Debates in the Senate on the Twelfth Amendment, 1803

December 2, 1803

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION.57 min read
140: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 140 (Senate1803.Dec2.140)

Permit me, sir, to illustrate this argument fay declaring how I would proceed, if such was my design to destroy the Constitution of the United States, premising that I speak prospectively and not retrospectively. I would have recourse to those very energies which constitute the English monarchy: armies, debt, Executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. I would endeavor, by these monarchical energies, to produce the same effects as in England ; and I would hide my intentions by exciting a fanatical adoration for the Constitution, which 1 would endeavor to make a metaphysical idol; and which I would myself adore, in order to destroy. Whilst J pretended to be its devotee, it should become my screen.

141: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 141 (Senate1803.Dec2.141)

This, sir, will be the consequence, if the people of the United States should become jealous of the amending the Constitution; and therefore this species of jealousy so industriously attempted to be excited, is calculated, if it could operate, to bring upon them the utmost calamity. Abuses of a political system will happen ; and amendments only can meet abuses. Public opinion, and not an Idolatrous tenet, is the element of our policy ; and, however the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. PicKERiNo) may deride the opinion of the people, it is the element in which our policy is rooted, and which can at all times be safely entrusted with moulding their form of Government. [Mr. PicKEaiNO here explained.]

142: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 142 (Senate1803.Dec2.142)

Sir, I quote gentlemen's ideas and not their words. Is it not true that the gentleman ridiculed a recommendation of this very amendment, even from a State Legislature, because of some grammatical inaccuracy ; and that he reasoned against the possibility of knowing what the public opinion was; and yet, however inaccurately it may be expressed, that gentleman certainly has had sufficient evidence to convince him that public opinion is really a noun stii)statttiDe.

143: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 143 (Senate1803.Dec2.143)

It has been urged, sir, by the gentlemen in opposition, in a mode, as if Cbey supposed we wished to conceal or deny it, that one object of this amendment is to bestow upon the majority a power to elect a Vice President. Sir, I avow it to be so. This is one object of the amendment; and the other, as to which 1 have heretofore expressed my sentiments, is to enable the Electors, by perfecting the election of a President, to keep it out of the House of Representatives. Are not both objects correct, if, as I have endeavored to prove, the Constitution, in all cases where it refers elections to the popular principle, intended that principle to act by majorities? Did the Constitution intend that any minor faction should elect a Vice President? If not, then an amendment to prevent it accords with, and is representative of, the Constitution. Permit me here again to illustrate by a historical case. England in the time of Charles the Second, was divided into two parties — Protestants and Papists — and the heir to the throne was a Papist. The Protestants, constituting the majority of the nation, passed an exclusion biU, but it was defeated, and the minor Papist faction, in the person of the Duke of York, got possession of Executive power. The consequences were, domestic oppressions and rebellions, foreign wars occasionally for almost a century, and the foundation of a national debt, under which the nation has been ever since groaning, and under which the Government will finally expire.

144: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 144 (Senate1803.Dec2.144)

Had the majority carried and executed the proposed exclusion of James II. from Executive power, the English would have escaped all these calamities. Such precisely may be out case. I beg again that it may be understood tlial, in application, 1 speak prospectively and not r spec lively.

145: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 145 (Senate1803.Dec2.145)

But it is far from being improbable, that place of these religious parties, political parties may arise of equal zeal and animosity. We may at some future day see our country divided into a Republican party and a Monarchical party. Is it wise, or according to the intention of the Constitution, that a minor monarchical faction should, by any means, acquire the power of electing a vice Presideoi ; the possible successor to Executive power? Ought a Republican majority to stake the national liberty upon the frail Life of one man? Will not a monarchical Executive overturn the system of a republican Executive? And ought the United Stales to shut their eyes upon this possible danger until the case shall happen, when it may be too late to open them?

146: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 146 (Senate1803.Dec2.146)

Sir,let us contemplate the dreadful evils which the English nation have suffered from the cause of investing Executive power in a man hostile to the national opinion, and avoid them. They suffered, because their exclusion bill was abortive. Election is our exclusion bill. Its efficacy depends upon its being exercised by a majority. It is only a minority which can render election insufficient to exclude monarchical principles from Executive power. It is against minority that election is intended to operate, because minority is the author of monarchy and aristocracy.

147: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 147 (Senate1803.Dec2.147)

Shall we, sir, be so injudicious as to make election destroy the principle of election by adhering to a mode of exercising it, now seen to be capable of bestowing upon a minority the choice of a Vice President? Shall we make election, invented exclude monarchy, a handmaid for its introdi lion? Or shall we, if we do not see monarchy at this day assailing our republican system, conclude that it never will; although we know that this system has but two foes, of whom monarchy is one? No, sir, let us rather draw instruction from the prophetic observations of a member of the English House of Commons, whilst the bill for excluding James II. was depending, who said: " I hmu- a lion in the lobby roar, Say, Mr. Speaker, shall we abut the door, And keep him there t Or shall we let him in. To try if we can get him out again ?"

148: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 148 (Senate1803.Dec2.148)

Instead of shutting the door, the English left it open ; tyranny got in ; and the evils produced by Its expulsion, to that nation, may possibly have been equal to those which submission would have produced.

149: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 149 (Senate1803.Dec2.149)

Sir, much has been said about the rights of minorities, and the tendency of this amendment to keep up party spirit. I wish I could hear these righliof minorities defined. It is easy to comprehend the justice of the position, " that every individual in society has equal rights, whether he belongs to a majority or a minority ;" but the idea of a minor faction, having political rights as a faction, to me is incomprehensible. On the contrary, I [consider all minor factions as inflamed, | excited, and invigorated by a prospect of success; just as the Popish faction, in the period quoted of the English history, was kept alive and propelled to make attempts, which they never would have made, had it not been for the excitement arising from the prospect of gaining possession of Executive power; so here, if at a future day a minor and monarchical party should arise, that also will be propelled and excited by the chance of getting possession of Executive power, to keep party spirit alive, and to make attempts which they never would have made, if no such excitement existed. Hence the amendment, if it will have the effect of depriving a minor faction of the possibility of getting possession of Executive power, will suppress and not provoke parly and faction.

150: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 150 (Senate1803.Dec2.150)

Mr. President, we have been warned by a pic. ture of the evils produced by the French revoln- (lon, to forbear to amend our Constitution ; for what end I am at a loss to conjecture. Sir, how are these arguments intended to apply to the people of the United States ? If the state of national information in France has disqualified the great mass of that nation for the enjoyment of self-gorernment, does it therefore follow that the peopfe of America are disqualified for self-government ? If this State adopts the French nation for the species of government now existing in France, doesit follow that we are adapted for a similar government? Sir, It is our superior degree of national knowledge which enables us safely to use national opinion as an element of government. This is evinced by facts. ' In France, constitutions were several times made and amended without producing good effect; in America, constitutions have been, in many Instances, perhaps to the extent of sixty or seventy, made, repeated and amended, without producing the least disturbance or evil effects in a single case. Changes in France, even often for the worse; here generally, and perhaps constantly, for the better. It is because the public will is here rooted In a sufficient degree of public knowledge to preserve a moderate and free government. Shall we sacrifice this will and a right to amend our constitutions, to a species of metaphysical idolatry, although we owe to these sources all the prosperity and happiness we now possess? For the doctrine, "that it is a species of political aacri' lege to amend constitutions, and that the people should be jealous of every such attempt ;" it is precisely the best means to destroy the right in the people to do so. It is a doctrine levelled against the people themselves, under the predominance of whose will the right can only be exercised ; and tending to throw this mode of national self-defence against the arts of avarice and ambition ''■-" in the back ground; whilst these foes can carry on their encroachments upon liberty and property, by form of law. Let not, then, the people of the United States be deterred from exercising their right to alter their constitutions, so frequently and so successfully exercised, by a picture of the French Revolution.

