December 8, 1803

Far from believing that experience has shown Ibe impropriety of the existing mode of election, I am convinced, so far as it has gone, that it has evinced the wisdom of the arrangement. The general success of the Government is well understood, and exhibits a strong proof in favor of the Constitution, as it now stands. But gentlemen speak of the late election of President by the House of Representatives, and by the manner in which that transaction is described. I am persuaded the circumstances which attended it are not understood. Iwasamemberoflhe House of Representatives at the time, and I lake this occasion to declare that no transaction ever was more grossly misrepresented, than that has been, in every part of this country. When the election commenced in the House of Representatives, every gentleman knew that it must terminate in the choice of one or the other of the two candidates, and the only question was, who could, or would think proper, to Eriisi the longest in support of the candidate he d first chosen. The election was conducted wit b perfect mildness and good humor; not an expression or look of severity escaped from any one ; and when the election was closed, the House proceeded to the ordinary business of the session, as though nothing of particular importance had taken place. The candidates who on ibal occasion were brought into the House, were both se. lecied by the same political party, It could not beof much importance to that party which should be chosen, nor could it be supposed to be of vast importance to their opponents. The event therefore was certain that an election would be made, and there did not exist the smallest hazard that the Government' would be left without a President. Had the election terminated in favor of either candidate, those who brought them into the House must have been satisfied. If the controversy had arisen between two candidates of different political parties, the contest might have been a serious one, but that is a state of things for which the present amendment makes no provision. The public agitation, which it is said by some gentlemen existed at that time, was not called for by 1, and must have been harmless. The people of this country are not at this time, nor were they then disposed to rebel against their Constitution and Government, li was not only the right but the duty of the House of Representatives, to select from the two candidates the man in their opinion was be^l qualified to execute the office of President. And if the choice had fallen on the gentleman who now presides in ibe Senate, "all United America," to use the favoreipression of the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. Q. W. Campbell,) would have acquiesced the decision, and submitted without rebellion insurrection to the Administration.

But there is one important lesson which the experience of that election has taught the people of the United States— it is this, that it become* the great and solemn duty of Electors, upon all occasions, to give their votes for two men who shall be best qualified for the office of President. The Electors do not, they cannot know which of their own candidates will succeed. They are therefore called upon by every sacred principle to select the most eminent of their fellow-citizens. They will be stimulated on all future occasions, by the experience of the last election, to do, what I trust they have heretofore done, to give their votes for two men, in either of whom they are willing In confide the Executive power of the Government. What then can induce us to change the form of our elections Some gentlemen havesaidacreat deal about the voice of the people, and declared that the people demand the alteration. This is a language too frequently used within these walls. The purposes for which it is used, I leave toothers to explain; but it must be perfectly understood that the clamors of designing men are too often mistaken for the voice of the people. The people are rarely disposed to seek for changes whilst they feel and enjoy the blessings of their old establishments. Be this as it may, we have been sent into this House to obey no voice but that of our own consciences end judgments.

If gentlemen would, upon this occasion, divest themselves of those party considerations, which are so apt to swallow up deliberation, I cannot persuade myself that they would agree to the resolution. When they view the deep wound which it inflicts on the interests of small States — when they see the wide door which it opens to corru^ lion — the certain and pernicious effect which it must produce on the Electors of a Vice President, and the destruction of that balance of power among the States which was settled by the Constitution, they will at least hesitate, before ihejr give a final vote for the passsage of the resolution, The security given by the Constitution to the interests and influence of the different States, in our great national concerns, forms the only basis on which the Government can rest. Disturb those interests, and the Government must tremble to it* foundation. And although the effect may not be immediately perceived, yet the day will come when it will be both seen and felt, and the large States, who have now seized a moment of passion to grasp the power, may regret the hour when they violated the compact which binds us u^thei Mr. Dennib.— Bncouragf d by the indulgent atlenlion with which the remarks of other feolletlemen have been received, I submit to ihe consideratioa of the House some observations on the resolution before us. Not having been present when the resolution, which originated in this House, containing alone the dixcrLmlnaliDe principle, was under consideration, and which it is presumed was fully discussed, because that point was exclusively considered, and deprived of the elaborate and learned argument of the Senate in relation to that principle. I should not hare offered myself to the consideration of this House, if there had not been incorporated into the resolution Other principles which have been but little investinted, and which, though called subordinate principles, I conceive to be as important as the principle of designation Itself.

The friends ol the resolution, aware of the influence of names, have chosen to call the two last, secondary principles; have omitted to discuss them themselves, and have presumed that others would regard them as subordinate principles, because they have chosen so to denominate tbem. It may, however, be shown, that these principles, acknowledged on all hands to be obnoxious, even lo many of those who favor what 1 will term the pre-eminent principle, and which they are admonished to surrender to obtain that object, are far from being so innocent and unimportant as is represented; and that Ihe last one goes essentially to impair if not entirely to defeat the favorite principle of designation itself.

As far as I have been able to develope th^ leading argument in favor of a discrimination, it is, that by such distinction we shall insure the complete control of the public will, and that the man intended as the secondary, may never become the primary character. But, according to the last member of the resolution, instead of assuring to ns that object, in every case where no one candidate shall have a majority of all the votes of the Electors, and where by any means or contrivance a choice in this House can be prevented, the person designated as Vice President becomes the Presldeni.

In considering the combined but warring principles of this resolution, we are not to consider their tendency simply in the present state of things, but look to a period when our States and our political parties shall have multiplied their numbers. Scarcely does the earth perform her annual revolution without adding to our existing numbers a sister State; and I will venture to predict that many years will not have passed away when this nation will be divided into three or four political parties. As your States and those parties augment their respective members, so will increase the difficulty of procuring a majority of electoral voices in favor of any individual. Admit that thedesignatingprineiple may render it lesspi bable that the election shall be brought into tl House, as in the case of a tie, the case of a nc eleciiou by the electoral bodies, for the reasons before assigned, on account of no one candidate having a majority of votes, may frequently occur. For, let it be remembered, that this ca-e will be but little affected by the discriminating principle. When the election shall be brought into this House the increase of States and of parties will in like manner, as in the electoral bodies, render it extremely difficult (even without the influence of fraud or corruption to prevent it,) to effect an n of a sufficient number of members voting by States, where there may be a number of candidates, togiveany oneof them a majority of the States. A non-election by this House then, by this resolution, is precisely equivalent to an election of ibe man to the Presidency who was intended as the Vice President ; because, by the last member of the resolution, if no choice be made in the House by the fourth of March, then the Vice President, already chosen by the Senate, is to become the President. Thus it is, that by the magical operation of these conflicting principles, you do the very thing you mean lo prevent, and elect the man intended as a secondary character to the Chief Executive Magistracy.

Again, sir, in order to secure the certainty ol electing a man of the people, throw the wnole weight of the Senatorial branch and of the Vice President, who have nothing to do but to defeat an election here to make him President, into that scale which is opposed to the public will; and you hold out a temptation to the exercise of every species of contrivance which the mind of man, stimulated by a love of power and possessed of allurements to acquire it, may suggest and put into motion in this House, to preponderate the balance oa the side of non-election ; which non-election is tantamount to an election by the Senate of their President to be the President of the United States. Nor will the weight of that body be realized alone when the election shall be brought here ; but may be exerted in the first instance to multiply candidates, perplex and divide the electoral bodies, and prevent, in them, a majority in favor of any one candidate; so as to bring as many as practicable into this body, in order that they may again perplex and obstruct it.

