March 7, 1947 (2)

The Senate resumed the consideration of the joint resolution <H. J. Res. 27), providing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to the terms of office of the President.

Mr. O'DANIEL. Mr. President; for many years I have been sponsoring a proposal to limit the tenure of office of the President of the United States. I am glad the subject has finally reached the floor of the Senate for debate.

A proposed amendment to the Constitution limiting to 6 years the tenure of office of the President and Vice President of the United States and the Members of Congress, and imposing limitations on the appointment or election of certain persons to office has been before - this · body for some time.

My resolution was first introduced on October 14, 1943, in the first session of the Seventy-eighth Congress, and was referred to the Committee on the J:udiciary. At that time the resolution was known as Senate Joint Resolution 86. No action was taken on it.

I reintroduced this joint resolution on January 22, 1945, in the first session of the Seventy-ninth Congress; and it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. In the Seventy-ninth Congress it was known· as Senate Joint Resolution 21. No action was taken on it.

I again reintroduced the resolution on January 8, 1947, in the first session of the Eightieth Congress, ' s, and it was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. In the Eightieth Congress the resolution is known as Senate Joint Resolution 18.

I now offer my resolution, Senate Joint Resolution 18, as a substitute for the joint resolution which is pending.

Mr. President, my resolution, which I am offering as a substitute for the pending resolution, goes further than the pending resolution, by including in addition to the office of President, the office of Vice President and all Members of both branches of the Congress. My resolution would limit to 6 years the tenure of all elective offices in.our Federal Government. It would also prevent appointment of Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives to any civil office for 5 years after the termination of their elective job.

For the information of the Senate, Mr. President, I . now read my resolution: Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States:

"ARTICLE-

"SECTION 1. The term of office of each President of the United States and of each Vice President of the United States elected after the date of this article takes effect shall be 6 years; and no person who shall have served as President or Vice President shall be eligible for election to the office of President or the office of Vice President.

"SEC . 2. No person shall be eligible for election or appointment to the office of Senator or Representative in Congress for any term which, if served by such person, would cause the aggregate service of such person as a Member of either or both the Senate and the House of Representatives to exceed 6 years. "SEC. 3. Nothing contained in section 1 or section 2 of this article shall be construed to prevent any person who may hold the office of President, Vice President, Senator, or Representative in Congress, during the term within which this article is ratified from holding such office for the remainder of such term.

"SEc. 4. No person shall be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States who holds, or who shall have held within 5 years next preceding the date of such appointment, the office of Senator or Representative in Congress or of judge of any court under the authority of the United States, but nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent the appointment or assignment of 'a person who holds the office of judge of a court under the authority of the United States, to the office of judge of any other court under the authority of the United States.

"SEC. 5. This article shall be inoperative unless It shall have been ratified . as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within 7 years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress."

Mr. President, I have prepared an article on this subject, and it gives quotations from former public officials and others. I ask unanimous consent that the article may be printed in the RECORD as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

The theory embodied in Senate Joint Resoution 18 is not new. When the Constitutional Convention was in session Randolph offered a number of resolutions, the fourth of which follows:

"Resolved, That the Members of the first branch of t he National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of . the several States every -- for the term of ; to be of the age of -- years at least; to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; to be ineligible to any office . established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of after its expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall."

The fifth resolution reads:

"Resolved, That the Members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper nUmber of persons nominate¢ . by the individual legislatures, to be of the age of -- years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to insure their independency; to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to the public service; and ·~ o be ineligible to any office established by a particular State , or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch during the term of service; and for the space of-­ expiration -:; hereof." (The Madison Papers, vol. 2, pp. 731-732, 1840.)

Still referring to the legislative branch of the Gov.ernment, we find in the Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, edited by Max Farrand, volume 2, pages 285-287, the following summary of discussion on this question:

"Mr. Gerry read a resolution of the Legislature of Massachusetts passed before the act of Congress recommending the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the fifth article of Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the Members of Congress a capacity to hold office under the Government. This he said was repealed in consequence of the act of Congress with which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified · manner. The sense of the State however was still the same. He could not think with Mr. Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to ministers and ambassadors, few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent among us, and that source of influence be shut up. If the Senate were to appoint ambassadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the House _ of Representatives will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best citizens are actuated by such mercenary views, we had better choose a single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one gentleman (Mr. Mercer) our Government it seems is to be a government of plunder. In that case it certainly would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be emplayed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this system. It will be e xa mined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye. The people who have been so lately in arms against Great Britain for their liberties will not easily g i ve them up. He la m ented t h e ev i ls e xi s t ing at pre s ent under our gove r nments, but i m puted t h em to the f a ul t s of those in office, not to the peo p le. The mi s dee d s of the former will prod u ce a crit i cal attention to t h e opportunities ie s afforded by the new system to like or gre at er abuses. As it now s t ands It is as comple t e an ar i s t ocracy as e v er was framed. If g r eat powers should be given to the S e nate we sh a ll be governed in reality by a Junto as has been apprehended. He rem a rked that 1t would be ve r y d iff erently co n stituted from Congress. ( 1) There will be but t wo deputies from each State, in Congress there m a y be seven and are generally five. (2) They are chosen for 6 years; those of Congress annually. (3) They are not subjeC't to rec a ll; those of Con g ress are. ( 4) In Congress, nine S t ates are necessary for all great p urposes-here eight persons will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the Members of the House of Representatives as well as of the Senate inelig i ble not only during, but for 1 year after the expira t ion of their terms. If it should be thought · that this will injure the Legislature by keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve in other offic e s, it may be required as a qualification for other offices, that the candidate shall have served a certain time in the Legisl at ure. "M:r. Gouverneur Morris . • .., • He was against rendering the members of the legislature ineligible to office. ae was for rendering them eligible again after having vacated their seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people choose to g i ve them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the people or the legislatures who are to be the electors. If they say we see their merits, we honor the m e n, we choose to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them prefe r ence, and can they be properly abr i dged of it?"