151: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 151 (Senate1803.Dec2.151)

Finally, Mr. President, this amendment receives my approbation and support, because I think it conformable to public opinion, evidently the special recommendation of sun drjr States, and the concurrence of a great majority of the representatives of the people in the other House; because it accords with the principle of self-Kovernment that this expression of the public will should be obef ed, that the right of the nation to amend the form of its Qorernraenl, should, upon that ground, be solemnly recognised j because elections, the result of preference, are more consistent with moral rectitude, than those influenced or guided by intrigue, party artifice, or the intrigues of diets and because it was the intention of the Constitution that the election of a President and Vice President should be determined, by a fair expression of the public will by a majority, and not that (bis intention should be defeated by inesubsequeDl occurrence of a state of parties, neither foreseen nor contemplated by the Constitution or those Mr. Jackbon. — The gentleman from Connecticut has alleged that the Georgia Electors had consulted him, and that there was an intrigue, and seemed to insinuate something about bribery. 1 expect that gentleman will explain himself.

152: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 152 (Senate1803.Dec2.152)

Mr. Tract said he had meant do improper im- !utatioQ whatever on the gentleman's character. !he gen tlemaii had talked of his being at 8 meetingof gentlemen in (Georgia, and that a letter had been received which changed the intentions of the Electors ; and he had also talked of intrigues ; and it certainly appeared as if there had been eom^ thing more than ordinary election proceedings when the intention was changed by a letter. He then observed that the hour was late, and moved that the House, when it adjourns, adjourn to Monday. The question was lost.

153: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 153 (Senate1803.Dec2.153)

It was then moved that the House adjourn now. The question was taken, and lost, by a large majority.

154: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 154 (Senate1803.Dec2.154)

Mr. BuTLEB hoped gentlemen would not do one thing and tell us another. After hearing them for several hours — after sitting without refreshment from eleven to now near six — will not gentlemen afford us an opportunity to deliver our opinions upon this subject? Are gentlemen afraid of argument? Or do they wish to press us to debate, when this state of fatigue renders it scarcely possible to do justice to the subject or to ourselves? As gentlemen proceed thus, he could not avoid using strong language, and must say that he conceived such conduct grievous and oppressive — it was almost tyrannical. There were other gentlemen beside himself who wished to offer their opinions, and he hoped they would not persist in forcing a great portion of the Representatives of the States to vote without a hearing at this late hour. He moved an adjournment.

155: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 155 (Senate1803.Dec2.155)

Mr. Logan. — As the gentleman wished to give his opinion, he hoped the House would adjourn. On this question there were — yeas 12, nays 15. Mr. HiLLaonBB was sorry that, after so long a debate, he should be obliged to trespass on the House, and perhaps be obliged to repeat arguments with which the Housewasalready familiar. But ihe extraordinary speech of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Taylos) wa« such that, although was danger of this Government being destroyed by idol worship: the framers of the Constitution foresaw and made provision against it. But there are more kinds of idol worship than one: the Republics of antiquity will bear witness, by their ruin, to the existence of this destructive idolatry. It is that idol worship,! fear, which blinds the gentleman himself to the consequences of this amendment, though in general he would allow him to be distinguished for candor and fairness, and for which he admired him. What is the position which the gentleman lays down and avows ? That it is his purpose to prevent a minor faction from carrying a Vice President into that Chair. Had the gentleman laid aside all consideration of what the Constitution intended ? Does it not say that two persons shall bevoted for as President? And what was the object of this, but to afford the minority an opportunity of putting in one of the two ? But gentlemen will say this is not reasonable. He thought differently. It was to prevent this idol worship,and to make the majority look about them; it was to prevent any one State domineering over the rest, or attempts of particular Slates to carry their idol at all risks. For this purpose, two persons were directed to be voted for. Your amendment proposes to persuade the people that there is only one man of correct politics in the United States. Your Constitution provides a remedy against this, and says vou must bring forward two. If the majority will select two, and bring them fairly forward, how is it possible for the minority to bring any forward with effect ?

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156: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 156 (Senate1803.Dec2.156)

He would suppose case, that there is in aparticular State a man who in every view is entitled to the highest respect, and so popular as to be beyond the reach of competition. According to the laws of some ancient Republics he would be condemned to the ostracism, and banished. This was the punishment of the most virtuous and meritorious men. They were banished because their popularity made them dangerous to the liberties of the Republic — because, in short, he was in danger of becoming an idol. Our Constitution, more wise and just, provided a more safe and effectual remedy: no man can become too popular; for, if there is a portion of the people who are disposed to be infatuated, the Constitution provides there shall be two candidates; and those who are not infatuated can choose a man perhaps not so popular, but I probably possessed of equal talents station. Had the Convention supposed religious sects, as the Protestants and Catholics, and that there should be a candidate from each sect the gentleman's arguments, drawn from the English exclusion bill, would be parallel. But here they have the right to choose two Protestants, or two of any sect; and the comparison of course is not perfect. What avails it that the minority should propose a Catholic, if the Protestants have a majority ? They may select two Protestants, and the two will have the major vote.

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157: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 157 (Senate1803.Dec2.157)

The time was very remote, he believed, when it would be in the power of M17 nun to wrest the power out of ihe hands of ihe people of this c try ; but get this alteration made, and yoa d_ .. never back to so safe a statioo again. At some future day an artful and powerful man will rise, (as has been tbe case in all nations.) and if, by this alteration of the Constitution, he can command a majority of votes, he will take possession of the Executive Chair, and your liberties are gone ; for the people of no nation have ever knowingly destroyed their own liberties. ■

158: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 158 (Senate1803.Dec2.158)

When a whole society has become acquainted with its constitution, changes in it are dangerous. Every change you make renders the knowledge of it uncertain to the people, and the uncertainty is equally pernicious as ignorance ; for, after successive changes, is the time for an usurper; then ih.^ friend of the people who had stolen away their hearts, under the pretence of preserving their liberties, steals them away too. But now, as our Constitution stands, you have every guard against ambition ; no man can corrupt the whole people ; and if you put up two can did a lea^ the second will be preferred to the first, if there is any danger to be apprehended from him.

159: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 159 (Senate1803.Dec2.159)

When we wish to promote a particular object, we are too apt to view it only on one side. The ^;enlleman from Virginia had compressed the object of amendment m one expreasion—he wished to prevent a minor faction from choosing a Vice President. The gentleman from Tennessee (Mr. Cocke) had avowed the same sentiment in still It was most certainly a wise principle to guard against evil; but wisdom requires that there be a just apprehension or a real evil. He did not believe that a Federal Vice President was an evil of any kind. The gentleman had indeed talked of armies, debts, patronage, and so on, but what concern have the Senate and House of Representatives in those evils 1 They have not the command of armies; no member of either House can be appointed to ihem. The evil apprehended from these things can only attach where the command devolves upon some ambitious man, as thegenlle* man (Mr. Jackson) said, above impeachment.

160: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 160 (Senate1803.Dec2.160)

He was sorry the gentleman had made use of such an epithet as the minor faction. He believed, when that gentleman was in the minority, he did not think himself a member of a faction. Difference of opinion does not constitute faction ; and a free government always implies the right of free opinion. He was in a minority, but he disclaimed faction.

161: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 161 (Senate1803.Dec2.161)

Mr. Tavlor had before stated that his arguments were wholly prospective — not present or retrospective — but founded on a presumption that, at some very remote time, there may be a monarchicalfaction.