Surely, Mr. Speaker, the Senate ought to have been satisfied, (determined as they have been to innovate on the Constitution in a point never contemplated by any but themselves,) to have provided that the election of their President, a secondary character, should vest him with the powers, emoluments, and patronage of the high office of Presidentof this great nation; so longand no longer than an election should be made. This would have taken away that strong inducement to intrigue and corruption, which results from exhibiting to human frailty the important price of the Chief Magistracy of this country, for four succeeding years. I was about to move such a modification or extension of that principle in Committee of the Whole ; but we were told, nay, the friends of the principle of designation were told, that all efforts at amendment, even for changing an obscure and unintelligible phraseology, differently construed by those who held this language too, would be vain and illusory. These intimations have since grown into fact, in the rejection of the resolution this morDio^submittedbyagenileman from Pennsylvania (Mr. Hooe.) Yes, sit, we are told that although the discriminating principle is the onlv one to which the public attention has been invited, and the only one embraced in the resolution of this House, yet it must be adopted, because the other branch of the Legislature. not deigning to consider the resalorjoD of this House, have incorporated into it a principle vesting ■■> their own fiodf a novel and important power) and that they will not adopt the one without the other.

But, Mr. Speaker, let me here In a particular manner address myself to those gentlemen who are favorable designating principle, and who acknowledge the other to be extremely obnoxious. Can you discharge your duty to your constituents, who have required the one and not the other, and ' reconcile it to your conscience to take the resolution as it stands? You are told the last is s subordinate principle and must be yielded to effectuate the main design. Is that a subordinate principle which transfers the choice in any contingency from this House to the Senate? Is that a minor principle which not only makes that transferfrom the immediate representatives of the people, to a body much less responsible to the public, but changes the mode of voting by States to a *oi< You are told the object of amending ibe Constitution is lo conform the choice of the President to the will of the people. But is this object attained by holding out temptations to frustrate that will in the first place, aoii transferring the jurisdiction from the House of Represenla tires to the Senate in the second t

But you are told you rausl do so, otherwise the Senate will not agree to your principle of designation. Other gentlemen may be in possession of means of individual information to which I am a stranger, but sure I am, we do not possess that information as a body, which warrants the assertion. Have you ever asked them to recede, or signified your wishes on the subject 1 Has not every effort of the kind been rejected by this House? Shall it be said that whilst our rules indicate the propriety of this course in case of a difference between the two branches, in ordinary legislation, we will not make one attempt to expunge from the resolution principles which almost all of us declare to be repugnant to our wishes 1

You are told that the people of the United States and the Legislatures of the States imperiously demand a change of the Constitution. In relation to the discriminating principle, let it be conceded ; but, have the people or the States required you to transfer your own power to the Senate, and has the declamation respecting the will of the people any application to the two last principles of the resolution 7 No. I will venture to assert that this ingenious contrivance had its origin in the other branch of the Legislature.

We are told we have only the initiative in the business, and our acts are to undergo the revision of the State Legislatures ; and, therefore, the less need for that caution and deliberation which might otherwise be requisite. It would be a very rr excuse in a judge of an inferior court to say was less sedulous to understand a legal question, and to decide correctly upon it, because his decision would be revised by a superior tribunal. We should not transfer into the hands of othen ibal trust which is confided to ourselves. I will not say that there is not any individual in any State Legislature who is not posseased of at moea knowledge as any individual here ; but I will say, that it is not to be calculated that the Legislative body of any State possesses as much collective knowledge as does this House, of a subject affecting not only individuals but States differently situated in regard to geographical position, population, wealth, and interests. That the dectuOB of this House will have its influence on the Stat* Legislatures is not to be doubted, and therefore we should scrutinize the contrarient principles of the resolution, and go as far as practicable to remove its defects.

I have said, in the course of the discussion on some incidental questions, that to say I would in no case change the Constitution, would be using unconstitutional doctrines, because the instrument contains within it a principle oriisainendation,Bad it may be necessary to conform it to new circumstances and contingencies as they emerge. But I have also said, and beg leave to repeat it, that to induce a change of it, the existing evil ought to be clearly demonstrated, and the aptitude of the remedy proposed to effectuate the object ought to be unequivocally established. The* alteration of the Constitution of the United States is of a more delicate nature than to change that of a single State. In one case you have only to quiet the apprehensions and compose the disquietude aJF discordant individuals ; in the other to disarm ike jealousies and reconcile the interests of jarring Stales, To this distinction those gentlemen who have reposed the whole argument on the basis of the popular will, have not sufficiently attended.

A gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. CAitrHELi,,) and other gentlemen who have advocated the adoption of the resolution, have informed us that this Constitution was adopted by. and that the departments ought to be organized according to, the dictates of a majority oi the people. Admit it to be so, and that the designating principle will produce the effect I have endeavored to show, the whole resolution will defeat it. But, I beg leave to enter my dissent to their theory of our Government. That the will of the majority in a republican Government, and in a single State, moM and ought to prevail, I do not deny: but IwhoUy deny this lo be the theory of the American Confederacy. The Constitution of the United States was not adopted by the people of the United States, but by the people of the several Slates as such, voting through the medium of their State Con ren lion s ; and, so far from its being adopted by the people of the United States as such, it it doubtful whetherit was not adopted by a minority of the people, though ratified and confirmed by a majority of the adopting Slates. North Carolina and Rhode Island rejected it, and in Virginia, Pennsylvania, and New York, the minoritiee won powerful. Tbe minority in Virginia and PennsylTiDia alone were more than equal to counlervail the majorities of five or six of the smaller States ) so that, if the vote had been taken by the whole American people vol log together, it is doubtful if it had ever been adopted.

When we view it in relation to the organization of the departments, they are equally mistaken. The House of Representatives, which partakes most of the popular or consolidated principle, is not chosen by the will of the people of the United States, butin different modes, by the people of Ibe respective States. The Senate partakes in its mode of appointment exclusively of the federative principle, without regard to the number of individuals contained in the several States.

When we come to the organization of the Eiecutive department, we find an intermixture of federative and popular or consolidated principles, combined and interwoven with so delicate a hand that it is impossible to strip it of the one without destroying the other. The Electors who choose the President are not chosen in a manner to ascertain the sense of the people of the United States, but are chosen in some States by the Legislatures, in others by the people voting in a general ticket, and smothering the voice of the minority; while, in others, the cnoice is made by the people voting ilt districts, and giving the proportional weight to the minority. The number of Electors likewise assigned to the different States depend on the cojnbin ed number of the Senators and Representatives of each Staiein the Congress of the United States; so that a State having one Representative,has two votes on the federative principle, to one on the popular principle. The result of this analysis of the Constitution will satisfy gentlemen that State interests are materially affected by this amendment; and that the public will, always equivocal, is not the only thing to be considered in this particular. Indeed, sir, it proves to them that, instead of giving complete effect to the popular will, the choice of the Electors is made through the medium of so refined a process, and in BO artificial a manner, that it may happen that a majority of the Electors may be chosen and the President elected by a minority of the people. I believe, sir, a President of the United States has We have been told that numerous amendments have been made to the Constitution, and It is therefore proved by experience that those State jealousies and other dangers, which are represented as likely to arise from this amendment, have no place except in the imagination of the opponents of the resolution. i think t shall not be considei^ ed as metaphysical, however, when I declare that, there occurs to my mind a material distinction between an amendment which goes merely to enlarge or abridge the Legislative power, or the power of any given department, and one which materially changes the manner in which on Ibe departments itself is organized.

