December 8, 1803

The gentleman last up, (Mr. Oonn&RO,) has asked if any inconveniences had been experienced from the present provision in the Constitution for electing President and Vice President? To this inquiry I might answer, that if this part of the Constitution be evidently defective, and calculated to produce inconveniences in practice, and such as are of a very serious nature to society, it would be extremely impolitic to wait until we had experienced all the evil consequences that would arise from it before we attempted to make the necessary amendment. I should suppose we ought to apply the remedy as soon as we discovered the defect, and thereby prevent those evils may further answer that ' , .. late occasion, well remembered by every gentleman in this House, a very serious inconvenience was experienced by the Union in consequence of the operations of that part of the GonsliluiioD sow proposed to be amended. On this occasion the Legislative functions of the Government were suspended, and the aspect of affairs seemed to excite very serious apprehensions in the most delibate minds, with regard to the external peace of the nation ; the feelings of the American people were wound up to the highest degree of sensibility; they felt indignant at the attempt so obsIi> nately made to contravene their wishes, and deprive them of the person of their choice to direct the affairs of the nation ; and the agitation of the public mind rose to such a height as seemed to threaten a general convulsion. In consequence of this event, the voice of the American people, from almost every quarter of the Union, has called for the amendment ; the same sentiment has been expressed by the Legislatures of most of the States; and are not these the strongest evidence of the general wish of the nation? Will you then, sir, when the voice of united America seems to demand this amendment, refuse to comply with that demand T Will members of this House, on account of a mere verbal difference of phraseology, or an unimportant provision for a case not likely to occur in an age, refuse their assent to a measure embracing a principle necessary to secure the tranquillity of the Union ? I trust they will not. I hope we shall in some degree yield up our preference for particular modes of expression, and our opposition to a provision of minor consideration, in order to unite in adopting, so far as respects us, this amendment, and in so doing, perform an act that will be agreeable to, and joyfully hailed by nine-tenths of the American people.

Mr. HooE having declared himself in favor of the principle of designation, but adverse to the other provision of the resolution, moved to recommit it, for the purpose of obtaining the following amendment :

"Forthe term of one year; an extraordinary election of President and Vice President,sha!l be made by Electors, who shall be chosen in the BBtae manner, and Bb&U give their votes on the same day, as is directed by the Constitution in the case of a regular election of s President and Vice President ; and in of such extraordinary election, the votes shall be transmitted to the seat of Government, and the election ascertained and concluded in the same manner ; and if no election shall be made b; the House of Representatives, in the same manner ai is provided by the Constitution in relation to the regular election of President and Vice President ; and the person who shall be elected at such extraordinary election, shall be the President until the next Constitutional period of election."

The motion to recommit was lost— yeas 40 nays 63.

Mr. T&OQABT. — Mr. Speaker, unaccustomed as I am to parliamentary discussions, I feel a degree of diffidence and embarrassment to which many others are probably in a great measure strangers. I have no intention to enter into t, lengthy discussion, or investigation of the reiioliir lion now before the House. But as I stand here in my place the Constitutional Representative of a section of the American people, perhaps equal in point of respectability to other sections represented on this floor, and as I suppose some of my constituents expect that I will, upon certain occasions, do something more than give a silent vote upon such questions as may from time to time come before the House, I request the indulgence of a patient hearing, whilst I offer two or three reasons for the vote I shall give upon the resolution under consideration. I have not the vanity to suppose that I shall be able, by any thingi shall offer, to influence the members ot this House to vote in a different manner from that in which they have already made up their minds. Probably no discussion which can now take place will alter so much as one single vote. 1 think it likely that the proposed alteration in the Constitution, comprised in the resolution now before us, will pass this House by the Constitutional majority-, and I know not but it may be finally ratified by a sufficient number of State Legislatures to makea part of the Constitution of the United States. If this event should take place, I shall, nevertheless, feel a satisfaction in having done my duty, in endeavoring, though feebly and unsuccessfully, to arrest the progress of a spirit ot innovation, which I fear (God grant that my fears may prove groundless I) will undermine, and finally destroy I have not heretofore been particularly hostile to what is called the mere designating principle. . I have sometimes inquired within myself, what good reasons could be assigned why the Convention which framed the Constitution left that article in its present form? It never having been a subject of investigation in the small circle of my acquaintance, 1 viewed it as a matter of but little consequence either one way or the Other; and I am persuaded that, heretofore, this inattention to the merits of the question has been general in the part of the country to which I belong. But after seriously reflecting upon the subject, and attending to the discussions which have taken place in this House, both upon a former occasion and since the resolution was transmitted from the Senate, as well as listening occasionally to the debates in that body, I have received that evidence which, in the view of my mind, has more weight than a thousand metaphysical arguments. that the Constitution ought not to be meddled with. When I have beheld the many difficulties and perplexities attending every attempt.to adjust the proposed alterations to the various bearings of the other parts of that instrument. I have been led to admire the wisdom and discernment of the framers, as well as to have a more realizing sense both of the difficulty and danger of innovating. Innovations in a national system, 1 humbly conceive, ought never to be admitted without the most imperious necessity. They iire,atall times, s matter of hazardous experiment. But where is the imperious necessity in the present case? 1 I trust it does not exist. If our national system is, io the main, a good one, though it may ooi in every particular completely meet the wishes of every individual, or even of every State in the Union, which, considering that it was formed upon a compromise, uniting a variety of different, and, some of them, clashing interests, was an event rather to be desired than expected, it ought to be like the law of the Medes and Persians, which altered not. But that it is, in general, a good one. we have had the most striking practical demonstration in its be DcScial effects ; in the almost unexampled national prosperity and advancement enjoyed under thatsystem. In one respect 1 must be permitted to differ widely from an opinion advanced during the discussion of this question, by a gentleman from Virginia. I don't know that 1 should be correct in saying that he advanced it as his own opinion ; I believe he rather spoke of it as the prevailing sentiment of particular sections of the Union, at the period in which the Consti' tntion was adopted. The sentiment alluded to was, that the Constitution was objectionable on account of the difficulty of obtaining amendments. I believe, on theother hand, that the facility wherewith alterations may be proposed and obtained, isnotcne of the least of its imperfections. That provision of the Slate Constitution of Massachusetts, which, agreeably to the general sentiment and impression of the people, was at the time of its establishment, considered as an obstacle not easily surmounted in the way of its revisal, until after the term of fifteen years had elapsed, was, in my opinion, a wise one; though objected against by many at the time of its adoption, about six seven years afterwards there was a peculiar season of ferment and irritation throushoui a large portion of the Commonwealth. Had It not been for that provision in the Conslititution, which threw an obstacle in the way of its revisal for a limited time, it is probable it would then have underwent some important alterations. This public sentiment happily subsided and when the fifteen years elapsed, the period when the voice of the people was called for, to see whether they wished for a revisal, I do not recollect that there was found one town or corporation in the Commonwealth which manifested the desire of an alteration, in so much as a single article. At the end of another fifteen years, it is probable the public sentiment may be found still the same. Had as great, or even greater ob- ■laclet been thrown in the way of alterations in the Constitution of the United States, for the term of twenty years, instead of its being exposed to frequent alterations under the name of amendments, so much am I opposed to innovations in a national system, I could not have viewed it as less perfect. Upon this general principle I am at present opposed to any alteration whatsoever in the Constitution of the United States. '

But further, Mr. Speaker, another reason which. u it is a point of delicacy to mention, I previously declare that I consider it as having reference to no individual but myself. I make no doubt but every gentleman on this floor can reconcile the part he takes in this business, with the utmost purity of intention. But so far as it respects myself the consideration of taking a solemn oath to support the Constitution of the United States is of considerable weight. I cannot see how I could act consistently in taking such an oath to day, and endeavoring to introduce an alteration in one of its important principles and provisions to-morrow.