162: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 162 (Senate1803.Dec2.162)

Mr. HiLLRousE was glad of the explanation ; for it could not be supposed that he was a monarchical politician, nor the section of the Union which he came from disposed to monarchy. He would never consent to put up any man as a candidate for office who was in favor of monarchical principles. There were men enough in this country, always to be found, without taking up men of that description. But how will gentlemen reconcile their dislike to monarchy with their dislike of Federalism also? The expression is to prevent a Federal Vice President being elected : this comes nearer home than monarchism. Is not every friend to this Government a Federalist — is not our Governmenl a Federative Republic 1 The habits and feelings of every man in this country are strictly Republican. He was not indeed an Utopian Republican, nor could he flatter himself that the time would ever arrive when every man would think alike, He should rejoice to see such a time, but believed it would not arrive before the millenium, and was alike the creation of an heated brain. Th.r asperity — but there n party spirit will not exist ; never will come a time when tnere will be no ambitious men aspiring to power. In the present time, gentlemen are pet* :cllf able to place two persons of their own opinions in the two great offices. The minority cannot do it. What is the evil, then, which calls for this amendment Is it from a fear that the minority may bring forward a monarchical character? He would not undertake to characterize those who brought forward a man whom they never intended for that office. If they have done an improper thing, bought wit is best; but he hoped that gentlemen would not do away the salutary checks of the Constitution.

163: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 163 (Senate1803.Dec2.163)

• Mr. Dayton said that, in the course of their debates upon this important question, the Senate had been favored with some novel lessons in ibe science of ethics by an honorable member from Virginia. Aware of the impracticability of inducing the small States by mere force of reasoning to assent to a measure so injurious to their rights, he had resorted to the stronger argument of power, and threatened them with the resentment of the great States. When the too hasty threat was thrown back upon him, and treated in the manner it deserved; when an appeal was made on the occasion to the independent spirit of the Senate, the honorable gentleman from Virginia explained it to be intended, not as a menace, but only as a more effectual means of inculcating a higher sense of morality upon the little S[aies> He had been so good also as to give the Senate a lecture in favor of calmness and moderation in debate, in a style and manner rather singular and uncommon, for he had done it in one of the most warm, animated, ao^ impassioned speeches, thai he had ever uttered on that floor. Thus lo inculcate morality in the language of terror, and mod- '.ion of temper in the style and voice of pasI, seems to be the peculiar faculty of that gentleman, and would have passed without this notice, if it had not been for its effect as an example. The honorable member from Tennessee, (Mr. " Cocke,) either allured by the novelty or success thus recommending one quality by exemplify* ing in himself the opposite character, had per* fectljT copied after so favorite an original. He had indeed done full justice to his great prototype by recommending to the Senate, in the comm^icement of that day's discussion, to itUce the TDte immediately irilhoat Islktog, and by pointing out, in his usually concise style, the hcIvrdtagesand economy of silence, in a speech of nearly one hour’s length. To such authorities and precepts, enforced too in such s manner, it was Mr. D.'s disposition to bow submissively, and therefore in (be little he should take the liberty of saying, he should neither threaten nor rave, nor claim for any length of time the attention of the Senate. There were other considerations which pre- ▼ented him from entering deeply into the merits of this question, no less than a serious indisposition, and a firm conviction that the decision in favor of the measure was immoveably fixed.

164: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 164 (Senate1803.Dec2.164)

Although, however, no arguments can avail to prevent the adoption of an amendment of the Constitution so fatal to the interests of a great portion of the community, yet, as a member of one of the small States, I claim a right to m over our fallen honors and dignity, and as a Representative from New Jersey, I deem it ray duty to enter my solemn protest against the injury done to our interests and our sovereignty. But a fewyears ago we were equal in votes and influence, though inferior in size and population, to the largest States. We consented to give up a certain portion of that influence for the general good, expressly retaining the other portion for our own protection and security. This instrument, the Constitution, which we have sworn to support, and are now about to deface, is the new compact which that temper produced. It is the great plan of compromise between the jarring and contending interests of the great and small States. One of its most prominent and fairest features is now about to bechan^d and deformed. All theotber amendments which have been proposed since its adoption are unimportant' when compared with this. They may ^enerallybe regarded rather as operating to exfJam than alter the Constitution ; but this strikes at that jrreai principle, which, in all countries, has been found the most difficult of all others to settle ; yet, in this country, had been considered as unalterably fixed, viz : the succesBorahip to the office of Chief Magistrate. This point, so essential to the tranquillity of every people, is now about to be disturbed and unsettled, and so important a provision as the mode of electing that great officer is to be henceforth varied according to the whim of the prevailing party, and subjected to all the fluctuations of political opinion, or the gust* of popular passion. Never was a more just sentiment •expressed than that which had been uttered by an honorable gentleman, highly respectable for his talents and influence, in the other House, "that in framing amendments we ought to consider not so much what the Constitution ought to be as what it is." Paradoxical as this mifht seem at first sight to those who view the subject superficially, yet it is to persons of such description only, it will appear so, for never has been inculcated a doctrine more ■mnd and salutary. It is now however, I fear, about to be disregarded in the case before us, but il cannot be done with impunity, for we shall one day repent the departure from it. Toti ■« now about to change this form of Government, with regard only to existing circumstances and present convenience or policy, and to change it too in one of its most prominent features. You are now about to reduce the already too little influence of the small States, without restoring to them the consideration which they gave for it. Let it not be believed, however, that (although perhaps blindly instrumental themselves in effecting this reduction) they will not hereafter claim an equivalent for the sacrifice theyare compelled to make. When it is once established that the Constitution is thus to undergo changes in reference only Itf the prevailing policy or temper of the day, and the existing stale of things, what will be the situation of this country, and whither will the principle carry us, or where will it be arrested? Even the apportionment of representation in the other branch of the Legislature must be condemned if tested by that standard, and will probably be shaken, or at least most justly nttacked. It was never founded upon numbers merely, but regulated by a qualified ratio of wealth and numbers. An additional representation, equal to three-fifths of a certain description of population, was considered as the best criterion which at the time of forming the Constitution could be adopted ; but it is far, very far, from being a just and true one now. Who will pretend, at this period, that six persons in "North Carolina are richer than seven Massachusetts or Connecticut; that they consume ; more or pay more into the Treasury 1 Yet is most assuredly the calculation upon which that representation is framed and apportioned. Gentlemen may perhaps feel full security that an amendment to regulate anew the proportion of Representatives, by taking off the additional allowance for the three-fifths of the number of slaves, can never be carried ; but they must be sensible that the serious discussion of it would produce most disagreeable sensations throughout the country, and they ought to beware how they originate and establish a principle, which, losing nt of the original plan of compromise, and regulated only by present expediency, will render the

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165: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 165 (Senate1803.Dec2.165)

reconsideration and revision of that delicate subject, an act of right as well as duty.