There is one additional point which I would like to mention that was discussed in the Federal Convention, a brief quotation from records of the Federal Convention, by Farrand, volume 1, page 362, being sufficient for the purpose:

"Mr. Sherman preferred annual elections, but would be content with biennial. He thou gh t the representatives ought to return home and mix with the people. By remaining at the seat of government t- hey would ac q uire ;the habits of the place which might differ from those of their constituents." It will be observed that in the days of the formation of the Republic the s a me questions were discussed that are involved in Senate Joint Resolution 18. The fears of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of permitting members of the legis l ative branch of the Government to hold office in , the executive branch appear to me to be just as real as in the days of the Constitutional Convention and are not lessened by the fact that now they wait until the expiration of their terms and, if they have rendered faithful service to the administration then in power, they are taken care of by appointm e nt to some place in the executive branch of the Government where they can serve as long as they can be taken care of and then can become eligible for retirement, counting the years th a t they have served in Congress toward the number of years' service . e in the Government on which retirement pay is based.

On June 11. 1944, Gould Lincoln, in an article in the Evening Star of Washington, D . C., under th~ beading "Six- Year Limit Urged for Congress," wrote at some length on this subject, with particular reference to Congressman WAT ARNOLD ' s efforts along the same lines as Senate Joint Resolution 18. Quoting Mr. ARNoLD, Mr. Lincoln wrote:

"I favor a limitation of the terms of office of all elected representatives of the people of the United States of America, and such an atti t ude seems to border closely upon betr a yal of the sacred trust of political officeholding."

Quoting further from Mr. ARNOLD, Mr. Lincoln sa i d:

"No American should aspire to a career as a P r e s id e nt. or as a Con g ressman. Industries, ins ti tutions, and ideas ch a nge too swiftly. Overlong exposure to the impersonal glare of the public spotlight focused upon Capitol Hill causes the sense of perspective which guides a public servant to diminish or even disappear entirely."

Again quoting Mr: ARNoLD. Mr. Lincoln says:

"A public officer, tn my opinion, should be so restric t ed in his tenure of office that his efforts as a legislator would not have the opportunity to become completely unh i nged from every day realities, as calculated from the standpoint of John Q. Public.

"His period of service to his country should be spent in compete freedom from the aggravating responsibility of continuously build . ing toward reelection. A Congressman should serve his term of office and then return to his district to see if he coUld earn a decent moral living under the laws which he has been instrumental in enacting. No Congressman who cannot demonstrate his usefulness to his constituents in a practical enough way to justify his continuance in office for three terms should expect to be returned to Congress indefinitely. Such a down-to-earth approach to the problem should be a forever effective bar to the overload i ng of the statute books with legislation as ill-conceived as is its effect upon a redtape-ensnarled citizenry.

"The exigencies of war make it imperative that the Congress remain in almost continuous sess i on. Until the moment of victory comes, and well into the period of reconstruction following the conflict, it will be necessary to follow the same legislative schedule in the interest of the Nation's welfare.

.. Naturally such a condition tends to expand tremendously the dangerous policy of increased centralization of government in Washington. The issue of States' rights may become irrevocably lost in the complex maze of bureaucracy and government by directive unless a substantial bulwark is established against further encroachment.

"To guarantee a regul a r infusion of new blood into the ranks of Congress would provide an excellent means of antir.entralization control.

"The shores of the pond of Washington society are littered with an accumulation of humanity deposited there by reason of the presence of public servants in various stages of activity-mostly defunct."

When a m a n is elected to the Congress of the United States, I believe that he should be accountable to the voters who elected him and to no one else. That is not always the case, in my judgment, under present conditions. The power of Federal patronage can be invoked to reward those who follow the administration's policies and to punish those who vote against them. When a man for reasons which he considers to be val.id and proper opposes the policy of the administration then in power it is always possible to refuse any request the man may make, no matter how worthy. If he goes along with the administration and secures his share of patronage he can "point with pride" to his success in forthcoming elections, and if he fails to do s o his opponent can "view with alarm" his inability to obtain proper consideration for his Sta t e or district by the authorities as evidenced by his failu r e to ob ta in Fede ra l p-rojects and Federal a pp appointments for citizens of his State or d i strict who are prim a rily interested in le gi s la tion w h ich they believe will be to the in t erest of their own particular group. Form i ng solid cohesive units many of them exercise subs t antial influence and political power.

There are in Washing t on various pressure gro u ps, the stock argument of such ~ h groups be i n g "vote as we say or we will de f e a t you in the next election." If a person knew in adv a nce that he would not be a c an d i date in the next election this argument would fall fi a t. If a Member of Con g ress was b a rred from reelection I believe that there would be far less opportunity for pressure gr o ups to influence legislation. In fact I believe most of the pressure groups will g o out of business if Senate Joint Resolution 21 is adopted.

I firmly believe that it is to the best inte r est of the people of the United S tat es to adopt this amendment and I also believe it is for the best interest of the M e mbers of Con g ress themselves.

The office of Vice President is pu r ely in ­ cidental to the office of President although he serves in the legislative branch as President of the Senate, unless by chance the man elected to that office should become the President of the United States.

For that reason I do not believe that there Is any necessity · to dwell on the necessity, or desirability, of a limited tenure for the Vice President. Anything that might be said about the office can be included in what I have to say in reference to the Pres i dency, and I therefore shall not advance any specific arguments concerning the Vice Presidency. In reference to the executive branch of the Government it is only necessary to deal with the President because of the fact that all other officers and employees draw th e ir authority from him and are responsible to him for their action . There Is no question but what a strong Cabinet will, to a limited extent, be reflected in the political life of the country. In the final analysis the responsibility for and the authority under which they operate both rest with the President of the United States.

