December 2, 1803

The Senate, who have the power of a legislative check upon the House of Representatives, and many other extensive and important powers, is preserved as an entire federative feature of Government as it was enjoyed by the small States, under the first Confederacy.

In the article which obliges the Electors of President to vote for one person not an inhabitant ot the same State with themselves, is discovered State jealousy. In the majorities required for many purposes by the Constitution, although there were other motives for the regulations, yet Ihe jealousy of the small States is clearly discarntble. Indeed, sir, if we peruse th« Coniiita- 8th CoH.— 6 tion with attention, we shall find the small States are perpetually guarding the federative principle, that is. State equality. And ibis, in every part of it, except in the choice of the House of Representatives, and in their ordinary legislative proceedings. They go so far as to prohibit any amendment which may affect the equality of Suiesinlhe Senate.

This is guarding against almost an impossibility,because the Senators of small Slates must be criminally remiss in their attendance, and the Legislatures extremely off their guard, if they permit such alterations, which aim at their own existence. But, lest some accident, some unaccountable blindness or perfidy should put in jeopardy the federative principle in the Senate, they totally and forever prohibit all attempts at such a measure. In the choice of President, the mutual caution and concession of the great and small States, is, if possible, more conspicuous than in any other part of tbe Constitution.

He is to be chosen by Electors appointed as the State Legislatures shall direct, not according to numbers entirely, but adding two Electors in each Slate asrepresenlatives of Slate sovereignty. Thus Delaware obtains three votes for President, whereas she could have but one in right of numbers. Yet, mixed as this mode of choice is, with both popular and federative principles, we see the small Slates watching its motions and circumscribing it to one attempt only,-and, on failure of an Electoral choice, they instantly seize upon the right of a Federal election, and select from the candidates a President by States and not by numbers. In confirmation of my assertion, that this part of the Constitution was peculiarly the effect of compromise between the great and small States, permit me to quote an authority which will certainly have great weight, not only in the Senate, but through the Union, I mean that of the present Secretary of Stale, (Mr. Madison.) who was a leading member of the Federal Coii- ^nlioD who formed, and of the Virginia Conven- ]n who adopted tne Constitution.

In the Debates of the Virginia Convention, volume 3, page 77, Mr. Madison says, speaking of the mode of electing the President;

" As to the eventual voting by States it hu my approbation. The lesser States and some larger States will be generally pleased by that mode. The Deputies * im the small States argued, and there is some force their reasoning, that, when the people voted, the large States evidently had the advantage over the rest, and, without varying the mode, the interests of the little States might be neglected or sacrificed. Here is a compromise. For in the eventual election, the small States will have the advantage."

Af^erthisviewoftheCoQstituiion,letDB inquire, what is the direct object of the proposed alteration in the choice of President?

Torender more prac ticable certain the choice by Electors — and for this reason : that the people at large, or in other words, that the great States, ought to have more weight and influence in the choice. That it should be brought nearer to Ibe popular and carried further from the fed«- ralire principle. This claim we find was made at ihe formation of the Constitution. The great States naturally wished for a popular choice of First Magistrate. This mode was sanctioned by the example of many of the Slates in the choice of Governor. The small States claimed a choice on the federative principle, by the Legislatures, and to vote by States; analogies and examples were not wanting to sanction this modeof election. A consideration of the weight and influence of a President of this Union, must have multiplied the difficulties of agreeing upon the mode of choice. But as I have before said, by mutual concession, they agreed upon the present mode, combining both principles and dividing between the two parties, thus mutually jealous, as they could, this important privilege of electing a Chief MaThis mode then became established, and the right of the small States to elect upon the federative principle, or by States, in case of contingency of electoral failure of choice, cannot with reason and fairness be taken from them, without their consent, and on a full understanding of its operation since it was meant to be secured to them by the Constitution, and was one of the terms upon which they became members of the present Confederacy ; and for which privilege they gave an equivalent to the great States, in sacrificing so much of the federative principle, or Stale equality.

The Constitution is nicely balanced, with the federative and popularprinciples; ibe Senate are the guardians of the former, and the House of Representatives of the latter; and any attempts to destroy this balance, under whatever specious names or pretences they may be presented, should be watched with a jealous eye. Perhaps a fair definition of the Constitutional powers of amending is, that you may upon experiment so modify Ibe Constitution in its practice and operation, as to give it, upon itsown principles, a more complete effect But this is an attack upon a fundamental Erinciple established after a long deliberation, and y mutual concession, a principle of essential importance to the instrument itself, and an attempt to wrest from the small States a vested right, and, by it, to increase the power and influence of the large States. I shall not pretend, sir, that the parties to this Constitutional compact cannot alter its original essential principles, and that such alterations may not be effected under the name of amendment; but, let a proposal of that kind come forward in its own proper and undisguised shape; let it be fairly stated to Congress, to the State Legislatures, to the people at large, that the intention 13 to change an important federative feature in the Constitution, which change in itself and all its consequences, will tend to a consolidation of this Union into a simple Republic; let it be fairly stated, that the small States have too much agency in the important article of electing a Chief Magistrate, and that the great States claim the choice; and we shall then have a fair decision. If the Senators of the small States, and if their State Legislatures, will then quietly part with the right they have, no person can reasonably complain.

Nothing can bemoreobvious, than the intention of the plan adopted by our Constitution for choosing a President. The Electors are to nominate two r!rsonB,or whom they cannot know which will be resident; Ihiscircumstance not only induces them to select both from the best men ; but gives a direct advantage into the hands of the small States even in the electoral choice. For they can always select from the two candidates set up by the Electors of large States, by throwing their votes upon their favorite, and of course giving him a majority ; or, if the Electors of the large States should, to prevent this effect, scatter their votes, for one candidate, then the Electors of the small States would have it in their power to elect a Vice President. So that, in any event, the small States will have a considerable agency in the election. But if the discriminating or designating principle is carried, as contained in thisresolution, the whol& or nearly the whole right and agency of the small Slates, in the electoral choice of'Chief Magistrate, is destroyed, and their chance of obtaining a federative choice by States if not destroyed, is very much diminished.

For this indentical purpose is the principle of electoral discrimination and designation introduced into the resolution before you ; for the same purpose is the number of candidates reduced from five to three, from whom the House of Representatives may elect, in case of electoral failure of choice; that is, to destroy or diminish the agency of the small States in the choice of President.

For what purpose else are we perpetually told, and from all parts of the Senate, that the public will is opposed by the present mode, and public will cannot be gratified, without the introduction of the discriminating principle 1

By the public will thus mentioned, the gentlemen mean the will of a popular majority, or, the will of the great States, which in this case, 1 repeat it, are the same. How is it possible for the gentlemen to increase the chances of gratifying lis description of the public will, without decreasing the agency of the small States?

