December 8, 1803

The House resumed the consideration of the question which was depending yesterday at the time of adjournment, "that the House do now agree to the resolution of the Senate, in the form concurrent resolution of the two Houses, proposing an article of amendment to the Constita- '}n of the United States, respecting future elections of President and Vice President." Mr. Oreoq. — Entertaining the opinion, Mr. Speaker, that the amendment to the Constitution now on your table had been already sufficiently discussed, I did hope that the question on its final passage would have been decided yesterday. I thought the minority could have no just cause of complaint that they had not been heard, and I believe the people of the United States will concur with me in this sentiment, when they attend lo the lengthy speeches on the subject, with which ihe newspapers have been filled (or several weeks. The great anxiety of the majority, discovered by tbeirloud and repeated calls for the question, convinced me that they also were fully satisfied with what had been said, and were willing to rest the decision on the discussion that had taken place. Il appeared, however, that one gentleman of the majority entertained a different opinion. At a late hour last night he again entered the field of discussion, and delivered his sentiments at considerable length. A decent respect for the minority requires that they should be heard iri reply. 1 shall now attend with patience to gentlemen on both sides ; and, although I had intended to lake no part in the debate, I shall ask the indulgence of the House while 1 briefly state ibe reasons that will influence my vote, and notice the most prominent objections that have been urged by gentlemen in the opposition.

I am willing to acknowledge, Mr. Speaker, IhU (he Constitution far surpasses in excellence, nay, that it is infinitely superior to the constitution of another country, that has been styled " the most stupendous monument of human wisdom." I believe it to be the best that now is, or perhaps that ever was, in the world. The names of those sages, to whose wisdom and patriotism we are indebted for it, will, I trust, be always recollected by the American people with gratitude and pleasure. But, sir, it IS a Constitution of experiment. The wise f ram ert of it, with all their sagacity, could not foresee how far its various provisions would,' in practice, correspond with their views, or answer their expectations. It looked fair in theory, hut its real excellence was to be tested by experience, and, therefore, a provision was inserted for introducing amendments, when experience should prove the propriety of adopting them. This, it must be acknowledged, is an admirable provision, and also a convincing evidence of the candor ot the Convention. Conscious of their own fallibility as men, they did not, as some have since done, proclaim the Constitution to be perfect They foresaw that experience might discover imperfections, and, therefore, they inserted the fifth article, declaring that " the Congress, whenever , ' two-thirds of both Houses shall &eia it itecem- * r^, shall propose amendments to ibix Cooslitu- ' ‘tion; ; or, on the application of the Legislatures ' of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a ' contention for proposing BtDeodmeDls, which, in ' either case, shall be valid to all intents and pur- ' poses as part of this Constitution," &c.

The article respecting the election of President and Vice President, I have understood, was suddenly adopted by the Convention. A variety of modes of choosing the Chief Magistrate had been suggested, none or which received the approbation of a majoriijr. Fatigued with the subject, all parties united in support of the mode contained in the article as it now stands, which was not proposed until all the other plans had been rejected. Plausible, however, as it appears, and supported, as it has been, bjr the opinions of very eminent men, it is on experience found to be imperfect. The result of the last election evinces this beyond the possibility of a doubt. Had the discriminating principle now contended for been at that time in the Constitution, could the Electors have designated on their ballots who they voted for as President and who as Vice President, no person will pretend to say they would not have made a President, and by that means saved the country from that anxious solicitude, from those distressing fears and alarms which were excited by the uncertainty and delay which attended that election in the House of Representatives. This single experience appears to me superior to a volume of abstract reasoning on the subject. It is, in my view, an unanswerable argument in favor of the amendment.

Another reason in support of the amendment, which has great weight with me, is, the public sentiment being so long and so loudly expressed in its favor. Several years have elapsed since it was first brought into view. It originated in the East ; it has been echoed from the South, and the people of the West are also calling for its adoption. It has been advocated in turns by men of all political parties. A federal member from the federal Stale of New Hampshire, if 1 recollect right, first introduced it into Congress. A proposition, the same in substance, was afterwards renewed by a federal member from the then federal State of South Carolina. lo the two last instances it has been brought forward by republican members, from republican States — first, by one of my colleagues from Pennsylvania, a republican State, and, during the present session, by a gentleman from Virginia, which is said to be also republican. New York, Vermont, Tennessee, Ohio, and, I believe, Kentucky, have, by their Legislatures, expressed their approbation of the measure, and invited its adoption. Federalists and Republicans, in every part of the country, thus uniting in recommending the measure, is conclusive evidence that a majority oi the people, however they may differ on other political questions, are in favor of the leading principle contained in the amendment. This circumstance led me to conclude that it would have received but little opposition in this House. The members from those States that had been most forward in recommending it, 1 did expect would have given It their unanimous support.

To obtain such an amendment as would confine itself to the principle of discrimination, was the only object I bad originally in view. That principle I consider as of the first importance. It would, I think, be sufficient to guard against the inconvenience attending the present mode of election. If the Electors are authorized to designate on their ballots who they vote for as President and who as Vice President, there is little danger of their failing to make an election, while the country continues to be divided, as it is at present, into two great political parties. ] would even now prefer a proposition embracing that single principle to the amendment on the table, not only because 1 think it adequate to the attainment of the object in view, but, also, because I believe, in that form, it would be most likely to receive the sanction of the Slates. There is, I acknowledge, one feature in it, as it now stands, which recommends it to my approbation, and gives it, in my opinion, a decided preference to the proposition which went from this House to the Senate. In the event of the Electors not making a President, the House of Representatives were, by our proposition, reslrict< ed in their choice to the five highest on the list of the persons voted for as President, provided no one had a majority. By the amendment on the table, they are confined to the three highest on the list. I prefer the number three before five, because it evidently brings the choice nearer to the will of a majority of the people. This was so fully discussed, and so clearly elucidated on a former occasion, that it would be an unpardonable trespass on the patience of the House to dilate, further on it at this time.

But the most objectionable part of this amendment, in the opinion of many gentlemen, and against which the gentleman from Vermont, in particular, has levelled his keenest darts, is that which vests the Vice President with poWer to discharge the duties of President, in the event of a President not being elected. The passage stands thus : "And if the House of Representatives shall ' not choose a President, whenever the right of ' choice shall devolve on them, before the fourth ' day of March next following, then the Vice ' President shall act as President," &c.

It is acknowledged that, at first view, the principle contained in this provision appears liable to objections, but it must be admitted that much may be urged in its defence; nay, I will even go so far as to say, that on a fair and candid investigation, the objections will lose their weight, and the principle be found not to be incorrect, considering the bearing it may eventually have on the people, on the Electors, and on the House of Representatives, in making a President. Let us, sir, for a moment, examine the probable tendency of the principle. The possibility, or if you will the probability, of the Vice President being placed in the Presidential chair, through the obstinacy or neglect of the House of Representatives to make an election, may have a powerful influence over the Electors, and produce a concentration of their H.ofE.