From the beginning of the Government various Presidents have discussed this subject. The first being George Wash i ngton, who in a letter to the Marquis de Laf ay ette on April 28, 1788, which appears in Ford Worthington Chauncey, the Wri t in g s of George washin g ton, which was - collected and edited by New York and London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1891, the particular letter appearing in volume 11, pages 257 - 2 5 8:

"There are other points (in the proposed Constitution) in which opinions would be more likely to vary. As, for instance, on the ineligibility of the same person for President after he should have served a certain course of years. Guarded so effectually as the proposed Constitution is, in respect to the prevention of bribery and undue influence in the choice of President, I confess I d i ffer widely myself from Mr. Jefferson and you as to the necessity of expediency of rotation in that appointment. The matter was fairly discussed in the Convention, and to my full conviction, though I cannot have time or room to sum up the argument in this letter. There cannot, in my judgment, be the least danger that the President will by any practicable intrigue ever be able to continue himself one moment In office, much less perpetuate himself in it, but in the last stage of corrupted morals and political depravity; and even then, there is as much danger that any other species of domination would prevail. Though when a people shall have become incapable of governing themselves, and fit for a master, it is of . little consequence from what quarter he comes. Under an extended view of this part of the subject, I can see no propriety in precluding ourselves from the service of any man who on some great emergency shall be deemed universally most capable of serving the public."

President Washington evidently felt that the only danger in connection with this situation would come when the people were no longer able to govern themselves. However, placing a readily available species of domination in position to be exercised might conceivably accentuate that danger.

Thomas Jefferson was wholeheartedly in favor of the limitation in the Jeffersonian Encyclopedia, compiled by John P. Foley; printed by Funk & Wagnalls Co., New . York, 1900, pages 865-867, the following occurs:

(a) Letter to John Taylor, January 1805: "My opinion orig ina lly was that the President of the United States should have been elected for 7 years, and forever ineligible afterward. I have since become sensible that 7 years is too long to be irremovable, and that there should be a peaceable way of withdrawing a man in midway who is doing wrong. The service for 8 years, with a power to remove at the end of the first 4, comes nearly to 1.ay principle as corrected by experience; and it is in . adherence to that that I determine to withdraw at the end of my second term. The danger is that tl;le indulgence and attachments of the people will keep a man in the chair after he becomes a dotard, that reelection through life shall become habitual, and election for life follow t.hat. General Washington set the example voluntary retirement after 8 years. I shall follow it. And a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to anyone after a while who shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a disposition to esta-b­ lish it by an amendment of the Constitution. I believe I am doing right, therefore, in pursuing my principle. · I had determined to declare my intention, but I have consented to be silent on the opinion of friends, who think it best not to put a continuance out of my power in defiance of all circumstances. There is , however, • but one circumstance which could engage my acquiescence in another election, to wit, such a division about a successor, as · might bring in a monarchist. But ­ that circumstance is impossible" (p. 865).

(b) Let ter to Marquis de Lafayette, May 1807: . "I am panting for retirement, but am as yet nearly 2 years from that goal. The general solicitations I have received to continue another term give me great consolation, but considerations public as well as private determine me inflexibly on that measure" (p. 866).

(c) Letter to Mr. Weaver, June 1807:

"If some period be not fixed either by the Constitution or by practice, to the service's of the first magistrate, his office, though nominally elective, will, in fact, be for life; and that will soon degenerate into an inheritance" (p. 865).

(d) Letter to Abner Watkins, December 1807:

"Believing that a definite period of retiring from this station will tend materially to secure our elective form of government and sensible, too , of that decline which advancing years bring on, I have felt it a duty to withdraw at the close of my present term of office; and . to strengthen by practice a principle which I deem salutary" (p. 865).

(e) Reply to .Vermont Legislature, December 1807: '

"I received the address of the Legislature of Vermont, bearing date of the 5th of November 1806, in which with their approbation of the general course of my administration, they were so good as to express their · desire that I would consent to be proposed again, to the public voice, on the expiration of my present term of office. Entertaining, as I do, for the Legislature of Vermont those sentiments of high respect which would have prompted an immediate answer, I was certain, n~ertheless, they would approve a delay which had for its object so interesting as the election of the Chief Magistrate. That I should lay down my charge at a proper period, is as much a duty as to have borne it faithfully. If some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution, or supplied by practice, his office, nominally for years, will, in fact, become for life; and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance. Believing that a representative government, responsible at short intervals of election, is that which produces the greatest sum of happiness to mankind, I feel it a duty to do no act which shall essentially impair that principle; and I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound prece ­ dent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolon g ation beyond the second term of office. Truth, also, requires me to add, · that I am sensible of that decline which advancing years bring on; and feeling their physical. I ought not to doubt their mental effect. Happy if I am the first to perceive and to obey this admonition of nature, and to solicit a retreat from cares too great for the wearied faculties of age" (p. (f) Letter to James Sullivan, March 1808: "I derive great personal consolation from the assurances in your friendly letter, that the electors of Massachusetts would still have viewed me with favor as a candidate for a third Presidential term. But the duty of retirement is so strongly impressed on my mind, that it is impossible for me to think of that" (p. 866) .

(g) Reply to Taber Fitch, Esq., chairman, Connecticut Republicans, 1 8 0 8 : ·

"Having myself highly approved the example of an illustrious predecessor in voluntarily retiring from a trust, which, if too long continued in the same hands, might become a subject of reasonable uneasiness and apprehension, I could not mistake my own duty when placed in a similar situation" (pp. · 865-866).

(h) Letter to Henry Guest, January 1809: · "I am sensible of the kindness of your rebuke on my determination to retire from office at a time when our country is laboring under difficulties truly great. But if the principle of rotation be a sound one, as I conscientiously believe it to be with respect to this office, nb pretext should ever be permitted to dispense with it, because there never will be a time when real difficulties will not exist, and furnish a plausible pretext for dispensation. You suppose I am 'in the prime of life for rule.' · I am sensible, I am not; and before I am so far declined as to become insensible of it, I think it right to put it out of my own power” (p. 867).

(i) Letter to James Martin, September 1813:

"I am for responsibilities at short periods, seeing neither reason nor safety in making public functionaries independent of the Na- - tion for life, or even for long terms of years. On this principle I prefer the President i al term of 4 years, to that of 7 years, which I myself had at first suggested, annexing to it, however, ineligibility forever after; and I wish it were now annexed to the second quadrennial election of President" (p. 866).

