June 12, 1911

Ur. BORAH. Neither is there in reference to Representatives, and no one except my colleague would ever suggest that the legislature could elect them.

Mr. HEYBURN. The people may do it through the legislature. .

Mr. BORAH. I want to call attention, Mr. President, without reading more than a paragraph or so, to some of the language found in the case of McPherson v. Blacker, in 146 United States. Here the question of the power of the legislature over the manner of electing presidential electors came squarely before the court, and the court said :

Under the second clause of Article II of the Constitution, the legislatures of the several States have exclusive power to direct the manner in which the electors of President and Vice President shall be appointed. · .

Such appointment may be made by the legislatures directly, or by popula-r vote in districts, or by general ticket, as may be provided by the legislature.

If the terms of the clause left the question of power in doubt, contemporaneous .and continuous subsequent practical construction has determined the question as above stated.

The second clause of Article II of the Constitution was not amended by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments-

It will be recalled that during · the last session my colleague suggested . that the clause . which I am now discussing had been modified by the fourteenth and fifteenth a.mendments-

The second clause of Article II of the Constitution was not amended by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and . they do not limit the power of appointment to the particular manner pursued at the time :tl e of the adoption of these amendments, or secure to every male Inhabitant of a State, being a citizen of the United States, the right from c m tlie time of his majority to vote for presidential electors.

On page 35 of the opinion the court said :

From this review, in which we have been assisted by the laborious re s earch of counsel, and which might have been greatly expanded, it is seen that from the formation of the Government until now the practical construction of the clause has conceded plenary power to the State le g islatures in the matter of the appointment of electors.

Even in the heated controversy of 1876-77 the electoral vote of Colorado cast by electors chosen by the legislature passed unchallenged, and our attention has not been drawn to any previous attempt to submit to the courts the determination of the constitutionality of State action.

In short, the appointment and mode of appointment of electors belong exclusively to the States, under the Constitution of the United States.

l\1r. Willoughby, in his work on the Constitution, says:

The Constitution gives complete power to the States in the selection of presidential electors. The provision is that each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct. There is no requirement as to their election by the people. And so plenary is the power thus given to the States in this respect they may, if they see fit, as Representative Storrs on · ce said, vest the appointment of electors in "a board of bank directors, a turnpike corporation, or a synagogue." (Willoughby on the Constitution, vol. 2, p. 1126.)

Not only, Mr. President, is the manner of electing the electors left exclusively to the State legislatures, but Congress has proceeded to accentuate the power of 'the State and has practically left the determination of the validity of the electoral votes to the State.

In 1887 Congress passed this statute:

If any State shall have provided, by · laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors, for the final determination of any controversy or contest concerning the · appointment of all or upon them. any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or procedures and such determinations shall have been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day, and made at least six days prior to the time of meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereafter regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointe'd by such State is concerned. (Act of Feb. · 3, 1887, sec. 2.)

Ur. President, the manner of choosing those who select the Executive is left exclusively and alone where we propose to place the power to prescribe the . manner with reference to the election of Senators. If a State should refuse to proceed, us has been suggested here, in delinquency of its duty in selecting electors for the Presidency, it would be in precisely the same attitude, it would involve the same dereliction of duty upon the part of the individuals of the State as if they should fail to proceed to elect Senators or to prescribe the manner thereof. We go back and rest the obligation and the duty where the fathers of the Constitution rested it with reference to the selection of the Executive. It does not seem to me, in view of the fact that here has rested the power to determine how the electors shall be elected for over a hundred years, that it can be said we are trying an experiment, that we are dealing with chance, or that we are jeopardizing the power to preserve the National Government.

There may be room for legitimate discussion between Senators as to where it should best rest, with the legislatures of the States or with the National Government; but when it is urged, as it was a few moments ago by the Senator from North Dakota [Mr. l\IcCUMBER], that we are striking at the very life of the National Government, it is urged by reason of the fact that Senators have not taken the time to give consideration to what we are doing. We have a class of men who the very moment a power is undertaken to be added to the State's authority are in arms in opposition to the movement, but when some vast power is undertaken to be given to the National Government, as in the fourteenth amendment, they are quite willing to enter upon the sea of experiment and to try a new and untried proposition.