Totes in favor of one caodtJale. The same consideration may operate as a considerable excitement to the people, to be careful in their selection ofcharac(ers as candidates for (he office of Vice President. The additional chance now given of his being called to discharge the duties of President, will determine their choice in favor of such men us are entitled to their esteem and confidence, next to (be persons whom they may nominate for Pre^idetit. Jt will also operate as a stimulus to the Hoo^eof Representatives to make an election. They will doI be likely through obstinacy to suffer themselves to be divested of the power of making a President, when that power constitutionally devolves upon (hem. They will be very reluctant to yield ii to (he Senate. Their immediate responsibility will not permit them either to refuse or neglect making a choice. They will consider themselves more immediately the organ of the public will, even for (be purpose of election, than the Senate. They are so. The long period for which the Senators are appointed, clearly justifies this position. Bulwiihoutrcsortinglo arguments, I will elucidate it by an example taken from the State in which I live, (Pennsylvania.) At the late election for President, the members of the House of Representatives from that State gave B vote for the presentCbiefMagistrate. Had the vote been given by the Senators of the State, there is no doubt it would have been different. The question then was, who speaks the voice of the people? Look to the result for an answer. As soon as the Constitutional period expired for which their Senators bad been appointed, they supplied their places bv successors, whose political opinions they supposed to be in coincidence with those of their members who composed the majority at the Presidential election.

But there is one provision in this part of the amendment which is certainly of very considerable importance. As I have several times observed, I again repeat, I do not think the Electors will be likely to fail in making an election. Should they, however, not agree, I cannot conceive that the House of Representatives will be so lost to a. sense of duty, as either to refuse, or neglect complying with their Constitutional obligations. But should an election fail there also, we will have by this provision a person Constitutionally vested with Presidential power, until a President is elected. Surely it is better to have a Constitutional officer to discharge these important functions, (and that officer chosen too in the first instance, with an eye to such contingency, infinitely preferable,) than to suffer the office to become vacant, and (hereby expose ourselves to all the evils incident to such a state of things, as would be unavoidably produced thereby. I could have wished that this provision had extended further, and directed the vacancy to be supplied by an extraordinary election within one year from the commencement of such vacancy. But as it is providing for a remote contingency, one which may not, and I hope will not happen in a century, I think we may trust it u it is. As the Constitution now stands, "Incase of the removal of the President from office, or his Amendment to the Camliiulum. Dbcbuhbb, 1 death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice President."— Art. 2, sec. 1. This is only adding one other possible and barely possible, for it is not a probable case .of vacancy of that office, and it is securing against all the dangers and confusion to be dreaded from an interThe objections that have been raised to the amendment generally, I think, all resolve themselves into two. First, the danger of innovating on the Constitution, and, second, the jeopardy in which the small States will be placed by itsadopI perfectly accord in sentiment with gentlemen la all their remarks respecting the great caution to be observed in touching the Constitution. No abstract, theoretic reasoning could induce me to alter it in many of its parts ; but when on experience it is found to be defective, as in the casf in the present instance, I think we are bound to exercise our Constitutional privilege in obviating that defect.

With respect to the objections drawn from the danger to which the small States are to be exposed if the amendment prevails. I confess, Mr. Speaker, my mind is not capable to comprehend their force. From whence do gentlemen derive those fears and alarms with which they endeavor to persuade us their minds are so distressed 7 Do they know, or have they ever heard of the large States forming combinations against the interest of the small ones 7 I live in a large State, and I declare I never heard such a thing even hinted. Such an idea, I am persuaded, would receive no currency in that State. Such a combination u unnatural — it cannot obtain.

Should local considerations ever have any influence on the election of our Chief Magistrate, that period I believe is far distant. While the country is divided into two great political parties, (and 1 believe it will long continue to be so divided,) each party will endeavor to select the most prominent character, whose political sentiments are in unison with their own, and place him in the Presidential chair, without any regard to local situation. His politics will be the criterion by which he will be judged, without any reference to his being an Inhabitant of the Eastern, Middle, or Southern sections of the Union.

How far would the ambition of the small States extend 7 Look into the Constitution, and see security. In the Senate, a distinct and entire branch of the Legislature, they are placed on the same footing with the largest States. There, Rhode Island, which is but a ninth part of Massachusetts, has an equal vote with that large and populous State; ther&Oelawareison equal ground with Pennsylvania, although it contains but little more than one-eighieenih part of her population. In this House, also, their weight is equal to that of the large States in the important election of President, when that power devolves upon the House. The Constitution declares, "that in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, each Stale having one vote." What greater powers, what more extensive privileges, can the small Slates desire 1 Do they expect the large States to surrender their independence, and bow at the shrine of their omnipotence? Sir, I live in a large State, and although as a Representative of it, f would spurn every idea of combining with other large States to injure the small ones, or to divest them of the Constitutional standing and influence which they possess in this Union, yet I hope 1 »haU never be influenced by the alarms now attempted to be excited on their account, to surrender the rights secured to the large States by the same Constitution. Important as the federative principle is which pervades the Constitution — which links the States together in a common band— which places the small States on a level with the largest in the Senate, and in this House in the exercise of one of its most important functions — equally important, at least, is the democratic principle it contains, which secures to the people the right of choosing their public agents. To enable them to exercise this right with a greater probability of succeeding in making a choice, and thereby preventing the removal of it to a different set of Electors, is the main object of the amendment. It scarcely appears proper to dwell so much on a subject calculated to excite State jealousies.

Should the large Slates, contrary to the ordinary and natural course of things, attempt to form such a combination as has been alluded to, I would ask how' it is to be effected? They are separated from each other in their geographical situation by the intervention of the small States. There is no commercial connexion betwixt them, except what is confined to their maritime towns. Distant from each other, they differ considerably in their custom? and manners. They can derive I am unable to discover any force in the objection that has been so much relied on respecting their danger. Should local considerations ever have influence in deciding this important business, and combinations be formed to effectuate that object, the combinations will be betwixt States that lie contiguous. There may be Eastern, Southern, and Middle associations. In such a stale of things, which, however, is by no means probable, Pennsylvania might unite with New ersey, Delaware, and Maryland, but surely never with Virginia or Massachusetts.

Upon the whole, the objections to this measure do DOC appear to me to be by any means conclusive; and the arguments in its favor are of such weight as to satisfy me that the vote I shall give is in conformity with the Constitution, is sanctioned by the experience already had on this subject, and is in unison with the wishes of a great majority of the people in every part of the country. Mr. EusTis considered the subject important, as it went to effect a considerable change in the exiscingprovisionsoflheConstitution, in themode of electing the Chief Magistrate ; and also important, as it nad long occupied the attention of the 8th Cow.— 23 lies and of the people. When, said Mr. E., I consider the resolution from the Senate, and come it with that which passed this House, 1 find several marked differences. It contains three proThe first provides for a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President, which is a modification rather than a change of principle, and is in unison with the amendment sent from this House, and with the general sentiments of the people — perfectly so with the sentiments of the Slate I have the honor lo represent. While on this point, it may be proper to state, that, when I some time since mentioned the instruction* given b^ ihe Legislature of that State on this subject, I did it toshowlhai the great principle of this amendment had been sought for by all parties in the United States. So far, then, as it embraces the discriminating principle, I am in favor of it. 1 find that the instructions alluded to leave some latitude with regard to the modification of the amendment, so as to conform it to the opinions of the two Houses.

do not conceive that the amendment sent from House effects any alteration in the essential features of the Constitution ; for, when the Constilution provides that two persons shall be voted for, it follows that one must be voted for as Presi' deoi, and the other as Vice President, and the discriminating principle only tends to carry this view ■ lo effect. So far, this resolution meets my en- -e approbation.

The second provision of our amendment was, that this House should choose the President from the five highest on the list: by the resolution from the Senate the number^oe is struck out and three inserted, in my opinion unnecessarily. Has any serious inconvenience resulted from the practice under the existing rule in the Constitution, as to the number of persons from whom a choice shall be made? We have heard of none. The inconvenience experienced arose from another source. This provision, therefore, of the amendment, appears to me exceptionable on this account. It is also exceptionable on account of the language used, which appears to me not to partake of that precision which at present characterizes every part of the Constitution.

