October 28, 1803

An engrossed resolution for the amendment of the Constitution was read a third time. as follows: " Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United Staia of America, in Congress a»- tembkd, two-thirds of both Houses ametirring. That the following article be proposed to the Lcgislalurcs of the different States, as an amendment to the Constitution of the United 8tite« ; which, when ratified by threeiburthsoftboiaid Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, u a part of the said Constitution,

" In all future elections of President and Vice President, the Electors shall name in their ballols the person Toted President and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice Pntident ; of whom, one at least shall

October, 1803. not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves, The pnnon voted for as President having a majority of the votes of all the Electors appointed shall be the President; and if no person have such majority, thcn.ffom the five highest on the list of those voted for as Pre«- dent, the House of Representatives shall choose the President, in the manner directed by the Constitution.

The person having the greatest number of votes aa Vice President shall be the Vice President; and in case equal number of votes for two or more persona for Vice President, they being the highest on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice President from those having such equal number, in the manner directed by the Constitution."

G. Griswold.— I rise to assign the reasons for the vote which 1 shall give against the resonow under consideration. When in Committee of the whole House on the same resolution, _ with much satisfaction that I heard gentlemen who advocated the resolution declare their anxious desire and full determination not to make any inroad upon the article of the Constitution, now under consideration, so as in any degree to impair the rights and benefits thereby secured to the smaller States.

The honorable gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Randolph) acknowledged his very great respect for the worthies who formed the Constitution — that our Union was a Confederation of States; and the result of a compromise between the several different Stales, as States, and that he was the last man who would consent to take from ibe smaller States any right or advantage secured to them by this article of the Constitution.

Should I be able to show that the alteration nowproposed would maleriallyaffect the interest of .the smaller Slates in the choice of President of the United States, I trust that gentlemen, agreeably to their public declarations, will vote with me against the resolution.

The Constitution of the United Stales is n compact formed by the several States to and for the general good. It is well known to have been produced by a spirit of compromise among the several States; that much difficulty arose in its formation ; and, perhaps, in' no one article of the Constitution, could there have arisen greater jealousies between the larger and smaller States than that pointing out the mode of electing the Chief Magistrate. The larger States, as is natural to suppose, would contend for an election, according to the number of inhabitants of each State, as they thereby would secure more votes; the smaller States, on the principle that it was a confedeta' lion of States, would contend for an equal vote; that is, to vote by States, and not by population or numbers. To settle the difficulty, the present article was agreed to, and thereby both of the above principles, as contended for by the larger and smaller Slates, adopted .to a certain extent — the mode being a mixture of both principles. First, it permits the election of President to be by numbers; that is, giving each State votes in proportion toils population; whereby the larger Statesjcon' considered in their corporate capacity as States, have the advantage of the smaller States in their coiporaie capacity a« States. But in case of a failure of choice ID the first mode, iheo the second, of choosing by States, is to be pursued, whereby the former Slates hare an equal vote vriib the larger States.

In no other place than on this floor are the smaller States on an equal footing with the larger States in the choice of the President of the United States. It follows then, of course, that the greater the chance of bringing the States to a vote on this floor, the more advantageous it is to the smaller States, as here the smaller Slates are as powerful as ihe larger States. By the Constitution, as it now stands, there are two chances for a choice of President on this floor : 1st, when there are more persons than one who have a Constitutional majority of votes and are equal in number; 3d, when there is no person who has a Constitutional majority. Only one of the above cases can happen at a time; but there Is always a chance for one of the two to happen. But, by the proposed amendment, the first before-mentioned chance can never happen ; it is wholly taken away, and only one possible chance of voting on this floor by Stales left. For, when your ballots designate who is voted for as President, it never can happen that more persons than one can have a Constitutional majority of votes. One chance then of voting on this floor by States being taken away by the proposed amendment, it follows irresistibly that the smaller States will be injured, and the larger States benefitted. I ask then, sir, if gentlemen representing the larger States can be sincere, when they declare that they mean not to infringe upon the rights of the smaller States, as secured by this article of the Constitution, and still give their TDle for the present resolution? The one in my opinion will contradict the other,

I have the honor of representing one of the larger States, but I feel no wish to lessen the rights of the smaller States, as secured by this article of the Constitution, and I trust my vote will correspond with my declaration.

1 also ask, sir, if gentlemen who represent some of the smaller States are willing to si ve up so important a right as is secured them by this article of the Constitution? Gentlemen may think they are answering the wishes of their constituents, but I am sure if their constituents fully understood the principles of this article of the Constitution, they never would thank the gentlemen for their votes in favor of the resolution.