The whole power of election is now vested la the two parties; numbers and States, or, great and small Stales; and it is demonstration itself, if you increase the power of the one, in just such proportion you diminish that of the other. Do the gentlemen suppose that the public will, when Constitutionally expressed by a majority of States, in pursuance of the federative principle of our Government, is of less validity, or less binding upon the community at large, than the public will expressed by a popular majority! The framers of your Constitution, the people who adopted it, meant, that the public will, in the choice of a President, should be expressed by Electors, if they could agree, and if not, the public will should be expressed by a majority of the Slates, acting in their federative capacity, and that in both cases the expression of the public will should be equally binding.

It is pretended that the public will can never, properly or Constitutionally, be expressed by a majority of numbers of the people, or of the House of Represenlatires. This may be a pleasing doclrioe enough to great States; but it is cenaiDly incorreci. Our CoostitutioD has given the expression of the public will, in a variety of iastaoces, other than that of the choice of Presi dent, into very different bands from either House of Representatives or the people at large. The President and Senate, and in many cases the Pre sident alone, can express the public will, in a^ poiDtmenta of high trust and responsibility, and ii cannot be forgotten that the President sometime!: expresses the public will by removals. Treaties, highly important express ions of the public will, are nidde by the President and Senate ; and they are the supreme law of the land. In the several Slates, many great offices are filled, and even the Chief Magistracy, by various modes of election. The public will is sometimes expressed by pluralities instead of majorities, sometimes by both branches of the Legislatures, and sometimes by one, and in certain contingencies, elections are settled by lot. The people have adopted constitutions containing such regulations, and experience has proved that they are well calculated topreserve their libertiesand promote their happiness. From what good or even pardonable motive, then, can it be urged that the present mode of electing our President has a tendency to counteract the public will 7 Do gentlemen intend to destroy every federal feature in this Constitution ? And is this resolution a precursor to a complete consolidation of the Union, and to the establishment of a simple Republic I— Or will it suffice to break down every federative feature which secures to one portion of the Union, to the small States, their rights?

1 am not without my fears, Mr. President, that this is but the beginning of evils, and that this Constitution, the bulwark of the feeble members of the Confederacy; the protection of the weak against the strong; the security of the smallagainst the great ; the last, best hope of man, with a view to stability in a free (^vernment, and to the preservation of liberty in a Republic ; is destined to undergo changes, and suffer innovations, till there be no residue worth preserving, and Dotblng left which ambition will condescend to overturn.

Time will not permit me to dwell any longer on this part of my argument. But I am deceived, air, if the view I have now taken of the Constitution does not show most obviously, that in its formation there was a struggle between the great and small States, with respect to many of its principles and leading features ; and that the participation ilk the election of the Chief Magistrate. clearly secured to them by the Constitution, will receive a deadly blow by the adoption of the proposed amendment.

It can be do contradiction to my ideas upon the subject, if we have heard nothing of State conflicts, in the administration of ihjs QoveramenL The great States have never, till now, directly attempted to violate the sanctuary of the small, and despoil them of their rights; had this been earlier attempted, we should have heard and seen the same jealousy awakened, and the same opposition exerted.

The conflict could happen in no other way than by an attack from the large States. We had neither the desire nor ability to injure them, and we now ask no favors, but their permission to enjoy, in peace and safety, the rights conceded to us by themselves, and secured by a solemn Constitutional compact.

We have been told by a gentleman from Virginia, that it would be impolitic in us to rouse the great States. I shall, at present, take no further notice of this warning, given to us, no doubt, in the full exercise of benevolence, but to request the small Stales to preserve it in constant recollection. It may induce them not hastily to part with Constitutional security.

There are some other points of light, in which I wish to place the subject before us.

The Constitution is of recent date; it was formed by the mutual concessions of conflicting parties, and balanced with a view to the securing of all. Experience alone can test its utility, and time and practice discover its faults. It is a sound position that you should never attempt an alteration in an instrument so complicated, and calculated to serve so many various and opposite interests, without being able, by the test of experiment, to discern clearly the necessity of alteration, and without a moral certainty that the change shall not only remove an existing evil, but that it shall not produce any itself. The article in the Constitution establishing the mode of electing a Chief Magistrate, and which is now proposed to be altered, was undoubtedly one of the most difficult parts of the whole at its formation. I am convinced, sir, that the public mind is not sufficiently impressed with the difficulty of adopting, not only an unexceptionable but even a tolerable and prac* licable mode of electing a Chief Magistrate, possessing such important and extensive powers as are Constitutionally vested in the President of the United States. An attempt to detail the number and magnitude of his powers, to this Senate, would be impertinent. But it must and will be acknowledged by all, that the President is vested with powers vastly extensive and important, and that he will bring with him into the Government more or less of State politics and State prejudices, and these facts, to which may be added the probability that he will be taken from a large State, must have increased the difficulties of the Convention in fixing on a mode of choice.

How often have contests, wars, and bloodshed, the destruction of confederacies, of liberty and of vast portions of the human race, arisen from the election of Chief Magistrates'? When we consider that the powers vested in the President of this Union are sufficiently important to excite the avarice and ambition of the human heart, its two most active principles, to gain possession of the office ; when we consider the difference of sentiment, habit, and interest, in this country; State pride and State jealousy, which could never be lid asleep; the difficulties of fixing upon a proper mode of election must be also infinitely multiplied. And yet this article is now selected for alteration. All ine amendment! which have been hitherto adopted, went to some general explanation upon Tery general principles, not changing but ratDi expounding ine Constitution.

This, as I have before said, is taking up the most difficult and most important article m the Constitution, both in relation to rights and principles. But it is said that experience has shown us the necessity of an alteration in this article that an evil has been found in practice to grow out of the Constitutional provision, which calls imperiously for remedy.

At the last election of President two persons bad an equal number of votes, and that number was a majority of the votes of all the Electors apeiiated, which circumstance gave the House of epresen la lives a Constitutional right to select one of ihem for President. In exercising this Constitutional right, they voted by States, and there was at first a division, no choice being made until the sixth day ; when an election was effected, of the very man whom the great States, and the advocates of this resolution, wished.

It ought to be noted here, that although they voted by States, yet it happened, in this division, that a majority, in point of numbers, voted for the person as President who eventually became Vice President. As to intrigue, by either of the candidates. or by their friends. I know of none; the sentiments and conduct of the Vice President, as published, were perfectly fair and honorable, containing a declaration of his wishes not to stand in the way of the other candidate.