The third provision contained in this resolution is more objectionable than the second, because it is predicated on the presumption that the House of Representatives will refuse to make a choice, in case the election of a President is devolved on them. It goes, in my opinion, to provide for * contingency that will never happen.

lam inclined to think that the designating principle will remove every solid objection lo the present provisions of the Constitution. I wish not to touch the principles of that instrument. Not changing its principles, I wish the election to remain Bslieretofore, with this sole difference, that the person voted for as President shall be designated by the Electors. I object also to this provision, as countenancing and inviting intrigue, and because it removes from the House of Representatives the responsibility under which they are placed I by the Constitution. It appears to me, that in case two rival candidates are presented lo the House for a choice, by means of the influence the Vice President ilie election may be protracted till the fourth of March, or that, io other word: the Vice President will become President.

I am sensible that this is only a proposition made to the several States, and that it must b submitted to their decision before it becomes part of the Constitution. At the same time,! am convinced, that going forth as an act of this Government, It will have great influence with the Stat< Legislatures, It ought, therefore, before it is submitted lo them, to he so correct and explicit that the collected wisdom of the country may be presumed to adopt it.

I repeat it, the first part of this amendmenttbai which establishes the designating priocipleisB desirable object. I am sorry that lam reduced to thealiernaiiveoflakine other provisions to obtain this, or otherwise to lose it. I, however, yet entertain a hope of accommodation, and thatgentlemen will suffer this principle, desired by the people, to go to them unencumbered. Under thi ope, f move a recommitment of the resolution I the Committee of the whole House, and that it be made the order for Monday next, thatwe may, in the meantime, send a message to the Senate to desire them to answer our resolution. The Senate may be induced, by this step, to take up our resolution and recede from theirs, when ihey find that it is not agreeable to this House. If after this measure onour part they prove tenacious. and insist on their resolution, we shall then have to meet the question of agreeing to it in the whole, or of abandoning everything. I do not know whether 1 shall not be induced to vote for the whole resolution, when I am satisfied that a better could not be baa. I do not perceive any reasonable objection to this course of procedure. I do not think a decision of this important subject should be precipitated. The resolution is certainly less perfect than its best friends could wish it; therefore, I think it proper to recommit it.

Mr. Lowndes. — It is with very great pleasure that I rise to second the motion of the honorable gentleman from Massachusetts, (Mr. EusTia,) because I believe if it is adopted it may be the means of preventing ibis House from precipitating itself into a dilemma in which it will not be very hon- -rable for ii to be placed. Iiis the practice of this House, 1 ;_ in ;.j ordinary imajnegj of legislation, to correct inaccuracies of expression when they are pointed out. Ought it then, sir, on so important an occasion as that of changing the Constitution, to pass a resolution replete with obscurity 7 Verbal criticisms are said to be unpleasant, and we have had enough of them. Suffice it to say, that gentlemen who press the nassingof tbisreKoIution in the very form in whicn it came from the Senate, give It a very different meaning. It is, sir, with equal pleasure I heard the very handsome eulogium passed upon our Constitution by the gentleman from Pennsylvania, who says he thinks It better than even the constitution of that country which has been termed the most stupendous monument of human wisdom. I hope,sir, that it it. I think, sir, that the gentleman might have gone on and applied to our Constitution the observation of a celebrated writer upon that of England, that, " though in some of its parts its policy was ' not obvious, and did not strike the superficial ob- ' server, yet, when tested by practice and experience, ' ence, was discovered to be founded in the great- ' est wisdom and ability." It is this feature of our Constitution which, above all others when examined into, is discovered to be founded in that wisdom and utility. Considering the Constitution was the deliberate result of the best talents and integrity of our country, exercised at a time when party spirit did not influence our Councils, I am unwilling to give into any alteration of it which is not dictated by an imperious necessity. I am unwilling, sir, to familiarize the public mind to innovations upon ibis compact. I am afraid, sir, that any alteration wc may make, however unimportant it may appear to us, may lay the foundation and make necessary other alterations, and that the nice adjustment of the different interests of the States may finally be destroyed. What, sir, is the result of the attempt to make a single alteration in your Constitution 1 For this House, certainly, when it passed the resolution sent to the Senate, did not contemplate anything more than a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President; but the resolution now before us contains three distinct, specific, and independent alterations. If we vary the principle established by the Constitution for the election of our Chief Magistrate, and by that means diminish the influence of the small States in the choice of that officer, what security have we that at another time the combined principle upon which the people of the different States are represented in this House may not also be varied, and the influence of the State which I have the honor of representing, and others similarlv situated, be lessened on this SoarT In the few observations which I have to submit to the House, I will endeavor to avoid a repetition of arguments which have been already advanced. The two leading objections made to the Constitution, as I understand them, and which are made the ground-work of the proposed alterations, are, that by the double ballot two persons may be returned to this House having an equal number of votes, and a majority of the votes of the Electors, and, in the event of this House not determining which of the two shall be the President, the peace and tranquillity of the country may be hazarded, and that the person not designated by the Electors for the President, may, by a concurrence of cir-

:es, be elevated to the Chair of State. Though the policy of a double ballot may not be obvious at first sight, from the best reflection I have been able to give the subject, I am of opinion that it is founded in wisdom, and the more I ex-

Ibe more confirmed I am in the opinion.

uncertainty which of the two candidates will be the President, Is to me a strong argument in of it, because it is calculated to render an access to the office of President, through the in«- medium of cabal and intrigue, less practicable, and thereby diminishes (he inducement, which would be held out hf the proposed amendments, to a resort 10 those practices: the intrigues of a candidate, if successful at all, may result in his being only the Vice President, a situation certainly not calculated to inspire or satisfy the expectations of an ambitious man. The object of the Constitution is to produce the election of Gt persons to be magistrates, and, compared with this great object. the elevation of a favorite character is of trifling importance. This country is not so destitute of talents that one man only can be found qualified for the office of President. I have no doubt that this country abounds with men eminently qualified. I have no doubt that every State in the Union can furnish men who would administer the Government advantageouly. The uncertainty who will be the President, will impose upon the Electors the obligation of voting for none but men of high character, and, if they do their duty, no inconvenience can arise to the country. It is true that two persons mav be returned to the House having an eqnnl number of votes, and a majority of the votes of the Electors, but it is an event which 1 think it improbablewill ever again occur. I think it much, more likely that the elections will eotne into this House in consequence of no candidate having a majority of votes, than from the cause first stated. The men heretofore elected to the office of President, were conspicuous characters during the Revolution; it was their conduct during that period which acquired them the confidence and attachment of the people; they must ere long be off the stage of life. It appears to me that the time is not far distant when the elections ' will be much more likely to come into this House from the defect of any candidate having a majority of votes, than from the other cause; but, Mr. Speaker, suppose has happened should again occur, and that two candidates with an equal number of votes should come into the House ; it will then be the duty of the House to determine which of them shall be President. We then assnme the character of Electors, we become Electors under the Constitution equally with the original Electors, and I do not see but that we should represent the wishes of the people as correctly; we are equally chosen by the people, and, in some of the Slates, more immediately than the original Electors. But I do not apprehend the mischief which some gentlemen have predicted from this occurrence. I trust that there will always be found more patriotism in this country, more of the spirit of conciliation, than would permit, by a pertinacious adherence to a favorite candidate, to endanger the peace of the country. The person not designed by the Electors may indeed be the j President; ; but if the Electors do their duty, and vote for none but men of high character, no injury | can result to the country. Establish the discriminating principle, and the Electors, calculating | upon the durability of human life, will, in their ' choice of Vice President, be influenced by considerations by which they ought not to be governed. They will select some popular man for

3 Other than those which Id fit hiui station of President. T II say he is 1 preside n credit in the Senate. But he ir f be called to the higher duties, and the exposed to all the evils of a weak and ineffici As the Constitution now stands, it may indeed happen that the person not designed by toe Electors may indeed be the President, but I think it very improbable. But if this resolution is adopted and becomes a part of the Constitution, it appears to me inevitable, that the person designed for the Vice President will be the President, and that under circumstances of very great disadvantage. The resolution goes to defeat the very object which has been stated as the ground of an alteration in the Constitution. It says, "and if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before (he fourth day of March next following, then the Vice President shall act as President, in the case of death or Constitutional disability of the President."