(j) Autobiography, 1821: ·

"The reeligibility of the President for life (in the new Constitution), I quite disapproved. • • • My fears of that feature were founded on the importance of the office, on the fierce contentions it might excite among ourselves, if continuable for life, and the dangers of interference, either with money or arms, by foreign nations, to whom the choice of an American President might become interesting. • • • My wish, therefore, was that the President should be elected for 7 years, and be ineligible afterward. This term I thought sufficient to enable him, with the concurrence of the legislature, to carry through and establish any system of improvement he should propose for the general good. But the practice adopted, I think is better, allowing his continuance' for 8 years, with a liability tp be dropped at half way of the term, making that a period of probation. • • • The example of four Presidents voluntarily retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the pro g ress of public opinion, that the princ ipl e is salutary, have given it in practice the force of precedent and usa g e; insomuch, that, should a President consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected, on this demonstration of ambitious views" (pp. 866-867).

James Madison also mentioned this question in a letter to Robert Lee, February 22, 1830, which will be found in the letters and other writings of James Madison, volume 4, pages 66 arid 67, published by J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1865. The pertinent part of which reads as follows:

"The question of reeligibility in the case of a President of the United States admits of rival views, and is the more delicate because it cannot be decided with equal lights from actual experiment. In general, it may be observed , that the evils most complained of are less connected with that particular question than with the process of electing the Chief Magistrate, and the powers vested in him. Among these, the appointing power is - the most operative in relation to the purity of government and the tranquillity of republican government, and it is not easy to find a depository for it more free from the dangers of abuse. The powers and pa tr onage of a Chief Magistrate, whether elected for a shorter term and reeligible for a second, or for a longer, without that c apa city, might not, in their effect, be very materially different, though the difference might not be unimportant."

Andrew Jackson was as prolific on this subject as Jefferson. In six of his annual messages to Congress he discussed the subject-the references being found in Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, volume III, pages 1011, 1082, 1120, 1168, 1253, 1336 (J8l.B97):

(a) First Annual Message to Congress, December 1829:

"I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as may remove all intermediate agency in the election of the President and Vice President. The mode may be so regulated as to preserve to each State its present relative weight in the election, and a failure in the first attempt may be provided for by confining the second to a choice between the two highest candidates. In connection with such an amendment it would seem advisable · to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either 4 or 6 years . If, however, it should not be adopted, it is worthy of consideration whether a provision disqualifying for office the Representatives in Congress on whom such an election may have dev"olved would not be proper" (p. 1011).

(b) Second Annual Message to Congress, December 6, 1830:

"It was a leading object with the framers of the Constitution to keep as separate as possible the action of the legislative and executive branches of the Government . To secure th i s object nothing is more essential than to preserve the former from all tempta- · tions of private interest, and therefore so to direct the patronage of the latter as not to permit such temptations to be offered . Experience abundantly demonstrate~;; that every precaution in this respect is a valuable safeguard of liberty and one which my reflections upon the tendencies of our system incline me to think should be made still stronger. It was for this reason that, in connection with an amendment of the Constitution removing all intermediate agency in the choice of the President, I recommend some restrictions upon the reeligibility of that officer and upon the tenure of offices generally. The reason still exists, a.nd I renew · ew the recommendation with an Increased confidence that its adoption wm strengthen those checks by which the Constitution designed to secure the independence of each department of the Government and promote the healthful and equitable administration of all the trusts which it has ereated. The agent•most likely to contravene this design of the Constitution is the Chief Magistra t e. In order, particularly, that his appointment may as far as possible be placed beyond the reach of any improper influences; in order that he may approach the solemn responsibilities of the highest office in the gift of a free people uncommitted to any other course than the stri c t line of constitutional duty, and that the securities for this i;ndependence may be rendered as strong as the nature of power and the weakness of its possessor will admit, I cannot too earnestly invite your attention to the p r opriety of promoting such an amendment of the Constitution as will render him ineligible after one term of service” (p. 1082).

(c) Third Annual .Message to Congress, Decem her 6 , 1831:

" I have heretofore recommended amendmerits of the Federal Constitution gi v ing the election of President and Vice President to t he people and limiting the service of the former to a single term . So important do I consider these changes in our fundamental law that I cannot, in accordance with my sense of duty, omit to press them upon the consideration of a new Congress. For my views more at large, as well in relation to these points as to the disqualifica t ion of Membe r s of COn g ress to receive an office from a Pr~ i d e nt in whose election they have had an offic i al agency, which I propose as a s u b­ stitute, I refer you to my former messages" (p. 1120).

(d) Fourth Annual Message to Congress. December 4, 1832: ·

"I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to the views heretofore exp r essed in relation to the mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, and to those respecting the tenure of office generally . Still impressed with the justness of those views and with the belief that the modifications suggested on those subjects if adopted will contribute to the prosperity and harmony of the country, I earnestly recommend .them to your consideration at this time" (p. 1168).

(e) Fifth Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1833:

"I would also call your attention to the vie w s I have heretofore expressed of the propriety of amending the Constitution in relation to the mode of electing the President and the .Vice President of the United States. Regarding it as all tmpo . important to the future quiet and harmony of the people that every intermediate agency in the election of these officers should be removed and that their eligibility should be limited to one term of either 4 or 6 years, I cannot too earnestly invite your consideration of the subJect" (p. 1253)

(f) Sixth Annual Message to Congress, December 1, 1834:

"'I trust that I may be also pardoned for renewing the re;commendation I have so often submitted to your attention in regard to the mode of electing the President and Vice President of the United States. All th~ reflection I have been able to bestow upon the subject increases my conviction that the best interests of the country will be promoted by the adoption of some plan which will secure in all contingencies that important right of · sovereignty to the direct control of the people. Could this be attained, and the terms of those officers be limited to a single period of either 4 or 6 years, I think our liberties would possess an additional safeguard" (p. 1336).

James K. Polk addressed the House of Representatives, February 25, 1835, "In discussion of joint resolutions on subject of election of President and Vice President of the United States," found in the Congressional Globe, February 25, 1835, Twenty-third Congress, second session, page 292 :

"Mr. Polk said , he believed he had discovered a very important omission in the resolution. They nowhere stated the number of votes to which each St a te was entitled, although they laid down the mode and manner in which the elections should be held. Mr. P . was for a single term; against an election by that House, and would r in all cases, confine the election to the people; but he did not think that they should pass upon so we i ghty a subject in half an hour's deliberation."