After the view of the Constitution which we have taken, and comparing this fact, or set of iacts, with the provisions for electing a President, we shall really be at a loss to find out the mighty evil, which the experience of this election has discovered, vered,iind which is said to call so imperiously for a remedy. But the advocates of this resolution have had the goodness to put their finger on the spot. They say, that in the certificates of the Electors, Mr. Jefferson's name stood first ; this is called a sort of record testimony, and, in addition, some, if not all the Electors said they meant to elect Mr. Jefferson President, and Mr. Burr Vice President ; and this is declared to be the public will, eiprcMed by the Constitutional organ, the Electors. Notwithstanding this expression of the public will, say the gentlemen, a large portion of the House of Representatives withstood and opposed the public will for the space of six days, and wilfully voted for the man to be President. who, they knew by the evidence just mentioned, was meant to be Vice President. One gentleman (Mr. WmoRT) has said, that if he had been a member of that House, possessing such sentiments upon the subject as he now does, such voting would in him have amounted to the crime of perjury, or words to the same effect. I mean to quote his ideas, as expressed, and believe I have given nearly his very words. And, it is added, that thus there was imminent danger of a person being imposed upon the United States as Chief Magistrate, who was not originally intended for that high office, and that civil war must have been the consequence; ; and, as is common in such cases, the picture is filled — in the back ground, with brother raising his murderous hand against brother, father against son, and with an afSictins' 5 group of et teteroM ; and to avoid a repetition of lis tremendous crisis, as tt is called, the present resolution, it is said, must pass.

Let this statement of facts be kept in view while we examine the duties assigned by ibeConstitution to the several agents concerned. The duty of the Electors is precisely defined. They are each to bring forward two candidates fully qualified for President, because they cannot know at the time of giving their ballots upon which the choice will fall. The circumstance of two having a majority, and both being equal in number of votes, is an expression of the public will, through the only Constitutional organ, by which, in this case, the public will can be expressed, that both had the requisite qualifications. The public will, then, was in this instance clearly and unequivocally expressed, by a Constitutional and numerous majority, that both candidates were worthy of the office ; but here the expression of the public will ceased, and which of these two should be President was now to be decided by another Con siiluiional organ, that is, by the House of Representatives, voting by States.

The framers of the Constitution so intended, and the people who adopted it have so ordained, that their will in this case should be expressed by a majority of the States, acting by their representation in the House of Representatives, The right of selection is a right complete in itself, to be exercised by these second Electors, uninfluenced

ns consideration, and governed only by V their < own sense of propriety and rectitude. The ( I of the people had been expressed by the Electors, but it only reached a certain point, , and then . ... was totally silent as to which of the two should be President, and their sense upon this point could only be collected through their Constitutional organ, the House of Representatives, voting by States. Any interference of the first Electors, or of an individual or individuals, must be informal and improper. The advice of sensible and candid men, as in every other case, might be useful; but could have no binding force whatever. The first Electors had no right to choose a Vice President. To claim it was overstepping their duty, and arrogating to themselves a power not given to them by the Constitution.

If there is anything in this whole transaction which has the most distant appearance of a breach of duty, it was in the Electors, by attempting to designate, and by exercising the important office Elector under the influence of improper 's ; that is, by officiously attempting to decide the question, which of the two persons was proper for Vice President, which they were constitutionally incompetent to decide. B^ this conduct they attempted to break down an important guard provided by the Constitution, and improperly to release themselves from its obligations, which made it their duty to select two men qualified to be President. But if there can be a shadow ofmsoD in thta claim of the Electors to designate under the present Constitutional regulations, of which, to doubt, seems to be so heinous, what necessity can there be for this amendment? The object of the amendment, or certainly its chief object, is to establish the designating principle; but why this, if it can alreadyTje effected by the simple mode of placing one name first on the ballot, which is so easy to be done that it can scarcely be avoided T And if done, by the doctrine of gntlemen, it is so far binding on ibe House of epreientatives, that if they even doubt, they are damned t

The fact certainly was, that at the last election, the great States brought forward the two candidate*. They were both of the same political seotiments. This they had a Constitutional right to do. But it now seems that their language to the small States was: "because you will not give up your Constitutional rights to us, and let us go on and designate, we will stir up a civil war, and lay the blame to you ; and of this improper conduct of oars we will take the advantage, and obtain an alteration of the Constitution, which will hereafter gratify us in every respect" A gentleman from Maryland (Mr. Smith) had said, that he heard, though he could not prove it, that the Federal majority, at the time of the last election, contemplated making a law authorizing or appointing some person as President, in case no choice had been made by the House of Representatives. I was then, sir, a member of the Government, and knew nothing of such a project; it might have been so ; but supposing it was, what then? Why, says the gentleman, the person thus appointed could not have kept his head on his shoulders twenty-four hours; and this would havemadea civil war. If the majority now should contemplate a measure which the Constitution does not authorize — as it clearly did not authorize the measure suspected by the gentleman, though he cannot prove it — the best thing in the world for them to do would be to give up, without any attempt to effect it, as it seems the Federal majority did. But what argument all this can afford in favor of the amendment, or why it was mentioned in this debate, is beyond my comprehension. In the reBult of the last election, the great States and the ruling political party were certainly gratified, and there does not appear the least reasonable S round of complaint against the small States, in le use of their Constitutional rights on the occasion. All support, therefore, to the amendment. drawn from that transaction, must fail.

I have said that the article fixing the mode of electing a Chief Magistrate was, from its nature, attended with many difficulties. A more strict inquiry into the Constitutional mode, and a comparison of it in some other and more particular points with the proposed alteration, will be useful in forming an opinion of their relative merits.

At the Constitution stands each Elector is to write the names of two persons on a piece of paper called a ballot. Either of the two persons thus voted for may be President, and the Elector cannot know which. This affords the most powerful inducement to vote for two, both of whom are qualified for the very important office. For it is not only uncertain upon whom the choice will fall at first, but the one remaining will certainly he President upon any contingency which shall remove or incapacitate the first. The Convention seem to have selected a mode of proceeding the most simple, the least liable to accident, and the best calculated to insure the main object, that is, that both should be really worthy of the trust. If one candidate wishes to make interest with the Electors, as each must vote for two, it will be impossible for bribery or intrigue to succeed ; for, without corrupting the whole, or certainly many more than half, he may be defeated by the other candidate on the ballot This is, perhaps, the most effectual bar to intrigue that waa ever contrived ; for, unless all, or a great proportion of the Electors are corrupted, an extreme case of depravity not probable in any country, intrigue can have no assurance of success. The danger and difficulty which must always attend such an important election as that of Chief Magistrate of Ibe United States, was meant to be avoided by diminishing the chances of its frequent recurrence. So, two persons are placed in condition to act as President in succession, to prevent both the evils of vacancy and a recurrence' of choice more frequently than once in four years: and it seems merely incidental to this second peiv son to be called Vice President, and neither the first nor second description of Electors can have any right to vote for him as such. Indeed, he can have no existence till the first character is designated, and then seems to be discovered, not elect^. The Senate, in case of an equal number of votes for two or more remaining persons, after the President is elected, are vested with authority to choose a Vice President, for as such he is to preside over this body, and this body therefore seems to be the only Constitutional organ to designate him. Both the other descriptions of Electors have nothing to do with such a character or office, but are confined to act with a single reference to the character and office of President, and are trusted with no power to give any qualifications of a ; remarkable that there are no appropriate qualifications madenecessary by the Constitution for a Vice President; but every qualification has reference to President. There is another important feature in this part of the Constitution. It was known by the Convention that in this country, in con>> mon with all others where there is freedom of opinion and of speech, there would be parties. They likewise knew, that the intolerance of the major or ruling sect and political party, was fr^ quenily exercised upon the minor party, and that the rights of the minority ought to be protected U> As well then to secure the rights of the minority,