When the Constitution was formed popular elections in the sense in which we have and understand them now were not familiar to the people. Manhood suffrage was most limited. The members of the Confederate Congress were selected by the State legislatures. Most of the State officers were elected by the State legislatures, including governors. But now the respective States have worked out with great care and through long experience their system of popular elections. They elect all of their State officers, and according to a system which time and experience have proven to be efficient and wise. These systems of popular elections are different in different States in matters of detail. And thus popular elections have come peculiarly to be matters of local arrangement. The manner of holding them has become essentially local. The trend of events, and the logic of conditions have made them local. Each State has its primary or is coming to have. It fixes its style of ballot, its entire method, mode, and manner of holding popular elections. .All these things are essentially local and should be and can be with entire safety left to the States. . What will . be the situation when the resolution passesshould it be modified, as suggested and urged? We will have intrusted to the State the sole power to determine, outside of the rule against discrimination, who shall vote for a Senator. We will have intrusted• to the State to determine what kind of a man shall be sent here, save as to his age and citizenship. We will have intrusted to the people the power to directly choose Senators, and, sir, we will have intrusted to the voluntary action of the people of the State the sole power to determine whether they will elect a Senator at all or not. For these vague and nebulous suggestions that ' the National Government could enforce an election · are impracticable, unreasonable, and repudiated by experience , by logic, and by the very · terms of the Constitution when all its terms are taken together. Yet, after intrusting to the States and the people of the States all these substantial powers, we say they may nevertheless prove unfit to determine the manner of doing this; that they may not be wise enough to say whether they want nominations by primary or open conventions; whether they want the Australian ballot or the open ballot; whether they want protected booths or unprotected booths. The thing of substance they may do, but the manner of doing must be prescribed by another power. I say this is unreasonable, inconsistent, and illogirnl. It grows out, l\1r. President, of an unwarranted distrust of the intelligence and patriotism of the people-an unwarranted distrust of the capacity and integrity of the States to perform their proper functions and discharge the obligations which rest Mr. President, I am a believer in nationalism but I want it to rest upon a broad and sure foundation. I w'ant the pyramid of the Republic to rest upon its base and not upon its apex. I want a nationalism which is founded upon a full and uncompromising faith in the loyalty and self-governing capacity of the people-that is the broad base upon which to build. I want a nationalism which next recognizes the unhampered and unchallenged sovereignty of the States. There can be no such thing as a great Federal Union with stripped and discredited and crippled States. Nationalism such as our institutions will sustain derives its strength and durability from the increasin<Y strength and durability of the States, with their sovereig~ powers ever undiminished and always unchallenged.

Those who think they can build up a national power at the expense of the sovereignty rightfully belonging to the States who would aggrandize and accentuate the Federal Government at the expense of the just powers of the State, have either forgotten or never knew the lesson of 1787. The fathers divided the State and national powers upon the logical rule of things which were national in scope and things which were local. They regarded the latter as essential to the life of the State and the former to the life of the National Government, and the preservation of both as indispensable to the growth and prosperity of the people. They realized fully that conditions might necessitate a readjustment or a redistribution of powers that things then local in their nature might become in time nation al in their reach and scope, that things which were national might in ti.me become local and better cared for by the State. But the readjustment was always to be made because of the change in the extent and scope of the thing to be dealt with, and not because of a diminishing faith in the capacity of the State to do its duty, or an enlarged faith in the National Government to do more than its duty. It never occurred to them that the individual citizen was the source of one kind of civic righteousness and civic capacity when acting for the State, and a source of higher grade of civic righteousness and civic capacity when acting for the Government. It · never occurred to them that the sheriff of the State was of a lower type of official than a United States marshal; that a Federal judge was wiser than a State judge; that a kind of a halo exuded from the Federal citizen that was not always perceptible to the naked eye when beholding a common citizen of the State. This modern distrust of the citizen of the State, this exaltation of and confidence in the Federal Government, was not the theory upon which our dual Government was built. Faith in all its parts, faith in the source of all power, the people, was the theory upon which it w:as built. The advices of those who urged a. strong Government did not in all their fullness prevail. The jealous guardians of States rights were not permitted to have their way as fully as they thought they ought. The sublimest fact in all our histery is that Hamilton and Jefferson lived in those days; that out of concession and compromise, of clashing judgments and conflict- sion of it. ing views, came the finished fabric, the dual government, which has excited the wonder and challenged the admiration of all the civilized people of the earth.