All the amendments heretofore made are of the first description; operating merely on the popular and affecting in no wise the federative principle! there was no ground for local jealousy. But, in this case, for the first time, you are affecting the organization of the departments, and, of course, the federative principle; and the arguments used in this discussion have but too well demonstrated the State jealousies and inquietudes likely to result from every such amendment between the large and smaller States. Representing a State which occupies and is likely to maintain, for a long time to come, a middle position in the Union, f have not critically examined whether the resolution will operate for or against the one or the other ; but I know that there are jealousies on this subject, and we ought to be cautious not to fan the flame. If there be individuals in this nation hostile to the Union, (and we have been admonished that such exist,) let us be cautious how we put into their mouths the strongest arguments to effectuate their designs; and, let me again repeat it, (here must always exist inquietude both among States and individuals wherever you attempt to change the mode of organizing a department, and every amendment you make tends to weaken the bond of our Union. Tbe idea of the friends of the resolution, on the subject of changes in the Constitution, therefore, is whully erroneous, when they suppose there is nothing to be considered but what they call the public will ; and they have made the mistake by regarding the Confederacy as a consolidated Government. But it partakes cnT this equality in no instance, except in the operation of its laws. Here it reaches our citizens aa one people, regardless of State limits and State inequalities. It is this property alone which forms the distinguishing characteristic between that system and the Confederation. Here we operate upon the people, and there they .operated on States through the medium of requisitions. I am sensible I have availed myself to the full extent of the patience of the Committee, and shall conclude with an exhortation that we do nothing which may affect the harmony of our Union ; and that we revise, and revise again, this resolution, before we stamp it with our sanction.

Mr. Jackbon.— Mr. Speaker, when I came to the House this morning, nothing was more forei^ to my intention than to trespass upon their indulgence, but the importance of the subject, and the bold and daring assertions made by gentlemen in the opposition, will be my apology for the remarks I shall make, and I promise the House asa remuneration for the attention they may honor me with, to be as concise as possible. Sir, I must call that a'bold and daring assertion, made by the gentleman from North Carolina, (Mr.PcRViAHOB,) that if the small States had contemplated a change in the Constitution, and had not considered it as Union; and see used not vague expressions or dubious language admitting of its amendment, but an express article, id wit: the fifth, ant bori zing amendments and designating the mode by which they may be obtained, which declares that — •• The Congnn, nhoiuvei tno-tbiida of botii HotUM ■lull deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to the Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing amendment!, which, in either case, ihall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification ma; be proposed by Congress :"

And when I consider the perspicuous and emphalical language used by its framers, that they have act inserted a single clause not iDlentted to have a full meaning, and that they were incapable of holding forth a feature in the Constitution which should be construed contrary to the plain accepiBiion of it, I am induced to believe that the gentleman has not paid a proper attention to the subject, or he would not bare hazarded the

The same gentleman has said, we are about to encourage fraud, intrigue, venality, and corruption, by the passage of this resolution; my respect for decorum and ilie rules of this House prevents me from answering this assertion in the language it deserves. I may. however, be permitted to say that the reverse will be the case ; and I contend that there is more danger that fraud, intrigue, venality, and corruption, will be practised in cases resulting from the Constitution as it now stands, than there will be under the amendment before us, if adopted. To illustrate ray position, I willsuppoae an understanding and agreement among the States (for without them no election for President can take place.) that A shall be supported as President, and B as Vice President; will not the importance of the office, and the probability of success, under the want of the discriminating princiSle, warrant the assertion that there is great anger of intrigue, to secure the election of B, the ostensible candidate for ihe office of Vice President to the Presidential chair, by reducing some of the Electors in one of the States to violate the agreement thus made with the sister States, in voting for him only, whom none but themselves, and those active in the intrigue, contemplate to be President, and thereby a President will be crammed upon us, whom nine-tenths of the people never thought of7 Much has been said by gentlemen respecting the spirit of compromise and accommodation which governed the framersof the Constitution, and it is contended that thisspirit of accommodation and compromise will be materially affected, and one ol the main principles of the Constitution violated by this amendment, I admit that a spirit of compromise and accommodation influenced some of the framers of that instrument, but I deny that it was mutual. There certainly was a noble magnanimity evinced in the accommodating spirit of the KepiCMOtaiivea of the large States, to induce the small States lo come into the Union, but that spirit was not reciprocal. I believe that those who represented the large States justly estimated the danger and rivalries of neighboring States, if not subject to one confederated Government, competent to their individual protection. The fate of other little Republics warranted the idea that the smaller members would be swalloired up by the larger ones, who would, in turn, attack each other; and that the liberty achieved by the blood of some of the bravest men that ever lived would pass away without leaving a trace behind it. They, therefore, yielded everything lo the little States, knowing they were most numerous, and naturally jealous of the large ones. If we examine the Constitution, we shall find the whole of the great powers of the Government concentred in the Senate. They have the sole power of trying impeachments, and of making treaties. Congress may declare war; but, once declared, they cannot make peace; that power as well as the boundless, undefined, treaty-making power, generally, are exclusively vested in the Senate ; in the Legislative power they possess an absolute veto on the passage of ererf measure sanctioned by the Representatives of ine people; and how are they chosen? Two from each State; the smallest State has the same influence in that body with the largest. In the choice of Electors of President the small States have this additional extraordinary privilege of choosing one Elector for each Senator, and if the election of President comes into the House of Representatives each State has equal power. The small States also possess the power, under the Constitution, of reducing the Representatives on this floor lo one from each State, and in such event of completely controlling the power of the large States in every department of the Government, for the CoIt5tin^■ "The number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one Representative."

1 therefore think that, in the formation of this Constitution, the accommodation was exclusively on the part of the large States, and that, of course, it was not reciprocal. Though the large States have not their due share of power, I do not complain. I only infer that, as the small States have almost all the power of the Government, or may get it by amendments, and as they are vested with all this power, without an equivalent given to the large States, they are most interested in tbe existence of the Constitution, and if most interested in its preservation they are also most interested in the adoption of this amendment, because I have Eroven that intrigue and corruption are more kely to occur under the Constitution, wanting the discriminating principle, than under the amendment now proposed ; and I ask gentlemen whether any engine that can be set in motion will be more destructive to this Constitution than fraud, intrigue, venality, and corruption'? Sir, the friends of republican Government have justly considered that the great danger it has to dread is from overgrown Executive power, and from the desperate efforts of aspiring individuals to obtain it. Render the election a matter of chance, make the Electors vote blindfolded, as they now do, and often indeed will the election come into the Mouse of Kepreventa lives, where (I wish to be under- $Ii>od, I speak not of the present time, 1 believe the present Representatives would spurn at every effort lo influence them improperly,) intrigue, venality, and corruption will be brought to h focus with wealth and all the allurements of office in the train, arrayed against virtue, and the wishes of the nation. Will there not be great danger that corruption will be played off here in such a way as to induce the members to disregard the voice of the people, and elevate to supreme Executive power an aspiring individual 1 Sir, experience a borne testimony against the present mode of election. Let us not reject its admonitions. By recurring to the situation of Ihiacountry. not long since, it will be recollected that there was serious danger of a dissolution of the Government, and I believe it was felt in the most remote parts of the United States. Under the discriminating principle now contemplated, the election will not, probably in one case out of a hundred, be brought into the House of Representatives, and iheawful crisis of alarm, to which I have alluded, never occur again.