This part of the resolution, Mr Speaker, I think fraught with the greatest mischief to this country. We alter our Constitution to prevent, among Others reasons, the person from being President who was not intended by the Electors ; and in the same resolution we prescribe, under circumstances much more likely to happen, that the Vice President ' " as Pre-sident. But, sir, this is not all, you the interest of this Vice Presideni to pre- ■ vent an election taking place in this House. Von allure him by the greatest temptation which can beheld out, to exercise all the arts of inlrigae, bribery, and corruption, to elevate himself, and the . whole patronage of the Executive Is made subservient to his success. I do not think that a person who comes into office through these means will ever make a good Magistrate. He will not be at liberty to pursue those measures which the good of the country may require and his own judgment dictate. 1 think it the worst of all possible provisions that can be made. There are other objections to (his resolution. .but, as they are of minor importance and have already been noticed, I shall forbear making any comments upon them. The gentleman from Virginia said that the difficulty of obtaining amendments to the Constitution had been made an objection to it, but this resolution departs from the language of the Constitution, and instead of the ratification of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States, requires that Of threefourths of the Legislatures of the several States to its adoption. In every point of view in which I have considered this resolution, it appears to me objectionable, nor can I see that necessity exists for any alteration which alone in my opinion can justify us in meddling with the Constitution.

Many gentlemen have disclaimed being influenced upon this occasion by party views or considerations. I am unwilling to impute such views I to any gentleman, particularly those who disclaim them ; but I think the House ought in justice to its own character to avoid even the appearance I of its being actuated (when altering the Constitution) by improper motives, and taking up the subject at this time, when the election of a President is so Dear, does exhibit an appearance not jety favorable. If it was for no other reaaon, 1 would wish this resolution deferred until the next Presidential election is over j it might then be taken up and acted upon without any imputation or appearance of its being designed to meet a parMr. Elliot. — While the present subject is under discussion I shall not quit it until hurled from my •est by the hand of death. As to the doctrine of submitting to the will of a majority, when that majority itself is not ascertained, I must again conaidermyseif as opposing a torrent which threatens the destruction of my country. I have listened with extreme pleasure to the remarks of the gentleman from Massachusetts (Mr. Eustis.) Today the terms Federal and Republican have been introduced into the debate. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr. Grggo.) I am persuaded, in the privilege he exercised on this occasion, did not mean to use any improper terms. That gentleman has had the candor to say that one of the majority having risen in the debate it ought to be protracted till every member is heard. It is never my custom to adopt the language of admiration; panegyric is one thing, truth another. That the proposition now under consideration comes from a republican quarter cannot be doubted. I glory that the gentleman who made it is an eminent republican, who stood in the high places of danger when we, as (be poet says, "were mewling and puking in our nurses' arms." 1 rejoice that we can take ground so high, assumed by one whose republicanism cannot be questioned. What objection can gentlemen bave to recommit a most important proposition, and to postpone it for three or four days ?

Is not this republican, to invite to cool reflection the agitated minds of the members of this House and of the people ? If this is not republican, then what is 1 The object we have in view is most decidedly, most gloriously republican. What is that object? To support the dignity of the Representaiiveaof the people. Thislrepeai, b gloriously republican. I am glad such an opportunity is presented to evince to the American people, the sincerity of our republican principles; those principles I will ever support, in imitation of the bright example of the Revolutionary patriot who has made this motion. I will die at my post, if necessary, to support them. Sometime since, after long and deliberate discussion, we passed a resolution which was some weeks ago sen! to the Senate. There it seems to sleep the sleep of death. The Senate have not deigned to inform us, whether they have deigned to bestow on it a moment's attention. It has been superseded by a resolution to which I trust in God ibal the American people are not prepared to agree ; by a resolution bearing on the face of it the most manifest want of precision and of haste, that I ever saw; and we are now told that it is disrespectful to inquire whether the Senate will or will not bestow the least attention. 1 have no wish to wander into the wide Geld of discussion; I wish only to make a few observations in favor of the reference. The object of Ibe motion has been already stated. It has been stated that it comes from a republican quarter, from one who cannot be considered as a federal man, or as actuated by a desire to defeat the great object of the amendment. It may further be stated, that the prospect begins to brighten ; the dark clouds which yesterday hovered over us have passed away. I have been assured by several republican members, that it is their sincere wish that this amendment should be altered before it is passed. I know of one republican member, from the republican State of Pennsylvania, (Mr. HooB,) who desires anopportuniiy of introducing an amendment; such a one as, if adopted, may remove his objections to the resolution. This is a forcible argument in favor of a recommitment, and can only be answered by a recurrence to the principle of the omnipotence of a majority. Unless amended, I feel a strong presentiment that the resolution on the table will not obtain a Constitutional majority. I believe it will be rejected by republican men, on republican principles, as anlf republican, as tending to destroy the Constitution] and to introduce intrigue, venality, and corruption. I believe the great mass of the American people to be virtuous, but I believe there are bad men in both parties. I believe there are in both parties some men of aspiring and unprincipled genius, who. if advanced to the banks of the Rubicon, would not, as Cesar did, pause for a moment. Believing that this motion comes from a republican quarter, that it will have a republican effect, by preserving our Republican Constitution, anil being one who can never be in favor of anything not republican, I must support this motion, hoping there is that spirit of wisdom in the House that will insure its adoption.

Mr. Gbuoo. — I understand the gentleman as saying it would save time to send a message to the Senate to require an answer to our resolution. I did believe the gentleman too well versed in parliamentary proceedings to fall on this idea. I do not recollect such a proceeding ever to have occurred. Each House will undoubtedly act as they see proper.

After a few observations by several gentlemen on the propriety of sending a message to the Senate, as intimated by Mr. Edbtis^ the question was taken on the preliminary motion to recommit, and passed in the negative — ayes 49, noes 59. Mr. GoDDARD. — After what passed in the House yesterday, respecting (he resolution on your table, and after the remarks which have fallen from the gentleman from Pennsylvania, (Mr, Qheoo,) I presume it will not be thought strange that gentlemen opposed to a concurrence with the Senate in the passage of this resolution, should express to the House their reasons for that opposition. 1 rise Mr. Speaker, to do this. Before I enter into a consideration of the merits of the resolution, let me notice a remark which felt from the gentleman from Pennsylvania, that the time had been when the adoption of the discriminating principle, iu the choice of President and Vice President vna, to use the gentleman's own expression, a federal measure. Now the gentleman considers it as ■ republican measure, using his own terms of distinction® But sir, iftiie time has been when it was a favorite measure of opposite parties, 1 will venture to say that the time never was, when the subject has been fully discussed, examined, and understood. Prior to the last Presidential election, and when I suppose the gentleman would consider this as a federal measure, a resolution containing the discriminating principle came from the Legislature of New Hampshire to that of Connecticut, of which at the time I was a member, and that Legislature, although in the language of the gentleman, it was a federal measure, rejected it, I believe unanimously. It was at that lime opposed by those who chose to call themselves republicans. The subject was not then very fully discussed, and I believe was rejected rather from a repugnance to innovate upon the principles of our Constitution than from a full perception of all the beauties and advantages which belong to this feature in the Constitution. But, sir, ever since that time, the more the provisions of the Constitution, as it now stands, have been examined, the more beautiful, useful, and wise, do they appear, and the more reason have I had to be satisfied with the vote then given. Let the simple principle be stated, and almost any person, without much examiDation, would ask why shall not the Electors be permitted to distinguish by their votes which man is intended for the office of President, and which for Vice President? What good reason can be given 9 This measure is now said to be called for by the voice of the people; it has received , thesanction of several State Legislatures, yet, as I have never seen any newspaper discussion of it, nor any debates of those Legislatures, I am inclined to . believe, that it has been acted upon by first impressions only, and the alteration been considered as proper, without much inquiry into the motives which induced the framers of the Constitution to adopt its provision.