1\Ir. HEYBURN. Well, Mr. President, may I interrupt the Senator?

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield to his colleague?

Mr. BORAH. Certainly.

Mr. HEYBURN. I desire. to say in. this. connection that, being the last hours of the consideration of this measure, I assume the Senator is not expecting to deliver an uninterrupted speech on this occasion.

Mr. BORAH. No; I am not.

Mr. HEYl3URN. So I take the liberty of placing in the R:Eoo.RD some suggestions in connection with his remarks. He is just now engaged in placing the stability and existence of the Government upon the patriotism and loyalty of the people. This is a Government of law, not of sentiment. I should like to know if the Senator has given all the thought that he thinks is necessary to the question as to whether or not the Gov-ernment can compel a State to exercise the function of. a State. Can it do it?

Mr. BORAH. I hav-e given all the thought that I have been able to give. without the benefit of consultation with my colleague. I do not think the National Government could compel a State to elect a Senator.

Mr. HEYBURN. The Sena.tor thinks it could not?

Mr. BORAH. That is my view.

Mr. HEYBURN. That is to admit that this Government may dissolve itself at the pleasure of any State.

Mr. BORAH. Colorado has not elected a Senator, and we arc not dissolved, neither are we in a position to compel Colorado to lence. elect a Senator. ·

Mr. HEYBURN. Colorado has one Senator in this body.

l\fr. BORAH. rt is. entitled under the Constitution to two Senators. If we could compel it to elect at an, we could compel to elect both or either. I am sure that my colleague could find ample compensation from the candidates in Colorado if he could suggest to them a legal method by which to force an election in Colorado.

Mr. HEYBURN. If the State o:f Colorado or any State should decline to choose representatives in this body the G-Overnment has the power to institute conditions in that State that they would be compelled to do it

Mr. BORAH. I am quite content to leave the solution of this question with my colleague.

But~ Mr. President, those wllo are favoring this proposition are doing so not because they uesire to hamper or to embarrass or to disturb the powers which should really . belong to the Federal Government..

Mr. HEYBURN. !\Ir. President—— .

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield :further?

BORAH I d l\Ir. · O.

Mr. HEYBURN. No more important question has been discussed than that which the Sena.tor is now presenting. As I understand him, he is contending that the Government of the United States can not compel a State to elect Senators and se n d them to this body, when the Constitution, as it now reads. says in express terms that it can do it. It can fix the time; it can say to the State on the 20th day of October it shall elect. rt can fix the place; it can say at the capital of the State in the legislative hulls. It can fix the manner by saying to the legislature you shall do it by a majority vote. This can be done in the absence of action by the State in conformity with those provisions. There is no question about it; and if the man was elected under those circumstances he would be constitutionally elected.

Now, of what avail is it to- say that a State can dissolve itself out of the Union by inaction? It was because of the possibility of such conditions that section 4 of Article I was placed in the Constitution; and it is a dangerous doctrine to send out to the people of this country in times of discontent that they may destroy the Union by inaction. You can not do it either by inaction or by the sword.

Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I would be very glad to yield to my colleague for any question that he desires to ask, but I do not desire to submit to a lecturing program such as has been going on from time to time in this debate.

M.r. HEYBURN. I hope the Senator will indulge me long enough to speak a valedictory word to him. I had supposed that in these last hours of the debate no man would monop.­ olize the entire time, and I had supposed that any man who took the floor would be open to a free and fail" and fnll discus­

Mr. BORAH. I have never hesitated to yield to my colleague for a question or foi: an argument, but I do not desire to have my colleagne deliver a kindergarten lecture here upon the Constitution to all who assume to expr~s an opinion about it. I have made a statement. If it is one of eri·or, it can go ont to the country for what it is worth. But it is not worth while to take up time, after my colleague has once disputed the proposition~ to censure its author.

I will say in passing, however, that I have adopted the line of argument, as to this particular,. of Mr. Barber and the concessions of Mr. Webster in a very famous case in the Supreme Court of the United States.