166: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 166 (Senate1803.Dec2.166)

Through the whole course of this discussion great art has been used by some of the most zealous advocates of the measure, to divert us from the real ground of distinction upon which it rests, and to lull into a fatal repose the jealousies of the small States for their rights and sovereignty. A remark of the honorable gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) tending to that object, ought not to escape animadversion. He averred that no law could be found in our statute book that was produced by a combination of States, and hence inferred that no such combination ought to be apprehended. The fact admitted, said Mr. D., and what does it prove? Not what the gentleman from Maryland would infer; not what he ought to prove, before the assertion and the argument can be worth anything to him on this occasion;

167: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 167 (Senate1803.Dec2.167)

. not that such combination may not be feared if you alter the Constitution, but that it is impracticable as it now stands. The refined process established for electing b President was calculated to guard against that very danger, but if altered sdiT destroyed, we shall soon be subject to that evil. Why is it, sir, that none of our laws are the result of any combinations of States? The reason is to be found in the checks provided against it in the Constitution. Any project founded upon a coalition of the small States, originating as it must in the Senate, would be checked in the House of Represenia tires ; and, on the other hand, any one resulting from any concert among the great States in the other branch, would and must be defeated in this. Bui if these wholesome checks could be done away, where could be found a security against so great a temptation? I thank God that ibe Convention were so enlightened as to place the equality of Slates in the Senate beyond the reach of amendment. Fortunate, most fortunate indeed is it, that (here has been provided at least this one sanctuary of our rights, too sacred to be approached by the unhallowed feel, or touched by the unsparing hands of amendment The seventeen States, said Mr. D., may now be regarded as so many planets, equal in dignity, though unequal in size and splendor, composing the same system, and revolving in their own orbits around one common centre; but, under this new dispensation, the greater number Af them are to be degraded to the dependent station of satellites, humble tendants and with feeble lustre around the few great planets, and forever hereafter subject their control and influence. Judging then from my own feelings, and from my knowledge of the people of the State whose sovereignty 1 represent— a people proud of their independence, and high-spirited in defence of their tlgbis — ihey will itevet willingly submit to such degradation. I cannot therefore see another portion of our sovereignty stripped from us and remain silent in my Slace. I cannot behold that death warrant of our earesi rights and interests about to be sanctioned, without raising m^ loudest voice against it, and entering against it in the name of that people, the citizens of New Jersey, my formal and solemn protest.

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168: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 168 (Senate1803.Dec2.168)

Mr. PicEERiKQ said, after the very able discussion which had taken place, he would not have risen on this question, but to repel a misrepresentation. He had not said " that the will of the people was never to be regarded." He had expressed his belief that the people had viewed the subject under consideration very superficially; and therefore that their opinion, or their will, ought not to determine the votes of the Legislature. He recollected that some three or four years af;o,hehad heard mentioned the designating principle now contended for, and that it had struck him agreeably, as some inconvenience had occurred in the present Constitutional mode of electing the President and Vice President, to which the designating principle seemed to offer a remedy. He well remembered, however, to have heard at that time a few persons, of the first intelligence and patriotism, say that this principle was pregnant with mischief. But he had not Ibea investigated the subject ; he had indeed viewed it very superficially. Since that time he had been a farmer, and without leisure or occasion to examine it. Thus circumstanced, he had thought himself not very uncharitable in supposing ibe opinion of his brother farmers, who compose the great body of the nation, to be as superficial and incorrect as his own. He would go farther, and say, that he believed the Legislative bodies who had advised the adoption of the proposed amendment had also viewed it superficially. As one evidence of it, he had referred gentlemen to the instructions nf the Legislature of New York, laid before ibe Senate at the commencement of the session, and presenting the proposed amendment. which contained, not a clerical, or a grammatical error, as the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Tivlor) had said, but a palpable absurdity, in supposing ibal on the designating principle, when each elector would vote for one candidate, by name, to be the President, that two candidates could each have a majority of all the votes! !

169: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 169 (Senate1803.Dec2.169)

When this amendment was first urged Upon the Senate, the motive was declared to be to prevent a recurrence of such a state of things as had happened at the last election of President, when the choice came Constitutionally before the House of Representatives. The division of ibe States in ibal House suspending forseveral days any choice, had brought us, some gentlemen had said, to the brink of a civil war. And an honorable member from Georgia (Mr. Jackson) bad told us, that if Mr. JEFFEaaoNbad not been elected, the citizens of that Stale would have been ready, and he wasdiaposed to believe the citizens of their sister State, South Carolina, would have been equally ready to taken up arms in his behalf. And were, Mr. P. asked, the people of the United States thus early decrepit, thus early corrupt, that, like the old monarchies of Europe, for the sake of one man, they would have rushed 10 arms, and involved their country in a civil war? On that one man, indeed, ■ the honorable gentleman had repeatedly pronounced his eulogies; he was unimpeachable, he wu beyond the reach of censure. Others, however, thought differently. Mr. P. believed there was abundant room for censure, but he should waive it. Men are often blind, not only to their own faults, but those of their friends. In politics, men differed in their opinions of men and things, as in religion ibey differed as to their religious tenets. Hence the poet's remark:

170: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 170 (Senate1803.Dec2.170)

But, said Mr. P., the great motive for the proposed amendment, at first expressed its friends, seems not now to be relied on; while a gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Cooke,) with great simplicity, has told us what was its real object : “ That the majority, the Republicans, may obtain the man of iheir choice, and with certainty prevent the election of either a Federal President or Vice President." And a gentleman from Virginia (Mr. T&tlob) has suggested that the proposed amendment would finally destroy the minority. And it was by such destruction, Mr. P. supposed, thai " harmony was to be restored to social intercourse." But hewould quote hd authority which certainly the advocates of the amendment would respect. This authority had declared, " that the minority possess their equal rights, and that the will of the majority, to be rightful, must be reasonable."

171: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 171 (Senate1803.Dec2.171)

Mr. P. believed that one of the most embarassiog questions before the General Convention, d the choice of the chief Executive officer, had been informed by a meiobet mbet of of that c Tention, the gentleman from Georgia on his left, (Mr. Baldwin,) that it had been proposed and concluded that the President of the United States should be elected by Congress for seven years, and be ever after ineligible to that office; but that' late in their session the present complex mode of electing the President and Vice President was proposed; that tbe mode was perfectly novel, and therefore occasioned a pause ; but when explained and fully considered was universally admired, and viewed as the most pleasing feature in the ConAs to the proposed alteration of that mode of electing those two great officers, Mr. P. said that, when it was first offered in the Senate, at the be- ^nning of their session, not having then examined the question, he was unprepared to give his vote ; yet, if its instant decision had been forced upon the Senate, as was demanded by a gentleman from New York fMr. Clihton) not now of the House, he should have voted against it ; believing it safer to adhere to a rule established by the deliberate wisdom of the enlightened statesmen who formed the Constitution, than to adopt an untried mode offered at a time of party dissension, and for a particular object. He should also, at that time, have been influenced to vote against it bv the respect he entertained for the gentlemen with whom ne usually voted, and who, at a former session, had had the subject presented to their consideration. But, having since had time to consider it, he should now vote against the amendment, on the fullest conviction of the mischiefs which would flow from it. What these were, and bow much superior, how much safer was the present Constiiutional mode of electing the President and Vice President, had been so amply, so clearly.and so ably shown by an honorable gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr.TRAOT.) that he (Mr. P.) would not attempt to add anything to his observations. If these should have no weight with the Senate, nothing which he could offer would havethe smallest influence.

172: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 172 (Senate1803.Dec2.172)

But Mr. P. would attempt to trace the Constitutional mode of election to its source.