Let me premise further, that I consider it as our duty to proceed with the same care, and examine with the same deliberation, as if the proposed amendment became, by our vote, a part of the Constitution. I state this, because I understood gentleman considered us as only initiating a proposition, which could not become part of the Constitution until it shall be ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States. This is correct; but the inference drawn from it, that it is, therefore, unnecessary for us very seriously and carefully to consider it, before we give it the sanction of our votes, is not correct. The Coniiitution has here erected one of its most powerful barriers against innovating upon its principles. It must not only be agreedto by us, but two-thirds of both branches of Congress must concur in proposing amendments. If we adopt any other rule of conduct than that of giving to this proposition the most deliberate attention, it will be dangerous in The Legislatures of some of the States call upon Congress to propose amendments. The Senate take up the subject and agree to it, because the States, and the people require It. It comes to us, under the confirmed influence of the vote of the Senate, and the Legislatures. We adopt it, because they recommend it ; and we send it to the States, with accumulated credit. They adopt it because we recommend it. In this way, sir. It will, like the description which we have of fame, acquire strength by going. It is, therefore, our duty seriously to examine the merit of the amendment, and not give the sanction of Congress to an improper resolution, under an idea that, if it is wrong, the States themselves will reject it.

Received in this point of light, the resolution on your table assumes a very important aspect. It goes to change entirely a fundamental prinei' pie of that Consiiioiioo, under which, for more than fourteen years, the people of the United States have enjoyed unexampled national happiness and prosperity. It goes to change that Constitution in a part of all others the most delicate and dangerous, that which respects the choice of a Chief Magistrate, to whom is confided the whole Executive power of an extensive country.

I consider it as more dangerous to change the principles in the Constitution by which a Chief Magistraieiselecied, than any other; and a mode once adopted, ought not be altered until experience has proved lo us its disadvantages. Gentlemen seem disposed to join in extolling the virtue, wisdom, and integrity of the sages and patriots who framed the Constitution. Why not then permit ibetr work to remain untouched until we feel or clearly perceive the evils which it does, or may produce? The framers of the Constitution adopted the principle which we are about to explode, at a time when no party spirit prevailed on this subject; when they had no rival candidates in view to fill the office. They discarded the discriminating principle, which we are about to adopt when all eyes were directed to and all hearts united in the man who was designed to become the first President of the United States under tbe Constitution. And nothing shows in a stronger point of light, how highly they valued the prinei* pie of election, by double ballot, contained in the Constitution, than that they were willing even to put at hazard the election of that man, rather than to lose a principle which was calculated to give future peace, tranquillity, and liberty totheircountry. We are now about to destroy this principle. Before we do this, let us pause and inquire, what are the evils to be feared under the Constitution, as it now is t What are the benefits to be gained by the alteration proposed 1 I say feared, because no evils have as yet been experienced. Gentlemen tell us that the Constitution as it now stands is calculated to promote intrigue, venality, and corruption, and that the amendment is to give a deathblow to these enemies of our repose and Republican institutions. If this be true, it is certainly a formidable objection to the Const iiniional proviv ion. But when gentlemen say this, they deal only in general terms. Why not condescend to tell as how the Constitution is calculated to produce these evils? Has it been shown to us, by experience, tbat such is its operation 7 If so, at what period of our Government has it done ill When did this intrigue, venality, and corruption show itself? At the first or second Presidential election 7 The dioughi will not be harbored fur a moment. At the third? No one will pretend it. Atlhefourth? The friends of this amendment will not surely say that the present Chief Magistrate owes his election to intrigue, venality, or corruption. Reference bis been often had to the last Presidential election for instruction OD this subject. But what does that prove to us 1 Why, that two men, whom the friends of the present amendment chose to select, «ud recommended to the people of the United States, were elected ; and that they now fill the very offices for which gentlemen themselves say they were intended. Experience then proves to us, not that any evil hasactually occurred, but that there was a period when they dreaded an evil. And. what was that evil 1 They feared that their own favorites might have been misplaced ! On a review of our proceedings under the Constitution, it cannot be surely said, that experience has proved to us that the provisions of the Constitution as theyuow stand are pernicious. If experience does not furnish this evidence, are gentlemen capable of pointing out to us clearly how the Constitution la capableof producing the evils which they fear? I heard asuppoaiiion stated, that hereafter a party might arise m this country, hostile to a republican goveiDOieal, and favorable to introducing a monarchy, and that the Constitution must be amended lo prevent this. To be able to prevent this is one of the very reasons why the Constitution ought not to be altered. If such a party should ever arise in this country, they will either be a majority or a minority. If a ^majority, the amendment to the Constitution now proposed to be adopted furniabes them with the ready, means of designating their man, without competition or embarrassment, and elevating him to the Chief Magistracy. But suppose they are a minority 1 Leave the Constitution as it now is, and they will be compelled to have for their President one of two republican candidates, who shall be presented to them by a republican majority. The Constitution has therefore erected a most effectual barrier against the intrigue and corruption of any aspiring individual, who may be disposed to trample on the liberties of his country. But the moment you introduce the designating principle such an individual may proceed directly towards his object— sel all his engines to work, and operate with effect, having no competitor and but a single object in view.

Suppose a proposition should be made to alter the Constitution, so as to elect one man President for life 7 Would not gentlemen startle at it? il 7 1 think they would, and yet, in my view of the subject, the proposition on your table falls little short of doing it. The advantages which the designating principle holds out, will always be in favor of the present incumbent of office. When I say present incumbent, I would be understood to refer to the Chief Magujt rate for the lime being— atany time. Once elevated that high station, and the double ballot being abolished, he will, by means of his extensive powers, and the patronage which he possesses, always have the means of exercising a species of indirect corruption, if he should be ever disposed to use them. Preserve the Constl* lution as it now is, and he will have little inducement improperly to exert himself to maintain his station, oeoause he mnal always be uncertain whether he can operate to effect. 1 am therefore, clearly of opinion that the provisions of the Con* stilulion as it was originally adopted, are wisely calculated to prevent intrigue and corruption ; and that the amendment on your table. If substituted in lieu of those provisions, is calculated to open the door to those evils, and perpetuate the Kx«c- utive power in the hands of a single man ; and am therefore opposed to it.