I well know, sir, that at first view it appears plausible that the ballots should designate who is voted for as President 1 also confess, sir, that when the subject was first mentioned to me, I could see no solid objection why it should not be. But, sir, when I examine the nature of our Government, the clashing interests of the several States, the balance of power and influence necessary to be formed between the larger and smaller States, and trace all the minute ways and means by which this power and influence may operate. I find many objections. The more this article of the Constitution is investigated, the more will its principles be admired.

The present mode of bringing forward candU dales for the office of President and Vice President is the least liable to call forth art, intrigue, and corruption ; the uncertainty of the event and the difficulty of making arrangements are strong checks 10 the artful and designing. But the moment the mode pointed out by this resolution is adopted, the door for intrigue and corruption is open ; the candidates and iheir friends can calca* late with certainty and apply the means direct; the power of party, influence of office, art, cunning, intrigue, and corruption, will all be used, and used to effect, because the object is certain.

I would ask, sir, if this is a proper lime to alter the Constitution ? The public mind is agitated with violent party rage. Cool, calm reasoning is not to be expected. The general good must and will yield to party purposes, because parties will consider that lo be for public good, which immediately promotes their own views. In such a state of things, I think an attempt to alter the Constitution not advisable. Again, sir, I believe it is better to suffer a small inconvenience, should any exist, than to attempt an alteration ; for the habit of compliance on the part of the people with a ririe of Government, is of as much importance to give effect to that rule, as the soundness of the principle contained in the rule itself. By altering the articles of the Constitution for every trivial pretext, you destroy that sacred regard which every citizen ought to have for the Constitution. For these reasons I shall assuredly vote against the resolution.

Mr. HuoEH — Much a.s has Wn said, Mr. Speaker, and much of our time as has been already taken up, since ihe commencement of the present session, in discussing the resolution now under consideration, you will no doubt have remarked, that the debate has heretofore been almost ezclu' sively carried on by gentlemen of one particular side of the House; neither will it have escaped your observation, that numerous as have been the speakers, and various and lengthy as have been their arguments, scarcely one of them has deemed it necessary to discuss the general merits of the question, or to show the propriety of making the proposed alteration in our national compact. The necessity, propriety, and expediency of making such an alteration, would seem, indeed, to have been regarded as points conceded on all nanda, as constituting a proposition, so plain, so self-evident, so unencumbered with anything like a doubt, that it would have been superfluous to bestow a moment's thought on, or to adduce a single argument in support of it. The gentlemen, therefore, who have preceded me, taking it for granted that an alteration must, and would of course, be made, have confined themselves almost exclusively to the consideration of the manner in which it was lobe brought about, and the extent to which it was at this time to be carried. I have listened with the utmost attention for several days past to the various propositions which they have presented lo the consideration of the House. I have been greatly edified by their arguments and have admired the ingenuity and ability with which the respective propositions have been supported. You will permit meloadil. sir, that 1 have heard with infinite pleasure, the declarations and assurances of attachment to our present happy Constitution, which have been so frequently expressed by almost every gentleman who has taken any part in the debate. It has given me peculiar sallslnclion to hear these sentiments repeated again and again, by characters no less respectable for their talents, than distinguished for their influence in the community. The fears and apprehensions which, I will candidly acknowledge, had maile a deep and Ginful impression on my mind, have been greatly aened, in some degree removed, by the assurances of unfeigned acquiescence in, and perfect conleotmeni with the present Constitution of the United States, and by the expressions of unequivocal disapprobation of every other alteration in the national compact, (save the one now proposed,) which have fallen from quarters, from whence, I will not deny, that I had anticipated and apprehended sentiments of a very contrary tendency. But whilst I give full and perfect credit, Mr. Speaker, to the assertions of honorable gentlemen ; whilst t rejoice most sincerely that the members of this respectable body one and all A- oord,and unite in one common attachment to that compact which forms the bond of our Union; whilst 1 deprecate the idea of casting anything like an imputation on the motives of any member on this floor, I cannot but lament that an exception is made in one instance, and that the Constitution is not allowed to remain unaltered and as it now stands. I impute not, I repeat it. any improper motives to the friends of the resolution at present under consideration. The rage, however, for change and innovation has, of late years, spread itself with a rapidity unequalled among the nations of the earth; and we have seen and heard enough out of doors and in our own country, to authorize caution, and to excite the apprehension that there are many among us to whom great and material alterations in our national compact would be more than aceptable. Obata princtpxit ii an oldand trite, but, on most occasions, a sound and safe maxim. In times like (he present, I deem too immediate, in its polilica! situation and prospects, since the adoption of the present ConsU ulion ; we have increased too rapidly in wealth, in strength, and in national prosperity, and we enjoy too great a portion of present happiness under its benign auspices to assent easily, and at a moment's warning, 10 many great and evidently serious alterations in it. The most enthusiastic advocate of innovations would not venture to propose such ; for it is evident the public mind is not yet sufficiently pre- {aied to receive them. It is only by degrees, and f undermining under plausible pretexts, and at favorable moments, first one, and then another of the main supports of the fabric, that we shall be exposed to see it, sooner or later, begin to totter, then cromble, and I fear bury us m its ruins.