It further appears to me, that should alterations in our national compact become really necessary, this House, or even both Houses of Congress, are the most improper of all places to originate them. That the Senate and House of Represent a tivea have a jointly Const ituiional right to originate amendments, is a point not to be contested. But in allusion to a remark which, upon another occasion, fell from a gentleman, who occupies a conspicuous station upon the floor of this House, that there were certain provisions or powers in the Constitution, which Congress never had ezbe hoped i would be exercised; I am free to declareit as my opinion the power of originating amendments to the Constitution ought to be the last of all constitutional powers to put in practice. If any thing in the world approaches to a solecism in practice, it is a legislative body engaged in enlarging, altering, varying, or narrowing the sphere of their own powers.

I further observed, that, after hearing the subject discussed largely in this HonsCj when it was first under consideration, and occasionally attending debates in the Senate, after patiently attending to the discussions on the different arrangements, adjustments, and modifications of the proposed amendment, which, as all are sensible, nat proved a subject of no small difficulty ; I could not but feel a degree of surprise to find that, in the course of such a lengthy discussion, not so much as one solitary argument should be advanced in support of the general principle of the resolution. It seemed to me as if the importance of the designating principle was, in the view of its advocates, one of those self-evident propositions which were in themselves so plain as to be incapable of any illustration by proofs. I am free to confess that I -am not possessed of that intuitive knowledge which enables me to discover either the importance or correctness of the principle. Before I can vote for it I must have some sound, convincing argument in its favor.

It is true, some attempts of this kind have been made in an advanced stage of the discussion, first by a gentleman from Virginia, afterwards by a gentleman from Pennsylvania, and lastly by another gentleman from Tennessee. But, when I reflect upon the acknowledged talents of these gentlemen, I cannot but be affected with some degree of surprise that a measure of so much importance should be prosecuted with such a degree of zeal, while supported with such superficial arguments. My design is merely to state my own reasons for voting against the resolution, and not to answer arguments ia favor of it. I shall only briefly mention one, which appears to be principally relied on, viz: that it is the voice or will of the people. I know not of a more equivocal phrase in the English language than this — "the voice or will of the people," Gentlemen, 1 presume, will not assert that the voice of the multitude, but too frequently formed upon a sudden impulse, and ever fluctuating, which is one thing to-day and another to-nionon; changing many times by the breath of some popular demagogue who is disposed to make this voice a hobby-hor^e to serve a turn, can furnish any solid basis, either for legislation or the formation of a national compact. But it is said that this voice has been exCressed by the Constitutional organ, by the Legiaitutes of the several States, from time to time. We are referred back to New Hampshire and South Carolina, to New York and Vermont, to federal and republican States, and to the same State when federal and when republican. If the distinction between federal and republican is meant merely to discriminate the two great political parties into which the United States have been principally divided, it is acknowledged some terms must be used for that purpose. Whether this in the most proper I pretend not to say. I presume the term is not meant to convey an idea that those who choose to call themselves republicans are so exclusively, and that all others are opposed to a republican government. Such a distinction is better adapted to a discussion in a party newspaper than to the floor of this House. I give full faith and credit to that gentleman when he says he is a republican, and that the Stale of Pennsylvania which he represents is a republican State. But will the gentleman assert that the State of Massachusetts is not equally republican, and that the tepresen IB lives of that State upon this floor are not republicans as well as those from Pennsylvania T No, 1 trust he will not. I am willing 10 go hand in hand with that gentleman in favor of real practical republicanism. I hope to live and to die under a republican Government I know of no State in this Union which is not a republican State, nor any period of the Union in 'which they were otherwise! and i know of no member upon this floor who is any other than a republican, nor of any prevailing party in the United States opposed to a republican Government. But to return from this digression to the subject of public opinion. This, as expressed by Legislative acts, has been various. What it is at the present moment 1 pretend not to say. In some States I believe important changes have taken, and are gradually taking place. To say positively what it is in Massac h use (Is, I perhaps am incompetent. Many probably have never viewed the question in a serious point of light. I am far from supposing a majority in the State to be decidedly in favor of the designating principle. Bal, sir, the public opinion, when constantly and uniformly expressed, ought to have its due weight. There are other reasons which ought more especially to govern the decisions of public bodies. The question ought to be, rather, what will operate for the best good of the people, than what will strike the present full tide of public opinion, which perhaps before another year may be greatly, if not almost totally changed. lean therefore see no reason arising from this why 1 should vote in favor of the resolution.