I observed, upon a former occasion, when this subject was before us, that the polar star of republicanism was, that the majority should govern; and that, so far as we have deviated from that principle, our Constitution is anti-republican. Shall we reject the present favorable opportunity to give efficacy to that principle in a most essential branch of our Government? and, by adhering lo a mode which experience has proven is fraught with imminent danger, suffer the minority of this nation to choose a President of the United States? ^ For, unless we sacrifice the election of Vice President, they may vote for him whom we intend for that office, and thereby make him, ents and patriotism with the highest office in the power of the nation to bestow, we shall be obliged to give up the Vice Presidency to the minority, and thereby set a price of $80,000 on the head of the President, with all the honors and offices of the nation, to be given lo a political enemy. 1 hope, sir, as such a stale of things may happen, we aball take care to guard against it. The gentleman Irom Connecticut says this subject is not understood by the American people, and, that it may be understood, he wishes it to be discussed here, in the newspapers, and in the State L<»islatures. Sir, it has been, long since, discussed here and elsewhere, and is, in my opiDioo, well understood. In several State Legislatures, whose politics correspond with those of that gentleman, (and which will, therefore, be allowed by him lo have been uninfluenced by party zeal,) as well as in States which correspond in political opinion with the majority of this House, it has been repeatedly examined, and the States have almost invariably concurred in recommending; the ^■' and Vice President. Can there be evidence of its justice than its being recommended at a lime when party views were out of the question 1 The gentleman is correct when he says the interests of the State's are implicated by this.amendment. Sir, I believe there are talents and virtue sufficient in the State Legislatures to discern the import of measures implicating their interests, and lo adopt or reject ihem as those interests dictate; they will not be thankful to the gentleman and his political friends for attempting upon this, as on a former, occasion, to guard the people against themselves as their worst enemies. Much has been said against the details of this amendment. I acknowledge, sir, I am one of those who do nut like them all, but 1 think the cases in which inconvenience is apprehended, so extreme and unlikely to occur, that I am unwilling to hazard the great principle of the amendment on account of them. I am not disposed to risk a certain good, by guarding against a visionary evil, which, it may be supposed will result from it. I believe the guarding against the right of the Senate to elect a President would be p(0- vidingfor an extreme case that will never happen. For, as 1 before observed, it is not likely that the election will come into ihe House of Representatives for a century to come, if the discriminating principle be adopted ; and when it does come into this House, it is not to be presumed they will neSlect to make a choice, when, in that case, they know the Senate have the authority. 1 ask, if a man would not be esteemed mad, who, having a ship and its cargo in the hands ofan enemy, should refuse to accept the restoration of the one without Ihe other? As the Constitution at present stands it has, in a great measure, placed the election (as I have attempted to show) in the hands of a minority — in the bands of political enemies— and out of the control of the majority 1 Shall we suffer this to be ihe case, because we cannot make the resolution more perfect; although we acknowledge it contains a most essential amendment, and almost all the States, before the prevalence of party spirit, declared an alteration necessary 1 These are my reasons for voting for the resolution, and I hope it will be agreed to.

Mr. Stanton. Mr. Speaker, I exceedingly regret that 1 cannot forbear troubling the House with a few remarks, in justification of the vole I am about to give, on the all-important resolution on your table, for amending the Constitution of the United States. Sir, that venerable body, who were the framers of that valuable instrument, presupposed that, after its merits had undergone the ordeal of experience, it would need amendment. All intelligent, well-disposed men, of every de* scription, agree that the main object of Government is, or ought to be, such as expressed in the language introductory to our Constitution: "to promote the general welfare and secure the blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity;" that being the case, it strongly recommends the adoption of the resolution in contemplation. That part of the national compact that relates to the choice of President and Vice President, which does not permit the Electors to designate on their ballots who they vote for as President and Vice President, which envelopes the Electors in darkness, and cuutol be reconciled with the good purpose of the CoOTenlion, but by their own seotimeoti expressed in their letter to the President of Congress, signed by their illustrious President, the words are emphatical ;

" This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minda, led each Stale in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude than might have been otherwise expected, and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our situation rendered indispensable.”

For it evidently appears that the divided situation of the Convention was such, in consequence of the difference among (lie several States as to their particular extent, habits, and particular interests. This being the case, the CoaretitioD was obliged to submit to improprieties and imperfections, and to wait the test of experience on the merits of the compact. Sir, I am hostile to the doctrine advanced on this floor, that the least innovation in this sacred charter would endanger Uie tranquillity of the Union. At the same time, I admit that it should not be touched but for coSDt reasons and emergencies like the present. Sir, that Constitution which, in its operation, tends most to promote the happiness of the people, by rewarding intrinsic merit, defending the innocent, and affording speedy and effectual redress of grievances, is the best. No doubt but the framers of the national compact, in all their deliberations, kept in view the greatest good of the people. And, while 1 am disposed to pay homage to their superior talents and patriotism, I am unwilling to pay them a compliment or encomium that may, in the least degree, depreciate the good sense of their creator, the people. I believe our CousiitDiiou is as free from imperfections as any oaearih.yet itis, like all other human productions, susceptible of improvement. Sir, the fifth article in the Constitution says ;

" The Congress, when two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to Ail Constitution, or, on the application of the Legislatures of two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing amendments, which, in either ease, shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the aaveial States, oi by Conventions in three-fourths thereof; as the one or the other mode < ratification may be proposed by the Canfre*i)and that no State without its consent shall be deprived by its equal suffrage in the Senate."

This article, that forever keeps open the door for amendment, and secures an equal sufirage in the Senate, and gives an equal vote in the choice of a President, in the event of no choice by Electors, is the life, beauty, and quinlessence of the Constitution. Sir, 1 recollect that, yesterday, when this subject was discussed, an honorable member from Connecticut repeatedly called on the friends of the resolution to point out one evil that had resulted to the people of the Union from the existing Constitution. Sir, permit me to ask thehonorablegenlleman wherehewasat theawfil crisis of the Presidential election] when the public mind was agitated and tossed to and fro oa the tempestuous sea of doubt, and forced to (h« verge of despair ? Surely the honorable gentleman must have been out of the United States, or out of his senses, or he must have lost his usual sagacity, patriotism, and sound regard for lh« honor of his country, or he must have recollected the alarming catastrophe. Even had he been among the antipodes, who walk on the other side of the globe, with their feet opposite to ours, he would almost have heard the destructive sound, which seemed to be from the clouds, and penetrate the solid earth. Sir, I ought to apologize for this digression and detention of the House; but, while I am up, I hope to be indulged to make a few remarks on what dropped from an honorable gen. tleman from Pennsylvania, who appeared an able advocate for the discriminating partof the resolution, and opposed the clause relative to the exPresident acting as President in the event of certain contingencies. But, he suddenly seems to change his ground, and says, the most objectionable partof this amendment, in the opinion of many gentlemen, Bn4 against which the gentleman from Vermont in particular has levelled his keenest darts, is that which vests, the Vice President with power to discharge the duties of President in the event of a President not being elected ; and proceeds by saying, at first view it appears liable to objections, out, on a candid and fair investigation, the objections lose their weight and the principle is found, in his opinion, correct. Sir, 1 beg leave to differ with the honorable gentleman, not only in this, but also on another position, where he says, it will also operate as a stimulus to the House of Representatives to make an election. I think, sir, it will produce a contrary effect; they will, I fear, consider themselves exonerated from the imperative language of the present Constitution, that says : "They shall immediately choose a President." Sir,Bfier viewingthewholegroood, and notwithstanding the imperfections of the re»- olutiOD in its present form, as it contains the di»- criminating principle, which alone was all I wished to obtain, I shall give it my feeble support Being fully impressed in my mind that, by adopting the designating' principle contained in the resolution, it will frustrate the machinations of factions, secure in future a fair expression of (he public will, and tend to increase the domestic happiness, and national prosperity and glory.