Here, then, on the merits of the Constitution, as it was presented to us by the Convention, as it now is, I take mystand. Upon this ground I am unequivocally opposed to the alteration proposed, for I feel the strongest conviction that, if it obtains, we shall have given a deadly wound to the national compact, we shall have effaced one of its leading features, we shall have signed the death warrant of one of the vital and most important principles upon which it was originally estshI have already observed, Mr. Speaker, that the gentlemen who preceded me in the present debate have avoided everything like a discussion of the general merits of the Question, and confined themselves almost exclusively to the consideration of the manner in which the proposed alteration ■■ to be brought about, and the extent to which it is at this time to be carried.

Some observations have, nevertheless, fallen from two gentlemen, both of them from the very respectable State of Virginia, which appear to me peculiarly worthy of attention. Theone (Mr. Clopton) has presented to us a view of the subject, which, although I by no means think the correct one, [n evidently that in which most of the gentlemen in this House have regarded it, and in which persons out of doors are for the most part wont toconsider this, and indeed every other Constitutional question. I have listened to him however with great pleasure, and from the ingenuity and information which pervaded such of his arguments as I could fully comprehend, I feel much regret that the utmost attention on my part, owing partly to the feebleness of his voice, and partly to the unfavorable situation of his seat, did not enable me always to connect his ideas and arguments, and perfectly to understand him. This gentleman seems, for the moment, to have forgotten that the Government under which we live is formed upon Federative no less than upon R«- Sublican principles ; and though wishing to introduce an important alteration in our national compact, puts the compact itself, the spirit with which it was formed, and the vital principles upon which it was established, entirely out of the question. He takes an abstract view of the subject, as if it had no connexion whatever with other parts and principles of the compact, carries us back to a state of nature, and seems to regard it as a radical error in the Constitution that the provisions and modifications it contains are not solely founded upon the broad basis of population and numbers. He talks to usof therightsormaninasta'leofoBtur?, of the origin of the social compact, of the foundation upon which all Governments ought to be formed, viz: the will of the people; and, drawing his inference from these pure, unmixed, and abstract principles and theories, thinks, whilst he shows us what would be the most eligible mode of providing for the Executive branch of Government about to be formed for the protection of the people, just risingforlbcGrst time into political existence, he proves triumphantly and unanswerably that such too ought to be the mode adopted by a Union like oors, composed of so many distinct and independent sovereign ties, of so old a date, and having such Tarious, distinct, and complicated Tiews and interests. Let me not, however, ' misunderstood; I am not finding fault with, condemning ja the abstract, the principles laid down by the honorable member. Still less would I be understood to deny that the Constitution has been formed upon the broad basis of the public sood, and the will of the people of the respective Slates. 1 well know, and it is for tfial Tery reason I feel so sincere an attachment to it, that ibe Fe eral compact is founded upon liberal and genuine republican principles; but let not gentlemen the meantime forget that the Government under which we live is of a federative nature; and that these general, unmixed, and abstract principle?, upon which we are called on exclusively to act, were then modified and practically applied, to the wants, prejudices, and clashing interests ofa numerous and increasing population, divided into a number ordistinetsovereigniiesjspread over a vast extent of country by that very compact in which it is now proposed to make so material and essential an alteration. This is the true point of view in which the subject should be taken up ; and I am happy in finding the ideas of the gentleman's colleague, to whom 1 beforealluded, (Mr. J. RanDOLPB,) accord so perfectly with my own in the present instance, and that he too is of opinion, that this is the true and proper point of view in which not only the present but every other proposition to alter or amend the Federal compact, should invariably be considered. Sir, I am truly happy to recollect that the sentiments of that gentleman and my own accord so perfectly on this part of the subject, for, exclusively of the advantages which the weight of his authority must tnaii to my argument, I am free to acknowledge that it has frequently been a source of regret to me to find a difference in our view of things led II to differ In opinion with ins of my yi met on this floor, and whom I have for so many Tears been in (lie habit of regarding as persons of onor and worth.