173: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 173 (Senate1803.Dec2.173)

When these States were British Colonies, thev. had Governors and Lieutenant Governors. Both those officers were yet retained in some of the States, and in those States the designating principle had always been observed. The people gave their votes for one candidate by name, to be Ooventor, and to another to be Lieutenant Governor. This practice was perfectly familiar to the members of the General Convention j why then did not they adopt it 1 Mr. P. would offer a conjecture. The Governors and Lieutenant Governors were chosen for one year. The inferiority of rank and importance attached to the office of Lieutenant Governor, would naturally induce the people to think a man competent to the duties of that office, although his qualifications should be decidedly inferior to those they would deem requisite in the man they would choose for their Governor; and no material inconvenience would be apprehended from the choice of such a Lieutenant Governor, because he would administer the Government for so short a period — a portion only of one year. But to administer the affairs of a great nation more circumspection was necessary, and a longer continuance in office. The President and Vice President were to be chosen for four years. In case the office of President became vacant, the Vice President would succeed and be charged with all the duties of the President; and this might happen to be for two or three years, or even for four years, if the President should die between the time of his election and the period of his taking upon himself the Government. It was therefore an object of the highest importance to place the election of Vice President on such ground as, if possible, would necessarily produce the choice of one everyway qualified (or the office of President. And this wjuld be the happy result of a correct adherence to the present Constitutional mode of electing those two great officers. All the difficulty, all the embarrassment which had hitherto been experienced, had arisen from a palpable departure from the plain Constitutional rule, from the Electors acting on the discriminating principle; not indeed by designating by name, but in their minds, which of the two persons voted for should be the President, and which the Vice President ; a designation forbidden by the spirit, if not by the letter of the Constitution. If the Electors, laying aside all attempts to give one of the candidates for President an advantage over the other, yolb for two men, each possessing the qualifications requisite for that high office, it will then be a matter of much indifference, as it respects the great interests of the nation, which becomes the President, and which the Vice President, The evil arising from the non-observance, by the Electors of this plain rule would, after a few elections, work its own cure. They would see a necessity of a strict adherence to the spirit of the Constitution, convinced that the true interests of the people lay in such an equal choice.

174: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 174 (Senate1803.Dec2.174)

Much had been said about the interests of the large and of the small States, and those of the latter it was conceived would be deeply affected by the proposed alteration of the Constitution ; but without adding to the numerous observations which had been made on that subject, Mr. P. would only remark, what on all sides had been admitted, that the Constitution was the result of compromise — of mutual sacrifices of State interests, of local wishes, and attachments, to the common good. The General Convention, after long and full deliberation and discussion, had adjusted Ac balance of power among ifae Stales compriaias the Union, and there was great danger, by making any alterations in the Constitution, that this balance would be destroyed. It was inexpedient frequently to change the ordinary acts of legislation ; it was dangerous to be often changing the fundamental laws of a Stale, and still mon dangerous to change those which, like the Con. slitutioa of the United States, form the bond of Union among a great number of confederated Slates. It was only in case of great and n fe«t evil arising under a Constitution, that amendment should be attempted. Such a case did not now exist. stood by the people. That it had been only very superficial view of it, that what was called the public mind and the public will had been expressed ; and that it was therefore the duty of gentlemen, uninfluenced by the popular voice, now to act independently, according to the dictates of their own minds; and thus secure the real and permanent interests of the people.

175: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 175 (Senate1803.Dec2.175)

Mr. Jackson.— The gentleman last up has thought proper to notice what he had said would hare been the effect of the meditated usurpation «i the last election. He assured that gentleman, that however much he might plume himself on his own virtues, that the people of Georgia would not take their ideas of the course that ought to be pursued, when their liberties were at stake, from any other source than the principles of virtue and freedom. The gentleman had also thought proper to notice what he called an euloSlium upon the present Chief Magistrate. His anguage was too humble and inadequate for that great and good man's eulogium; it was far beyond any form of words which he could employ, to express the veneration which he felt for him ; and he believed that, excepting only the departed Wabhinoton, no man ever possessed or merited more of the affection of the people of America than he did.

176: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 176 (Senate1803.Dec2.176)

But, not content with noticing my tribute of truth, which the occasion called for and which the gentleman questions, he has given the Senate what it was to t« supposed he intended for poetry ; he would not compliment him on his taste for selection, any more than on his liberality. The verses are bad enough, and the application worse; they reminded him of the speech of Moloch, in the second book of Paradise Lost. But taking his verses as they are, he was content to believe the first; the gentleman might, if it could console him, believe in the second. For he did believe that the President's virtues were a hell to him.

177: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 177 (Senate1803.Dec2.177)

The zeal of Georgia appears to be a matter of surprise to the gentleman. But it is by no means surprising. Why was that State so anxious for a change of Administration 1 Under the former Administration her rights were violated, her Govemment treated with studied insult. In discharge of bb duty as Governor, he could scarcely get an answer on fitibUc biuioen from the Department of State, at the head of which that gentleman (Mr. P[CBER[Na) was then placed. Under that Administration State rights were degraded and disregarded ; we saw the principles of the Revolution brought up as topics for reproach, and we saw that we had no chance but m the resort 10 first principles. We looked up to the author of the Declaration of Independence, — be has not disappointed us. Would to God I were capable of doing justice to his eulogium.

178: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 178 (Senate1803.Dec2.178)

Mr. Wbite proposed an adjournment ; hefeared [he fatigue would create irritation ; some warmth bad already been displayed.

179: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 179 (Senate1803.Dec2.179)

On the question being called (10 minutes past 7) it was lost.

180: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 180 (Senate1803.Dec2.180)

Mr Whiobt would offer but a few words. It bad been observed that our Government is the result of a compromise. So are all federal Governments. The reference lo the old Confederation and their voting by States amounted to nothing conclusive ; the old Congress possessed no Legislative power, they had only an Executive and recommendatory power. The Constitution was produced by the necessity of the case; no impost could be l.evied by the old Congress, and, to preserve the benefits of the Revolution, Virginia called the Convention. He could not account for the opposition of the gentleman from Delaware, as he would not strike the amendment out if it formed part of the Constitution.

181: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 181 (Senate1803.Dec2.181)

Mr. WutTE. — The gentleman misapprehended my expression.

182: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 182 (Senate1803.Dec2.182)

Mr. Whight.— I took the gentleman's words down — they were these: "If the amendment formed part of the Constitution I would not vote for striking it out." He then went very largely intoa recapitulation and reply to the various points of discussion, and asked if it was consistent with the principles of the Government that our laws should belike those of the Medes and Persians, their form immutable and error eternal 1 Heasked ifgentlemen would not think it a hard case if men were placedin the two first offices of Government who were neither the choice nor agreeable to either party 1 Yet this would not be more inconsistent or absurd than to have any one man so placed, contrary to the fundamental principle of representative government, the will of the majority. Every gentleman must recollect what a scene was exhibited in the Legislature of Pennsylvania at the late election, which could have its origin in intrigues alone, and which ended at length in a compromise which gave the most populous State in the Union the real value of no more than one vote; the same intrigues existed in New Jersey, where an organized plan existed to place a man in the Executive chair against the wishes of the nation, uncbosen and unintended for the Executive chair by either party.

183: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 183 (Senate1803.Dec2.183)

Here we provide a remedy for such evils — we offer you the certain meansoffrustraiingand rendering them hopeless; we offer you a designation. But it is said that this is a party question. G(entlemen appear not to look around them, or to overlook facts staring them in the face. Do we not see gentlemen of opposite parties in politics on both sides of this question? Is it from party TJewa the gentleman from South Carolina opposes it?

