October 26, 1803

The House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole on the stale of the Union, on the proposed amendment to the Constitution.

Mr. Clopton addressed the Chair as follows : Mr. Chairman, I beg leave to solicit the indulgence of the Committee a few minutes. Having bad the honor to propose an amendment to tbe report of the select committee, and having failed of obtaining it, I feel a wish to state my reasons why I am in favor of the principle of the provision contained in the report; the principle of designating the persons voted for as President and Vice President. Sir, lbs propriety, the eligibility, and the importance of such a provision, appear to my mind so plain, and so obvious, as scarcely to require a single argument to support it. Nevertheless, plain and obvious as I think it is, it does not meet with universal approbation; inasmuch as it contemplates a material alteration in one of the provisions of the Constitution, and an important provision too, inasmuch as it may involve consequences of vast moment to the hap- . S'nessand tranquillity of this country. I trust the ommittee will pardon me for troubling them with a statement of the principal grounds of my opinion in favor of the resolution. I promise the Committee ^lat I will not utter a single word but what applies directly lo the principle of the resolution. Every sentence shall be a reason why I am in favor of that principle. I am in favor of the resolution because it is perfectly congenial with the most essential principles of our Government, even the principle of representation. For, sir, in a Government constituted as our Govern- i menl is, wherein all the constituted authorities ^ are the agents of the people, the suffrages given for the election of those agents ought ever to be complete expression of the public will,and should therefore be directed immediately to those persona whom the Electors intend to place confidence, _ their agents, in the particular offices for which the elections are made. An election, therefore, which may, from the mode of holding it, terminate ultimately in the appointment of a different person to an office, than the one originally intended for ii by a majority of the Electors, cannot be said to be such complete expression of the public.nill. When one person is intended for an office and another person actually obtains it, such election, if indeed it can properly be called an election, is not conformable to ibe will of those by whom it was made. No sir, it is contrary to it. The effect resulting from the act of the majority, in such a case, would be completely at variance with the will of that majority in performing the act. Such an event would indeed exhibit a case in which the will of the majority would be defeated by the act of the majority in the very exercise of its elective franchise. I think, sir, I can provethat such a consequence may result from the present mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, I think I can prove it in the following manner: I will supfDse that four persons, A, B, C, and D, shall be eld up for candidates. I will then suppose that ninety-five Electors shall prefer A for President, and vote for him with the intent to elect him to (hat office, and that the other eighty-one Electors shall prefer B for President and accordingly vote for him. I will suppose also that, of the ninetyfive Electors, who prefer A for President seventyfive shall also prefer C for Vice President, and S're him their votes with that intent, and that e other twenty Electors shall prefer D for that office. Lastly, 1 will (suppose that of the eightyone Electors who prefer B for President, twentyfive shall also prefer C for Vice President, and accordingly vote for him; and that Ibeolberfiflytil shall prefer D for that office. Now, because seventy-five of those ninety-five Electors who prefer A for President and twenty-five of those who prefer B for President, are also willing that C should be Vice President, and vote for him with Ibal intent, C actually becomes President with one hundred votes, not one of which was given to him for that purpose. Thus the will of ninety-five, who compose a clear decided majority of (be whole number of Electors, is defeated by seventy-five of their own votes, together with the other twenty-five votes given to C ; that is to say, the will of the majority is defeated by the act of the majority, in the very exercise of its electoral capacity. But, Mr. Chairman, if the proposed amendment should be adopted, this anomalous effect cannot then result ; for, as each of the candidates would then be designated for the particular office for which he was intended, ninety-five TOtes would be given to A for President ; eightyone would be given to B for President; one hundred to C for Vice President ; and seventy-six to D for Vice President. So that A would then be elected President, according to the real will and intention of