It was stated, and in my humble opinion correctly stated, by the honorable member from VirgiDia(Mr.RANDOt.rn)Df whom 1 have last spoken, some days since, that, when we were about to make any alteration in the compact which unites these States together, it behooved us not to take into view merely what we thought, individually, it ought to have been, or wished it to be, nor what shape, were we in convention for that purpose, we should give it ; but rather to consider what shape had already been given to it, and what the compact, as it presents itself to us in the Constitution, now is. Taking up the subject then under this point of view, allow me, sir, to put these questions to the House. Let me ask. what is iheCOQstitutionofthe United States? From what sources did it originate? In what manner, by whom, from what causes, upon what principles, in what spirit, was it originally adopted? Is it not a federative Government, agreed upon between thirteen distinct and separate sovereignties, for their mutual defence and protection 1

Is it not, in its essence, a compact, a bargain, a perfect compromise of the interests, powers, influence, and rights of a number of independent societies, who have united for their common advantage, and who are no further bound or pledged to each other than by the articles and conditions in the written contract — the Constitution — which has been acceded to bv them all ? And is it not upon the spirit, in which the conditions of that compact was originally formed, that every amendment to, or alteration in it, should be predicated? These questions must all be necessarily answered in the affirmative. The inhabitants of these United States did not then, in forming the Federal Constitution, act in mass as one people, nor can the abstract principles borrowed from different authors on the primeval formation of political societies apply to them. The worn-out theory ofa number of insulated beings assembled together in an extensive plain, and led by their common wants and necessities to form themselves into a body politic, cannot be applied to the Federal Government, nor can inferences drawn from ni>" tionsof thiskind afford correct grounds upon which to build or support alterations and amendments in the naliooal compact.

Thirteen Colonies, at this time composing the United States, spread over an extensive continent, having been threatened with a privation of their rights and liberties, were induced to form a league, offensive and defensive, and to unite for their mutual and common defence. After a bloody though not inglorious, contest, they severed themselves forever from the mother country, and they became and were acknowledged as thirteen independent and distinct Republics or Sovereignties. Under what gloomy and critical circumstances they found themselves for some few years after the close of the war, it would be superfluous for me to detail to this House. Let it suffice to say, that their situation was such as seriously to alarm all classes of our citizens, and to threaten complete anarchy, perhaps political dissolution, unless some bona of union, better adapter ed to their wants and necessities than the original Confederacy, could be established. That band of worthies therefore, as they have been aptly styled, were sent from twelve, I believe, of the States, who, having met together in convention, ultimately formed that compact, which, having been since ratified by all the States, now happily unites us in one great Union. But by whom and by what authority were the members of the Convention delegated 1 Whom did they represent when a»- sembled together? They were not, it must be acknowledged, even in the degree that the mem* hers of this House are, the immediate representatives of the people, inhabiting that part of this vast continent in which the United States are comprised. They were not selected by the people at large, nor did they represent them in their original and individual capacities. No, sir, they were sent to represent the interests and views of thirteen distinct sovereignties; they were appointed by the governments of the different States, and they held their authority from the States, aa, States, and not from ihe people of the United Stales generally and indiscriminately. When met therefore, in convention, iheir object was not to form one general consolidated government for the inhabitants scattered over this vast territory, but 10 modify still further, and to draw still closer the bands of alliance; by which these Slates were already connected. And it cannot surely be forgotten, that one of the strongest objections, one of those most insisted on against the Constitution, T«is, that federative principles had not been sufficiently retained, or rather that they had been totally abandoned, and the Constitution approached 100 nearly toa consolidation of the different members of the Confederacy, and one general national Government. It is not necessary for me here to detail the difficulties, which opposed themselves to the formation and adoption of any compact, more efficient than that oi the old Confederacy, nor would the opportunities I have had of knowing them, (for I was not only under age, b'ut absent from America, when the Convention met) enable me to do justice in the subject. Every one knows, however, that difficulties without nam* ber did present themselves, and the Convention was more than once on the eve of dissolving itself without agreeing upon anything. It is a fact equally well ascertained, that (he great bone of contention, the point of all others which it was most difficult to adjust, was the jarring interests and opposite pretensions of the large and small States, This was the point upon which the whole business turned, and gentlemen will see at once the justice of the remark, when they recollect that although every other amendment whatever, after the year eighteen hundred and eight, maybe made to the Constitution, by two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, when ratified by (he Legislatures of three-fourths of the States, yet a single exception is made, and it is particularly specified, that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage la the Senate.