But as 1 have as yet heard no arguments sufficiently forcible to evince the propriety of adopting the resolution, so there are still many good reasons for its rejection, at least they appear so to me. Here I shall not again travel over the ground of the clashing interests of great and small States when elections shall happen to be finally determined in the House of Representatives. Nor shall I inquire whether three, five, or twenty, art the most proper numbers of candidates from which to select the President. I believe that an election in any form by the House of Representatives ii an event which will happen but very seldom. The larger States, by acting in concert, can always carry an election by the Electors. It will be for their interest to do it, and we are not to suppose that it is an interest which will be often overlooked. Whatever objections may be against the designating principle on account of its militating against small States when the election happens to be determined in the House of Representatives, I have a still stronger one admitting the determination to be made by the Electors, which will be an event more common, and that is, that whenever we adopt the discriminating principle we will throw an influence almost unbounded into the hands of the President of the United States, which will in the end make him President for life. That extensive patronage which is necessarily attached to the Presidency of the United States, aided by twenty-five thousand dollars per annum — a sum which, with our growing wealth and population, will probably increase — joined 10 his influence in the army, navy, and militia, can scarcely fail to render his re-election at all time* so certain as to be nothing more than form. I have not the most distant apprehensions that these consequences would be immediate. Probably this generation may not realize them in ibeii fullest extent. But if the progress is slow, I a|H Eirehend it will be sure, and that we will hereby forge Presidential chains for posterity, it may be to the latest generation. I see no security that we have that a President of the United States may not, at one time or another, be ambitious, artful, and intriguing. The love of power is congenial to mankind ; this desire seems to be iotei^ woven with human nature. It grows with our growth, and strengthens with our strength. Is it not natural to expect that a President of the United States, unless he is such a prodigy of virtue and d is i uteres led oets as is not at all times to be expected to fill that important office, having once tasted the sweets of power as well as the emoluments of office, would wish to perpetuate ill We cannot Ijul suppose that a judicious distribution of the places of honor and profit which he has in his gift will have a great tendency to secure his re-election, nnJ if k little extra expense should be sometimes necessary in the view of an ambitious had unprincipled man, the importance of ibe object to be obtained will be sufficient to justify the means. I wish to entertain e^ high an opinion of the integrity and incorruptibility of every member of the Government as any gentleman on this floor. I wish not only that all the individuals attached to any btBDca of our Government, but that all our citizens were forever to remain so entirely incorruptible as to be totally uninfluenced by indirect means and motives. But is such degree of public and private virtue to be expected in the existing state of ibiozs? It was a maxim of a wise statesman, one who had a very exteu' give knowledge of human nature, especially on the dark side, 1 mean the noted Sir Robert Walpole, Prime Minister of Oreat Britain during the first part of the reign of George the Second— "that every man had his price." Though I c not suppose this observation true in its fullest extent, yet 1 believe its opposite is equally untrue, that is, that no man has his price. Truth, I believe, lies between the extremes. The same statesman further observed, " that patriots were like mushrooms. He could cause fifty of them to spring up in a night, and leave the world to judge by what means." Such patriots or friends to prerogative may spring up in our country. They may, at some future time, spring up on the floor of this House. Why then will we, by the adoption of the discriminating principle, lay such a temptation before a President by putting it into his power, with so much greater facility, to prolong and perpetuate his authority. It appears to roe that the wisdom of man could scarcely adopt a more effectual check to ambitious views of that kind than the present mode of election, by a double ballot for two persons without discrimination. So long as elections are managed in this way, an ambitious man, as he must forever remain uncertain of carrying an election, even by securing all the Electors, unless he can secure the House of Representatives too, will be under comparatively small temptations to use any unfair means to accomplish that end. But adopt the designating principle, and according to the present ratio of population, his election is secured by eighty-nine votes,

Besides, as the Vice President will not stand on such high ground in the method proposed, as he does in the present mode of a double ballot, so it is probable so great care will not be taken in the ■election of a character to fill that office. Not standing on such high ground, the probability is that he will take the more humble station of the mere tool of the President ; and truly, if the designating principle be once introduced into the Constitution, I see not what end a Vice President can answer, unless it be to take a pleasant journey to the seat of Government once a year, meet with and preside in the Senate for a few weeks, possibly not more than three or four in a session, receive five thousand dollars, and go home again. This to be sure is a very pretty douceur, and if he i can, by the by, lend a hand to bring forward the President's re-election, he may expect to be assisted in securing his own in return. Upon the whole, can it be thought necessary, in order to avoid a momentary inconvenience, such as was supposed to be experienced at the last Presidential election, and such as will rarely happen more than once in an age, if so often, to set aside an important principle in the Constitution, and thereby subject our country to inconveniences of a more serious nature?

If it be said that should these or any other serious inconveniences be experienced, the amendment may be dropped, or a new one introduced to guard against them. I reply in the words of the

" Padlis descensus Avemi sed levocara giaduni, " Hie labor, hoc opus."

The descent is easy, but to retrace the step on an up-hill road, this is the arduous task, this the painful labor. But as I view the proposed alteration as needless in every respect, and as injuring instead of amending the Constitution of the Untied States, so I view the resolution which has come from the Senate as still much more exceptionable than the one which originated in this House. I agree with gentlemen who urge the propriety of paying a suitable deference to the opinions of the Senate, but as no member of this House is obliged to give the sanction of his vote to a measure merely because it is agreeable to the Senate, I think this House ought to pay some respect to their own opinions. To pay an implicit deference to a resolution of the Senate, which I have reason to suppose the majority of this House, so far from considering as superior, view as much more objectionable than their own, merely from its being a supposed expression of the opinion of the Senate, is a degree of deference which I can hardly suppose due from one Legislative body to another.

The resolution in its present form tends to plunge us completely back into all the difficulties apprehended from the Constitution as it now stands, which its advocates proposed to avoid by the adoption of the discriminating principle, by rendering it possible that we may have an acting President of the United States, who never was contemplated ; and never had so much as one vote for the office ; a man who in all probability will not have that dignity, independence, and respectability of character, which we would naturally expect would be found in one chosen by a joint ballot, with some probability of his becoming the President ; and indeed, whenever an election of President shall come into the House of Representatives, there is the greatest probability □f the Vice President's succeeding to that office. Supposing that officer to be previously elected, either by the Electors or by the Senate, and must succeed of course to the Presidency in case of the non-election of a President, as be would have IE temptations; so the nature of [be resolution calculated lo invite intrigue, in order to defeat the election of a President; and although I have purposely guarded against running a con^ parisoQ between large and small States, yet permit me 10 remark, lliat seven Representatives will be more likely to be tampered with than seveolyfour, and as according to the present apportionment they would represent an equal number of States, they, when voting by States, would have an equal weight in either effecting or defeating a Presidential election. Upon the whole, as the amendment now proposed shields us from nb difficulty, and may, and probably will, expose us to evils innumerable, whatever may be its fate, I feel an entire satisfaction that I shall do my duty Mr. Holland. — I am not surprised, after hearing the declarations of the honorable, I might add the venerable, member from Massachusetts, (Mr. TaGGaRT,) that the resolution on your table proposing an amendment to the Constitution as it respects the election of President and Vice President, will not obtain his support. The venerable gentleman states that he has taken an oath to support the Constitution, and therefore infers ihai b« IS under sacred obligations not to admit the alteration or amendment, as it would violate his oath. If the venerable member had read a certain provision in the Constitution, he would have there found, that in cases of amendment, he would be completely absolved from the obligations of his oath.

The venerable member has also said that the reasons offered so far as respects the will of the people in favor of this amendment is entitled to ittle weight. Thai the will of the people is unstable, versatile, fluctuating, and not to be relied on. Sir, I am one of those who have been early Uugbi to respect the will of the people, and notwithstanding what has been said, I still retain an opinion that the public will is of binding obligation, and I hope I shall continue to regard it. The Constitution itself is predicated upon the will of the people, and in order to ascertain this will at all times, the framers were obliged to resort to elections and delegations of power by which agents were to be appointed to express and execute their will) whether acting in a Legislative or Executive capacity. But the delegation of power ought to be imposed only in cases where the will of the people cannot be otherwise known. Under these impressions I have not admired the plan adopted in the Constitution of electing those high officers by Electors. I should have preferred an immediate suffrage to this indirect mode of electing by Electors ; but as the framers of the Constitution have thought proper to ascertain the public will through the medium of Electors, I am unwilling that they also should be under any unnecessary trammels whereby the will of their constituents should be impeded.