0 check the intolerance of the majority, they placed ' the the majority major in jeopardy, ipardy, if if they they should should )t at grasping all the benefit benefits of a President President within themselves, to the total exclusion of the minority. This very case which bfppcDed Bl the last session was contemplated, jq | which the majority attempted totally to exclude the minority h-om any participation. The language of the Constitution lo such majorities is, ‘take care that you aim not at too much, for if ' ‘you do, it is put into the power of the minority ' to check you, and, by a judicious disposition of ' their few voles, determine the choice of Presi- ■dent." To avoid this event the majority will probably be cautious in the exercise of power; and thus the rights, the proper weight and influence of a minority, are secured against the conduct of the majority, which is certainly liable to be intolerant and oppressive. In this respect the spirit nf the Constitution is, political moderation. And it is clear lo my mind, that the experience of the last election has taught a lesson to all majorities, which will in future completely secure them from again incurring a similar risk. I recollect well that it was thought probable, when the electoral votes were given, that Mr. Burr would have a vote or two in some of the Eastern States. If he had received but one, he would have been by an electoral choice the Constitutional President. If the majority in future have powers of recollection, they will undoubtedly avoid the evil, if it is one, which happened at ihe last election, with such unfailing certainty, that there will be no need of the remedy proposed by the amendment. But the majority say, if their votes are to scattered for one candidate as to avoid this danger, that another will be incurred; and that is, the minority will elect a Vice President. The language of the Constitution to them is, again, " that this was meant as a security for the minority against the majority." But the majority exclaim against both these provisions as very -- Teasonable indeed. "What!" say they, "are minorities to govern majorities'?" The answer of the Constitution is, " "no, but their due weight and influence shall be secured to them, and the danger - of your intolerance guarded against.” For the security of small States and minorities, there is in the Constitution a mixture of the federative with the popular principles. And as it is well known that when popular majorities alone prevail, and exercise power uncontrolled by Constitutional checks, the minorities, who generally possess their proportion of integrity and virtue, are overwhelmed, and liberty itself, by the same means, destroyed ; so it is in kindness to both parties, to the country and to humanity, that these wholesome checks are Constitutionally provided. Had the majority or the great States been willing fairly to have submitted to the Constitutional checks in the last election, no evil could have happened. And it is remarkable that the Constitution completely protects them, as Ion ^ as they obey its precepts, in the creation of which they had an agency, and to which they have solemnly agreed. To prove that lam correct in these ideas, 1 not only refer to the Constitution but to the Secretary of State, (Mr. Madison.) In the Virginia Debates, volume 1, page 96, he says :

" Bnt on a candid examination of history, we shall the majority trampling on the rights of the minority, '' have produced factions and commotions which, in Re-. ^jblics, bsTe more frequently than any other cause produced despotism. If .we go over the whole history "^ ancient and modern Republics, we shall find their destructions to have generally resulted from those causes. If vt consider the peculiar situation of the United States, and what are the resources of that diversity of sentiments which pervades its inhabitants, we shall find great danger that the same causes may terminate here in the same fatal eBecIa which they produced in those Republics. This danger ought to be wisely guarded against. Perhaps, in the progress of this discussion, it will appear that the only possible remedy ibr those evils, and means of preserving and protecting the principles of republicanism, will be found in that very system which ia now exclaimed against a* the parent of oppression."

Mr. President, it has been often said by the discerning and judicious of this and other countries, that our Constitution, for its brevity, its comprehensiveness, its perspicuity, and the political skill contained in it, was the best State paper extant. 1 believe all this and even more is a tribute justly due to its merits; and I am persuaded that the article which fixes a mode for the choice of a Chief Magistrate stands most prominent among its excellencies.

Let us now, sir, examine and compare the merits of the amendment with a special reference to this last view we have taken of the Contiila* tional provision.

The amendment authorizes the Electors to vote for a President and Vice President by a specific designation. Is ambition in your country 7 Here is a direct and inviting object for its operation. — Is the integrity of your Electors assailable? You place it here in the most encouraging attitude for an assault. A fear of detection, and m sense of shame, upon the exposure of an improper action, has been, perhaps, a better security against political errors or crimes, than all the moral virtues united, when the temptation has been attended with an impossibility of detection. An intrigue with an Elector can be carried on without much danger of detection; but when your election is carried into the House of Representathree members held the choice perfectly In their own handv. If I mistake not, three gentlemen, that is. a member from New Jersey, a member from Vermont, and one from either Maryland, Delaware, or Tennessee, could have given a President to the United States. The particular gentlemen mentioned were above suspicion of bribery ; but, in addition to this circumstance, if they had in the contest gone over from improper motives, or under the influence of bribery, a detection was

This will remain forever the criterion, as it respects the relative danger of intrigue and bribery, in the two modes of choice. And the amendment is avowedly intended to secure a choice by Electors, and to prevent a resort to the House; ; because, says the gentleman from Virginia. (Mr. Taylor,) " if you permit the election to go into ' the House, there are small Slates, and minorities, ' and all the evils of a diet election ;" meaning their corruption must be the consequence. But, be says, let there be a divided election by the ' Electors, meeting by States separately, and you 'lessen the tendency to corruption." This roar look plausible in theory, but I think practice will ■how its fallacy.

It may be better for the Electors to meet by States than for all to be together, but this can never prove that they are less liable to corruption than the House of Representatives ; which is the only point in question.

The manner of electing the Vice President, as proposed by the amendment, not only invites ambition to an unchecked operation, but exposes us to the selection of a less important and more unfit person than the Ccwsiiiullonal provision. In addition to his importance in the Government, arising from his incidental succession to the Chief Magistracy, the Vice President is ex officio President of the Senate, and gives a direct influence to the State from which he is chosen, of a third vote in this body, in all cases of equal division, which are usually the cases of most importance. Besides, his influence as presiding officer is, perhaps, more than equal to the right of a vote. It becomes therefore peculiarly important to the small States, and to minorities, whose security rests in this body, not only that their influence in the election of Vice President should not be diminished, but that no measure be adopted which may tend to bestow the office upon an unworthy character. By the proposed amendment, this character must necessarily become a sort of make-weight and stepping-stone for the Presidency. As in recruiting for an army, a man, active, and of a particular cast of character, but not very proper for a Comntaader" in-Chief, is employed to obtain recruits, and, upon condition that he obtains a given number, is to be rewarded with a sergeant's warrant; so, in this case, the man who can procure "a given number of votes for President will be encouraged to hope for the Vice Presidency ; and where will such characters be sought after 1 In Delaware or Rhode Island? No, sir, but in the great States; there the recruiting talents will be put in operation, because the number of recruits, or votes, will be sufficient to test his active and recruiting merits. And thus the office of Vice President will be sent to market with hardly a possible chance to meet an honest purchaser.