184: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 184 (Senate1803.Dec2.184)

He was as much a friend to cbe principles of a majority governing as any man, but here it was A different question which he thought principally concerned — it is to prevent the disgrace and injuries of intrigues; ; it is to prerent men not intended «c] to be chosen from being edged into power. At the last election what did we see 1 An attempt made by a party in truth hostile to Ibe man at that time, endeavoring to put him into the Executive chair! And for what purpose'? For the purpose of confusion — to distract and divide the country, and to lay the foundation of another factioas Administration on one already humbled by public indignation. Had they succeeded in corrupting a single man from his duty, would it not have beenusurpationofiheworatspecies? What did his colleague say 1 — that after this project of wrong had failed, another was meditated; it was even supposed to set up a man who had not a single vote, and that had they attempted to carry it into execution, the people would not bear it. And tbe gentleman from Connecticut expresses his aa- (ot>ishment that the people would not bear usurpation, while he confesses that his section of the Union would have been quiet spectators of the act! He knew that the people of Maryland felt the danger and were determined to resist it, not with their arms folded but with the energy of freemen; and such was the sensation which ine meditated wrong had occasioned, such was the spirit of the people to resist it, that some of the most opulent men in the State found it time to interfere. This amendment then is intended to prevent the recurrence of such alarming dangers. Does it deprive any one or any Slate of a right 1 Is ii not Stj that if J am called on to vote for President and Vice President that I should have my free choice? f» it then consistent with reason that I should be compelled to vote for one man upon equal terms whom I do not think has equal talents or equal claims to my confidence 7 Is it fair that I should be reduced to the alternative of choosing a wise man and a fool, in order to gire the former a chance 1 Are not the small States as well secnred by this amendment as the large? If this amendment was not intended, why has it not been guarded like those parts which cannot be changed before 1S08? In mis Senate the small States liave their security — their equal representation, and in the provision against any change being tiiade in their representation here without the consent of each. ThegenllemBnfromMasiachusetts(Mr.ADAMB) has drawn all his eloquence in force, he has collected all his vengeance, and pours out the vials of his wrath upon Virginia, Why this vehement, this toothless rage against that State, which in evil times had indeed stood firm, the rock of our political salvation: to whom we looked in the hour of adversity for counsel, for succor, for stalesmeo and leaders of our armies ? To her we were indebted for a WAaBtNOTon, and is it because we are indebted to her for other great men that this jealous rage b vociferated against her 1 Is it to be supposed that with her twenty-four votes for President she can control all the rest ? We hold the true federative counterpoise, the other House has the democratic or popular, for he knew no difference. Nine or ten are destined to be small States, and will always have a majority here? Gentlemen, when they cannot make good their case by argument or fact, endeavor to make it out as well as they can. Hence, we have the declaration about small an d large States, and hence so many warnings against touching the Constitution. But who are they who wish to tear up this C(»l- stitution ? Two propositions have been offered of infinitely more force on the principles of the Constitution— one to abolish the office of Vice President altogether, the other to limit the election of President. We wish to provide against an evil noiforeseen,and to supply the deficiency ; thegenilemen wish to tear a part of the Constitution d- altogether. And who have proposed and advocate these erasures? Theopposersof this amendment. So, that when reverence for the Constitution u spoken of, these amendments must be abandoned. Experience, sir, is worth a thousand volumes of experiments. Had it been foreseen at the last election, that such events could have proceeded from the principles of honor and good faith being rigidly observed by the republicans, many would have opposed their uniform vote and cast their vote away rather than lay the country open lo intrigue and its consequences.

1 connection
185: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 185 (Senate1803.Dec2.185)

He bad thought the number five would equally answer the purpose of election. Arguments had convinced him thai three would be still more safe; because it would give the greater certainty of k choice by tbe people. And was there a man in that House who would dare to say that the people ought not to have the manof their choice? Tbef look for the security of that right, and the principle of designation secures it. Is there any man wtio as an Elector would prefer the uncertainty of two for the certainty of one. Some affect to say we strike at fundamental principles. But we say we wish to strike at error and give stability to republican representative principles. The Constitution says the President shall be chosen by Electors; lie believed there was a militant spirit against democratic republican principles, which would take the power from the people and their Electors, which would Qy in the face of the Constitution itself, and tell the people it ought not to be amended ; that error should be perpetual, and experience fruitless; this was notoriously avowed. Our greatest blessing and our first pride is that we have the powerand the right ioamend,and to redress wrongs without the resort to arms which nations are ever exposed to, where abuses are rendered sacred and hereditary. On the subject of this amendment, so far as it concerns designation, he believed the public mind could not be better known ; could threefourths of our Legislatures and two-thirds of both Houses of Congress commit treason and trcacberr on themselves ? He was decidedly for theuMndlaent, and for the number three.

186: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 186 (Senate1803.Dec2.186)

Mr. Wnn-E.— The gentleman says the old Congress had no Legislative powers. Did they not raise armies, and emit money, both high Legislative Whiobt.— The gentleman is wholly mistaken ; the several Slates raised armies, and moneys were raised by State conliibuiions — hU the power ibey had was to recommend lo the States and make requisitions upon the State grants.

187: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 187 (Senate1803.Dec2.187)

The question on -inserting the number three Was put (at ten minutes past S o'clock, p. m.) and carried— 21 yeas, 11 nays.

188: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 188 (Senate1803.Dec2.188)

Mr. Davtod asked if the question could be taken on the whole of the designating amendment, without deciding upon the remainder of the report ?•

189: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 189 (Senate1803.Dec2.189)

Mr. Butler.— You assuredly cannot decide upon the first part without deciding upon the whole of the report, unless you do it by power; and you can do anything, as Judge Blackstone says, by power, but make a man of n woman. Power, however, appears to be the order of the day ; though he hoped the Chair will do so much ' juslice to himself as to acknowledge that we have been hiiherioinaCommitteeof the Whole. Some gentlemen had spoken as often as nine or ten times in the debate, and in the House that would have been contrary to order. The object of his wishes was to probe innovation. If we have hitherto been in a Committee of the Whole, as this is only a part of the report, of course it will stand as it is, and we may proceed to the remainder of the report — though, from what he had already seen, he did not expect the indulgence that he thought was due to every member of that House; and it was not impossible ihi

190: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 190 (Senate1803.Dec2.190)

States would say, when ihey see the doors closed against all dispassionate discussion, and all opportunities open to one side of ibe House. There was an example of this kind given by a gentleman (Mr. Cocke,) who, after making a speech of an hour, sirs down and roars out, the question I the question! Unless gentlemen mean to practice the larae indelicacy as two hours ago.

191: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 191 (Senate1803.Dec2.191)

The PaeainENT wished to interrupt the gentleman for a moment barely to inform him that the question has never been before a Committee of the Whole.

192: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 192 (Senate1803.Dec2.192)

A desultory conversation on the point of order *TluB qneition has reference to the following sDisndinent proposed by Mr. Butler, for limiting the period tai which A President should be elected, and which was not acted upon :

193: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 193 (Senate1803.Dec2.193)

"Raobxd, That the following amendment be proposed 10 the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Constitution, to wit;

194: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 194 (Senate1803.Dec2.194)

"That no person who has been twice successively elected President of the United States, shall be eligible •a President, until four years shall have elapsed; but ■Dj citizen who has been President of the United States, ms;, after such intervention, be eligible to the office of President, for four years, and no longer."

195: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 195 (Senate1803.Dec2.195)

here took place, in which Messrs. Nicholas, But- LER. Tracy, S. Smith, Dayton, Taylor, Franklin, HiLLHOUse, and Adams, spoke a few moment* each. In which it was contended that the first amendment could not be decided on without first deciding on the second amendment, which waa reported by the same committee.

196: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 196 (Senate1803.Dec2.196)

On the other side it was maintained that the amendment for designation was a separate proposition, and might be voted upon, whether the other was voted upon or not; that the other amendment might be called up at any time without interfering with the principle or the passage of iliai now before the House.