James Buchanan also discussed this matter in the House of Representatives on February 6, 1829, the reference appearing in Gales and Seaton, Regis t er of Debates in Congress, February 6, 1829 , Twentieth Congress, second session, page 321. The remarks reading as follows:

"The example of Washington, which has been followed by . Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, has forever determined that no President shall be more than once reelected. This principle is now become as sacred as 1! it were written ill the Constitution. I would incline to leave to the people of the United States , _ without incorporating it in the Constitution. to decide whe t her a President should serve longer than one term. The day may come when dangers shall lower over us. and w.hen we may have a President at the helm of S t ate who possesses the confidence of the coun t ry. and is better able to weather the st-orm than any other pilot; shall we. then, under such c i rcumstances. deprive the people of the United States of the power of obtaining his services for a second term? Shall we pass a decree, as fixed as fate, to bind the American people and prevent them from ever reelecting such a man? I am not afraid to trust them with this power."

Andrew Johnson, in his message to Congress, July 18, 1868, m a de recommendations for a constitutional amendment. The recommendation reading in part:

"My ob j ect in this communication .is to suggest certain defects in the Constitution · which seeta to me to require correction, and to recommend that the judgment of the peop l e be taken on the amendments proposed.

•"The first of the defects to which I desire to d i rect att-ention Is in that clause of the Constitution which p r ov i des for the election of President and Vice President through the intervention of electors, and not be an immediat-e vote of the people. The importance of so amending this clause as to secure to the people the election of President and Vice Pres i de~t by their direct votes was urged with great earnestness and ability by Preside n t Jackson in his first annual message, and the recommendation was repeated in five of his subsequent communications to Congress, extending through the 8 years of his administration. In his message of 1829. he said:

' "I would therefore recommend such an amendment of the Constitution as may remove all Intermediate agency in the election of the President and Vice President. • • • In connection with such an amendment it would seem advisable to limit the service of the Chief Magistrate to a single term of either 4 or 6 years.

"I feel called upon by an imperative .sense of duty to revive substantially the recommendation so often and so earnestly made by President .Jackson. and to urge that the amendment to the Constitution herewith presented, or some similar proposition. may be submitted to the people for their ratification or rejection." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. VIII. pp. 3838, 3839.)

In Johnson's message to Congress on December 9, 1868, he-wrote as follows:

.. I renew the recommendation contained in my communication to Congress dated the 18th July last--a copy of which accompanies this message-that the ju~!TIIlent of the people should be ta k en on the propriety of so amending the Federal Constitution that it shall provide-

"First, for an election of President and Vice President by a direct vote of the people, instead of through the agency of elec t ors, and making them ineligible for reelection to a second term.

“Profoundly impressed with the propriety of making these important modific a tions in the Constitution. I respectfully submit them for the early and mature consideration of COngress. We should, as far as possible, remove all pretext for violations of the organic law. by remed y ing such imperfections as time and experie n ce may develop, _ ever remem;.,ering that 'the Constitution which at any time exists until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people is sacredly obligatory upon all.'" (Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents . vol. VIII, p. 3889.) · In the Senate on March 22, 1875, appearing in the CONGR E SSIONAL RECORD, Forty-fourth Congress, special session of the Senate, page 123, the following appears:

"I know the dete r mination of that people (in Louisiana). Their great object is to be restored back into the Union upon equal footing with all the other States, and ha v e a fair participation in the leg i slation of the country. That Is all they desire. Bu t what is that to those who are acting behind the curtain and who a r e aspiring to retain power, and if it cannot he had by popular consent and the approval of their pub li c acts would inaugurate a system of terrorism, and in the midst of the excitement. in the midst of the war cry triumphantly ride into the Presidency for a third Presidential term; and when that is done, farewell to the liberties of the country.

« It is my honest conviction that the real meaning of all this is a desire for a third t e rm for the Pres i dency of the United States, violating the example that Washington set and which has become equal to a part of the COnstitution by the general · acquiescence and approval and almost looked upon as sacred as if it was a part of the Constitution itself. E v en Washington, the Fa t her of his Country, when be had served 4 years, wanted to retire at the expiration of his first term. He thou g ht that was long enough, and his farewell . address was partly prepared at the termination of his first term of 4 years; but being prevailed upon by those who surrounded him, in view of the peculiar condition of the country, to accept a second term when that expired, he terminated his connection with the Government. That example has since been pursued and followed and looked upon as a part of the Constitution of the country. But I suppose it is almost out of order to refer to Washington now. Is not the present condition of affairs humiliating when we look at the example that he set in many things? Look at the great probity of his character. When he accepted office, what did he say in reference to the morals of the country and the expenditures of the Government? · In his message that he sent to Congress With regard to making provision for the executive department he asked them to m a ke no further provision for the executive department than was absolutely necessary to de f ray the legitimate expenses of the office. We know; furthermore, that Washington was opposed to a third term, and set the ex am ple of serving in g but two."

And in a letter to Gen. Harry White, Presi"7 dent Grant wrote on May 29, 1875, as follows: "A sh or t time subsequent to the Presidenti a l elec ti on of 1872, the press, a portion df it hostile to the Republican Party, and particularly so to the administration, st arte d the cry of 'Caesarism' and 'The Third Term,' callin g lustily for me to define my position on the latter subject. I believed it to be benea t h the dig nity of the office which I have been twice called upon to fill to answer such a question before the subject should be presented by competent authority to make · a nomina ti on, or by a body of such dignity and authority as not to make a reply a fair sub j ect of ridicule. • • • But a body of the dignity and party authority of a convention to make nominations for the State officers of the second S ta te in the Union hav- · in g cons i dered th i s question, I deem it not improper that I should speak.