The gentleman that I have alluded to has acknowledged that on his first reading the Coosti. tulion he did not discover the policy of confining the Electors to what he calls a double vote, but is now willing to suppose that it was intended for wise and good purposes. I must confess, sir, that I, who have labored under the same difficulty, have never understood ibe policy that dictated this provision.

□. It was doubtless intended for the best of purposes. I am far from implicating the motives, but it appears to be an effort to conceal in raidligbt silence and secrecy the intent of the Electors as to the person intended to be President, and the person intended to be Vice President. If this was the intention of this provision, let me ask gentlemen if it has been effected? A recurrence to all the elections for President and Vice President since the commencement of the Government will solve this question, and fully demonstrate that the person intended by the Electors to till each office was well understood and known to all the Electors, and to all other persons that wished to know the secret has not been kept; from which it follows that the end has not nor never will answer the original design 7 And for what purpose shall we continue it any longer?

This mode takes more of the nature of a lottery than an election ; the Electors are compelled to put two persons' names in a box, deprived of the liberty of exercising their rationality as to the application ol either person to any specific office, and must leave the event to blind fate, chance, or what is worse, to intrigue to give him a President. Experience has shown that difficulties have attended this mode, and that it has not answered the original intention, and it is easy to foresee that it may be so practised upon as to destroy the first principle of our Government, that of the will of the majority in their election of the Chief Magistrate, r will not say that there is a faction now existing that would wish to defeat the will of the majority. But I may be permitted to say that it is a possible and a probable case that such a faction may exist, and on the existence of such faction, how easy would it be for them, under the existing provisions of the Constitution, to defeat the public will. I have before said that the intention of the majority is known to all ; the Electors compose a part of this faction, and knowing that the majority to fulfil their object will decline to give alt their votes to the person intended by them for the second office, this minor faction will accomplish their design by giving all their suffrages to the person intended lo fill the second office, and by this means contravene and totally defeat the will of the majority; and all this may be right and proper in the view of maDT gentlemen, but to me who regard the public will, It is exceedingly improper — to prevent which, I am in favor of the amendment. Nor do I conceive the force of the objection of my worthy friend from Massachusetts, (Mr. Eubtis.) for whose opinions I entertain a high respect, to the amendment to our original resolution as made br the Senate, in reducing the number from which the President is to be chosen by the House of Representatives, when the choice devolves opoa them, from five to three; and I hope, when he comes to reconsider his objections, that they will be found not to be solid, and that the amendment of the Senate is not an innovation of the principles of the Constitution, but more in unison with It than our original resolution. In the Constitution, whentheelection devolves upon the House of Representatives, ihe President and Vice President are to b« taken from the five highest numbers on the list. In our original resolution the President alone was to be elected from the five highest numbers of those voted for as President, and the Vice President was to be elected from the two highest of those voted for as Vice President, aug' menliog the numbers from which those officer; were to be chosen from five to seven, la the reduction of the Senate from five to three, from which the President is to be chosen, and [be Vice President to be chosen from two other distinct numbers, makes precisely the same number out of which those officers are to be chosen as in the existing provisions of the Constitution.

In regard to the additional amendment providing in cases where the House of Representatives fails to elect a President, the whole objections are predicated upon a. presumption that the House of Representatives and Senate have or will become so corrupt, that they will not regard the high duties attached to their stations.

Mr. Speaker, when the American Congress are thus coniaminated, it will be an extreme case; against the evils of such a situation no remedy would avail you — all is gone. But this is only a possible case, and such a one that 1 will not suffer myself for a moment to apprehend, and therefore shall not attempt to guard against. And as I think that the resolution is calculated to avoid evils heretofore experienced in the election of our Chief Magistrate, and is consistent with the wish of (he people, and will contribute to their happiness, it shall have my most cordial support.

Mr. Thatcher. Mr. Speaker: My principal object in rising upon this occasion is, to examine some of those ideas which were suggested by gentlemen of the majority in the course of yesterday's debate. But, before! attempt that examination, I beg leave to call the attention of the House for a moment to a view of the subject, which baa convinced my mind that the proposed amendment cannot be adopted without materially impairing the tights of individual Slates — without, ID fact, destroying the very basis of the Confederacy.

Under the first confederation the States com posingthe Union wereequal and independent. They voted by States, This Constitution was adopted by States, acting in their corporate capacity. They relinquished certain important rights, and the United States, by the Constitution, guarantied to each State the enjoyment of other rights as an equivalent. The one was a consideration for the other. The States, for example, which held few or no slaves, consented to relinquish their right of equal representation in the House of Representatives; and that those States which possessed B vast number of slaves should be represented in Congress " according to their respective numbers, ' which shall be determined by add log to the whole ' number of free persons including those bound to 'service for a term of years, and excluding Indians ' not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons." The numberof Electors President and Vice President is increased in the same proportion. Among other SlhCoK.— 24 things, in return, the Constitution establishes a mode of electing the President and Vice President which gives to each State a share In the election, and in determining the number of Electors it has express reference to States in their corporate capacity. By the article which it is proposed 10 alter, each Slate is entitled to " a number of Electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which ihe State may be entitled in the Congress." It provides that two persons shall be voted for. without designating which is intended for President. It further provides that " if there shall be more than one" (person) 'who have a majority, and have an equal number 'of voles, then the House of Representatives shall 'immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for 'President; and if no person have a majority, ' then from the five highest on the list, the said ' House shall in like manner choose the President. 'But in choosing the President the votes shall be 'taken by States, the representation from State 'having one vole,"&c. By this important article of the Constitution a degree of influence in the choice of President and Vice President is in fact guarantied to each State, and the hi^e States consented that the small States should nave a greater share of votes in ihe choice than they would have been entitled to by their population. It has been so clearly shown, indeed it is so evident, that the Const ilulional mode of election is calculated to guard the rights and interests of each Slate, but most of all the small States, that I forbear to enlarge upon this point. It is certain that the larger States would not have guarantied to the small, rights so important, rights which abridged their own power materially, unless they had received an equivalent. We cannot determine, with certainly, that one of these rights was solely a consideration for another, but it is sufficient for this argumeol lo know the rights guarantied were a. consideration for those relinquished. It follows, that although we may modify the forms of the Constitution, in such a manner as will operate equally upon all the States, we cannot, under the article providing for amendments, ingraft new principles into the Constitution which will destroy the rights ofindividual Stales, without the consent of those States. There are certain rights inherent in Stales, as well as in individuals, ol which they can never be divested without an express consent. Suppose two-thirds of Congress and the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States should adopt a resolution which in direct terms should declare that in future other States should give no votes, or should have no share in the election of President and Vice President, would any one pretend that they were authorized to do this under the article providing for amendments of the Constitution? I consider i[ impossible to adopt a resolution which will impair the rights of sovereign 'States, which in fact will secure to the few States the power of choosing thePresidenland Vice President at pleasure, to the total exclusion of all the other States, (and it has been clearly shown that with the present population five States may choose the President Vice President, to theexclusiou of the other t wet re,) without making the CoDsiitDiion a nudum pactum; without destroying the very basis of the Confederacy. I look forward, sir, wiln fearful apprehension to (be consequences, should this resolution be adopted. It will create the greatest dissatisfaction in the States injured by the alteration. It will furnish arguments to the enemies of this Union, which may effect its destruction.