I have already remarked upon the alteration made by the Senate in the resolution passed by the House of Representatives, changing the number five to three. But, one addition, made this morning, deserves attention. I mean that which authorizes the Vice President to administer the Government in case neither the first nor the second Constitutional Electors effect a choice of President, This is a newprinciple, andits operation is more uncertain than that of any other part of the proposed amendment. Viewing it in one point of light, it may be thought to confer a new power upon the Senate, that of giving a President lo the

. a. And. it is said, that this part will recompense the small States, who have the ascendency in the Senate, for the injury inflicted by the other parts of the amendment. If it be true that the ast part restores all which the former parts have taken away from us, it is inconceivable why any man can wish to pass a resolution the parts of which thus mutually destroy each other. It is possible that, by the force of intrigue and faction, the Electors may be induced to scatter their vi for both President and Vice President, in such manner as to present several candidates to the House for President, and two or more to the Senate for Vice President; in which case the Senate might immediately choose or select a Vice President. lo this state of things, there is an opportunity afforded for intrigue of a very extensive and alarming nature. The Senate, I mean a majority of them, might wish that the man whom they had elected Vice President should administer the Government, and if the House could be prevented from agreeing, their wishes would be gratified. The facility of preventing over that of produciiiga choice is very obvious.

A bold address may be made to any member of the House, without wounding his pride or offending his morality, to adhere to his candidate, and not change his vote so as to effect a choice. He can be told that there is no danger of leaving the United States without a President, as there is one already chosen to his hand by the Senate ; and this person may be more the object of his wishes than any of the other candidates, his favorite excepted. In this process the Senate may give a President to the United States. But if the probability of such a process and such an event is increased by the amendment of this morning, it cannot certainly greatly recommend it. For myself I wish for no alteration in the Constitution, not even if its operations were directly in favor of the small States, more especially if such a favor is to be derived through a sort of double conspiracy of intrigue; in the first place, to operate on the Electors, and then on the House of Representatives. It seems to me, that the small States had better be contented to enjoy the rights now secured to them by the Constitution, which they can honestly do, rather than submit to a deprivation of their rights for the sake of dishonestly obtaining a restoration of them. We may charitably and safely conclude that the majority do not intend, by this part of the amendment, to expose the country to such a scene of iniquity. And the uncertainly of its operations alone, is, in my mind, a sufficient ground for rejection. However the operation of this part of the amendment may appear in theory, as to other points, it seems to me that, in one point, all must agree: and that is, when the House of Representatives know that the United Stales will be left without an Executive Magistrate, in case ihey do not agree. This awful responsibility will speak in a voice too loud for the hardihood of party entirely to disregard. And may I not suggest, without giving offence, that the operation of this very responsibility has been proved, at least in some degree, in (he proceedings of the last Presidential election 7

If this last-mentioned security be worth preserving, it follows, of course, that the part of the has a reference to the general subject before us ; and that is, the caution exhibited with respect to the introduction of amendments. loan instrument so important, and containing many features new, if Dol to the world, at least to ourselves, although ifre might approve of its principles, yet experience might discover errors as to the mode devised for carrying those principles into effect. Hence it was the part of wisdom and caution to provide for such alterations in practice as would give the fairest operation to principles, without incurring the confusion and agitation incidental to a general Convention. But, lest the daring and restive spirit of innovation should injure or destroy, under the specious name of amendment, that same wisdom and caution hath provided salutary " Two-thirds of both Houses of the Congress shall deem it necessary" to propose amendments ; and three-fourths of the State Legislatures shall ratify such amendments, before they acquire validity. I speak now, sir, of the mode which has always been, and probably will be, put in practice to obtain amendments. The other Constitutional mode is equally guarded as to numbers, but, as it has no relation to the subject now in debate, may be laid aside. " Two-thirds of both Houses." must, I think, on every fair principle of construction, mean two-thirds of all the members. The number of Senators is thirty-four, two-thirds being twenty-three. And as there is no representation from New Jersey, the number of Representatives is one hundred ihirty-sii, two-thirds being My impressions are, sir, that (bis amendment cannot constitutionally be proposed to the State Legislatures unless it is agreed to in the two Houses by those numbers twenty-three and ninety-one, respectively. This is a Constitutional Eint, which, I am told, has never been agitated, t is certainly worthy of attention. If the construction should prevail that two-thirds of the members present, at any time, might propose amendments, the consequence is that twelve Senators, being two-thirds of a quorum, and fortyeight Representatives, being a similar two-thirds, might propose any and the most important amendments. I am aware sir, that it may be said such propositions are not final, they may yet be ratified or rejected by the State Legislatures. But the spirit of the Constitution seems to require two-thirds of the nation, acting by its proper organs, to propose amendments; and tnat, in so interesting a subject as a Constitutional alteration a less number should have no authority.

The letter of the Constitution will certainly justify this idea of its spirit. When two-thirds of the Senate are requisite to consent and advise to a treaty, the words are two-thirds of the Senators present." To convict on impeachment "twothirds of the members present." Yeas and nays are to be entered on the Journal " at the desire of one-fifth of those present." In the two first cases ills requisite to act immediately, whether twothirds of the whole are present or not ; then we see, the expressions are clear, "two-thirds" refers to the numbers present. Why so? Because without these expressions, Uie reference woolcf have been understood to the whole number of members. In the last case, why add the word "present" to the one-fifth 1 Because, without that word, " one-fifth" of the whole would have been its meaning. In all other cases, when two-thirds are required, the spirit of the Constitution certainly is, and the words seem to carry the meaning, " two-thirds" of the whole numbers. It is said, '* that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business." " House," in this case, must mean all the members. Two-thirds of both Houses must, on the same principles, mean twothirds of all the members of both. There i.s, I acknowledge, some obscurity, in the Constitutional use of the word " House," when either of the two branches of Congress is described by it ; but if the intention and sense, as well as words, areaitended to, lamfurcibly led to believe that two-thirds of all the members of both Houses are required to sanction propositions for amendments, and that this construction is most consistent with the wisdom and political skill of the Convention. The construction for which I contend is analogous to the caution manifest in other parts of the Constitution. It was well known to the Convention that amendments, if recommended or proposed by Congress, would have an imposing influence with the Slate Legislatures; and that, in no possible instance, could more evil arise from indigested measures than in the case of amendments, owing to the impossibility of clearly foreseeing their operation and effects on the general Constitutional system. It was made requisite, therefore, to wait for the uninfluenced movement of two-thirds of the popular and Federative Representatives of the nation. Whatever may be our opinion on the point now discussed, the State Legislatures have a Constitutional right to judge of it for themselves and to determine whether a proposition for an amendment is presented to them, with the sanction required, and, if, in their opinions, the requisite numbers have not agreed to the proposition, they will guard the Constitution, by refusing to ratify such amendment. My honorable friend from New Hampshire (Mr. PLumer) has done such ample justice to this part of the subject as to place it out of the reach of my assistance, and beyond the need of any.