It has been urged that Article I, section 4, . is necessary to protect elections from fraud and violence~ and that without Article I, section 4, the National Government wcmld be without power to protect elections where Federal officers were elected from fraud, violence,. or misconduct upon the part of those who should desire to prevent a fuir and impartial election. In the minority view which has been filed I find this statemen,t:

How vital is the preservation of the supervisory power conferred upon Congress by section 4 of Article I was strongly set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States . through Mr. Justice ?.filler, dellv· ering the opinion in the Yarbrough case (110 U. S.., 651). In that case the Supreme Court was passing upon the validity of the Federal eleetion law o1 1870, an act based upon the authority conferred by the first clause of section 4 ot Artiele I. We qll(}te from the opinion as follows:

The Senate will notice that in this minority view the statement is made that the Supreme Court was passing upon a statute which was passed under and by virtue of Article I, section 4, and that Justice Miller was of the opinion that that power was vita.I to preserve and to- prfi>tect elections against fraud and vioI feel compelled, Mr. President, to take a little time to call the attention of the Senate to just exactly what the Supreme Court was passing upon in that particular instance. I assert., without fear of successful contradiction, that the statute which the Supreme Court was passing upon in that instance was not passed under and by virtue of Article I, section 4; that it did not find its consti.tntionality in the power granted to control the manner of holding elections; and that the section which the Supreme Court was passing on was pass~ under 1:he implied power which Congress has to protect. an! right that 1.s guaranteed by or ~e­ pendent upon the Constitution of the United States. Every line , of Justice Mille.r"s opinion as to the validity of !he section of ~e statute here passed upon would have been Just the same if Article I, section 4, hn:d not been in the Consti~ution at all.

I need only read this statute to the Senate m order that the Senate may ~ upon a moments reflection that my contention is correct. Section 5508 reads as follows:

If two or more persons . conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway, or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than 10 years; and shall, moreover, be thereafter ineligible to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

The statute says "any right guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States. 11 Now, Article I, section 4. deals alone with elections. It is clear that if you were passing this statute under that, and that alone, we would have to have a statute dealing alone with elections. You could not deal with trespasses upon the public lands; you: could not deal with the question of interfering with a jury which was impaneled in a Federal court; you could not deal with the question of protecting a prisoner who was in the hands of a United States marshal. Yet there are a number of cases in the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Supreme Court has sustained an indictment under section 5508, covering almost every imaginable right which might arise under the Constitution of the United States.

For instance, under this section a man was prosecuted for interfering with another in trying to prove up a homestead. ·Do the Senators who signed the minority view think that under Article . I, section 4, dealing with elections,. you can pass a statute punishing a man for interfering with another in proving up a homestead? Mr. Justice Miller says that this power a.rises not out of any express provision in the Constitution but out of the implied power that Congress has to protect any right; and a right to vote for Representative, a right to vote for Senator, under this Constitution, if it should be amended, · after the State had fixed the status of tile voter, would be a right dependent upon the Constitution of the United States.

There was another pro-vision of the same law which was passed upon, and that was section 5520. Notice the reading of this section :

SEC. 5520. If two or m o re persons in any State or Territory conspire to prevent, by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy, in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of the Congress or the United States-

Now, the manner of holding the election of electors for President and Vice President is in the hands of the State legislature. The manner of electing a Representative is in the hands of Congress. Yet we are told that this authority upholds a statute which passed under .Article I, section 4, would leave the matter with Congress, while at the same time it protects electors and presidential electors and matters left entirely with the State legislature.

It is apparent, Mr. President, that the court would not have sustained section 5520 if they had gone to .Article I, section 4, for the authority of passing it, because it deals with presidential elections, which is provided for in another section of the Constitution and leaves it to the States. . Therefore the court proceeds to find the power to pass this statute under another provision of the Constitution, not written, but as plainly a part of it, since the decision of Chief Justice Marshall, as if it had been written. .After quoting a large portion of this opinion the minority view, however, left out of their views this paragraph, and had they observed its applicability it would have answered the argument which they were making. It says:

The proposition that it has no such power ls supported by the old argument often heard, often repeated, and in this court never assented to , that when a question or the power of Congress arises the advocate of the power must be able to place his finger on the words which expre s sly grant it. The brief of counsel before us, though directed to the authority or that body to pass criminal laws. uses the same language. Because there ls no express power to provide for preventing violence exercised on the voter as a means of controlling his vote, no such law c a n be enacted.