Mr. Orgoo said, he regretted the expression h% had made yesterday, as it appeared to nave given dissatisfaction to some gentlemen. That expression had, however, been misconceived. He had said, that the people were in favorof the discriminating principle; he had said that thiscounnr was divided into two parties, and that an ameo^ menC for the establishment of this principle had at one time been brought forward by one party and then by (he other ; he bad said that one of these parties was called republican, and the other federal. He did not consider this last term an imputation on any gentleman. Some gentlemen were called federalists; he was called a republican. They differed, it was true, in poliiical^sentimeot} but he had oBrer aadenioed that ^eDtlemeo thought [here was anything reproachful in being called federalists J on the contrary, he knew " time when the epithet was deemed honorable.

Mr. Lera moved a postponement of the subject till Monday. Lost — ayes 41.

A motion to adjourn was then made, and lost. Mr. Elliot.— There at« two or three remarks, which fell from me in the animation of debate, I wish to explain. I used the observation of rash precipitancy as applicable to the majority in this business; of personal indecorum, imperious r- cessity, and Senatorial authority, as applicable particular members. 1 also observed that there were men of both parties, who, in my opinion, were aspiring and unprincipled. 1 beg leave ex- [dicitly to state that I did not, at the time I made this remark, entertain an idea of any individual citizen. 1 alluded to no particular person. The remark was general, and I believe it to have been just. As to the charge of rash precipitancy, i did not mean to apply it to the majority. Perhaps I was wrong in making it ; I hope I was. When, at an advanced stage of the debate, I intimated a wish to be heard, when no more than one day had been spent on the subject, and when I declared myself too much exhausted and indisposed to declare my opinions at that late hour, the House, by a great majority, deprived me of ilie time necessary to do justice to my ideas. For a moment, 1 felt myself placed in a humiliating and degraded situation ; in such a situation as I thought no Representative, and particularly a Representative of one of the largest districts in the Union, containing a population of between fifty and sixty thousand souls, ought to be placed. If there was in this procedure anything of rash precipitancy, it was, perhaps, the error of the moment ; and what I considered at the time as the offspring of temper and passion, may have been noihiogmore than an evidenee of that disposition to which the greatest men have told us the first bodies in the world are sometimes exposed. If the body did. for a moment, yield to this disposition, lam ready to acknowledge that it has amply atoned for it by then ixhibited. f also made the charge rum. I thought that it really existed. I thought it indecorous for any gentleman to tell other gentlemen that they had personal knowledge of dishonorable intrigue practised on a late important occasion. As to the imputation of Senatorial authority, I am still of opinion that this charge is merited by gentlemen who say we must take this resolution precisely as it came from the Senate, or lose everything. 1 conclude what I have to say on this subject, by declaring that, whatever warmth I may have exhibited in this debate, the vote which I am now about to give is the result of the coolest deliberation, and in conformity to the most sincere dictates of conscience.

Mr. J. Ranoolph said, that they had been told the other night, by the gentleman from Connecticut, (Mr. GaiswoLD,^ that it was necessary to procrastinate this decision in order to give time t that thorough investigation which it was iltea contended had not taken place. From the promise which was held out on that occasion, and from the lime which had intervened, his expectations had been wound up to a very high pitch; whether they had been gratified or not he would leave the House to determine. Since the gentleman had expressed a desire, and the House had afBrmed it, that this discussion should be protracted, Mr. R. hoped that he, on this subject, (whatever might be the case on others, where he was comEelTed todefend what it was hisdu[y to originate,) ad occupied as little of their time as most of those who had discussed it, and might be permitted to make a few remarks in reply to those which had fallen from gentlemen.

He would begin with those of the worthy member from Massachusetts, (Mr. Eustis.) He ho* stated that this amendment embraces three objects: The designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President ; the mode in which the choice of President should be made by that House, in case of no election by the Electors, in the first instance; and the provision that the duties of President should be exercised by the Vice President, if the House of Re present a lives ^onld also fail to make an election. To the first of these provisions, the gentleman from Massachusetts felt himself warmly attached, but could not be brought to adopt it, when combined with the other two. On the first objection which he had taken, the gentleman had dwelt so short a time, and with so little force, and the difference between electing out of "the five highest," or out of those " having the highest numbers not exceeding three," was, in itself, so trivial, that little reliance seemed placed upon it. The possible succession of the Vice President to the Presidency, appeared to form the chief obstacle, and because he conceived it calculated to defeat the discriminating principle he could not be prevailed upon to assent to any amendment into which it was incorporated. And yet against this very principle of designation, the gentleman from Connecticut (Mr. R. Gbiswold) has made his utmost exertions, as subversive of the original ground of compact between the States. Let me ask, said Mr. R., upon what ground these gentlemen will vote together against this amendment when their views of its tendency are so entirely opposite, and when they are equally opposed in opinion as to what ought to be effected by us. I beg, sir, this inquiry may be understood to proceed from the high respect in which I hold the gentleman from Massachusetts, and from the regret which 1 must always feel in being compelled to act against him. It is dictated only by my anxiety to add the sanction of his character and his talents to every measure in which I may be concerned. The gentleman from Massachusetts advocates the discriminating between the persons voted for <W President and Vice President ; the gentleman from Connecticut deprecates it. The first gentleman is opposed to the amendment because it is calculated to defeat this principle of discrimination; the second because it contains it. When these gentlemen assigned such opposite and irreconcilable objections, I hoped they would not unite their votes against the arnendineDi — that one of them would become a conren to the otber, aod that we should derive some support from them OQ the question. But there is one point oa which they agree. They contend that it does not become us to suppose that the House of Representatives can reruse to obey the imperative voice of the Constitution, which commands them to elect a President, and that the provision of the Senate for such an emergency contains at once an unwarranted imputation on that branch of the Legislature, and an inducement to them to swerve from their duty. The supposition that this House will refuse to make an election when it is enjoined upon them by the Constitution, is said to ne de- {radinjT, and therefore inadmissible. We are exerted not to libel ourselves on our own statute IxHik, and a late case is adduced to prove that all fears on that head are groundless. From thai case I draw directly an opposite inference. Gentlemen then told us, we are highly averse to both the persons from whom we are to select a President, but there are shades in our dislike; we conceive that we have a right to be indulged with the candidate whom we consider the least obnoxious to our principles and views. If a mere shade of dislike between two persons whom ihey highly disapproved would warrant such an opposition as we then saw, what would have been the struggle if the choice had been to be made between the gentleman who succeeded to the Presidency, and either of those who were held up for that office from Massachusetts or South Carolina? Does any man believe that we should have succeeded in an election under such circumstances 1 Would the gentleman from Connecticut have abandoned his principles in that case, or does he expect that we should have surrendered ours?