"In the first place, I never sought the . office for a second, nor even for a first nomination. To the first I was c a lled from a life position, one cre at ed by Con g ress expressly for me for supposed services rendered to the Republic. • * • Without seeking the office for the second term, the nomination was tendered to me by a unanimous vote of the delegates of all the S t ates and Territories selected by the Repub li cans of each to represent their whole number for the purpose of making their nomination. • • •

"Now, for the third term. I do not want it any more than I did the first time. I would not write or utter a word to change the will of the people in expressing and havin g their choice. The question of the number 9f terms allowed to any one Executive can only come up fairly in the shape of a proposition to amend the Constitution, a shape in which all political parties can participate, fixing the length of time or the number of terms for which any one person shall be elig i ble for the office of President. Until such an amendment is adopted the peop l e cannot be restricted in their choice by resolution further than they are now restricted as to age, nativity, etc. It may happen in the future history of the country that to ch a nge an Executive because he has been 8 years in office will prove unfortunate if not disastrous. The idea that any man could elect himself President, or even renominate himself, is preposterous . It is a reflection upon the intelligence and patriotism of the people to suppose such a thing possible. Any man can destroy his chances for office, but no one can force an election or even a nomination.

"To recapitulate, I am not, nor have I ever been, a candidate for a renomination. I would not accept a nomination U it were tendered, unless it should come under such circumstances as to make it an imperative duty, circumstances not likely to arise." (New York Tribune, May 31, 1875, col. 4, p. 1.) Rutherford B. Hayes recommended in his inaugural address the amendment of the Constitution along the lines provided for in Senate ,Taint Resolution 18. His recommenda t ion reading:

"In furtherance of the reform we seek, and in other important respects a change of great im p ort a nce, I recommend an amendment to the Constitution prescribing a term of 6 years for the President i al office and forbidding a reelection." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, vol. IX, p. 4397 .)

And in the Grover Cleveland Addresses, State Papers, and Letters , page 52 , Alfred E. Bergh quotes a letter from Cleveland accepting a nomination for President, dated August 18, 1884, reading:

"Then an election to office shall be the selection by the voters of one of their number to assume for . a time a public trust, intt ead of his dedication to the profession of politics; when the holders of the ballot, quickened by a sense of duty, shall avenge t rut h betrayed and pledges broken, and when the suffrage shall be altogether free and uncorrupted, the full realization of a government by the people will be at hand. And of the means to this end not one would, in my judgment, be more effective than an amendment to the Constitution disqualifying the President from reelection. When we consider the patron a ge of this great office, the allurements of power, the temptations to re tai n public place once ga in ed, and, more than all, the availability a party finds in an incumbent whom a horde of office holders, with a zeal born of benefits received and fostered by the hope of favors yet to come, stand ready to aid with money and trained political service, we recognize in the eligibility of the President for reelection a most serious danger to that calm, · deliberate, and intelligent political action which must characterize a government by the people."

William McKinley also issued a public statement in reference to this matter under date of June 10, 1901, which is contained ln House Report !385, Sixty-second Congress, seco nd session, page 7, reading:

"I regret that the suggestion of a third term has been made. I doubt whether I am called upon to give to it notice, but there are · new questions of the gravest importance before the administration and the country, and their just consideration should not · be prejudiced in the public mind by even the suspicion of the thought of a third term.

"In view, therefore, of the reiteration of the suggestion of it . I will now say, once for all, expressing a long-settled conviction, that I not only am not and will not be a candidate for a third term, but I would not accept a nomination for it if it were tendered to me. "My only ambition is to serve through my second term to the acceptance of my countrymen, whose generous confidence I so · deeply appreciate, and then with them to do my duty in the ranks of private citizenship." And Theodore Roosevelt, in a public statement of November 8, 1904, as reported in House Report 885, Sixty-second Congress, second session, pages 7-8, reads:

"On the 4th of March next I shall have served 3% years, and this 3¥2 years constitute my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms re g ards the sub- . stance and not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or acce pt another nomination."

Roosevelt at a later date changed his mind in reference to this and running for office on the Bull Moose vJas defeated.

William Howard Taft, in a lecture at Columbia University in 1915, which was later published in book form (Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, by W. H. Taft, Columbia University Press, 1916) said:

"I am strongly inclined to the view that it would have been a wiser . provision, as it was at one time voted in the Convention, to make the term of the President 6 or 7 years, and render him ineligible thereafter. Such a change would give to the Executive greater courage an 1 independence in the discharge of his duties. The absorbing and diverting interest in the reelection of the incumbent, taken by those Federal civil servants whoregard their own tenure as dependent upon his, would disappear and the efficiency of administration in the last 18 months of a term would be maintained."

Calvin Coolidge's autobiography, published in 1929, pages 239 to 247, contains some very interesting commen t s on this situation. E xt r act s appearing herein . n cover his views in some detail.

"The Presidential office takes a heavy toll of those who occupy it and those who are dear to them. While we should not refuse to spend and be spent in the service 6f our country , it is hazardous to attempt what we feel is beyond our . strength to accomplish (p. _ 239). .

"Irrespective of the third-term policy, the P residential office is of such a nature that it is d i fficult to conceive how one m a n can successfully serve the country for a term of more than 8 years. ·

"While I am in favor of continuing the long-established custom of the country in rela t ion to a third term for a President, , yet I do not think that the practice applies to one who has succeeded to a part of a term as V ice President. Others m i&, ht argue that it does, but I doubt if the country would so consider it.

"Although · my own health has been practically perfect, yet the duties are very great and 10 years would be a very heavy strain. · It would be especially long for the mistress of the Whi t e House. Mrs. Coolidge has been in more than usual good health, but I doubt if she could have stayed there for 10 years without some danger of impairment of her strength (p. 2 4 0).

"I t is d iffic Ult for men in high office to avoid the malady of self-delusion. They are always surrounded by worshippers. They are cons ta ntly, and for the most part sincerely, assured of their greatness.

"They live in an artificial atmosphere of adulation and exaltation which sooner or later impairs their judgment. They are in grave · danger of becoming careless and arrogant. ·

"The chances of having wise and faithful · pu b lic service are . increased by a change in .­ the Presidential office after a moderate length of time.

"It is necessary for the head of the Nation to differ with m a ny people who are honest in their opinions. As his te r m progresses, the number who are dis a ppo i nted accumu- · lates. Finally, there is so large a body who have lost confidence in him that he meets a rising opposition which makes his efforts less effective.