Why then this single exception, but because the interest and opposite pretensions of. the large and small States were the great bone of contention, and the equal suffrage in the Senate the Sreat, the essential compromise between these conicting interests and pretensions. But this, though the most important, the nrieqtianon of any compromise, was by no means the only compromise which took place between them.

The great outlines of the Constitution were, I presume, Mr. Speaker, agreed on without much difficulty, and pretty generally acquiesced in. It was understood on all hands that the Government should be formed on republican principles — ihai the great departments of which It must necessarily consist should be distinct, and, as far as possible, independent of each other. The difficulty was in the detail, and more especially in respect to the quantum of State sovereignty which was to be yielded to the Union, and the degree of influence which was to be respectively given up or retained by the large and small States. Both were at that time independent of each other, and perfectly equal in their rights and sovereign powers, though unequal in size iglh, wealth, and popuThe basis . republican government however, is no doubt the will of the people; and that will could only be expressed and brought into action in a country so extensive as ours, by representation and elections. How then was that representation to be apportioned and those elections organized? To adopt the most common and simple principle in the abstract, and allow the representation to depend entirely on numbers, and (hfl elections to be made indiscriminately and without modification by the people at brge, would have been to put an end at once and at one blow to all State sovereignty, to amalgamate the inhabitants of thirteen free and independent Republics into one common mass, and to place the smaller and more feeble completely and forever at the mercy of the more powerful and larger States. But was this done? was such a result desirable? would the States at that day have acquiesced in any similar arrangement? Most certainly not; ; antL consequently, a totally different modification ana compromise took place. The Legislative department of the Government was divided into two distinct branches — a Senate and House of Representatives. In the latter, it is true, the principle of numbers and population was, to a certain degree, adopted, yet still under very important modifications, and with evident deviation from the abstract principle. In the first place, a certain class of people, who unfortunately existed in one portion of the Union, though not allowed any immediate interest them.selves in the Government, and regarded rather as property than as beings entitled to any civil or political rights, were included at a certain ratio in the calculation of the number of Representatives who were to have a seat in this House. This difficult and knotty point happily settled, it was in the second placedetermined that the members of this body, though understood to be the immediate representatives of the people, should not be elected by (be people of the United States at large, as one people; but its share of the whole representation according to the ratio and in conformity to the compromise above specified, was apportioned to each respective State, and is to be exclusively elected by the people of that Slate. Notwithstanding every modification, however, which could be devised, i[ was evident, and perfectly understood, that although the smaller States the interest and the will of the larger must virtually prevail in the House of Representatives, and that they would in fact dispose of this body at their will. As a partial check, therefore, as some little safeguard against this overweening power on their part, the federative principle was completely retained in its utmost purity, and without the smallest modification, in the other branch of Legislature, the Senate; and not only an equal vote and representation is given to all the States, however large, or however small, but the memberswho compose the Senate are not even to be elected by the people of the several States, but are to be chosen by, and immediately to represent, the government of each individual State. The dil&- cnlties which presented themselves in organizing the Legislative department of the Government, being loos surmounted and compromised, another question nolessembarrsssingand difficult to solve, arose, viz: in what roaoDer the Executive powers ought to be disposed of.

Before I proceed to investigate this part of the Constitution, it may not be amiss. Mr. Speaker, to observe that in the formation of any political association upon free principles, it has ever been deemed the Gordian knot, the great desideratum, to find out and to ascertain the best mode of disposing of and organizing the Executive branch of the Government ; nor is the experiment which these States are oow (I trust successfully) making of the practicability of uniting so vast a territory as is comprised in the American Confederacy, under one general and national government, (founded on free and republican principles.) more interesting or important to the interests of mankind, in any one point of view, than as relates to the creation and disposal of the Executive power. The history and experience of past ages show us indeed the rocks and quicksands, among which our bark may be stranded and wrecked ; but we are still left without a chart or compass, by the assistance of which we might be enabled to avail ourselves of the mistakes and misfortunes of those who have gone before us, and steer our course in safety and security. Divide the Executive power and place it in the hands of many, and you so distract, weaken, and enfeeble it, that it becomes unequal to its end : the security and protection of the body politic. Hence it seems to be the received maxim, that this branch of the Qovernment should be as compact and as concentrated, as a due respect to existing circumstances may permit. A serious difficulty, nevertheless, remains yet to be gotten over, in relation to the mode and manner in which it is to be created and brought into action. The first impulse of our feelings and common sense, untaugmbyeiperieneeand waiving local objections, would seem no doubt to point out at once the mode of election : yet such have been the inconveniences, such the fatal and bloody effects of creatingthe Executive branch inthis way, that we have found not only in monarchical, but in some even of those governments deemed most free, an heriditary has been thought preferable to an elective Executive.