197: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 197 (Senate1803.Dec2.197)

The President decided that the question now was on agreeing to the resolution as amended. Upon which the yeas and nays were demanded,

199: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 199 (Senate1803.Dec2.199)

Yeib — Messrs. Anderson, Bailey, Baldwin, Bradley, Breckenridge, Brown, Cocke, Condit, Ellery, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, Nicholas, Potter, I. Sinitb, B. Smith J. Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthinglon, Wright— as.

200: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 200 (Senate1803.Dec2.200)

' Nats — Messrs. Adams, Butler, Dayton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, White— 10. Mr. AnAMS thought it proper for him at this stage to notice some obf ervalions directed to him. It had been presumed that he had expressed some solicitude about the election of a federal Vice President; he had expressed nothing which could countenance a solicitude about the election of a federal or anti-federal Vice President ; but he had indeed noticed that the amendment appeared to him as intended directly to afiect the next election J though at the same time as far as related to himself he turned out of the consideration every idea of its effect on any single case ; he looked to it as it would affect a century to come — he never meant to take the diameter of the earth for the measure ofa barleycorn.

201: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 201 (Senate1803.Dec2.201)

The gentleman from Maryland (Mr. WRiaHT> had charged, him with pouring out the vials of his wrath on Virginia ; he was not conscious of uttering any degree of wrath against Virginia, and could not be persuaded that he had uttered what he certainly never felt ; so far from wrath, he bad ever entertained for that State the highest respect, as producing the greatest men of our Revolution. It was true, indeed, that when he heard a gentleman from that State holding forth what he had then considered as a menace, ne had felt some irritation; and when he compared it with the mould and process of the measure before us, that was increased ; and had he not been convinced that no menace was intended, by subsequent explanations, he should have entertained a serious alarm. His impressions were generally on the subject, that no regard had been paid to the permanent operation of the measure, but that all argument haa been drawn from the last, and all consequences are calculated for the next election. From the open avowal of the gentleman from Maryland (Mr. S. Smith) to the labored, ingenious, and elotjuent arguments of the gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. Tavlor,) all had this tendency and that view only.

202: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 202 (Senate1803.Dec2.202)

To the designating principle itself he had oa objection, and believed it calculated to be produetire of good. But ifhea he heard gentlemen talk of the jealousy of States, he had little expected to find a mixture of argument drawn from Eaglish corruptions and degeneracy, applied to our noine institutions. When jealousy of Bieculire power was spoken of. so much like the unmeaning noise out of doors, he had expected that after adding fifteen millions to the public debt at a blow; when eighty thousand men were proposed to be placed at the will of the Executive ; when by four short lines the whole of the arbitnry power of the Spanish King over bis subjects in Louisiana was transferred to the Executive, with all the consequent patronage, he did not expect to hear armies, debts, and patronage, introduced in the debate. When declamation of this kind is given, the best return that can be expected is declamation of the same species.

203: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 203 (Senate1803.Dec2.203)

Mr. S. Smith had not intended at any hour to have taken a further part in thisdebate; but when be found gentlemen resorting to stratagem when sound argument failed them, and words and sentiments are tortured from their intention, he could not remain silent. It requires very little ingenuity 10 lop off a part of a sentence, even in scnptore, and to make the remainder blasphemy ; though the whole sentence as written were Ine most solemn truth. The gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. Dayton) thinks it consistent, perhaps, to construe words which never had that meaning as a threat. He would beg leave to notice a mistake of the gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. Adams.) who had charged him with an open avowal that the sole object of the amendment was to preclude the election of a Vice President. He had said (hat it would certainly have that effect; and that the effect would be proper and conformable to the spirit and intention of the Constitution; ; and he approved of it for that reason; for, under the existing mode the people, who wished to secure a proper person, or that person in whom they have the greatest portion of confidence, would be obliged to throw their votes away, and make no choice of the second officers, or leave the choice to chance. But how could the gentleman say himself, or think him guilty of the absurdity of supposing, that this amendment originated and was conducted solely with a view. to the next election, and that only; or that all arguments were drawn from the last election? If be recollected correctly, the subject of this amendment was brought forward several years ago, by the representative of a small Eastern State, Mr. Abiel Foster of New Hampshire. At that period those persons were of the predominant party. But they tell us it was not then carried. And why not 7 Most probably because they could find members convinced of its necessity. It proposed before the last election, and that event has convinced every one who before doubted. After all, if the Legislatures do not think proper to adopt it, it cannot pass.

204: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 204 (Senate1803.Dec2.204)

Mr. Tract. — We are told this is a proposition for the Legislatures but will its passage through Congress have no influence on the votes of the States 1 Will the Legislatures not say two-thirds of both Houses of Congress passed it, and they would not deem it necessary if it was not good ? But here we have Legislatures prompting us to this measure, and it goes back to them again for their decision ; that this is a measure, a measure in a hoop, it comes and goes whence it came.

205: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 205 (Senate1803.Dec2.205)

The gentleman complains of attacks made on Virginia, it was never meant to reproach Virginia. But the gentleman tells us we must make an exclusion bill, and he tells you of the consequence* if you do not, in order to induce you to pass it. He admired the gentlemanly manner, the openness and good nature, and he was certain that he never meant to kill us outright, but he will exclude us. We know very well what was intended by the bill for the exclusion of Popish recusants, and that with regard to the objects of the measure we stand precisely in their place. This was the very condition of the gentleman; be supposed a minority had no rights, beside that of being trampled upon, and he is for bringing in a bill ot exclusion. He says he does not quote words ; he caught ideas, not words. He has given a key for his ideas, they go to the extirpation of the sect of Federalists, as the exclusion bill went to the total exclusion of the sect of Popish recusants.

206: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 206 (Senate1803.Dec2.206)

If gentlemen wish to shake the Constitution to pieces, if majorities must decide everything, why not go at once to a simple democracy ? There were many who did not think the Constitution sufficiently democratical. The gentleman thinks so perhaps, for he tells us that a Constitution maybe preserved while the liberties of the people are destroyed; he wishes you to go to the spirit which is democracy, and against which we guard. Btit he would not consent to go to that spirit for his remedy.

207: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 207 (Senate1803.Dec2.207)

Mr. BBECKENRioaG. — The gentleman last up had insisted on two or three arguments before repeated, that he thought proper to notice him. He insinuates that we are destroying principles. But the gentleman has lost sight of the amendment altogether, where no principle is in the smallest degree violated. He has indirectly questioned the democratic principles of the Constitution ; but in the course of three weeks' discussions, for the first time he had heard anything even glancing at a denial ofthe people's right to choose the Executive though the medium of Electors. What is this clamor about large and small States? It has nothing to do whatever with the question. The true and only point is. what will be the best mode of effectuating the choice? We hold that the amendment is that best mode. If any principle is more sacred and all-important for free government it is, that elections should be as direct as possible; in proportion as you remove from direct election you approach danger. And if it were practicable to act without any agents in the choice, that would be preferable even to the choice by Electors. But if you wish to elect A, and you are so placed as that B is elected contrary to your wishes, can you say that this is a reasonable and just process? Has it not always been insisted that the two characters chosen at the last election were equally estimable? Why then was there any hesitation? Why has public opinion, so ready to declare Itself, never uttered a. sound of tliscoDieot at the retardment of the choice. Had the now Vice President been placed by whatever secret means in that Chair, is there a man who now bears who would not say it was contrary to the intention of the people If ever public opinion was more strongly known on any point than another, it is on this. Nine States he believed had testified their wishes on the subject. New' Hampshire, New York, Vermont, Massachusetts, Tennessee, North Carolina, and Ohio, have in the mostsolemn manner recommended it. If the gentlemen from Massachusetts, or one of tbem particularly, (Mr. Pickerino,) are in doubt as to the understand inf; or information of their constituents on the subject, there can it is presumed be no doubt but the other House understand both the subject and the opinions of the people whom they eo immediately represent. And this supposed ignorance is a reply to the gentleman from Connecticut. It is to be presumed, if they are now ignorant, that when the amendment comes before uem they will possess new lights — and that all dancer will be avoided by their watchfulness.