"In the higher ranges of public service men appear to come forward to perform a certain duty. When it is pe_r f ormed their work is done. They usually find it impossible to re a djust themselves in the thought of the people so as to pass on successfully to the solution of new public problems.

"An examination of the records of those Pres i dents who have served 8 years will disclose that in almost every instance the latter part of their term has shown very little in the way of constructive accomplishment . They have often been clouded with grave disappointments. .

"While I had a desire to be relieved of the pretensions and delusions of public life, it was not because of any attraction of ple asur e or idleness (p. 241-242).

"The Presidential office differs from everything else . Much of it cannot be described, it can only be felt. After I had considered the reasons for my being a candidate on the one side and on the o ther, I could Jilot say that any of them moved me with compelling force.

. "My election seemed assured. Nevertheless, I felt it was not best for the country that I should succeed myself. A new impulse is more likely to be beneficial.

"It was therefore my privilege, after seeing my administration so strongly endorsed by the country, to retire voluntarily from the greatest experience that can come to mortal - man. In that way I believed I could best serve the people who have honored me and · the country which I love" (p. 246-247).

Two Presidents openly opposed the limitation on terms of office for Presidents-John Quincy Ad am s and Woodrow Wilson. Adams in his memoirs, taken from his diary from 1795 to · 181!8, vol. IV, p ag es 451-452, printed by J. B . Lippincott & Co., wrote:

"Upon all subject of eminent importance Cr awford's opinion is becoming whatever is not mine. I lament this ; because its tendency must be to weaken and distract the ' public councils; but the seeds of this discord are sown in the practice which the Virginia. Presidents have taken so much pains to engraft upon the Constitution of the Union, making it a principle that no President can be more than twice elected, and that whoever is not thrown out . after one term of service must · decline being a candidate after the second. This is not a principle of the Constitution , and I am satisfied that it ought not to be . Its inevitable consequence is to make every administration a scene of continual and furious electioneering for the succession to the Presidency. It was so during the whole of Mr. Madison's administration , and is so now."

Woodrow Wilson wrote a letter to Hon. A. Mitchell Palmer, of Pennsylvania, on February 5, 1913, which will be found in the CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD, Sixty-fourth Congress, first session, page 12620, reading: · "It was characteristically considerate of you to ask my views with regard to the joint resolution which has just come over from the House to the Sen"ate with regard to the Presidential term.

"I have not hitherto said anything about this question, because I had not observed that there was any evidence that the public was very much interested in it. I must have been mistaken in this, else the Senate would hardly have acted so promptly upon it.

"It is a matter which concerns the character and conduct of the great office upon the duties of which I am about to enter. I feel therefore that in the present circumstances I should not be acting consistently with my ideals with regard to the rule of entire frankness and plain speaking that ought to exist between public servants and the public whom they serve if I did not speak out about it without reserve of any kind and without thought of personal embarrassment. "The question is simply this: Shall our Presidents be free, so far as the law is concerned, to seek a second term of 4 years, or shall they be limited by constitutional amendment to a single term of 4 years or to a single term extended to 6 years?

"I can approach the question from a perfectly impersonal point of view, because I shall most cheerfully abide by the judgment of my party and the public as to whether I shall be a candidate for the P r Presidency again in 1916. • •

" Four years is too long a term for a President who is not the true spokesman of the people , who is imposed upon and does not lead. It is too short a term for a President who is doing , or attempting a great work of reform, and who has not had time to finish "To change the term to 6 years would be to increase the likelihood of its being too long, without any assurance that it would, in happy ca s es, be long enough . A fixed constitutional limitation to a single term of office ts highly arbitrary and unsatisf a ctory from every point of view.

"The argument for it rests upon temporary conditions which can easly be removed by law . Presidents, it is said are effective for one-half of their term only because they devote their attention during the last 2 years of the term to building up the influence, and above all, the organization, by which they hope and propose to secure a second nomination and election.

"Put the present customary limitation of two terms into the Constitution, if you do not trust the people to take care of themselves, but make it two terms (not one, because 4 years is often too long), and give the President a chance to win the full service by proving himself fit for it.

"As things stand now the people might more likely be cheated than served by further limitations of the President's eligibility. His fighting power in their behalf would be immensely weakened. No one wm fear a President except those whom he can make fear the election. ·

"We singularly belie our . own: principles by seeking to determine by fixed constitutional provision what the people shall determine for themselves and are perfectly competent to determine for themselves. We cast a doubt upon the whole theory of popular government .

"I believe that we should fatally embarrass ourselves if we made the constitutional change proposed. If we want our Presidents to fight our battles for us, we should give them the means, the legitimate means, the means their opponents will always have. Strip them of everything else but the right to appeal to the people, but leave them that; suffer them to be leaders , absolutely prevent them from being bosses."

Note his comments on fighting the people's battles.

Roosevelt's ideas are too well known to need comment. It seems that those who are not in favor of limiting the terms of men in the office of President are perfectly willing to lead . the Nation into war .

Insofar as the dangers i:D.Cident to the Judiciary are concerned I can do no better than to quote the statement which I made orally before the subcommittee:

"The dangers to the Judiciary appear to me to be very clear cut also. The framers of the Constitution gave to the Federal Judiciary life tenure in order to remove the temptation to 'play politics.' However, when one man is in control of the appointment of members of the Judiciary, it appears to me that there is a serious danger of a disproportionate number e! judges who are of the same political, economic and social theories as the man who makes the appointments. I believe it far better to have a well balanced judiciary and I also believe that is impossible when one man has the opportunity through length of service to appoint a majority of the judges either in the interior courts or the Supreme Court of the United States."

In addition to the dangers which I have pointed out, as I see them, there are two additional reasons why I favor the resolution which I have introduced.