The members of the Convention, however, were too well acquainted with the feelings and sentiments of the American people to hesitate long on this point, and it was consequently determmed that the Executive powers should be lodged in the hands of a single individual, under the title of President, who should hold his office during the term of four years, at the end of which period a new election should take place. But the real difficulty itt the organization of this department under our Constitution now naturally suggests itself to the mind, viz: how,and by whom, this President was to be elected; for it must be obvious, that all these jealousies and conflicting views and interests of the large and small States, which had been happily compromised, as relates to the Legislative authority, would, of course, apply with increased force in the case of the Executive. To divide this branch, as had been done in the former instance, would be. as I have already shown, to enfeeble it, to deprive it of all energy, to render it insufficient and entirely unequal to the purposes for which it was intended. If the Executive power, on the other hand, was to be vested in a single person, and he elected by the people of the United States, or even on the modified principles upon which the members of the House of Representatives were to be elected, it followed, of necessity, that the larger States would elect whom they pleased, and consequently, the Executive branch of the Government would be entirely under their control and the champion and promoter of their views and interests. But the large States have an entire control over one the two Houses, of which the National Legislature is composed, and an equality of votes (with all ibe advantages accruing from superior strength and power, and consequently superiorinfluence) in the other. If then, in addition to all this, the election of the Executive is put in their hands, you add strength to the strong, grant more power to those already too powerful, and yield up virtually to the large States that branch of the Government, which not only was to have a partial veto on the proceedings of the Legislature, but would probably give impulse to the whole, and be always on the watch and ever ready to avail itself of such favorable occurrences and favorable moments as might best enable them to carry their projects of aggrandizement and encroachment on their more feeble associates, into execution. On the other hand, the larger States, to whom fortune and the nature of the case ne^ cessatily gave a preponderating influence in this instance, could scarcely be expected to make a sacrifice of this advantage to the jealousies and fears of the small and weaker.and suffer themes a thing of course, to take possession of the Executive branch of the Government. Inthis dilemma, what was done by the Convention ?

As usual a compromise took place, and as nearly as possible upon the same principles upon which every other provision of the Constitution is predicated. It was decided that the Executive power should rest in a single individual. It was agreed that he should be elected, not by the people at large, not by the people of each State in the first instance; but by a number of Electors (equal to the combined representation of the States in ibe Senate, and that of the people of the several States in the House of Representatives) elected by the people of the several States, in the proportion to which they might be been adopted. complicated mode of election notwithstanding, it was evident the election of the President would be in the hands of the larger States. Every additional security therefore was sought for, the ingenuity of the Convention was put to the rack to Invent and devise some further means of quieting the fears and apprehensions of the smaller States, affording them every safeguard, and patting in their hands every check which the nature of the case would admit of, against the preponderating influence of ihe interest opposed to them; ; and 1 have ever understood, I have ever been taught to believe, by those few of ibe origmal Trainers of the Constitution with whom I have had the hap ptness to be acquainted, or to converse on the subject, that this very provision which obliges tbi for two persons 10 fill the offices of President and Vice President, and which it is now proposed to do away, was regarded as the best, the most effectual means, and that which did in fact tend most to sooth and quiet the fears of the smaller States, and was in this view, and for this very purpose. adopted as a part of the Constitution. The more I turn the subject over in my mind, indeed, the more closely I endeavor to examine and investigate it, the more confirmed are my impressions and convictions, that this really was the case; that the proposition to alter or amend the Constitution in the manner proposed, is neither more not less than a State question; a question between the different States of the Union, regarded in their original capacity as sovereign and independent Stales; a question which involves in it the vital principle upon which the Federal compaci was formed, viz; a compromise between the fears and jealousies, the jarring interests, and pretensions of the large and small States. 1 feel myself 1 confess, sir, unequal to this part of the subject. I am sensible of my inability to calculate all the chances of influence and consequent pro t«Ction which this, in my humble opinion, little understood provision, affords to the small States, or to point out the various modes in which it was anticipated, that it might and would, in various instances and on various occasions, operate in their favor. Waiving, however, one happy and material effect which I think it must have in regard to the Union at large, viz: that it tends to create a moral necessity on the part of the Electors to bring forward the most eminent characters, as well 10 nil the office of Vice President as that of President, waiving this certainly not unimportant consideration, I think I can prove to demonstration that this indiscriminate mode of electing the President and Vice President, affords to the ■mailer States a degree of influence over the election, places an important barrier to the superiority which the large States possess in this instance, and in every event, and at the worst, insures to the former a safeguard and defence against the encroachments of the latter, which they would not otherwise possess, and of which. if the proposed alteration takes place, they will 1m absolutely deprived.