I am convinced, Mr. President, that the amendment now under consideration could not, in the Senate, obtain a Constitutional majority of twothirds, or even a simple majority, were it not for the influence of instructions. Some gentlemen have ingeniously said that, until they gave this amendment the present particular examination, they had not contemplated the extent of its probable effects, and, although they entertained doubts, yet they were induced, oy the instructions given them, to make the proposition to the Legislatures and let them decide for themselves.

Whatever may or can be said in favor of iogiruciions generally, cannot be applicable to this case. For the purpose of obtaining amendments to the Constitution, Congress can only propose and the State Legislaluresralify. Thedulieaare appropriate and distinct, and the uninfluenced independent act of both requisite. The Legislatures cannot ratify till a proposal is made. This subject can be elucidated and enforced by familiar examples. The House of Representatives alone can originate a bill for raising revenue, but it cannot become a law without the concurrence of the Senate. Would not the advice and instruction of the Senate to the House, intimating our desire that they would originate and send to us for concurrence, a revenue bill, be thought improper, indelicate, and even an constitutional 7 The President and Senate ctfi appoint certain officers, but they have distinct and appropriate agencies in the appointment. The President can nominate, but cannot appoint without the advice and consent of the Senate.

But the Senate cannot nominate, nor could their advice to the President to make a nomination, be either binding or proper. The character of the several independent branches of our Government, forming Constitutional checks upon each other, cannot lie exemplified more fully than in the mode of producing amendments. And an interference of one independent body, upon the appropriate and distinct duties of another, can in no instance have a more prejudicial efieei. Can it be thought, then, either proper or Constitutional for the State Legislatures to assume the power of instructing to propose to them a measure when the power of proposing is not only not given to them but given exclusively to Congress ? As well and with as much propriety might Congress make a law attempting to bind the State Legislatures to ratify, as the legislatures, by instructions, bind Congress to propose. In either case, the check which, for obviously wise purposes, was introduced into the Constitution, is totally destroyed. And we have not as Qiach security against improper amendments, as we should have if the power were exclusively vested in the State Legislatures, and for this obvious reason, that, in this mode ofoperation, the responsibility for the adoption of an improper amendment is divided and destroyed. Is the sentiment correct, sir, that we shall be justifiable in sending forth this proposition to be considered by . the State Legislatures, if we believe it ought not to be ratified? What would be thought of the Senate if they should pass a bill and send it to ■ the House of Representatives for concurrence, the provisions of which. they disliked entirely, and wished not to be established And can any sound distinction be made between such a measure and the one now before usT In either case, the single act of the other body would be final, and in either case the people at large would he safer to have but one body in existence to legislate or make amendments ; for all our agency, in both cases, would only tend to deceive and mislead, and, in addition, to diminish if not destroy, as has just been observed, theresponsibility of the other body. It has been said, sir, that the House of Representatives have twice given a sanction to this measure, and that their conduct, in this particular, adds weight to it. I wish to treat that honorable body with the highest respect, but I must deviate from the truth were I to acknowledge that their conduct upon this amendment has a tendency to convince me that they have a full understanding of the subject. Twice have they sent us a resolution, similar in its leading feature to that on your table, and made no provision that the person to be Vice President should be qualified for the highly responsible office, either in age, or citizenship; and, for aught that they had guarded against, we might have had a man in the Chief Magistracy from Morocco, a foreigner, who had not been in the country a month.

Mr. President,— it was suggested in a former part of the debate, by a gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. Butler,) that the great States, or ruling party of the day, had brought forward this amendment, for the purpose of preventing the choice of a Federal vice President at the next election. And we are now put beyond the power of doubt, that this is, at least, one motive, by the observations of several of the majority, but especially by those of the gentleman from Virginia. He informs us, and I appreciate his frankness, that if the friends of this measure do not seize the present opportunity to pass it, tbe opportunity will never recur. He tells us plainly, that a minor faction ought to be discouraged, that all hopes or prospect of rising into consequence, much more of rising into office, should be crushed, and that this amendment is to produce a part of these beneficial effects; which amendment he compares to the bill which was introduced into the British Parliament, to exclude a popish successor to the Crown, commonly called tne exclusion bill. Have the minority then, no right left, but the right to be trampled upon by the majority 1 This is identically the conduct which is mentioned in the quotation which I have had the honor to make from the Secretary of State ; to which 1 ask leave to recur: "The majority, by trampling on the 'lights of the minority, have produced factions ' and commotions, which, in Republics, have more ' frequently than any other cause produced des- ‘ pot ism."

What avails it then, that this country has triumphed over the Invasion and violence of one opKressor, if they must now be victims to the vio* inceofthonsands? Political death isdenounced now; what denunciation will follow? It would be a useless affectation in us to pretend to close eyes upon either the cause or consequences of this measure.

The spirit of party has risen so high, at tbe present day, that it dares to altemptwhat in milder times would be beyond the reach of calculation. To this overwhelming torrent every consideration must give way.

The gentleman is perfectly correct, in supposing that now is tbe only time to pass this resolution ; there is a tide in the affairs of party most emphatically, and unless its height is taken, its acme improved, the shallows soon appear, and the present demon of party give place to a successor. A hope is undoubtedly now indulged that one great and domiaant passion will, like Aaron's rod, swallow up every other, and that the favorable moment can now be seized to crush the small States, and to obtain their own agency in the transaction. And when we recur to the history of former confederacies, and find the small States arrayed in conflict against each other, to fight, to suffer, and to die, for the transient gratification of the great States, have we not some reason to fear the success of this measure 1

In the Senate, is the security of the small States; their feeble voice in the House of Representatives is lost in the potent magic of numbers and wealth. Never until now-has the force of the small States, which was provided bv the Constitution, and lodged in this federative body, as a weapon of selfdefence, been able to bear upon this question. And will the small States, instead of defending their own interest, their existence, sacrifice them to a gust of momentary passion 7 to the short-lived gratification of party prejudice?

This resolution, if circumstances shall equivocally demand It, can pass at the next, or any future session of Congress. But once passed, and its passage will operate like the grave ; the sacrificed rights of ibe small States will be gone for ever. Is it possible, sir, that any small State can submit to be a satellite in the' State system, and revolve In a secondary orbit around a great State? Act in humble devotion to her will, till her purposes are gratified, and then content herself to be thrown a^ide like a cast garment, an object of her own unceasing regret, and fit only for the hand of scorn to point its slow unmoving finger at? Can the members of the Senate who represent the small States quietly cross their hands and request the great Slates to bind them fast, and to draw the ligature

1 am aware, sir, that 1 shall be accused of an attempt to excite the jealousy of the small States. Mr. President, I represent a small State, I feel the danger, and claim the Constitutional right to sound the alarm. From the same altar on which the small States shall be immolated, will rise the smoke of sacrificed liberty; and despotism must be the dreadful successor.