ninety-five Electors, by a majority equal to the difference between eighty-one and ninety-five ; and C would be elected Vice President agreeably to the will and intention of one hundred Electors, by a majority equal to the difference between seventy-six and one hundred. Mr. Chairman, such an event as that which 1 have stated as a possible, and, perhaps, a probable result, from the present mode of choosing the President and Vice President of the United States, must be a serious evil. In no point of view can I contemplate it, in which it does not present itself as an evil of considerable magnitude. For, sir, however respectful the public attention might have been towards the person who thus becomes Chief Magistrate of the Union, contrary to the intention of the Electors, contrary to the public sentiment, contrary to the public will, it cannot be expected that with the acquisition of the office, under these circumstances, he will receive the public confidence. It is not the nature of Qorernments as purely elective as this Government is, to produce a spirit altogether acquiescent in elections of this sort. It is not in this country, where the elective principle is so highly revered, so warmly cherished, and so dearly valued, that we are to look for a disposition in the public mind to feel itself satisfied with the introduction of agents into office, who are not the objects of its choice. Even in respect to departments of inferior consideration, this disposition is not to be found; much less can it be expected to appear and display itself, should the great and important duties of the Chief Executive Magistrate, by an appointment thus brought about, be devolved on a person not contemplated for Ibal station. It is, indeed, the nature of elective representativeGovernments to produce a very different spirit, a spirit of dissatisfaction, under such appointments. Or, more properly may it he said, sir, that in all such Governments there is a spirit coeval in existence with the Governments themselves, which disposes the people rather lo withhold their affection from public functionaries, than to bestow it upon them, when introduced into office after this manner. It is inseparable from the people of all countries, where the elective system prevails in any degree. Its influence and activity, ever commensurate with the degree of perfection which pervades that system, proportionably diffuse themselves through the great body of the people. Wherever genuine rational liberty most abounds (and 1 believe, sir, that so far from abounding, it cannot exist at all, where election and representation do not exist.) there this spirit abounds in like degree; there it is (0 be traced through all the departments of life; there it animates the mass of the community ; there it spreads. It extends and enlarges its sphere of action through the whole circle ofsociety, and that infiuenceiseierledto a d^reeof prevalence in proportion as the principles ofthat liberty actuate the public mind. It is not the spirit of-o wild and furious licentiousness, thirsting for the destruction of law and of order, it is not a spirit which aims to loosen the bands of society, or ro weaken the sanctions of law. No, sir, it breathes quite a different wish. It believes that the strength of the one and the efficacy of the other of these essential means of human happiness are best secured in the agency of those organs of public authority whose creation springs from the public will ; ana, believing this, wishes that the elective priaci>' pie in its practical operations may be directed through the channel of that public will. It belieres Ihai such direction of this great, this important, this inestimable principle is necessary to give full effect to the representative system, oo which depends the attainment of all the ereat denderata of a free Qovemmenl — everytning truly desirable in GoTeroment. And where, sir. does this spirit more abound than in America? Where does it so much abound ? Is it not the pride and the boast of Americans 1 Sir, I believe It is. 1 believe, too, it is a laudable, an honorable pride. It is a great, leading, characteristic sentiment which pervades the American mind — which dignifies and adorns this country — which constitutes the very germ of true American greatness. It is that which operates as the source of everything which spreads forth ihe lustre and ihe glory with which this nation is surrounded. It is the life, the souL of the Republic. It is that vivid flame which warms and cherishes, and gives to the body politic its just and proper and natural impulse, and directs its course towards the true end of the social institution— — the universal good. I believe, therefore, Mr. Chairman, it must be a consideration of primary importance that the modes of election be so established that in their event they may always secure a full expression of the public will, and the appointment of all public agents conformably thereto.