By that article of the Constitution, to which 1 have so often had occasion to allude, and in which it is now the object to make so material an alteration, it is provided "that two persons shall be indiscriminately voted for as President and Vice President, by the Electors in the respective States, one Ofwhoraat least shall not be of tbesame State with themselves," In carrying this provision into op- •rstioo, the larger States must necessarily do one of three things. They must either (in the hope of securing to themselves both the President and Vice President) give an equal number of vMes to the two candidates whom they may agree upon, or at least a very large portion, if not exactly an equal number of votes to them both; ; or, confining themselves to ihe securing the office of President to the individual whom they prefer, they must be satisfied to give one of the two voles to which each of their Electors is entitled exclusively to him, and throw away the other. What follows in either case? In the first place, if two candidates have an equal vote, and at the same time a. majority of the voles of the whole number of Electors appointed, il devolves on the House of Representatives to select which of them ihcy please as President; and as the Constitution has (in the spirit I have already described, and for the purpose of affording every possible check and security to the smaller Stales, which the nature of the thing would permit) provided, that in every instance in which the choice of the President d^ volveson the House of Representatives, the volet shall be taken by States, and the whole representation of each State shall have one equal vote — it follows of course that in every case of this kind, they are 'all, large and small, placed precisely upon an equal footing. But in ihc case of two or more candidates having an equal vote, yet less than a majority of the votes of the whole number of Electors appointed, a further advantage accrues lo the smaller States, for then, according to the Constitution, they not only vote bf States, the representation of each State having one vote, but they may choose the President from the five highest candidates on the list, and of course have a wider field for choice, and a greater and even equal chance of making him President whom their Electors perhaps had originally supported as such.

In order to avoid this, suppose the larger States support two candidates, giving to Ibe one however a few less votes than to the other. What advantages in this instance are afforded to the smallet States'? Why, in the first place it gives them a greater chance of bringing in their own candidate, at least as Vice President — for their opponents, in order to secure to themselves the office of President, and to avoid an ultimate election by the House of Repiesen la lives, have not thought proper to give their full support lo him whom Uiey run as Vice President; but have thrown away from him a part of their voles. In the next place, discovered (and this will not always be as difficult a point to ascertain as might at first view be supposed) how many votes are id be thrown away, the Electors of the smaller States may give - equal number of votes, and thus, putting the o candidates on an equality, bring the final election into ibe House of Representatives, where each State representation has an equal vote in deciding the election.

Nor is this their only alternative, for although it is true that they will not, from their inferior number of votes, have it in their power to select Itom all the citizens of the Union the individual whom they tnighi prefer, yet, in thecase supposed, (of the larger States giving a considerable portion. though DOl exactly an equal number of votes to the two candidates, whom they have determitied lo support,) the smaller States will at least have it at their option to choose between the two candidates, and by giving him their votes, insure the election of that one of them against whom they have the fewest object ions, and who sensible that the preference given him in the election ultimately turned on their votes, and possibly not beiDK taken from the very largest and most powerful States, would probably feel less inimical to their interests, and m fact have it less in his power lo injure them.