It is the cause of my country and of humanity which I plead. And when one vast, overwhelming passion is in exercise, full well I know, sir, that no warning voice, no excitement but jealousy, has been found sufficiently active and energetic to dissolve the wizard spell, and force mankind to listen to argument. Jealousy, hateful in private life, has perhaps done more in the preservation of political rights than all the virtues united.

I have made the stand, sir, in the Senate, which I thought the importance of the subject demanded. Ill fail here, there is hope of success with the Slate Legislatures. If nothing can withstand Ibe torrent there, I shall experience the satisfaction which is derived from a consciousness of having raised my feeble voice in defence of that Constitution, which is not only the security of the small States, but the palladium of my country's rights, and shall console myself with the reflection that I have done my duty.

Mr. Taylor. — The opposition to this discriminating amendment to the Constitution is condensed into a single stratagem, namely : an effort to excite the passion of jealousy in various forms. Endeavors have been made to excite geographical jealousies — a jealousy of the smaller against Uie larger States — a jealousy in the people against the idea of amending the Constitution ; and even a jealousy against individual members of this House. Sir, is this passion a good medium. through which to discern truth, or is it a mirror calculated to reflect error ? Will it enlighten or deceive? Is it planted in good or in evil — ia moral or in vicious principles? Wherefore, then, do gentlemen endeavor to blow it up? Is it because they distrust the strength of their argu- ments, that they resort to this furious and erring' passion? Is it because they know that

" Trifles light u air.

Are, to the jealous, confirmation strong As proofs of holy writ 7"

So far as these efforts have been directed towards a geographic aide ma real ion of the interests of the Union into North and South, in order to excite a Jealousy of one division against another; and, so far as they have been used to create suspicions of individuals, they have been either so feeble, inapplicable, or frivolous, as to bear but lightly upon the question, and to merit but little attention. But the attempts to array States against States because they differ in size, and to prejudice the people against the idea of amending their Constitution, bear a more formidable aspect, and ought to be repelled, because they are founded on principles the most mischievous and inimical to the Constitution, and could they be successful, are replete with great mischiefs.

Towards exciting this jealousy of smaller States against larger States, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tr AC v) had labored to prove that the federal principle of the Constitution of the United Stales was founded in the idea of miuori-. ty invested with operative power. That, in pursuance of this principle, it was contemplated and intended that the election of a President should frequently come into the House of Representatives, and to divert it from thence by this amendment would trench upon the federal principle of out Constitution, and diminish the rights of the smaller States, bestowed by this principle upon them. This was the scope of his argument to excite their jealousy, and is the amount also of several other arguments delivered by gentlemen on the same side of the question. He did not question the words, but the ideas of gentlemen. Words, selected from their comrades, are easily asserted to misrepresent opinions, as he had himself experienced during the discussion on the This idea of federalism ought to be well discussed by the smaller States, before they will suffer it to produce the intended effect— that of exciting their jealousy against the larger. To biiu it appeared to be evidently incorrect. Two prii). eiples sustain our Const ituii on i one a majority of the people, the othera majority of the Staler; the first was necessary to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the people; the last, to preserve the liberty or sovereignty of the States. But both are founded in the principle of majority ; and the effort of the Constitution is to preserve this principle in relation both to the peopleand the States, so that neither speciesof sovereignty orindepend' ence should be able to destroy the other. Many illustrations might be adduced. That of amendiDg the Constitution will suffice. Three-fourths of the States most concur in this object, because a less number or a majority of States might not contain a majority of people; therefore, the Constitution isnotamendalilebya majority of States, lest a species of State sovereignty might, under color of amending the Constitution, infringe the tigb t of the people. On the other hand, a. majority of the people residing in the large States cannot amend the Constitution, lest they should diminish or destroy the sovereignty of the small States, the federal Union, or federalism itself. Hence a concurrence of the States to amend the Constitution became necessary, not because federalism was founded in the idea of minority, but for a reason the very reverse of that idea — that is, to cover the will both of a majority of the people and a majority of States, so as to preserve the great element of self-government, as it regarded State sovereignly, and also as it regarded the sovereignty of the people.

For this great purpose certain political functions are assigned to be performed, under the auspices of the State or federal principle, and certain others under the popular principle. It was the intention of the Constitution that these functions should be performed in conformity to its principle. If that principle is in fact a go vera - ment of a minority, then these functions ought to be performed by a minority. When the federal principle is performing a function, according to this idea, a majority of the States ought to decide. And, by the same mode of reasoning, when the popular principle is performing a function, then a minority of the people ought to decide. This brings us precisely to the question of the amendment. It is the intention of the Constitution that the popular principle shall operate in the election of a President and Vice President It is also the intention of the Constitution that the popular principle, in discharging the functions committed to it by the Constitution, should operate by a majority and not by a minority. That the majority of the people should be driven, by an unforeseen stale of parties, to ibe necessity of relinquishing their will in the election of one or the other of these officers, or that the principle of majority, in a function confided to the popular will, should be deprived of half its rights, and be laid under a not the

But the gentleman from Connecticut has leaped over all this ground, and gotten into the House of Representatives, without considering the principles of the Constitution, as applicable to the election of President and Vice President by Electors, and distinguishing them from an election by the House of Representatives. And by mingling and interweaving the two modes of electing together, a considerable degree of complexity has been produced. If, however, it is admitted that in an election of a President and Vice President by Electors, that the will of the electing majority ought fairly to operate, and that an election by the will of a minority would be an abuse or corruption of the principles of the Constitution, then it follows that an amendment, to avoid this abuse, accords with, and is necessary to save these principles. In like manner, had an abuse crept into the same election, whenever it was to be made under the federal principle by the House of Representatives, enabling minority of States to carry the election, it would not have violated the intention of the Constitution to have corrected this abuse, also, by an amendment. For, sir, I must suppose it to have been the intention of the Constitution that both the federal principle and the popular principle should operate in those functions ~' ~ 1 respectively assigned to them, perfectly and m perfectly—that is, the former by a majority of States, and the latter by a majority of the Under this view of the subject, the amendment ought to be considered. Then the question will be, whether it is calculated or not to cause the popular principle, applied by the Constitution in the first instance, to operate perfectly, and to prevent the abuse of an election by a minority 1 If it is, it corresponds with the Intention, diminishes nothing of the rights of the smaller States, and, of course, affords them no cause of jealousy.