An honorable ff en tleman from Tennessee (Mr. Campbell) has founded his argument principally upon the position that the proposed amendment will carry into effect the public will ; that it will prepeDl a contingency, which, under the present mode of election may occur, viz: the person intended by a majority of the Electors for President may be supplanted by the person intended by them for Vice President, and will fill the second office in the Government. This argument has also been urged by other gentlemen.

It is scarcely within the compass of possibility that, with the experience already had, an equal number of votes, and a majority should be given to two candidates for the Presidency. But it is demonstrable that whenever the right of choosing a President shall, under this amendment, de- ▼olve upon the House of Representatives, the danger that the person intended by the Electors for President will be excluded, not only from the Presidency, but also from the Vice Presidency, will be increased in a tenfold ratio. For, under this amendment, as adopted by the Senate, the House of Representatives may choose the President not only from five candidates, as under the present mode, but from among the candidates who may have either of the three highest numbers. The number of candidates, therefore, is almost unlimited. Every Slate candidate, every ambitious man who can secure a few votes, will offer himself for the office, and knowing that his only chance of success will be in the House of Representatives, it will be the object of all his supporters to prevent a choice by the Electors. The Vice President will be impelled by the most powerful inducements to prevent achoice, because y this amendment, "if i^e House of Representa- * tives shall not choose a President whenever the ' right of choice shall devolve upon them, before ' the fourth day of March then next following, ' then the Vice President shall act as President, as ' in the case of the death or other Constitutional ■ disability of the President." If the Vice President shall be elected by the Senate, the influence of the Senators may be added, to prevent a choice by the House, for they will naturally prefer that the man of their own choice should act as President, Thus, to the clashing interests of States, and of numerous candidates, may be added the influence of the Vice President and of the Senate, all tending to prevent a majority of Stales from uniting in one candidate. Under the present mode, if, by possibility, the choice should devolve upon the House of Representatives, the responsibility for all the evils of an interregnum must operate as the most powerful inducement to make an election ; but, under this amendment, not be boris(ered by the Vice President. It is fairly to be calculated that no election will be made by the House of Representatives. What is the consequence'! A man who, from the nature of the choice, will probably be unqualified for the office, (as has been very clearly shown by my friend from Connecticut,) • man who had not one role for President, succeeds, in fact, to that office. Thus the choice may be virtually (ranferred from the popular to the federative branch of the QorTbe gentleman from Tennessee tells us that this argument, drawn from the omission of ibe^ House to elect a President, implies corruption. This cannot be admitted, for men will naturally disagree in their opinions of candidates, and may very honestly adhere to the dictates of their judgments and consciences. But, sir, if it AM imply corruption, it would not destroy the force <^ the argument. With the growth and opulence of our -country, we must expect corruption; with the progress of our Government we must calculate upon intrigue.

To prevent the difficulties and dangers of aeontested election in the House of Representatives, we hold out by this amendment to the large States the strongest inducements, we almostcompel them, by the principles of self-interest, so to combine that the right of choice shall not devolve upon the House of Representatives. As a few States may so combine as to secure to themselves the election of President and Vice President, to the total exclusion of the other States, the greatest evils are generally to be apprehended from such exclusive combinations.

What, let me ask, sir, are the evils, the great, theimpendingevils, which will induce lis to brave all the dangers of this hazardous experiment? The worst that can be apprehended from the present mode of choice is, that two of the first citizens in the United Slates, each having a majority of votes — voted for hy the same Electors— if it should happen that they have an equal number of votes, the one preferred by the majority of Electors for President may chance to fill the second office in tbeOovernment, while the candidate intended by a majority of the Electors for the second office, may. by the votes of a majority of States, be chosen President.

The gentleman from Tennessee conceives that the minority can have no share in the election but by counteracting the will of the majority. Let it be remembered, sir, that it requires a majority of the Electors to make a choice. All that IS left to the minority, under the present mode of election, when they have any share in the choice, is, to vote for one of the candidates offered by iha majority. Is there to be a line of demarkatioa drawn between the parties by the Constitution itself, which will render the Chief Magistrate of the Union the mere instrument of a party? /a this calculated to secure the equal rights of tbe minority

Mr. Speaker, several gentlemeti ia the raajotUf have tolJ us that the people call for this " amendment." My colleague (Mr. Taooabt) has been accused of speaking disreapectfully of the people. I understood him simply to say, that public opinion is mutable, and that the opinion of the people respecting this “amendment” has not been ascertained. How, air, dogentlemen know the opinion of the " people" upon this question ? By what evidence does it appear! It is said, that some of lb« State Legislatures have expressed a wish in favor of the "amendment." I know that two or three Legislatures, at different times, bare passed a vote in favor of the designating principle. But, air, no State Legislature has ever expressed approbation of the various other alterations in this resolution.

If the State Legislatures had expressed their approbation of this resolution, will gentlemen say that it ought to be obligatory upon the members of this House? We certainly are under the strongest obligations to give an independent vote upon the question, controlled only by the dictates or our own consciences. The Constitution has, in this instance, made each House of Congress and the Stale Legislatures a check upon each Other; else, why are two-thirds of both Houses of Congress, and the Legislatures ol three-fourths of the several States, required by the Constitution to concur in an amendment? If the opposite doctrine be correct, it would have been better to have decided questions respecting Constitutional amendments by the Stale Legislatures alone, than In have assigned to Congress a part in such a political farce.

In the course of this debate. various and repeated allusions have been made to party distinctions. We have, I believe, for the first time in this House heard the terms federal and republican applied to members of this House, and contradistinguished to each other. I have long seen these distinctions blarly upon a question which demands of os divest ourselves of all partial conai derations, and to investigate this subject with candor and with coolness. What can gentlemen intend to effect by this denunciation ? Is it intended to cast a reproach upon the name of federalist? Do they recollect whence was derived the honorable distinction of federalist 7 Do they not know that it is derived from an early and warm Hliachmentto tbe Federal Constitution ? If gentlemen claim the title of republicans, let them not claim it exclusively. Let them remember that we are all bound by oath to support the same Federal Republican Const ilDtion.