The third and last case is that in which the large States, in order to secure the election of the individual tbey wish to the office of President, unite in giving one of the two votes lo which each Elector is entitled exclusively to him, and throw away the other. The obvious and necessary consequence is, that the Vice Presidency remains completely at the disposal of the small Stales, and they make whom they please Vice President — a point of far more importance than gentlemen seem to suppose, or are perhaps aware of. It is in the first place to be recollected, that as the person who will usually be thought most worthy of being raised to the office of Chief Magistrate will most probably be advanced in years, there must be more than the common chances of his demise in the course of the term for which he was elected, and of the heir apparent, the Vice President, consequently succeeding to his station, and becoming himself in fact the President. Exclusively, however, and waiving this consideration, let it be moreover recollected, that the Senate have a part of tbe treaty-making power, participate in the appointment of the Judiciary, and of the other public officers, and form in short, to a certain degree, a portion of the Executive branch of the Government. Now all the States have an equal vote in the Senate, and the Vice President is ex officio President of the Senate. He enjoys therefore all the influence necessarily attached to such an office, and to the character of heir apparent; and he has, in addition, the peculiarly important right of giving the casting vote in all cases of an equality of votes in the Senate, an assembly composed of so very few members. Such then is the importance of the Vice Presidency, and such the influence and protection which in every point of view the indiscriminate mode of electing the two first officers in our Government affords. And is all this nothing, sir? Does the alteration proposed really constitute a proposition so plain, so self-evident, so unencumbered with anything like a difficulty or doubt, as not to require a moment's thought, or be worthy of the least investigation or discussion? Is it possible that any one within or without these doors will deny, after what 1 have just stated, that we are about to make a serious and important innovation in the vital principle, the very essence of the Consiiiution? Are we not in fact and in truth acting upon the maxim, "that from those who have not, that which they have shall be taken away, whilst to those who have, more shall be given?" Shall we not by this alteration lessen the chances of the smaller States, and take from them one of the most effectual checks, one of [he most essential safeguards, in respect to the election of the Executive branch of the Government, which was secured to them by our national compact; and add, at the same lime, to tbe preponderating and overweening influence which the larger States have heretofore possessed, the evident means and moral certainty of disposing at pleasure of the whole Executive department? These must necessarily be the consequences of the proposed alteration in the Constitution; and for my own part, I must say, that it appears to me to give a death-blow to that portion of the Stale sovereignties which has been reserved to the several States, and that we thereby take a monstrous and more than a gigantic stride, towards that very consolidation of the States against which gentlemen have been wont of yore so bitterlv to exclaim. For we may boast as much as we please; we may say what we will of our moderation, sincerity, and political virtue ; we may give every security which can be devised upon parchment or upon paper, and endeavor to render it more sacred by seals, and even by oaths ; still, so long as human nature remains human oalure — where power exists on the one side and weakness on the olb» — there ever will arise ambition, anijl the inclination to obtain additional power on the part of tbe most powerful; iind consequently, in proportion as you add to the means heretofore given lo tbe small Slates, in the « proportion do you throw the latter at the mercy, and invite the aggression of theformer,and thereby carry us further from a federative, and draw us nearer to a consolidated government.

I am perfectly aware, Mr. Speaker, that the ground I take is not the popular one of the present day. t well know that the principles for which I contend, and upon which our national compact was originally formed, have no longer the same influence on the public feelings, nor are they re- ^rded in the smaller Slates with that degree of interest with which they were worn to be at the time the Convention met and the Constitution was adopted. The prosperity we have enjoyed for fourteen years past, under the auspices of the General Government, has happily done away State jealousies in a very considerable degree. The occurrences which have since intervened, the new interests which have sprung up, and the different shapes which parties have assumed, have all contributed to lessen the impressions and obscure the grounds and basis upon which the great bond of our Union was framed and bottomed. This happy and natural effect of the successful experiment we have made in our political association, must give pleasure to every friend of his country; and so long as the original compact which unites and forms us into a uand of brothers continues to be held sacred, and no attempt is made to innovate upon and alter the principles upon which il was formed, 1 should rejoice as much as any laan at (his udjoq of sentiment— — this mutual confidence among the members of Ibe Confederacy; but when see (it matters not whether inteDlionally or from inadvertence) that advantage is about to be taken of this circumstance, that in the moment of party irritation and party zeal, and at a time when it may be truly stated that the influence interests of the larger States are completely triumphant, and many of the smaller Stales, uncouscious of danger, are enlisted from various causes under their banners; that at such a moment a proposition is brought forward to alter the Constitution in one of, its most important features, and, under the plausible pretext of giving effect to the will of the people, the small States are at one blow to be deprived of the checks and safeguards secured to them by the Federal compact in the election of the Executive, and this important branch of the Government is henceforward and foievermore to be put entirely and exclusively into the hands of the larger States ; when I see and behold all this, I acknowledge that I do feel the most serious alarm, and feeble and unavailing as my voice may be, I still deem it a duty incumbent on me, as one of the immediate citizens of a small State, no less than as a member of this House, and consequently a sworn guardian of the Constitution, to raise that voice, and loudly to protest against the innovation which it is contemplated to effect in the fundamental and vital principles of the compact which unites these States together.