I am not disposed, Mr. Speaker, to go at this time into arguments which have already been advanced, with much force, respecting the influence of this change upon the rights of great and small States — I can add nothing to their weight by a repetition. But I may be permitted again to call the attention of the House to the important and singular additions which the Senate have annexed to the discriminating principle. We sent a resolution to the Senate in which we declared that, in case no choice should be made by the Electors, a. President should be chosen from the five persons highest on the list. The Senate have not adopted this, but sent down to us the number three. Without attendingat this time to verbal criticism, or adverting to the extreme ambiguity of the sentence which contains the number or numbers ot g."J or the classes of persons, out of which the if Representatives are to choose, in case no election is made by the Electors ; f will only say, that whether three in that sentence is made to refer lo persons, or to classes of persons, highest on the list, it is, in either view, the most objectionable number which the Senate could have selected. I am not disposed to cultivate local feelings, or distinctions arising from geographical situations, but, sir, such is the extent of this country, such its diversity of interests, manners, and habits, that parties will rise up hereafter, influenced by such considerations. Look at the United States, and consider what may, and probably will be, the great sections of the Union most likely to be united in their views respecting a Chief Magistrate. The Eastern States will form one section, the Middle, another, the Southern a third, and the Western, a fourth. This last, from its great accessions and rapid increase, will soon be the most influential of the whole. Suppose each of these sections of ibe Union should set up their candidates fur the offices of President and Vice President — from a disunion, no election is made — a choice devolves on the House of Representatives. By this resolution a choice must be made from the candidates presented by three of these sections of the Union, to the total exclusion i^ ibe fourth ; and which that fourth will be, is not difficult to predict The adoption of this part of the resolution is, on this account, extremely objeetionable.

Bat, sir, the Senate have in this resolution proposed to alter the Constitulioo in another important particular, and have varied essentially from the resolution whicbwe seotto th^m. No less, in effect, than to take the choice from us, the immediate Representatives of the people, and assume it to themselves. And we are called upon to submit to thisi ] speak not now under the impression of State, or any other local feeling, but as the Representative free people. Incase no choice b made by the Electors, tb« Constitution has confided that choice to the Representatives of the people, without even the concurrence of the Senate. By the resolution on your table, we surrender that power wholly, in certain events, to the Senate. Having stated this objection on a former day, when that part of the resolution was under diS' GUssion, a gentleman from Virginia. (Mr. Randolph,) in reply to my objection, gave two answers— One, which he considered as conclusive, was, that altnou jh the Senate, if this amendment becomes part of the Constitution, may elect a Vice President, who may become President of theUailed States for four years, yet that this could only happen upon a failure of the House of Reprelen tali res to do their duty, and make a choice. Did the gentleman, before he gave this answer, consider that the provision in this resolution, to which the objection is taken, is predicated wholly on the idea that the House of Representatives will fail to make a choice? The provision itself supposes that a case will happen, in which no choice will be made by the House of Representatives. It is introduced to guard against the evils which it is supposed may result from such an event; and is wholly idle and nugatory, unless we are to suppose that such a case may happen. Another answer which the gentleman gave to this objection, but which he did not consider as conclusive as the former, was, that in case an election should devolve on the House of Representatives, the vote must be taken by States; and he says that the Senate are peculiarly the Representatives of the States, and will be as faithful guardians of their rights on such an occasion as the members of this House.

Is this, sir, a reason for our resigning to that body a power which the Constitution has confided lo asf It is true that the Senate, In performing this high duty, may act as wisely and with as much circumspection as the Representatives would, under the same circumstances.

But l^t it be recollected that they are chosen for a much longer period than the Representatives, and may not feel the same responsibility as they would. Besides, the Senate would not vote by States when electing theirPresideot, who may become the President. It is true, that all the States are equally represented in that body, but it does not follow that the vote would be taken, as in this House, by States, A member from a State may be absent; if present they may disagree in sentiment. That may happen in this House, it is true, where the Representatives from any Stale shall be equally divided. But the States here, being represented by much greater and generally equal numbers, it is much less likely toflbappen. The election, therefore, in almost all its features, willbeesseniially changed, in case the amendment should prevail. And 1 believe the time has been when the people of this country would have startled at the idea of conferring on the Senate of the United States the power of giving them, in any event, a Chief Magistrate. But gentlemen say it is Desirable to provide for the contingency of no choice being made, either by the Electors or the House of Representatives, that the United States may not be without a Chief Magistrate, Admit it. But why not provide for a new election immediately by Electors, and designate some officer of the Government to administer in the meantime? This is easily done, and would be much preferable to taking, for four years, such President as the Senate may give us.

As, therefore, I can see no necessity for resigning this power to the Senate, of giving to the United States a President in any event, I shall feel constrained to resist this insidious claim of theirs, by my vote against the resolution which they have sent us.

Mr. G. W. Campbell.— — When this resolution came from the Senate to this House, it was not my intention to have spoken on the subject. I had determined to vote in favor of it, and let the measure itself justify my conduct in so doing. But so much has been said on this floor with regard to the interests of small and large States, and the effect which it is insisted this resolution will have the rights of the former, that I conceive it my duty, having the honor to represent (in part) one of those small States, to stale some of the reasons that induce me to vote for the resolution, and to be of opinion that its adoption will not, in the manner contended for, infringe the rights of the small States, or diminish their relative weight in the General Government. I am, sir, of opinion that our Government was formed by the people of the United States, in their capacity as such, by their immediate representatives in the General Convention, and not by the several States convened in their State •■re The words of the Constitution are: "'We, the people of the United Slates, in order to form a more perfect Union," 6lc., and not we, the United Slates, in our Slate capacity, which I presume would have been the language used had the framers of the Constitution intended to have formed a Government for the States united in their State eap»- cities; and though the State interests, as such, are regarded in our Government and their sovereignties represented, whereby it may be considered as partaking in some degree of the federative principle, yet this will not prove our Constitution to be a Confederation of States, in the extent contended for in their State capacities; but only shows that the framers of the Constitution intended, by thus regarding the Slate rights and sovereignties as such, to qualify and limit the operations of the General Government with regard to the several State Governments and their respective interests and rights. The laws that are made by the General Government are binding on the people •" the United States at large, and not on the Stale Governments; for though the State Governments are limited by, and bound not to violate the Constitution of the United States, yet they certainly cannot be controlled, or in any manner bound by ibe legislative acts of the General Government. This, t conceive, shows, in a very strong manner, that the Union is not a mere Confederation of Slates. And considering ibe subject in this view will not tend to produce a consolidation of the General Government so as to encroach upon the rights of ibe Slate sovereignties ; for the operations of the General GoV' emment being felt by the people only in their individual capacities, the State Governments will not be affected thereby soas to infringe their powers or endanger their independence; provided the General Government, in exercising its legislative powers, keep within those bounds prescribed by Ibe Constitution, and does not assume the right of legislating on subjects that properly belong to, and are cognizible tiy the respective State Governments. 1 will here observe, that the object of every free Government is to lay down a rule of conduct for the people who live under it, by the observance of which, their general welfare and happiness may be promoted. Whenever, therefore, the intentions of the people in framing their Government can be ascertained, I conceive it the duty of those who administer the Government to pursue those intentions as nearly as possible. I have always considered to be ibe intention of the framers of the Constitution, and the true spirit of that instrument, that the Chief Magistrate shall be chosen by the people, through their Electors, and not by the States represented in this House ; uid that the provision for electing the President by the House of Representatives, in case no election should be made by the Electors, was intended to guard against an event that might happen, which, if unprovided for, would stop the operations of Government, and not as a mode of election that was desired by any portion of the Union, or contemplated to be introduced when it could be avoided. I conceive, therefore, such measures ought to be adopted as would prevent, as much as possible, the necessity of resorting to that mode of election. It is certainly of primary importance that the people should have that person to govern them that possesses their confidence in the highest degree. In him they will repose the protection of their rights and the security of their interests, and will acquiesce with the greatest readiness in ibe just measures he may pursue. It will, I presume, be admitted that in all free Governments the will of the majority must be considered for ibe purposes of Government as the will of the nation, and that it ought, therefore, to prevail, and control the will of the minority when opposed to it. This, I conceive, sir, is a fundamental principle in our Government. I am, therefore, of opinion that whatever part of our Constitution is found in its operations to contravene this principle ought to be altered, and so modified that the will of the majority of the people should be pursued. This, I conceive, sir, is the case with that part of the Constitution prescribing the mode of electing the President and Vice President now proposed (0 be amended ; it puts it in the power of the minority to control the will of (he majority, and elevate a man to the Presidential chair who did not receive a vote from the majority for that office. According toihepresentprovision of the Constitution, two persons are voted for bylfae Electors for President and Vice President, without designating which of them is voted for as President and which as Vice President Suppose the majority nominate two candidates, the one intended for President and the other for Vice President, and vote for them accordingly. It is well known that the Electors, who are presumed to express the will of the people, have in view at the time they vote which of these persons they intend shall be President and which Vice President, though they are not permitted so to designate them in voting. In this case the minority, by voting for the person intended by the majority to be the Vice President, and not voting for the person by them intended to be President, will contravene the intentions of the majority, and place in the Presidential chair a person not designed by (he majority, or by one of them, for that office, nor in most cases agreeably to the minority, but preferred by them in consequence of not possessing in so high a degree the confidence of the majority as the person by them intended for President, and therefore most likely to favor (he measures of the minority. And (he person thus elected would, in all probability, become suspected by both parties, and possess the confidence of neither. Hence a very serious inconvenience would arise; the majority, being disappointed, would become dissatisfied, and the minority would not have the man of their choice, but one from whom they expect some favor, in consequence of having contributed to his elevation ; and it is confidently believed the peace of the nation would, in such a be more endangeied than if a person decidedly other inconveniences likely to arise from the present mode ofelecting the Chief Magistrate of the nation, I am decidedly of opinion that the Electors ought lo designate by name the person they vote for as President and the person they vote for as Vice President. By this mode, a fair and unequivocal expression of the public wtU may bcobcained.and will have its due weight — the man declared best qualified by the general voice of the nation to direct the Government, will by that voice be placed in the Presidential chair ; he will be more likely than any other to give general salfaciion in conducting the affairs of State; and this will very much contribute to promote the general welfare and happiness of the people.