J resent mode of choosing the President and Vice 'resident of the UniteJStates^ that the election of those high and important officers of the Government may terminate contrary to the public will, I am thoroughly convinced of the expediency of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, directing a designation of them in the electoral votes.

Sir, the case which I had the honor to state to the Committee as possibly, and perhaps probably, resulting from the present mode of election, is a case wherein a decided majority of the electoral votes shall have been given to one of the candidates, though not according to the intention of the Electors who gave them. But, sir, what can we expect to be the public sensation in a case wherein an equal number of votes shall have been given to each of two candidates, and this House shall finally decide the election by rejecting that candidate for the Presidency, who was intended for it by a majority of the people and of the Electors, and choosing the other candidate who was not so intended for that office? The first mentioned circumstance of such a case we have already witnessed ; and, sir, should I mistake the circumstance, were I to say we had mournfully witnessed it? And what, sir, would have been the condition of these States, if, when assembled election of a President had taken place, although the public sentiment had been clearly and une- 3 unequivocally pronounced in favor of one of the candidates? There was every reason to believe, sir that gloomy indeed would have been the prospect I A long train of evils incalculable in their consequences could hardly have failed to overspread the face of this delightful country ! Indeed, sir, what would have been the ultimate issue it is not within the compass of human foresight to divine. This great, this flourishing country, which at this time pours forth innumerable streams of prosperity, displaying in vast and rich variety every means of individual happiness, every "means of national happiness, and every means of true at.' lional glory, instead of exhibiting the present pleasing, animating prospect, before this period might have been enveloped in dark and dismal clouds of confusion, disorder, and political distraction ! The bands of society being thusin a manner broken asunder, and all the angry turbulent passions incident to man left unrestrained, what fatal consequences might be expected to follow ! What violence of party, what rage of ambition, what dreadful commotions, might be expected to agitate this then unfortunate country E And, sir, is there a single American living whose blood is so far chilled with indifference concerning the fate of this country, that he would not be stricken with awful alarm at the prospect of such an event — an event tending directly to produce so complete a state of anarchy with all its concomitant calamities? No, sir, no! I would hope, I would persuade myself, Mr. Chairman, there is not one. Nevertheless, although the spirit of patriotism might have predominated over that of party in the case which has happened — determined the election, and determined it conformably to the public senlimenl— yet, sir, have we any infallible security that, in all future times. should any similar case occur, the same regard for the peace, the tranquillity, and happiness of this great community will retain the ascendency and arrest the evil? The mournful experience of ages, transmitted to us through the page of history, teaches an awful lesson that such security cannot be expected. I am seriously impressed with this sentiment, therefore, that it behooves us to let it be a work of the present day to guard against so great an evil by removing from the Constitution the means whereby it may be accomplished.

But suppose, sir, in the case alluded to, the election had terminated otherwise than it did, is there a single man in existence who believes that such election would have been hailed by the public voice with any degree of complacency? Innumerable, sir. and strong were the evidences of a contrary operation on the public mind ; innumerable and strong were the evidences that such an event would have been very unfortunate — would have produced much more of the public indignation than of the public approbation — although it would have been better than no election at all. And there can be no manner of question, sir. that if. in any future election, a similar case should occur, and such should be the ultimate event, whoever might be the candidates, a very disagreeable effect would be wrought upon the public mind ; that whenever such an event should happen, it would call forth the public indignation.

Should it be objected, Mr. Chairman, that even if the proposed amendment should be adopted and become a part of the Constitution, it will not make such provision as would, in all future elections, secure a majority of electoral votes to be S'veo to some one or other of the candidates, and thereby preclude the necessity of ever again resorting to a vote of this House for a final decision; it must be acknowledged that no provision what' ever can be made so as to have that operation ; but if, in any election, no person should liare a majority of electoral votes, a Legislative decision in such a case cannot possibly be attended with the same disagreeable consequences as such a decision might be attended with in a case happening under the existing mode, similar to that which has been cited ; for, if the amendment should be adopled.inasmuchnseachof the candidates would then be designated by the electoral votes for the particular office for which he was intended, and consequently thus pointed out as being so far the objects of public choice, on whomsoever of them the ultimate election should fall, the candidate, I apprehend, would be mc SulJ^e able to the public mind than anv peric who had not been contemplated for President by any of the Electors. Such public approbation I consider, sir, as a circumstance of incalculable importance in such an election. I hope, therefore, the resolution will be agreed to, and obtain the sanction of a full Constitutional majority.

The Committee rose, and reported a resolution thereupon, which was twice read, amended, and agreed to by the House, as follows:

*■ Raohid, by ike Senate and Houte of ReprtxnlaUva of Iht United State* of America in Congraa asttmhUd, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the different States u an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by threeibatthe of the said Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, aa part of the said Constitution, " In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice President; of whom, one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. The person voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed, shall be the Fro- •ident; and if there shall be no person having such majority, the President shall be chosen from £a highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list for President, by the House of Representatives, in the manner directed by the Constitution. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice President shall be the Vice Pre- •ident; and in case of an equal number of votes for two or more persons as Vice President, they being the bighaal on the list, the Senate shall choose die Vice President from those having such equal number, in the BUADer directed by the Constitution."