Mr. Speaker, my mind is deeply impressed with a sense of the vast importance of rejecting this resolution. We are not discussing an ordinary, a party, or a local question, but it is proposed to adopt a material change in a fundamental principle of the national compact i an alteration which will affect the whole Union, which will iofli the condition of millions long after the present distinctions of party shall have passed away, and we shall have pasted away with them. While we endeavor to render the present principle of the Constitution as operative and beneficial ai possible, let us beware lest, under the plausible pretext of "amendment," we introduce principles destructive of the compact itself. On former occasions, extracts have been read from the speeches and from the writings of eminent statesmen. " nit me to quote a few sentences from an authority which once had great influence in this House. I trust it will now have an effect :

"Towards the preservation of jonr Gavemmentand the permanency of your present happy state, it is i*- requisite not only that you steadily discountenance irrsg* ular oppositions to it* acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principle!, however specious the pretext. One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Conatitution, alterations which will impair the energy or the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are, at least, as necessary to fix the true character of Government, as of other human institutions; ; that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing Constitution of a country ; that facility in changes upon the credit of mere hypothesis and opinion exposes to perpetual change, from the endlaaa variety of hypothesis and opinion."

These sentiments are from the Farewell Address of that most illustrious statesmen and patriot who presided in the Convention which formed this Constitution.

Mr. Speaker, I have been greatly gratified by the various motions which have been made, some of them by gentlemen of the majority, Iq recommit this resolution for the purpose of amendment. It is evident that some of the expressions are so extremely ambiguous and obscure, as to admit a great variety of construction. Such a variety of constructions have, indeed, been given in this House to some of the most important clauses, and so just have been the criticisms upon the phraseology of this resolution, that the necessity of amendment must be obvious to the friends of the resolution. It certainly cannot be necessary to adopt it precisely as it stands. If it must be sent to the State Legislatures, I hope we shall so far respect the reputation of the House as at least to make the resolution intelligible.

Some gentlemen wish so to amend this resolution as to make it conform to that which passed this House, and of which gentlemen were, at that time, so tenacious.

I sincerely hope that two-thirds of this House will never adopt the various alterations of the Constitution, contained in this resolution. If disappointed here, the^late Legislatures will. I trust, perceive, that the important right guarantied to them by this Constitution, once relinquished, can never be regained ; that, by defacing the fairest feature of the Constitution, they sacrifice the rights of other Slates, they hazard the peace, the existence of the Union.

Mr. Thomas.— A number of gentlemen opposed to this amendment, and particularly the gentleman last up from Massachusetts (Mr. THaTCHER,) appear to lay great stress phraseology of the resolution. In ihp first paragraph, they contend that it is absurd, because it reads: "which when ratified by three-fourths of the Legialaiures of the several Stales." I agree ■ with the gentlemen that it would have read better. to my mind, had it said: "which when ratified by the Legislatures of threefounhs of the said States;" aod il would have been nigher the phrase made use of in the Constitution. But, as on all occasions like this, when there are precedents, as to form, we generally adopt them ; the Senate appear to have done it in this instance. I wish gentlemen to examine a resolution of the first Congress, under this Constitution, proposing a number of amendments to the State Legislatures. They will find, in that resolution, it is thus expressed : " which when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the said Slates." Now, I ask, what IS the difference in the phraseology of these two resolutions'? One says: -'when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the several States." The other, which I have just read, says : "when ratified by three-fourths of the Legislatures of the said States," For my part, I can see no difference between these two; besides, in my Opinion, it altogether unimportant whether anything is said in the resolution about ils being ratified by three-fourths, all, or any of the State Legislatures, I believe it sufficient that the bare {roposiiion go out from Congress, and when it as received the ratification of the Legislatures of three-fourths of the Stales, the Constitution itself, which is paramount to anything we can say on the subject, declares it to be a part of that instrument. And I ask the gentleman from Massachusetts. or any other gentleman on this floor, whether this is not correct? Whether what is said on the resolution, or what we could say, in relation to its ratification by the State Legislatures, can possibly affect its validity? It cannot ; therefore, all ihai has been said about that part goes for nothing.

With respect to the criticism of gentlemen as to the wording of the second paragraph, I wish they would read the exceptionable sentence, and then compare that with the one on the same subject in the Constitution. [Here Mr. T. read the two, and then said ;J To my mind it appears plain, and properly enough expressed ; and I do consider that the objections to the phraseology of that part are equally preposterous with the other,

Mr. Speaker, (said Mr. T-,) I am in favor of the resolution as it now stands, and shall give my decided support. I, however, acknowledge that "' ' I should ' " like like it it belter better myself, without the proi ' ■ by the Senate,- that the Vice President should act as President, in case no election should be made by the House of Representatives previous to the fourth of March, when the choice devolves on them ; and as several gentlemen have expressed a desire that a trial should be made to effect this alteration, I wish the Speaker to inform me whether if the House should amend the resolution, and the Senate should not concur in the amendment, when it comes down again to this House, B majority cannot rescind the amendment, or whether it will require two-thirds? Because, although I have heretofore voted against a recommitment, if the Speaker is of the opinion that a majority can rescind, I am willing to make the trial, and shall, in that case, move to recommit the resolution to a Committee of ihe whole House for that purpose.

The Speaker said, he considered it improper to give an opinion ona question of order relaiingto a subject not immediately before the House. He said, on all incidental questions, he considered a majority sufficient.

Mr. R. GniswoLO. — I feel nodispositiontoproIracl the debate to any considerable length. Nor can I flatter myself thai any remarks which f shall make will convince a single member of the House, whose opinions have been formed in favor of the resolution, of its pernicious tendency- But upon a question of so much importance, I must be permitted to state, in a concise manner, some of those considerations which will induceme logive my decided negative to the measure.

The election of a President is a transaction of vast importance to the United States, la the hands of ibis officer is deposited the Executive power of the Government ;. the Constitution having expressly declared that " the Executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America," On the execution of this power depends, in a great measure, the character and prosperity of the country. The President is entrusted with the execution of the laws. Heappoints, with iheconseniof the Senate, the Judicial and Executive officers. He forms, and with the advice of the Senate concludes, treaties, and in his hands is virtually lodged the peace and safety of the country. Even the right of declaring war, although nominally confided to the Legislature, must be substantially controlled by the acts of the Executive ; because it must generally happen that the necessity of war will depend on the manag»- meniof our foreign relations by the President, and the power of terminating a war by treaty rests with him. In a period of war the President is the Executive to conduct it, and in a time of peace he is the guardian of our neutral rights. A power so important and extensive must necessarily carry along with it vast patronage and influence; arid a President may at all times become emphatically a blessing or a scourge to the community.

From this hasty sketch may be perceived the deep interest which every State has in the Presidential election.

The election of the first magistrate of a nation has always been considered the most difficult part of Ihe science of government. The authority which the office necessarily confers, the respect which it creates, and the patronage which it gives, must render it the great object of ambition to aspiring men. The Journal of the General Convention shows that this subject created more difficulty than any other which fell under the deliberations of that respectable body. To organize the election in such a manner as to guard against popular cabals and corruption on the one nao^ and to secure a proper dependance on the people OD the other; to prevent improper combinations of States Of of iDdividuBls. and at the same time to give each State its due weight aod influence in the election, was no easy task. They formed, however, ibe great objects which engaged the attention of the Convention; ; and after every project had received a deliberate consideration, that ' body agreed upon the plan under which we have successFully practised for fourteen years. It is now proposed to introduce an essential and radical change in this plan,and we are called upon to decide whether we will recommend the change to the States. Under these circumstances, it cannot be improper to caution gentlemen against |)recipilaney, and lo request ibem to examine critically the nature of our Qovemraeiit, and lobe careful that they do not. under the pretext of amendment and reform, violate one of the first and ■moil important principles of the Union.

