would come forward and thank us for it.

Mr. TBitcy hoped the Senate would now adjourn; on the question being put, it was lost.

The motion of Mr. Tract for an adjournment having been negatived, he then addressed the President. .

Mr. Tracy moved an adjournment, because he thought a more full and fair discussion was due to this important question than could be had after this late hour.

The merits have never, until now, been before ns, for, although considerable time has been consumed in debate, it has chiefly been directed to the subordinate amendments, and not to the main resolution. But, since the Senate have refused id adjourn. I will now offer some observations on the merits ; in doing which, I will study brevity, as much as the importance of the subject will permit. I shall a sir, that the resolution before us contains principles which have manifest tendency to deprive the small States of an important right, secured to them by a solemn and Constitutional compact, and to vest an overwhelming; power in the great States. And, further, I shall attempt to show that, in many other points, the resolution is objectionable, and, for a variety of causes, ought not to be adopted.

As I shall be obliged, in delineating the main features of this resolution, to mention the great States in the Union as objects of jealousy, I wish it to be understood that no special stigma is intended. " Man is man," was the maxim expressed in an early part of this debate, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Bdtler,) and in application to the subject of Government, the maxim IS worthy to be written in letters of gold. Yes, sir, " man is man," and the melancholy truth that he is always imperfect and frequently wicked, induces us to fear his power, and guard against his rapacity, by the establishment and preservation of laws, and well-regulated constitutions of Government. Man, when connected with very many of his fellow men, in a great State, derives power from the circumstance of this numerous combination; and from every circumstance which clothes him with additional power, he will generally derive some additional force to his passions.

Having premised this, I shall not deem '' — requisite to make any apology, when I att npt I excite the attention, the vigilance, and e en the jealousy of the small, in reference to the of the great States. The caution is meant ply against the im perfect ions and passions of man, generally, and not against any State, or description of men, particularly.

It may be proper, in this place, to explain mjr meaning, when I make use of the words "small" id " great," as applicable to States.

Massachusetts has been usually called a great Stale; but, in respect to all the operations of this resolution, she must, I think, be ranked among the small States. The district of Maine is increasing rapidly, and must, in the nature of things, soon become a State. To which event, its locaI, being divided from what was the ancient Colony of Massachusetts, by the intervention of New Hampshire, will very much contribute. I believe there is a Legislative provision of some years' standing, authorizing a division at the option of Maine. When this event shall occur, Massachusetts, b use 111, although, in comparison with Connecticut and Rhode Island, will not be a small Stale ; yet, in comparison with many others, must be so considered. I think myself justifiable, then, for my present purposes, in calling Maine, New Hampshire, Massachusetts. Rhode Island, Connecticut, Vermont, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, and South Carolina, small States. They are limited in point of territory, and cannot reasonably expect any great increase of population for many years, not, indeed, until the other States shall become so populous as to discourage emigration, with agricultural views; which may retain the population of the small States as seamen or manufacturers. This event, if it ever arrives, must be distant. A possible exception only may exist in favor of Maine; but, when we consider its climate, and a variety of other circumstances, it is believed to form no solid exception to this statement.

By the same rule of deciding, the residue of the States must be called great ; for although Georgia and several others are not sufficiently populous, al this time, to be considered relatively great States, yet their prospect of increase, with other circumstances, fairly bring them within the description, in respect to the operation of the mea>- ure now under consideration. '

It will be recollected that, in the various turns which the debate has taken, gentlemen have repeatedly said that the Constitution was formed for the people; that the good of the whole was its object ; that nothing was discernible in it like a contest of States, nothing like jealousy of small States against the great; ; and although such distinctions and Jealousies might have existed under the first Confederation, yet they could have no existence under the last. And one gentleman, (Mr. Smith, of Maryland,) has said that he has been a member of this Government ten years, and baa heard nothing of great and small States, as in ihe least affecting ibe operations of Government, or the feelings of those who administer it.

Propriety, therefore, requires that we altenlively examine the Constitution itself, not only to obtain correct ideas upon these observations, so repeatedly urged, but to place in the proper light the operations and effects of the resolution in aebate. If ■we attend to the Constitution, we shall immediately find evident marks of concession compromise, and that the parties to these coi siODs were the great and small Slates. And the members of the Convention who formed the instrument have, in private information and public communications, united in the declaration, tlif ' the Constitution was the result of concession an compromise between the great and small State In this examination of the Constitution it will be impossible to keep out of view our political lions under the first Confederation. Weprimarily united upon the footing of complete Slate equality— — each State had one, and no State had more than one vote in the Federal Council or Congress. With such a Confederation we successfully waged war, and became an independent nation. When we were relieved from the pressure of war, that Confederation, 'both in structure and power, was found inadequate to the purposes for which it was established. Under these circumstances, the States, by their Convention, entered into a. new agreement, upon principles better adapted to promote their mutual security and happiness. But this last agreement, or Constitution, under which we are now united, was manifestly carved out of the first Confederation. The small Slates adhered tenaciously to the principles of State equality; and gave up only a part of that federative principle, complete State equality, and that, with evident caution and reluctance. To this federative principle they were attached by habit ; and their attachment was sanctioned and corroborated by the example of most if not all the ancient and the modern Confederacies. And when the great States claimed a weight in the Councils of the nation proportionate to their numbers and wealth, the novelty of the claim, as well as its obvious tendency to reduce the sovereignty of the small States, must have produced serious obstacles to its admission. Hence it is, that we find in the Constitution but one entire departure from the Federal principle. The House of Representatives is established upon the popular principle, and given to numbers and wealth, or to the great States, which, in this view of the subject, are synonymous. it was thought, by the Convention, that a consolidation of the States into one simple Republic, would be improper. And the local feelings and jealousies of all, but more especially of the small States, rendered a consolidation impracticable.