I put it to the gentleman himself whether he could under such circumstances have relinquished his own judgment and principles. I ask if he could have justified to himself the giving of such a vote? 1 answer for him that he could not. I take upon me to say so, because I could not have justified it in myself. 1 never could have justified myself, because the House of Representatives are directed to choose a President, in abandoning a candidate for whom I had the highest confidence, and voting for one of whom I fell the greatest diffidence. The Constitution enjoins it upon this House to make an election, but it cannot enjoin upon any man an abandonment of his judgment and his principles. When we have conscientiously given our votes we have discharged our duty. It is equally our business to pass laws and to perform other important functions. But does that imply an obligation on any man to vote for laws which he believes impolitic, oppressive, nr unjust If the case which I have put had actually occurred, I presume we should have broken upwithout an election. For one I do not hesitate to say. that 1 would have continued balloting till the 4th of March, and let things take their course. Let us suppose such a case to have happened. The gentleman from Massachusetts objects that

I the Preai-

II y defeated, since the Vice President, chosen either by the Electors or the Senate, will succeed to the Presidency. Is it not heller that a person, selected by the Electors, who are apprized of the contingency, or by the Senate out of two presented to their choice, should succeed to (be Presidency, than that anarchy should ensue, or desperate measures be resorted to for carrying on the Government! Will it not serve to diminish the violence of ifie conflict here, when this House is apprized that it does not with a party within its walls to defeat the election of President altogether? But this we are told will give rise to endless intrigue. The Vice President, if any, or candidate for that office, will use every means to prevent an election, in hopes of succeeding to (he Executive power. Do geuderoen reflect that this argument equally applies to every case of election by the House, as the Constitution now stands? Is it not as easy for a candidate for the Presidency to intrigue, in order to effect an election, as for a Vice President to intrigue to defeat one? When two or more men come into this House as candidates for ibe office of President, are not their inducements to intrigue as strong as any which can exi si under the proposed amendment, and is not the event of an election by the House of Representatives much more probable under the present than under the proposed amendment 1

To vote for two persons, without designating which is intended for the President and which for Vice President, is, we are told by the gentleman from Connecticut, to insure the selection of the two most capable men in the United States for those offices, respectively ; but if adiscriminatioa be made, combinations will lake place between the States, and the Vice President will become a weight to secure the election of President; that he will be selected rather with a view to the State of which he is a citizen, or to his influence with, particular Electors, than his worth or abilities. So far is this from being true, in my opinion, (bat a designation is absolutely necessary to secure the election of a fit person for the office of Vice President. When the Electors designate the offices and persons, respectively, for whom they vote, after choosing the person highest in their confidence for President, they will naturally make choice of him who stands next in their esteem for Vice President; but where they are not permitted to make this discrimination, they will, to >e- cure the most important election, give all their voles to him whom they wish to be President, andscatier the other votes; thus leaving to chance to decide who shall be Vice President. Where a discrimination takes place, the Vice President will necessarily be a man standing high in the public confidence. Where it does not take place, it is more than probable that he will be a secondary character. But we are told that it is degrading la the lowest degree to suppose that there is but one person in the United States equal to the Presidency. Far be this idea from me. Were 1 of this opinion, weak as I am, I should expect to survive the Conslilution — since I may reasonably expect Co survive the term of the present Chief Magistrate. But whilst I admit that there are hundreds capable of filling the office, I do not believe it possible to present to the public, or to an individual, cnro candidates between whom there will not exist a preference. This is the nature of man, and it is the nature of free Governments to gratify this preference.

But the gentleman from Connecticut has gone into a wide field. He takes a view of the elementary principles of our Government, which he states to be consolidating and federal, and he declares that the discrimination attempted to be introduced will violate the last of those principles, to which he professes himself particularly attached. It is a matter of some surprise to me that, agreeing so nearly as we do in general principles, we should differ so widely in our conclusions. With some variation of expression, (perhaps of ideas,) I subscribe to his general doctrine. With him, I consider this a Government of States — as a Federal Government. Inasmuch as it tends to consolidation, by so much is it objectionable to me. — With him, I prize the federal principles on which it is founded, and I will join that gentleman, or any other, in heightening every federal feature of (be Constitution. I consider it, too, not only a Government of States, but as a compromise between Slates of various dimensions and interests. When embarked inone common bottom, with a common sword and common Treasury, it became necessary to give the large States a superior degree of influence, to induce them to put their superior wealth and population at the disposal of the Confederacy i whilst the small States were to be secured against encroachment. While, therefore, they are equal in the Senate, on this floor the States are represented in proportion to their population and wealth — their influence in the choice of President is compounded of their influence in both branches of the Legislature. This is the basis of the Constitution, and carries compromise in every feature. I will venture to say, that even this House is not organized on the principle of a consolidated Government, because the representation on this floor is not of the whole mass of the people of the United States, but it is a representation of each State. The United States are not divided into as many districts as there are members, nor is there a general election, but each State sends its own delegation ; and the rule of apportionment of representatives is an additional proof that this is a federative Government and a Government of compromise. If I were to point out the part of this Constitution which tends most to consolidation, I should lay my hand on the Judiciary. The giving to that department jurisdiction not only under Federal laws, but in cases between man and man, arising under the laws of a State, where one of the parties h a foreigner, or citizen of another State, and even between citizens of the same State under the bankrupt system, is the strongest feature of consolidation in this Government. 1 will go all lengths with gentlemen in abrogating this jurisdiction — Sth Con.— S5 of Government. 1 wish to see the day when the jurisdiction of the Federal courts shall be confined to cases arising under the Federal Mr. R. apologized for the digression into which he had been carried by the view which the gentleman from Connecticut had taken of the principles of our Government. It is contended that the discriminating principle of this amendment goes to destroy the compromise between the States, since it will annihilate the power of the small 'States. To this 1 conceive it is an unanswerable reply that if such be its effect it can never become a part of the Constitution.