Sir, it could never have been the intention of the Constitution to produce a state of things by which a majority of the popular principle should be under the necessity of voting against its judgment to secure a President, and by which a minor faction should* acquire a power capable of defeating 'm; the majority in the election of President, or if electing a Vice President contrary to the will of the electing principle. To permit this abuse would be a fraudulent mode of defeating the operation of the popular principle in this election, order to transfer it to the federal principle — to disinherit the people for the sake of endowing the House of Representatives ; whereas it was an accidental and not an artificial disappointment in the election of a President, against which the Constitution intended to provide. A fair and not an unfair attempt to elect was previously to be made by the popular principle, before the election was to go into the House of Representatives. And if the people of all the States, both large and small, should, by an abuse of the real design of the Constitution, be bubbled out of the election of Executive power, by leaving to them the nominal right of an abortive effort, and transferring to the House of Representatives the substantial right of a real election, nothing will remain but to rupl the eleRtioQ in that House by some of those abuses of which elections by diets are susceptible, to bestow upon Executive power bd aspect both formidable and inconsistent with the principles by which the Constitution intended to mould it. The great check imposed upon Executive power was a popular mcnle of election; and the true object of Jealousy, which ought to attract the attention of the people of every State, is any circumstance 'tending to diminish or destroy that check. It was also a primary Intention of the Constitution to keep Executive power independent of Legislative 1 and although a provision was made for its election by the House of Representatives in a possible case, that possible case never was intended to be converted into the active rule, so as to destroy in a degree the line of separation and independency between the Executive and Legislative power. The controversy is not therefore between larger and smaller States, but between the people of every State and the House of Representatives, la it better that the people a fair majority of the popular principle — should elect Executive power; or, that a minor faction should be enabled to embarrass and defeat the judgment and will of this majority, and throw Ihi election into the House of Representatives? This is the question. If this amendment should enable the popular principle to elect Executive power, and thus keep it separate and distinct from legislation, the intention of the Constitution, the interest of the people, and the principles of our policy, will be preserved ; and il so, it is as I have often endeavored to prove in this debate, the interest of the smaller States themselves, that the amendment should prevail. For, sir, is an exposure of their Representatives to bribery and corruption (a thing which may possibly happen at some future day, when men lose that public virtue ' which now governs them) an acquisition more r desirable than all those great objects best (if not exclusively) attainable by the election of Executive power by the popular principle of the Federal Quvemroeot, as the Constitution itself meditates and prefers?

So far, then, the amendment strictly coincides with the Constitution and with the interests of the people of every State in the Union. But suppose by some rare accident the election should still be sent into the House of Representatives, does not the amendment then afford cause of jealoasy to the smaller States? Sir, each State Das but one vole, whether it is large or small; and the President and Vice President are still to be chosen out of five persons. Such is the Constitution in both respects now. To have enlarged the number of nominees, would have increased the occurrence of an election by the House of Representatives; and if, as I have endeavored to prove, it is for the interest of every State, that the election should be made by the popular principle of Government and not by that House, then it follows, that whatever would have a tendency to draw the election into that House, is against the interest of every State in the Union ; and that every State in the Union is interested to avoid an enlargement of the nominees, if it would have such a tendency.

Sir, the endeavor to excite a national jealousy against the idea of amending the Constitution, is in my view infinitely more dangerous and alarming than even the attempt to marshal State; against States. The gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. Tracy) has twice pronounced with great emphasis, “ man Is man," and attempted to make inferences against all attempts to amend our Constitution from the evil moral qualities with which human nature is afflicted 1 Sir, he has forgotten that Governments as well as nations are constituted of men, and that if the vices of governed man ought to alarm us for the safety of liberty, the vices of governing man are not calculated to assuage our apprehensions. Sir, it is this latter species of depravity which has suggested lo the people of America a new idea, enforced by constitutions. Permit me to illustrate this neir idea by the terms political law and municipal law. The former is that law. called Constitutional, contrived and enacted in the United States, to control those evil moral qualities to which this creature " man" is liable when invested with. power. The latter is that law enacted to control the vices of man in his private capacity. If the former species of law should be suffered to remain unchanged, the effects would be the same as if the latter should remain unchanged. Both, unaltered, would be evaded by the ingenuity, avarice, and ambition of public man, as well as private man. And, therefore, it is as necessary for the preservation of liberty, that constitutions or political law should be amended from time to time, in order to preserve liberty against the avarice and ambition of men in power, by meeting and controlling their artifices, as it is occasionally to amend municipal law, for the preservation of properly against the vicious practices of men not To illustrate this argument, I will repeat a position which I lately advanced, namely, that the substance of a Constitution may be effectually destroyed, and yet its form may remain unaltered. England illustrates it. The Government of that country took its present form in the thirteenth century; but its aspect in substance has been extremely different at different periods, under the same form. Without taking time to mark the changes in substance which have taken place under ' T the form of Kings, Lords, and Commons, it II suffice to cast our eyes upon the present state of that Government. What are now its chief and substantial energies'! Armies, debt, Executive patronage, penal laws, and corporations. These are the modern energies or substance of the Bng> lish monarchy j to the ancient English monarchy they were unknown. Of the ancient, they were substantial abuses ; for, whether these modern energies are good or bad, they overturned the ancient monarchy substantially, without altering its form. Under every change of Administration these abuses proceeded. The oul* were clamcrous for preserving the constitution, as they called itj for, though divorced from its adi hope ofgettioip in again caused them to abuses, by which their avarice or ambition might be gratified upon the next lurn of the wheel ; just as la Prussia, where divorces are common, nothing is more usual iban for late husbands to affect a violent passion for a former wife, if she carried off from nim a good estate ! And the ins fearing tbenBiioQaijealousy,and the prepossession against amending the form of Government, and meeting new abuses by new remedies, brought no relief to the nation. So ihal under every change of abuses proceeded.

The solution of this effect exists in the species of political craft similar to priestcraft. Mankind were anciently deprived of their religious liberty by a dissemination of a fanatical zeal for some idol ; in times of ignorance, this idol was of physical structure ; and when that fraud was detected, ametaphyslcalidolia the shape of a tenet ordo^ma was substituted for it, infinitely more pernicious in its effects, because infinitely more difficult of detection. The same system has been pursued by political craft. It has ever labored to the same species of idolatry and superstition for the same reason, namely, to conceal its own frauds and vices. Sometimes it sets up a physical, at others a metaphysical idol, as the object of vulgar superstition. Of one, the former “ Grand Monarch of France ;" of the other, the present "Church and State" tenet of England is an evidence. And if our Constitution is to be made like the " Church and State" tenet of England, a metaphysical political idol, which it will be sacrilege to amend, even for the sake of saving both that and the national liberty ; and if, like that tenet, it is to be exposed to all the means which centuries may suggest to vicious men for its substantial destruction, it is not hard to imagine that it also may become a monument of the inefficacy of unalterable forms of political law to correct avarice and ambition in the new and multifarious shapes they are forever assuming.

A Constitution may allegorically be considered as a temple for the preservation of the treasure of liberty. Around it may be posted one, two, or three, or more sentinels; but unless these sentinels are themselves watched by the people, and unless the injuries they are frequently committing upon the temple are diligently repaired, such is the nature of man in power, that the very sentinels themselves have invariably broken into the temple and conveyed away the treasure. And this because of the delusion inspired by political idolatry, which forbids nations to meet abuses by amending their Governments or constitutions and teaches them that municipal law alone will suffice for their happiness.