Says the counsel :

It destroys at one blow, in construing the Constitution of the United Stat e s, the doctrine universally applied to a.11 instruments of writing, that wh'at is implied is as much a part of the instrument as what is expressed. This principle, in its application to the Constitution of the United States, more than to almost any other writing, is a necessity, by reason of the inherent inability to put into words all derivative question? powers-

The opinion in the Yarbrough case would have been just the same with this provision of the Constitution adopted as we pro­ . Pose, because we leave the manner of holding the election with the State legislature. The Constitution leaves the manner of holding the election of electors to the State legislature; and yet the Supreme Court sustains the statute which protects both elections from fraud and violence. It is quite true that in the latter part of the opinion they refer to section 4 of .Article I, but solely in way of illustration, basing their argument upon the general proposition as I have' here stated it.

Does the repeal of section 4 of Article I render inoperative the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments? .Again, the minority view says:

Fifth. Poss e ssion of the power which it is proposed to strike out from s e ction 4 is essential to enable the National Government to act effectiv e ly in case it should ever have occas.ion to enforce the provisions of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendm e nts to the Constitution. The basis of any enforcement of those provisions must necessarily be the ascertainment and establishment of the facts in respect of the elections to which they may relate. The proposed amendment of section 4 of Article I, if adopted, would be the latest expression of the sovereign will of the people of the United States, and would take away from the National Government authority to make those regulations regarding el e ctions which are essential tb the preservation of evidence regarding what actually occurs.

Is there any doubt, Mr. President, but what the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments could be enforced to-day with reference to presidential electors where the manner of holding the election is left to the State legislature? Is there any possible qu e stion but what, under any action that we should take, presidential electors would be included just the same as Members of Congress? It is a confusion, as I said a moment ago, of the manner of holding the elections with the right to cast a ballot in the manner prescribed by the State legislature. In other words, as an illustration, suppose that the State of Missouri should provide the .Australian ballot system for recording the ballot. If this joint resolution should pass, I contend that the National Government could not go into the State, as it w e re, and establish an open ballot, but there is no possible doubt in my mind but what the National Government could see that every man who was qualified to vote for Senator in that State could cast his vote in accordance with the system established in the State. You can not interfere with the form of the ballot; but if the man was deprived of his right to vote, the National Government, if he was voting for Senator or Representative or for a presidential elector, could take such steps as would be necessary to see that he cast his vote in accordance with the system established in that State.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President--

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yie1d to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. BORAH. I do.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President, the Senator from Idaho says that in the absence of section 4 Congress would still have the power to pass legislation, as I understand, that would enable every person who was qualified to vote to cast his vote. If section 4 were eliminated, would it be within the power of Congress to pass legislation which would prevent unauthorized persons from casting their votes?

.l\Ir. BORAH. Certainly.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Under what clause of the Constitution?

Mr. BORAH. Because the Congress would have power to protect any election against fraud or anything of that kind where a Federal officer was being elected. I am coming to that in just a moment.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. If the Senator will permit me just a word further, the Constitution, I agree with the Senator, in effect guarantees the right of persons who are authorized to vote to cast their votes; but if there is any provision in · the Constitution which guarantees that unauthorized persons shall not cast their votes, I have failed to find it. ·

Mr. BORAH. Mr. President. one of the cases to which I will refer was a ballot-box-stuffing case, and the Supreme Court sustained a statute which prote c ted presidential electors the same as the election of Representatives. While I do not desire to take up the time of the Senate in reading that opinion, if Senators will refer to the case to which I have just been referring, the Yarbrough case, they will find that the court made no distinction in protecting elections against fraud or imposition or violence or misrepresentation between presidential electors and Members of the House of Representatives; but the decision turns upon the right of the National Government to see that its elections, where parties being elected to Federal offices are candidates, are protected from violence, fraud, or anything which interferes with an honest and a free vote.

l\lr. SUTHERLA:r-rn. Will the Senator permit one further

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield further?

Mr. BORAH. Yes, sir .

M:r. SUTHERLAND. If the Senator from Idaho thinks that the change which is proposed to be made in section 4, .Article I, of the Constitution, will still leave the power of Congress unim· paired, then what good purpose does the Senator see in making ( the change at all?