Five States may put their veto upon it. Rhode Island, Delaware, Ohio, Tennessee, and Georgia, are five as small States as can be found in the Union. They belong to the great subdivisions of the country, Eastern, Middle, Western, and Soulbpopulalion of the United States. Eleven-twelfths of the Union may be forbidden by these Stales from adding this amendment to the Constitution. An additional proof that this proposition is not injurious to the smaller States is, that the Representatives of those very States have expressed their approbation of it. If, on the contrary, as has been contended by other gentlemen, this amendment impairs the influence of the large States, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina, will reject it. But a strong proof that it neither affects the interest of the one nor the other is, that objections have been made to it on both these grounds. Whilst, however, the gentleman from Connecticut combats this discrimination as subversive of the rights of the small States his friend from Maryland (Mr. Dennis) objects to it because the last provision renders nugatory the discriminating principle. Does the gentleman mean to disarm his friends of their objections to the amendments and induce them to support it ; or does he, relying on their stability, expect to excite alarm in its friends and thereby defeat ill The gentleman and his friends have uniformly opposed all discrimination, and now it seems, he objects because that object is likely to be defeated. This objection the gentleman from Connecticut had, with his usual clear slghtedness, cautiously avoided. He knew better the real bearing of the amendment, and if such had been the effect of the last provision, the amendment would never have received so strenuous an opposition from him. No sir, it is because he sees this principle, so obnoxious to him, existing unimpaired in this amendment, that he has thrown every obstacle in his power against it. He has indeed taken the objection that it will open the door to intrigue — for so soon as any man is put in reach of the Presidency you arm him with the power, whilst you give him the disposition to corrupt the Electors. It will therefore be the interest of the Vice President 10 defeat an election by this House. But will not the disposition and power to intrigue be equally brought into action as the Constitution now stands, when two or more candidates shall be presented 10 ihai House for their selection? And is not the probability of such an event diminished by discriminating between theofficers? I conceive this provision, by lessening the chance of an election by this House, has done much. It will tend inagreatdegree to strengthen the union of these States, which never was more endangered than at the last election. The gentleman from Connecticut complains that the events of that period have been grossly misrepresented. Whether that be the case or not. I have no hesitation to Mate that it was, in my opinion, a period of imminent danger to this country, ll was a crisis such as I hope we shall never again be exposed to, and to avoid its recurrence is my motive for advocating the amendment which has been sent to us and which is as unexceptionable as any which I believe at this time attainable. The worst that can befall us will be the exercise of the duties of President by the same person who would be called upon to discharge them in case of his death, resignation, or removal from office.

Mr. E08T1H.— If at thislate hour I could expect the attention of this House, I should derive a peculiar satisfaction in replying to the observations of my friend from Virginia; and as from present indications I have a right to experience that indulgence, I shall proceed with the same candor 'which has distinguished the remarks of that gentleman, with whom it would be my pleasure to act on this as on other occasions.

That gentleman expresses his hope, as the resolution under consideration embraces (be great object had in view, that those who are desirous of attaining this object will not refuse their assent to it because the resolution contains other provisions which he terms of an inferior or secondary nature. It is necessary to review the resolution, and I must repeat the objections which were made when it first came under consideration. I stated at that time that it differed widely and materially from the resolution sent up by this House to the Senate, and on which it does not appear that the Senate have acted. That resolution contemplated a single object, viz : a designation of the persons voted for as President and Vice President. The resolution of the Senate 1 also stated to consist of three distinct and separate propositions: the first containing what has been termed the designating principle; the second reducing the Constitutional number of candidates from whom the House of Representatives are to choose, in case there be no choice by the Electors, from five to three; the third providing in case there shall be no choice by the House of Representatives, that the Vice President shall be President of the United States. The first provision, that of designating, appears to me, and the House will recollect, and the gentleman from Virginia will also recollect, that I then stated this to be a modification rather than a change of a Constitutional rule or principle, by which the votes of the Electors, given in that caseaslhevare now given under the Constitution, will be subject only to this alteration, that the person voted for as President, and the person voted for as Vice President, will be respectively designated in distinct ballots. This is the alteration contemplated in the resolution which passed the House — this embraces the whole of the change contemplated by the House and by the public — this is the amendment which 1 continue to approve, and against which I have heard no substantial objection.

The second amendment proposed by the Senate it may also be recollected, was objected to on two grounds: first, that it contemplated another important alteration in the Constitution in a point where no evil had resulted, and where no inconvenience had been experienced. Without any reason, it proposed to narrow the choice of the House from five to three. It has been contended — and I hope the gentleman from North Carolina will take this as an answer to his observations has been contended by that gentleman, as well as others, and with some ingenuity, that the President and Vice President are to be chosen from the five highest candidates, by the Constitution; and as, by the resolution, the President is to be chosen from the three highest, and the Vice President from the two highest, that the three and the two make five, and of course there is no difference; and the gentleman, therefore, does not see how the resolution can be objected to on this ground. But it will be seen that at present, and under the Constitution, the President is chosen from five; if the proposed amendment be adopted, he must be chosen from three candidates; making a change, and narrowing the choice from among the candidates, from five to three. The election of Vice President, by this amendment, is totally changed ; he is to be chosen at another time and in another place, and gentlemen must see that his election bears no relation to, and cannot be coupled with, that of the President.

The second objection to this amendment was grounded on the indefinite mode of expression — ' "from the persons having the highest numbers, ' not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for ' as President, the House of Representatives shall ' choose immediately by ballot." There is a want of precision in these words. Some gentlemen aodersiand it as limiting the choice to tne three highest candidates, while others suppose them intended to embrace five, ten, or fifteen, if there be so many having an equal number of votes in the three highest grades; and, if gentlemen on this floor differ in their construction, is it not to be expected that the State Legislatures when they come to consider, and the House of Representatives of the United Slates, when they come to act under it, will also differ?

The third proposition provides that, if the Home of Representatives shall not choose a President before the fourth of March following, the Vice President shall act as President, as in case of his resignation or death — another and a still more important change in the Constitution. To this I did object, and I do still object, because it is predicated on a concession which I am not willing to have ingrafted in that instrument. It is predicated on a presumption that the House of Representatives may refuse lo carry into effect Ibe public will — that they will refuse lo obey the imperative language of the Constitution, which ordains that, in case there be no choice by the Electors, (A«y «ftaU immediately proceed to a choice; because it assails a first and fundamental principle — it presume* 00 a privation or absence of political morality, OQ which all our institutions rest. The Constitution cannot exist if this principle become

The formation of this House — which is the democratic branch of the Government — how is it effected? In apportioning the representation of the several States, the words of the Constitution are,— "The State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to three Representatives." Suppose the people of the Stale of New Hampshire had declined to choose their Representatives, has this House the power to compel that State to exercise this r^hl 1 They have not; and if other States had, from whatever motives, pursued a similar course, this House could not have been formed, ■ud the Constitution must have been defeated.

A sense of Interest and of political obligation are the basis and the security of the Constitution, and distinguish the people and Government of this from those of other countries; if you presume on its absence, you discourage, you diminish, you destroy it. If the House of Representatives shall not choose." The House of Representatives will not refuse, they will not dare to refuse ; the transaction which is passed proves they dare not defeat the will of the people. But if you make this amendment you furnish them with an apology, with an excuse, with a justification for refusing; and, what is worse, you tempt them to refuse; you presume, at least, that they may refuse. The high responsibility imposed on the House by the Constitution is destroyed. This provision will be pleaded in justification of their refusal to make a choice ; and when they shall refuse what is to be the consequence? The officer whom it is intended to be defeated, by the first resolution, is promoted ; the man whom the people never intended should be President, the Vice President, becomes President of the United States. The Vice Presidency will thenceforth become the office of importance to be secured in the Government, and by; the means, and with the temptation, which will be in his power to offer and to use, he will anally become President

I am sensible this is a provision in a last resort, and which cannot take effect excepting in case of a failure of two other processes: that of the Electors first, and that of the House in the second instance; and 1 am also sensible that the three firOTisioDE for securing a President stand separate rom each other ; but it is true, and it will be found in practice, that they have each a relation to, and bearing on the other. The responsibility of the electors will be diminished, the House of Representatives will feel less responsibility, encourE^e- meot 'will be given to intrigue, and the m Trbic h have been, perhaps, too often alluded t this floor, will receive a facility In the hands of the person who shall be chosen Vice President, which may become dangerous to the public peace and destructive to the public happiness.