One of them is that I believe firmly in the theory of rotation in office. I do not consider any man indispensable to the service of the people of the United States. In my judgment there are many, m a ny thousands who can fill any office of public honor or trust in the United States in a thoroughly satisfactory and efficient manner. Why then should a small group hold on to such places year after year and thus deprive other citizens who are well qualified from exercising their talents and ability for the common good of all citizens of the · United States. Such a system will bring men to the Congress with a fresh viewpoint, with an understanding of the problems which are confronting the ordinary cit i zen who does not hold public office, and generally with a better understanding of the law needed to give everyone a fair chance, than would be the case if the greater part of their experience was with the people who make and enforce the laws rather than the people who have to endeavor to make a living under them.

It is also my firm belief that every man who votes for a law should later be required to go back in ' to private life and endeavor to make a living under the laws which he has helped to enact. When that time comes I believe that we will have much more thoughtful consideration · of the effect that the application of such laws will have than is the case at present. If a man knows that the law which he helps enact wm affect him personally the law will become a personal thing, instead of the highly impersonal thing which is to alter the lives and ways of earning a living of someone else. Such at least is my theory and I hope that I wm have an opportunity to see it work out.

The other reason for advocating the approval pf the resolution w that when a man retires from public office under the provisions of this amendment he will have many years in which he can be of service to the people in his community as a connecting link with government. Such is not rtow the custom . When a man retires from public office now, he is either seeking another public office or he i s too old to be of great value to the people of his community as a civic leader. Either, as a general rule, he retires because of age or 111 health or he is retired by his constituents and carries back with him to his home community either a desire to rest for the remainder of his life or a burning desire for vindication by being reelected .

While the main purpose of my amendment is to bring about an improvement in our Government which will be beneficial to the rank and , file of our people, yet the . proposaL is not wholly without benefit to those who serve in these public offices.

When once one is elected to a Federal position he soon finds himself' hemmed in between two 1 · aging fires. His friends shower praise or flattery upon him, insisting that he is the one man who can save democracy and urging him to run for reelection. On the other hand, his enemies pour out their poison . propaganda that he is a complete failure and would not dare to run again because he would face certain defeat.

Between these two fires, his pride and his esteem for his friends prompt him to run again, while his fearless courage and his desire to prove that his enemies are wrong also urge him to run.

Thus, he accepts the challenge and starts down the long pathway of a most nervewracking vocation which offers little remuneration and only controversial fame, but in time definitely brings certain defeat and humiliation or an untimely death.

For these reasons, I urge favorable action on Senate Joint Resolution 18.

Mr. O'DANIEL. Mr. President, it seems to me that if we are going to upset the elective machinery of the Government, which has been in operation ever since the United States became a nation, and if we are to start limiting t he tenure of office of one of the elective officials of our Government, we should not be selfish about it but should go all the way and take such action in regard to all elective officials of the United States Government. There may be differences of opinion as to exactly what benefit will accrue from limiting the tenure of office of the President; but if we are going to discuss and act on the subject of tenure of office, I see no reason why we should confine our discussions and actions solely to the question of the tenure of office of the President. In my judgment we should discuss the subject fully and act on it fully, rather than to have the legislative branch of government pick on the President and take the position that while great harm may result to the Nation from long tenure in the Presidential office the same objections cannot be raised to long tenure by those who serve in the Senate and the House of Representatives. I know that the subject of limiting the tenure of office of the President has been discussed for many years. I do not know that any other resolution · to include all the other elective officials of the Government under such a limitation of tenure has previously been offered. However, in fairness and equity and justice, I think the whole problem should be considered at this time.

It may be that we are not now ready to go all the way because of our pe rs onal interest in the matter. At any rate , the subject is at present up for discus si on, and I have offered my joint resolution as a substitute for the pending joint resolu tion. I cet·tainly trust that it will rece iv e cons iderat ion and will be adopted as a su bstit ute. ·

Mr. TAFT. I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The Chief Clerk called the roll , and the following Senators answered to their names: Aiken Hawkes Murray Baldwin H a yden Myers Ball Hickenlooper O'Conor Barkley Hill O'Daniel Brick e r Hoey O' Mahon ey Bridges Holland Ov ert on Brooks Iv es P eppe r Buck Je n ner Reed Bushfield Johnson , Colo. Revercomb Butler Johnston, S.C. Robertson . Va. Byrd K ern Rober ts on, Wyo. C a in Kilgore Russell Cap e hart Knowland E: ~ltonsta ll Capp e r Lan g er Smith Chavez Lodge · · S park man Connally Luc a s St ewa rt Cooper McCarran Taft Cor d on McCarthy T a ylor Donnell McClel l an Thomas, Okla. Downey M-cFarland Thomas. Utah Dworsb ak McGrath Thye Ecton McKellar Tobey Eller.der McMahon Umstead Ferg uson o n M agnu son Vandenberg Flanders Malone Watk i ns Fulbr ig ht Martin Wh it e George Maybank Wiley Green Millikin Williams Gurney Moore Wilson Hatch Morse Young

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Ninety Senators having answered to their names, a . quorum is present.

The question is on agreeing to the first amendment reported by the committee.

Mr. BARKLEY. Mr. President, may we have the amendment stated?

The PRESIDENT pro tempore. · e. The clerk will state the amendment.

The LEGISLATIVE CLERK. On page 1, line 6, after the words “ratified · fied by”, it is proposed to strike . ike out "the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, " and to insert "conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution." Mr. McCLELLAN. Mr. President, this amendment, and one other amendment proposed to this joint resolution, in my judgment, are very objectionable. . I had considered and am inclined to vote for a resolution of this character , limiting the terms of the President, but I do not believe that the convention method of ratification is the best method to carry out democratic processes, although the convention method is authorized by the Constitution. I much more favor the House joint resolution as originally passed by · the House, without the Senate committee amendments in it.

There is no hurry; there is ' no emergency; we are under no stress to get this proposed constitutional amendment adopted immediately. A period of 7 years' time is given, under the terms of the joint resolution, for the amendment to be ratified by three-fourths of the States. If it provided that it be ratified by the legislatures of the . several States; then it would afford opportunity for those who seck legis:iative positions in their respective States to discuss the issue in future campaigns. The people could be advised, and candidates would be afforded opportunity to state their positions, and by that method and through that process the people would have a better opportunity of making a choice and having their sentiments expressed as to the r atificat ion or rejection of the amendment than they will have if the co nventio n process is adopted.