I will notice another reason here, which 1 have not heard mentioned, that in my view has considerable weight in proving the expediency of adop^ ing ibe designating principle. I am of opinion the election of the Chief Magistrate of a nation ought not to be left in such uncertainty, that it would depend on a mere casualty or chance who should be the person chosen to that office. This is the case according lo the present Constitutional piOTiaioQ for electing the President. A difference of opinion among the majority, with regard to the person who shall be Vice President, or a greater unanimity in their choice of a person as Vice President, than in that of President, may, contrary to the design of the Electors, by giving the person designed as Vice President the greatest number of electoral votes, (though all were given ■with the view of making him Vice President only,) operate to the exclusion from the Chair of State of the person intended by the majority, and also of the person wished for by the minority, to fill that place, and elevate to the First Magistracy a man who did not receive one electoral sir, is contrary to the representative principle in Government, which I understand be, that the sense of the nation should be made known, by a fair and unequivocal expression of the public will, and when thus made known should govern. But it has been said that the minority ought to have some share in the Government, and haveachanceof obtaining the man of their choice to fill the second office in Government, if they should not expect to succeed in electing him to the first, or at least, that they should have an optbe present niodc of voting for those officers, without designation, is calculated to answer these purposes. I am, sir, of opinion the voice of the minority should be expressed, and fairly heard in Government, and that it should have its due weight consistent with the principles on which that Government is founded; but I am not willing that the minority should rule the nation, or have it in their power to defeat the will of the majority, as I conceive this would sap the very foundation of our Government; and the present mode of electing the President and Vice President, without designation, cannot strengthen the minority, or give them a share of the Administration of Government, in any other wav than by enabling them to contravene the will of the majority. They have not thereby a fairer prospect of obtatning the person of their choice to fill the second office in our Government, than they have to fill the first; to succeed in their choice as to either, they must probably vote for those nominated by the majority ; and the ultimate consequence is, that if they succeed, the majority must yield to their wishes; therefore, according to the present mode of election, the major part of the society have only the power of oomtnating, and it will, ia most cases, rest with the minor part to make the election from such nomination. This I conceive, sir, does not accord with the general sense of the American nation in theory, and will not operate more to the general satisfaction in practice. But it is insisted the proposed amendment ia calculated to infringe the rights of the small States, that they have certain advantages secured to them by the present provision of the Constitution, directing the Electors of President and Vice President lo vote for two persons without designation; and in requiring the votes in the House of Representatives, for President, to be given by States, in case the event .should bring the election into that House, and also, in that the rrea< ideni is lo be chosen in such event from the five highest on the list of those voted for. These provisions are said to constitute a part of the original compact between the States, and it is insisted, that although this amendment preserves the right of voting by States in this House, yet it diminishes the chances of the election coming into this House, and changes the number of persons from whom the President is to bechosenin such anevent, from the five highest on the list, to the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three. on the list of those voted for as President; and thereby, it is pretended, affects the interest of the small States, as they will not so frequently have the opportunity of exercising the power of voting for President by States, should this amendment be adopted, as they otherwise would have had; and also in that they will be more limited in the number from whom the choice is to be made. These are the only arguments I have heard advanced on this part of the subject by the opposite side of the House, that appear to me to possess sufficient plausibility to merit the examination, and these it is confidently believed, upon a fair investigation, will not support the objections made to this amendment, on the ground of its affecting the interests of small States.