The Government of the United States is not a consolidated Government; it is i^trictly federal, and its friends are of course federalists. It is true, that this branch of the Legislature (the House of Representatives) bears many marks of a consolidation. We are the Representatives of the people of Ibe respective Slates, and in this respect the principle of consolidation may be considered as existing in this House. But in the Senate, nothing but the federative principle is seen. In that body, each Stale is not only represented as a sovereign Slate, but the representation is equal ; nor can the size, population, or wealth of a State, increase or dimioisb its rights or its vote on that floor. In the election of a President, the federative principle is likewise discernable. That officer is elected by Electors, chosen in such manner as the State Legislatures shall direct, and to consist of a number of Electors equal to the Senators and Representatives of each State. By this arrangement, the choice of President is controlled fay the States; and although the large Slates have a greater influence in the election than the small States, yet this influence is not entirely regulated by population. The votes to which each State is entitled for its Senators increases the influence of the small States; and it is in consequence of this, that the Stale of Rhode Island now gives four votes for President, when, upon the principle of consolidation, she would be entitled to no more than two. The votes of Delaware, on the same principle, would be reduced from three to one.

There is not a feature of our Government more strongly marked than this of its Confederation, nor any towhich the people are more strongly attached. And it would be impossible to submit any proposition which could create more alarm than a direct project of consolidating the States into one Government. The Stales always have, and probably will continue, lo preserve with jealousy their sovereignty and independence. The present Government, it is well known, grew out of the old Confederation ; in which form the States were, iQ every respect, equal — each State having onevote in the National Congress. The innovation which was made on the pure federative principle by the present Constitution was the result of necessity and compromise. But still, as has been already observed, the federative principle is distinctly preserved,and remains the great and leading feature of the Constitution. It has been often repeated, that the Constitution of the United States was the result of compromise between the large and the small States. This is undoubtedly true, and the basis of this compromise ought to be considered as sacred — never to be shaken whilst the Constitution endures. After mutual concessions by the large and small States, (for both may be considered as conceding something.) the principles by which the influence of each State is balanced in the Legislative and Executive departments may be fairly considered as constituting the basis of this compromise. It results from this, that every attempt to diminish the influence of large States on the one hand, or to weaken that of the small Slates on the other, is sapping the foundation ol our Confederacy. The power to amend the Constitution was not given to authorize the change of any radical principle in which particular States might be interested. This power, it is well known, was given for very different purposes.

I have made these general observations, because it has appeared tome that every proposal to amend the Constitution ought to be first tested by the nature and scope of the Constitution itself; and if it shall be found to interfere with the rights of States, or with anv fundamental principle of the compact, it ought to be rejected, although it may promise some temporary advantages in the eyes of speculative men. It cannot be loo often repeated, that in considering projects for changing the Constitution, we ongnl to consider what the Constitution is, and not what it ought to be, in the opinion of individuals. Our Government is in fad a Confederacy, and as such we are bound to respect the rights of each party to the compact. ' In respect to the resolution under consideration, the first principle 1 assume is, that it must necessarily diminish the influence of small States in the election of a Chief Magistrate, and, of course, that it is a direct violation of that spirit of compromise which produced the Constitution.

The effect of the proposed amendment upon the influence of small Slates, in the Presidential election, has scarcely been denied on the floor of the House. Indeed, after the very able and lucid exposition of this part of the subject, by the gentleman from South Carolina, (Mr. HnaEii,) some daysago, it appears to be generally understood and admitted that the power of the small States, in this great point of electing a President, must be diminished. Under s' ' "* scarcely to repeat arguments or li

L a position which has been so clearly sns tain'ed in the debate. But as this isa point ofgreat ofgr( magnitude, and (if well understood) must be felt in every small Slate, I will take the liberty of adverting again to some of the proofs on which the assertion rests.

If the proposed amendment is adopted, it will remain in the power of five large States to combine, and wiih perfect certainly to yjve a President and Vice President to the Union. As the electoral votes were distributed under the lust census, ibis power may be exercised by Virginia. North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Massachusetts. To say that no such combination can be formed, is speaking without a knowledge of the human character. And although a combination of the particular States which I Rare named cannot at this time be formed, yet it is certain that a combination of large States, equally effectual, may at this moment be produced. Gentlemen deceive themselves, if they imagine that the large States can have no interest or inducement to form these combinations. We ought not to forget that our Government is a confederacy of States; J that the office of President is vastly important, and that the State which can possess the Executive power in the person of one of its own citizens, is necessarily elevated above the other members of the Confederacy. Nor can we forget our own feelings as men. There is not « member of this House who does not feel particularly attached to the State to which he belongs— whose pride would not be gratified by seeing the State which he represents giving a President to the Union, and a tone to the Goveronent — who does not believe that the interests of those with whom he is particularly connected would on many occasions be belter, and on every occasion be as well secured under the administration of a President from his own State as from any other quarter. Whenever communities or individuals are stimulated by the powerful inducements of interest or ambition to form combinations, they will necessarily be created. And although at this time there is no State which can Openly claim iheexclusivcright of giving a President to the Union, yet this right may be enjoyed in rotation by a few large States, in defiance of any combination which can be formed against them. We have already seen, upon one occasion; ' ' e of a combination crumbling ■--' jealousies which r n has excited. It might appear to a cursory observer that the same combinations may be formed under the ex iating mode of election, it being equally in the power of the large States to give a President and Vice President to the Union. But a critical attention to the subject will satisfy gentlemen that the present mode of election must necessarily create so much jealousy among the large States as to render all lasting combinalions impracticable. As the election is now regulated, each Elector must give his vote for two candidates for the office of President, one of whom must be the citizen of a State to which the Elector does not belong. Under such circumstances, if the large States should combine for the purpose of securing to themselves ibe two offices, they must givi to each of their candidates nearly an equal number of votes ; in which case it will be left in thi power of a small State to decide the election ii. Tor of the least objectionable candidate. The effect of which must often be to defeat the plan of rotation agreed upon by the large States, and to create suspicions that the votes of a small State thus given lo the successful candidate have been obtained by a secret combination with Ibe State to which ine candidate belongs, or with the candidate himself. In the same manner, the views of any particular Slate may be forever defeated by the small States; and such views will be defeated if any one of ihe States, from its local situation, its great extent, and its population, shoold arrogate to itself the right of giving a President. Gentlemen must be sensible ihai no combination formed under such circumstances can be ladling. Political combinations can only be lasting where the object for which they are formed Is obtained with certainty, and where no jealousies are excited. But where the object is defeated, where jealousies arise, and more especially where the views ot tbe most powerful and ambitious member of the combination are forever defeated, the combination can never endure.