Theseare the objections which 1 made to the t«^ resolution under consideration i a review of the subject has not diminished them. Wec( is to. make a choice when the election shall be brought there. My friend from Virginia was with us in opinion on these points; our affirmative vote is on the Journals; if there be any change of opinion, that change is not with us, it is the roar jority of the House who have changed. And what reason is assigned for the change? What is the reason assigned by the gentleman from Virginia? That this is the best or the most he can attain, or that, as he gains the discriminating principle, he is willing to take the two other amendments which the Senate have added. We ask to be satisfied that we are reduced to this alternative. It is not satisfactory to be told that the Senate will not recede when they shall be made acquainted with the objections of the House; we ask Tot an intercourse with them — we desire that the rules of procedure in ordinary business be observed in this. With this view, I moved yesterday that the resolution might be committed; that we might send a message lo the Senate, asking an answer to the proposal made to them for their concurrence in the resolution which passed the House, or to propose a committee of conference. The motion was negatived — it was said not to have been a custom in this Government to send such an order or message. Without pretensions to much experience. I know it must be in order. I know it must be consistent with parliamentary rule to send messages of this nature. In what other manner is the sense of one House to be made known to the other? On a subject of this importance, where there appears a difference of sentiment in the two Houses, some intercourse ought to be had, and some explanation is required. Perhaps the Senate, when they shall become possessed of the objections of the House, will be willing to recede from one or both the alterations which they have made in our resolution. When we ask them to institute this inquiry, gentlemen rise in their places and tell us, the Senate will not recede; and this is all we can have — this is not " satisfactory.

By wb»l can ■-R gentlemen know this It due to those who object, and to the House, that the inquiry should be made, that the ordinary course should be pursued. The retoln-, tion in the meantime will remain in custody of the House, and if there shall be a conviction that the Senate will give up nothing for the sake of accommodation, it may finally be adopted; until this course shall have been pursued it is nnreaso»- able to press a decision. Many gentlemen who approve of the designating principle are opposed to the amendments proposed by the Senate. Some of those gen itemeo have expressed their disapprobation ; some of them will be compelled to vote against the resolution if insisted on at this time.

On the subject of amendments generally, two tbe GoDBiitulion. Oae of them, & rererend gentleman, (Mr. Taoqart,) speaking of the const!' tatioD of Massachusetts, ascribed great wisdom to the framers of that instrument, because they had provided that it should not be amended until after the expiration of fifteen years; that within that term an insurrection had prevailed in the State, and if the constitution had admitted of being amended or altered at that time, the temper and disposition of what he has called the public mind were such as would have cast the State afloat on the ocean of anarchy. Sir, that worthy geii' tlemaD is not acquainted with the constitution of his own State. That constitution is bottomed on the principle that the people haveai all times a light to alter, to amend, and change their form of OoverDroeoI, whenever their own interest or their own happiness shall in their opinion require it. Impressed with this principle, the framers of that constitution provided by an express article that the General Court which should be in session fifteen years after the adoption, "shall issue precepts to the several towns and plantations, calling a convention in order to take the sense of the people, whether they wished for any alteration." Understanding their own coDStitutLon,and knowing that the^ have at all times the right to alter and amend u, the people of the Slate have rested easy under it without alteration.

With respect to the Federal Constitution, are gentlemen ignorant of the difficulty with which the convention of Massachusetts finally adopted it? Do they recollect that amendments were for a long time insisted on as a condition of the ratification ; that the people of that State having gone through the war under a. federative Government Tery different from this, were afraid of the powers granted by the new Constitution ; that their fears were extensive and influential; and that this Con- ■liluiion was finally adopted, because it carried with it (he means of being altered and amended as time and experience should suggest, and because (be Slate Legislatures as well as Congress had a right to institute amendments t

One of the gentlemen (Mr. Thatcher) has quotedBDRUlhoriiyio which every member of this House will bend with respect and attention. But the passage he has quoted, makes directly agains( him. Whilst we are cautioned against alterations under the garb of amendments, we are io- ■vited to adopt such as " experience" shall recommend, ^ mend, and the object of this amendment so far as it respects the designating principle is suggested by experience ; that the true way to preserve the affections of the people for this Constitution is, to recur to the principles and conditions with which it was adopted, and instead of objecting, to give facility to such amendments as experience siia 11 mggesl.

When Mr. Eustis had concluded, the question was taken, and decided in the affirmative, by yeas and nays, two-thirds of the members present concurring in their agreement to the said resolution of the Senate, to wit—yeas 83, nays 42— and Mr. Speaker declaring himself with Iho YiiB—Nathiniel Macon, (Speaker.) Willis Alston, juQ., Nathaniel Alexander, Isaac Anderson, John Atcher, David Bard, George Michael Bedinger, William Blackledge, John Boyle, Robert Brown, Joseph Bryan, erick Conrad, Jacob Crowninshield, Richard Cutts, Jno. Dawson, William Dickson, John B. Earle, Peter Early, John W. Eppes, William Findley, John Fowler, Jas. Gillespie, Peterson Goodwyn, Edwin Gray, Andrew Gregg, Samuel Hammond, John A. Hanna, Josiah Haabrouck, Daniel Heister, Joseph Heister, James Hoi' land, David Holmes, John G. Jackson, Walter Jones, William Kennedy, Nehemiah Knight, Michael Leib, John B, C. Lucas, Matthew Lyon, Andrew McCord, William McCreerj, David Meriwether, Samuel L. M^ chill, Nicholas R. Moore, Tbomaa Moore, Jeremiah Morrow, Anthony New, Thomas Newton, jun, Gideon Olin, Beriah Palmer, John Patleiaon, John Randolph, jun., Thomas M. Randolph, John Rea of Pennsylvania, John Rhea of Tennessee, Jacob Richards, Cesar A. Rodney, Erastus Root, Thomas Saramons, Thomas Ssndfoid, Tompson J. Skinner, John Smilie, John Smith of New York. Richard Stanford, Joseph Stanton, John Stewart, David Thomas, PbiUp R. Thompson, Abram Trigg, John Trigg, Isaac Van Home, Daniel C. Verplanck, Matthew Walton, John Whitehill, Marmaduke Williams, Richard Winn, Joseph Winston, and Thomas Wynne.

Niis— Simeon Baldwin, Silas Betton, Phan. Bisbt^ John Campbell, William Chamberlin, Martin Chittenden, Clifton Claggetl, Matthew Clay, Manasseh Cutler, Samuel W. Dana, John Davenport, John Denr nis, Thomas Dwight, James Elliot, Wilttam Eustja, Calvin Goddard, Gajlord Griswold, Ri^er Griswold, Seth Hastings, William Hoge, David Hougfa, Benjamin Huger, Samuel Hunt, Joseph Lewis, jun., Tboc Lewis, Henry W. Livingston, Thomas Lowndes, N«- hum Mitchell, Thomas Plater, Ssmuel D. ParvUnee, Ebeneier Sesver, John Cotton Smith, William Stedman, James Stephenson, Ssmuel Tag^art, Beojunin Tallmadge, Samuel Tennej, Samuel Thatcher, George Tibbits, Joseph B. Vamum, Pelcg Wsdaworth, and Lemuel Willums.