It is certainly true that our Constitution, in some . of its features, partakes of the nature of a compact, bottomed on a compromise of powers and rights between the small and large States; and this compromise will be found to be confined chiefly to the share which the several States have in the National Legislature, and the consequent effect which that modification produces with regard to the number of Electors of President and Vice President to which each Stale is entitled, according to the provisions of the Constitution ; but it will not follow, as a necessary consequence, that the right of voting by States in this House for President, (in the event of the choice being left to the House.) was considered as an advantage granted to the small Slates in order to induce them to come into the Union. I cannot be of opinion that this was considered, by the Convention who formed the Constitution, as an equivalent given to the small Slates for any rights or powers by them surrendered to the General Government. If the small States considered it so, they must have esteemed those rights and powers thus surrendered of very small importance indeed. For the event in which they could have the opportunity of exercising the right this mode of election secures to them (of voting by States,) is extremely uncertain, and might not occur once in a century. And though it has once happened, it is evident the small States did not in that case unite, nor did the interests of the U^ and small States seem to be Ukea into view as opposed to each other. But, sir. let me ask what real benefit eatt Ibe small States expect to derive from this inoile of election, more than the large States 7 Have they the power to bring the election into the House of Re pre Ren ta lives at their pleasure 1 They have not. It is a mere casualty, in which the small States can have no more agency than the large Stales. But what interest have the small Slates in bringing the election into the House of R«presenta lives if it were in their power? Is it very probable that in such an event, there would bea candidate from either of the small Slates on the list of those from whom this House would be authorized to choose the President 1 I presume it b not. But is it to be expected that the small States would in such an event combine, so as to succeed in eleciinga President in opposition to ike large States 1 Would the small Stales to the east and northeast, unite with those to the south and west ■) This may be possible, but certainly it is not very probable. Their positions are remote from each other, and each neighboring on large States; their local interests are different, andtheydiSerin politics as much from each other, at least, as they do from the large States. I am then, sir, inclined to conclude, that all the benefit the small States could expect to derive from the election of President coming into this House, would be only the opportunity of throwing their weight and influence, as each of them might feel disposed, into the electoral scales, in favor of such of the candidates from the large States as might be most agreeable to them. And this cannot be deemed such an interest as would Induce the small . States, at the least possible hazard of the national tranquillity, even to desire such an event. But, I am decidedly of opinion, it is the substantial interest of the small States that the election should be decided by the Electors, and not come into this House. It is their interest that the Government should be administered according to its genuine principles, that no jarring interests should so come into collision with each other, as to produce a convulsion in the nation or endanger the fate of the Union. So long as this is the case, so long will the small States and their respective rights be in perfect security; and if they ever should be in danger, it will be when the bonds of union between the States are broken asunder, and each left to protect its own interests. But 1 am of opinion the mode of voting by States is productive of advantages of a different kind from those contended for bv the opponents to this amendment. It was probably intended to guard the interests of theamall States in some degree, in case the event (hould happen of the election coming into this House, and not as an advantage to the small States, that would induce them to endeavor to bring about that event ; it was intended as a wholesome rule in applying a remedy in the case of a possible evil, and not as a measure to invite that very evil that seems to have been dreaded. It was probably considered by the framers of the Constitution. that, in case the election came into the House of Represeota lives, unless the votes were taken by Slates, the weight and influencce of the large States would render them too powerful for the small, because the large States could, if disposed, more easily act in concert, and unite their powers and influence in order to effect their purpose, as there would be but few of them necessary to constitute B majority of votes in this House, and it would be more difficult for the small States, being more numerous, ftod of course their interests more variant, to combine so as to act in concert. To this may be added that the mode of voting by States is less liable to the inconveniences that might arise from voting per capita in so larg« a body as this is, on such an occasion, which would in some degree partake of the nature of a popular election. From this view of the subject, I conceive it will also result, that the framers of the Constitution in fixing on the five highest on the list of those voted forasPresideot and Vice President, as the number of candidates from whom this House should choose the President, in case the event should render such a choice necessary, could not have intended thereby to confer any favor on ibe small States, more than they would have done by fixing on the two, three, or four highest on the list ; as it has been shown that the small States could not be benefitted by the election being decided in this House. lam therefore decidedly of opinion, that the relative interests of the large and small States had no influence whatever in fixing the number five in the Constitution. But I conceive the number was adopted by the framers of the Constitution as the least exceptionable to the States in general, when connected with the present mode of voting for President and Vice President without designation. According to that mode of election, three persons might have each a majority of the votes of all the Electors, and If the whole number of votes be an equal number, (which will be the case at the next election,) four persons might divide the votes equally, each having within one of a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and this is a case that might have been considered as likely to lake place, upon the supposition that two persons would be nominated and voted for by one political party, and two other persons by the opposite partjr; therefore, less than the four highest on the list could not with any reason have been adopted, from whom this House should choose the President in case no election was made by the Electors; ; and the framers of the Constitution thought it advisable to add one to this number, making it the five highest on the list, conceiving, in all probability, that this would have an effect to prevent an equality of electoral votes being given for different persons, and thereby be more likely to produce an election by the Electors. It must also be taken into view that from this number of candidates (five) both the President and Vice President are to be chosen, and on that ground might be considered as small a number as could reasonably have been fixed upon. Here, sir, I cannot help noticinga circumstance in this debate which presents to me a very singular aspect, and that ia, that most of those who have opposed this amend* meat on the ground of its affecting the interests of the small States, are Representatives from la r^ States. These would seem to become the protectors of the rights of the small Stales, as if they were not sufficiently tenacious of their ~ interests. Is this an-—'" ety m ■" those ■'■ gentlemen, ■ for the security of the small States and their rights really serious, or is it intended to awaken" ihi fears of the small States and alarm them, in order to defeat the proposed amendment? ? I trust ifae Hepresentativescrf small States will see their true interests, and will not be influenced by such measures. With regard to the verbal criticisms made DD the manner in which this resolution is expressed, I deem it unnecessary to enter into any examination of them, except so far as they relate to the number of candidates from whom the President is to be chosen by this House, in case the event should render such a choice necessary. As the resolution was printed and laid on our tables, the words alluded to are, " from the persons having the highest number, not exceeding three, on the list," d^c. In this, the word number, being singular, might occasion some doubt in the construction of this clause, whether the word three related to person as its antecedent, or was intended to relate to number; but as the words in this resolution as it came from the Senate, and as it is now considered under discussion, are, "from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list," &c., the word numbers being plural, the word three must relate to numbers as Its antecedent, (with which it agrees,) not to persons; and the word numbers evidently means aggregate numbers, each number including all the Totes given for one candidate, or for all the candidates that shall have an equal number of votes. Therefore, the " persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list," &c., will include all those persons whose names shall be on the three highest numbers on the list of those voted for as President, and may not exceed three persons; but in case of different candidates having an equality of votes, may be more than three, four, or five. Hence I conceive the difference between the three highest numbers, and the five highest persons on the list will not be very material, as there will seldom be more than five persons on the three highest numbers, and there may frequently be more than three persons ; and as there are some members in this House who would prefer the nre persons highest on the list, and others iroold prefer the three highest numbers, while some would prefer the two or three persons high est on the list, Ac., I trust this will not be considered as a material objection, as it seems to come as nigh the wish of a majority of this House as any number that could be adopted. 1 should myKit, sir, (as I had the honor of stating in this Houseon a former occasion,) prefer the two highest persons on the list of those voted for, dtc., under certain modifications, in case of an equality of Totes, to any other number, because it would confine the choice of President to such persons as should appear to have the strongest evidence of possessing the confidence of the people. But I do consider the difference between two and three persons, or between three persons and three numbers, or between three numbers and five persons, of sufficient importance to induce nie not to vote for either, in order to obtain the principal object of this amendment, that of designating the persons voted for as President and Vice President. I will only claim the further indulgence of the House while I make a very few remarks on the provisions in this resolution, by which the Vice President is to act as President, in case the House of Representatives shall not make a choice of President. 1 am free to declare that I would have been as well satisfied with the resolution had this provision not been annexed lo it. But I cannot consider this as introducing a dangerous principle, or likely to produce any real inconvenience. It only provides who shall administer The Government in the event of the House of Representatives failing to elect a President, by which the election is brought into this House. The House must next fail lo make a choice, before the fourth of March next following, and a Vice President must also have been elected before this provision can operate, so as to vest the Vice President with the reins of Government, which seems lo be the event so much dreaded — but one which may not happen for ages. But it is said that this provision will have a tendency to introduce a scene of corruption into the House ; that the friends of the Vice President will endeavor to prevent the election of the President in order that the Vice President may succeed to that office ; that this will be effected by the promises of lucrative offices, of favors, &c., or in fact by bare corruption. This is indeed supposing the members of this House will become more degenerate than the mass of mankind. I should presume we might rely on their continuing to possess as much public virtue as is usual in public bodies, and if this be admitted, I conceive there can be no serious cause of apprehension from this provision. But the arguments advanced, if they prove anything, would prove too much ; they would prove, with almost equal force, that you must not provide for a successor to the President in the cases of his death, resignation, or inability, lest the person appointed to succeed him should be induced to cause his assassination, or use other corrupt means to produce his removal from office, in order to open the way for himself to ascend the Presidential chair. But this would certainly be destroying the necessary and useful provisions of Government on s mere possibility, and it is trusted groundless fears, of their being abused.