208: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 208 (Senate1803.Dec2.208)

Mr. BcTLBH had allowed every gentleman to a^k, though he had early in the debate signified his tntenlion to offer a few observations on this important subject, which it was his lot to oppose from a conviction of its injurious tendency. He had gratified' himself in the opening of the discussion with the expectation that the regularity of proceeding would be such, that we should never more hear the voice of menace or of civil war — words which should never enter the walls of that Senate any more than the most vulgar expressions. But the hour was late. The gentleman from Kentucky has said that you should not remove the election farther from the people, and he appears to think that at the late election the disposition to place a man not intended in the Chair, was the consequence of that form of proceeding. Whatever may be the sentiments or wishes of the individuals who vote, he could take upon him toaaj what was the intention oftbeConsiiiution; tbe framers of that instrument were apprehensive of an elective Chief Magistrate; and their views were directed to prevent the putting up of any powerful man J that for this end the States should choose two, and that as public suffrage would be common to both, that either would be alike eligible, and it was totally immaterial which— he feared that the election ofa single individual might exhibit all the evils which afflicted Poland.

209: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 209 (Senate1803.Dec2.209)

One observation he owed to the side he had taken in this debate: it had been suggested abroad that he had changed his opinion from being in favor to U opposition of the amendment. This was not ■0, for when the amendment was introduced he had avowed his purpose to oppose it. He was more confirmed when he heard arguments employed avowing the determination to remove every possibility of an election in the House of Representatives, and for thisreason, that ibesmaller States having fewer representatives in that House, would be e;i posed to ibe corruption of any designing man, and they might be made the instruments of national ruin, as the rotten boroughs of England have in the hands of the King of that country.

210: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 210 (Senate1803.Dec2.210)

If the small States then are mere rotten boroughs, and their representatives liable to corruption, .is the evil remedied by this amendment? He asked if only two were to be voted for and had equal votes would it not then go to the House of Representatives as much as if there were five from which to make a choice 7 But the time which has been expended in ibis discussion ho* only served to render more conspicuous the anxieties by which it is pressed forward. A gentleman has asked us, shall a factious minority give a Vice President to the United States? Aye, there's Ibe rub! He had thought that the reproachful epithet of faction, that all heat and animosity of party,should long since have been buried j and the representatives of the small States he hoped would, see that I they were bound by duty and by feeling not to suffer the votes to go along with those reproaches; for with that vote would pass a very material part of their sovereignty.

211: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 211 (Senate1803.Dec2.211)

A great deal had been said to remove this idea of the jealousy of the States, and that it was only a. stratagem set up for the occasion. Whatever gentlemen might say on that subject he would say to the small States, with Ibe orator of Greece, "Beware of Macedon!" Beware of the great Stales ! In this, however, there was one exception i be would exclude the State of Pennsylvania; and civil liberty was belter understood and practised there than in any age or in any part of the world. He had, however, seen something very like this combination of States, and thought it behooved the small States to watch them, else they would monopolize the whole of the Execi>- tive departments i and the moment that was accomplished, farewell to the Republic, it would do longer exist; it would be succeeded by a high, haughty aristocracy of States, with an Executive moulded and accommodated to their views.

212: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 212 (Senate1803.Dec2.212)

When you pass this you plant the seed of discord ; the dissolution of Federalism. He thought that after a contention of seven years, with a party who he had thought abused Iheir power, the time was come when a better course would have been pursued ; he had conceived that principles would have prevailed, and that men would not absorb every consideration; but, with a member of the Convention, he would say, I hoped at\erso long a course of pork that our diet would be changed, but I find it is pork still with only a change of Pass this amendment, and no man can live ia the small States but under disparaging circumstances ; they will have about as many rights left in society as the Helots of Greece. And why ix all tbisdooeT For the purpose of showing one of the least becoming of the weak passions ofm an, resentment, you pursue a line of conduct reprobated by yourselves in the lime of your predecessors. He was sorry the embers of party were kindled even by the very injudicious maooeT in which it had been supported. The best reflecting men see iu this only the change of men without regard to measures ; and that it had paved the way for a revival of the heats and animosities which ought to have been buried, but which may lead 1 to loa B wparaUOD separation of of ihe the U Union. '-

213: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 213 (Senate1803.Dec2.213)

The 'he quesijon question was called for loudly at half past nine, e, and pal— the yeas and nays being taken, Yui — MoiB^ Andenon, Baikj, Baldwin, Bndk?, Breckenridge, Brown, Gn^, Condit, EUetj, Franklin, Jackson, Logan, Maclay, NlchnlM, Potter, Israel Smith, John Smith. Samuel Smith, Stone, Taylor, Worthington, and Wright— as.

214: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 214 (Senate1803.Dec2.214)

Ni.Ta — MssBia. Adams, Butler, Dajton, Hillhouse, Olcott, Pickering, Plumer, Tracy, Wells, and While: 10. Upon the P BESI UK NT declaring the question carried by two-thirds —

215: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 215 (Senate1803.Dec2.215)

Mr. Tract said he denied that the question was fairly decided. He took it to be the intention of the don sti tut ion, that there should be twothirds of the whole number of Senators elected, which would make the number necessary to its passage 23.

217: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 217 (Senate1803.Dec2.217)

Mr. Taylor said that since it was proposed to adjourn to Monday, when he should be disqualified to sit in ibnt House, he hoped the Senate would not rise without deciding the question definiiiyely on the gentleman's objections.

218: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 218 (Senate1803.Dec2.218)

Mr. Tracy said he certainly would avail himself of the principle to oppose its passage through the State Legislatures.

219: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 219 (Senate1803.Dec2.219)

The President declared the question bad passed the ~ Senate by the majority reqi fuired, and conformable to the Constitution and is

220: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 220 (Senate1803.Dec2.220)

Resolved, by the Senate and House of R^iraenla the of the United Slata of America in Congress or wembkd, two-thirds of both Houses concurring. That, m lien or the third paragraph of the Gnt section of the second article ofdie Constitution of tbeUniUd States, the following ba proposed aa an amendment to the Constitution ofths United StatM, which, vrhen ratified b; three-fourlha of the Legklaturea of theiaveral States, shall be lalid, to all inieitti and purposes, as part ef the aaid Constitution, to wit:

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221: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 221 (Senate1803.Dec2.221)

The Electors shall meet in their respective States and vote by ballot for President, and Vice Preaident, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the aaroe State with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and, in diHtinct ballots, the person voted for as Vice President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice President, and of the number of votes for each, which hats they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of Government of the United State*, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the {nwaence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having llie greatest number of votes for the President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed : and if no person have such majority, then, from the penon having the hi^. eat numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose, immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation horn each State having one vote ; a quorum for this purpose ahaU consist of a member or members, from two-thirds of the States, and a majority of all A« States ehsU be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act aa President, as in the case of death or any other Constitutional disability of the President.

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222: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 222 (Senate1803.Dec2.222)

The person having ^a greatest nnmber of votes aa Vice President, shall be the Vice President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electon appointed; and if no person have a majority, then, from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person Constitutionally ineligible (o the office of President, shall be eligible to that of Vice President of the United States.

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223: Senate, December 2, 1803, ¶ 223 (Senate1803.Dec2.223)

Ordered, That the Secretary request the concurrence of the House of Representatives in this resolution.

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