The advantages resulting to the small States from the present mode of election is not confined to the power of defeating the combination of large States. It is certainly important to possess the power of selecting the least objectionable of two candidates. Although neither candidale may be the particular object of our choice, there may still exist, in our opinion, a wide difference in their respective qualifications for office. Whenever a candidate has been preferred to his rival, by the suffrages of his political opponents, he will entertain those sentiments towards them which every liberal mind must feel towards those who have granted a favor. He will be conscious that he is indebted to ibem for office. He will feel bound to treat ibem with respect, and promote their interests. Such are the sentiments which must be presiding officer of the House must always feelwbea promoted lo the chair, in consequence of the division of his own party by his political opponents. This influence of the small States in the Presidential election will promote the harmony of the Union. The power of the small States, although circumscribed, may, under certain circumstances, become effectual. And as public bodies and individuals, in all political transactions, are caressed and respected in proportion to their power, the small States will be courted and respected by the large States, and the mutual dependence which they feel on each other must soften their passions, and in a great measure diminish those State animosities which endanger our domestic tranquillity. And will gentlemen tell me that these advantages are of no importance? In my opinion they are advantages which not only tend to harmonize the Union, but they form the strongest barrier for the small States in one of the most important transactions of the nation, against the overwhelming power of the large States. It is this peculiar mode of election which can render the votes of small States truly efficient in the choice of a President. Strip the Constitution of this feature— introduce (he discriminating ptinciple, and you transfer ibe whole power to ihe large States. Their combinations cannot be defeated ; and whilst they give you a President and Vice President wilii perfect certainly, and in perpetual rotation, they will laugh at our ioterieteace, and deride our impotency.

Permit toe, on this point, to appeal lo those gentlemen who represent ibe large States for the coirecioeas of the opinions which I have express ed, Bod to ask them whether it is consistent with their characters, as guardians of the Con sti tat ion, to avail themselves of the moment of party viO' lence to pursue this serious and radical change, and to aggrandize the States which they reprc' •ent, at the expense of those with whom they are connected T To those gentlemen who represent small States, it would not be necessary, under any other circumstances, to make an appeal. The interests of the Stales to which they belong would act be forgotten. But this is a moment when every object appears to be forgotten but the temporary views of party ; and i must be permitted to remind those gentlemen, that if they suffer themselves to be carried along by the torrent, and consent to abandon the interests of the States to which they belong, their vote* can never be recalled. If they agree to the resolution, and the amendment should be ingrafted upon the Consiitulion, the rights thus sacrificed are lost forever. For myself, I should be as well satisfied to see an amendment which should, in express terms, confine the choice of President to certain large States, as to see the resolution on your table. The effect must be precisely tbe same. But as it is not my intention to consume much of the time of the House, 1 will waive all further remarks upon this part of the subject.

There is another view of this subject, which furnishes to my mind a conclusive arguaienl against the proposed amendment. In all governments which have hitherto existed, in which the elective principle has extended the Executive Magistrate, It has been impossible, for any length of time, to Suard against corruption in ibe eTectioni. The anger is not an imaginary one, in this country. The office of President is at this time the great object of ambition, and as the wealth and population of this country increases, the powers and patronage of the President must necessarily be extended. We cannot expect to escape the fate of other Republics. Candidates for the office of President will arise, who, under the assumed garb of patriotism and disinterested benevolence, will disguise the most unprincipled ambition. Corruption will be practised by such candidates, whenever it can be done with success.

It is therefore an object of the first importance, to regulate the election in such a manner as to remove, as far as possible, both the temptation and the means of corruption. If gentlemen will attend to the proposed amendment with reference to this point, Ibey will find that the means and the temptation to corruption must be increased. As the Constitution now stands, the man who aspire; to the office of President, can at best but run the nee on equal terms with some individual of his own party. In order to succeed, he must not only obtain for himself and his associate, a greater nunt' ber of votes than his own political opponents, but he must obtain more votes than ibe associate himself. The chances of success are by those means rendered more remote, and however desirable the office may be, the temptation to enter the list, or to make individual exertions, are diminished. The means these, it is well known, constitute a fund of great extent, and where the election is brought to such a point, as lo rest with two candidates only, this fund may be used with great success. One office may be promised to this Elector as the price of ' bla vote, whilst other offices are promised to other Electors on the same corrupt consideration, auAthe aspiring candidate may thus mount to the first office lo the Government. But so long as your elections remain on this present footing, Uie means of corruption are diminished; because the aspiring candidate can only promise this corrupt distribution of offices upon eventually succeeding to tha Presidency, and as his chances of success are diminished by the mode of election, his promises are of less value to the Elector, and of course will be less frequently made, and more generally rejected. So far as I can understand the objections which are made to the present mode of election, they are brought within a narrow compass. They consist principally of a general and loose assertion, that it is reasonable and proper Electors should on alloc* occasions designate the man they intend for a particular office; and secondly, that the experience of the last Presidential election shows the nei>e»> lily of a designation in this particular case.

If it was true, that one man only could be found ivilbin the United States qualified to fill the office of President, there would be force in the first objection. But sncb is not the fact. There are men ' be found in every State, eminently qualified for is important trust. Where then can be the necessity of confining the votes of Electors to a single candidate 1 Is it an hardship upon an Elector to be compelled to vole for two candidates, when two may so easily be found? ? And are there not advantages arising from this mode, of a serious and decisive nature 1 I have already mentioned the interest which tbesmall States have in the arrangement, and I have alluded to the door of corruption which the change will open, and it is not necessary at this time to repeat those opinions. But I must be permitted to ask, is it not of some importance, that the most eminent men should be selected for the offices of President and Vice President? The President is elected for four years ; he may die within that period — he may be removed from office, or be may become disqualified to execute iisduiies; in either of these events the Vice President succeeds to the power. Under the existing arrangement you will secure. as far as human prudence can accomplish it, the most eminent men for these two offices. Each candidate must be voted for as President,and if the Electors fairly execute the Consiiiotion, they will give their roMa ibr those men who are the best qualified to ti-

;r the Government. Thus, under every probable event, you will 6ntl one of the most eminent of your citizens at the head of your Government.

But if (he aiQeaiimeot prevails the case must be frreally changed. The man voted for as Vice Presidentwill be selected without any decisive view to his qualifications to administer the Government. The office will generally be carried into the market to be exchanged for ibe votes of some large Slates for President. And the only criterion which will be regarded as a qualification for the office of Vice President, will be, the temporary influenceof the candidate over the Electors of his State. It is in this manner you must expect to obtain a man to fill the second office in the Government, and who must succeed to the power of President, upon every vacancy. The momentary views of parly may perhaps be promoted by such arrangements, but the permanent interests of the country are sacrificed.