Mr. BORAH. I will give the Sena.tor from Utah an illustration which shows precisely what I am trying to do: Suppose the State of Utah prescribed a certain form of ballot-we will say the · .Australian ballot-I maintain that the National Government should have no power to go in there and establish an open ballot. That is precisely the power which I insist on taking away, and that is the substance of the power which we do take away; but we do not take away from the National Government the power to see that the voter casts his vote according to the .Australian ballot system, because the one is a right to cast the vote, while the other relates alone to the manner in which he records it.

Mr. WORKS. Mr. President--

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield to the Senator from California?

Mr. BORAH. I do.

.Mr. WORKS. If the National Government has the right to protect the legal voter in the right to cast his vote and to have that vote counted , has it not, for the very same reason and upon the same principle, the right to protect that vote by preventing a fraudulent vote that would nullify it?

Mr. BORAH. I have no doubt about it at all. If the Senator from Utah [Mr. SUTHERLAND] will reflect for a moment upon the difference between the manner ot recording a vote and the right to cast it, he will get the idea of the Senator from Ida.ho with reference to the distinction which he is trying to make. While I am going to discuss that in a few momen t s, I take this opportunity to say again: Suppose the State of Ut:ih should establish a certain form of booth where the ele c t io n should be held, where the State ele c tions are being held, whe r e the governor is being elected, and where the popular election is coming off. The State knows best the manner in which to hold its elections, so far as the manner is concerned, and the National Government could not come in and change the machinery, change the modus operp.ndi, whether it be the Australian ballot or whatever it may be; but whenever a State undertakes to. deprive, or an individual undertakes to deprive, a party of the right of casting his vote according to the system pre cribed by the State, there is no doubt but what the National Government can prevent it.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. Now, l\Ir. President--

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho took to do that. yield to the Senator from Utah?

l\Ir. BORAH. I do.

l\1r. SUTHERLAND. The Senator thinks that if a State should adopt the Australian ballot, the General Government ought not to step in and provide for an open vote. I agree with him about that. The General Government ought not to do that. of men. But suppose the converse of that were true; suppose the State should adopt the open ballot and provide that votes should be cast as under the English system at the hustings by a viva voce proceeding, would the Senator think that it would be wise on the part of the General Government to step in, as it has stepped in, and provide a written or printed ballot?

l\Ir. BORAH. No, sir; I would not.

1\f r. SUTHERLAND. Then does the Senator--

Mr. BORAH. The vital distinction between the Senator from Utah and myself is that I do not expect to find any greater wisdom up here than we shall find down there in the States. 1\lr. SMITH of Michigan. But you find a greater responsibility to all the people or our country.

M1·. BORAH. No; you find no greater responsibility. The responsibility for the maintenance and preservation of this Government re ts right down there among those people. If :' you do not find sufficient patriotism and wisdom and intelligence to take care of that situation down there, you will not find it up here.

l\fr. SUTHERLAND. Mr. President, if the Senator will permit me to make a suggestion, Congress did at one time find that elections throughout the country were held at different times-in some States in August, I think, in some States in June, in some States in September, in some States in October, and in some States in November. Does the Senator not think that it was unwise that elections for Representatives should be sea ttered along through the year in that way and does not the Senator think that it is wise on the part of Congress to provide, as it has provided, that all such elections should be held in all the States upon the same day?

l\Ir. BORAH. ~Jr. President, I think it was eminently wise to provide that all elections should be held upon the same day; but where did that wisdom come from? The Senator argues that it came from up here somewhere. The fact of the business is that the States had been working through years and years \ for this unity of elections, and when Congress got ready to act 1 1 I upon the matter, Congress yielded to several of the States, which did not de ire to come in, as to time; and we find Vermont and some of the,States holding their elections at such time as the wisdom of their people deemed best. ·

Mr. SUTHERLAND. But, Mr. President, it was found that the States acting severally would not do that, and it · required that the States should come together in Congress in order to bring about that reform.

l\lr. BOR.dH. I disagree with the Senator that it was found that the States would not act wisely or together upon that proposition.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. They did not act.

l\lr. BORAH. The States were together upon the proposition, and the practical unanimity which did exist at the time the act of Congress was passed arose out of action upon the part of the States.

l\lr. SUTHERLAND. They were about 80 years getting to it. They did not get to it until Congress acted.

Mr. BORAH. We have been a hundred years in trying to get this joint re olution through.

hlr. SMITH of Michigan. And it will be a hundred years more, if the simple proposition to elect Senators by direct vote of the people is encumbered with race riders and other constitutional limitations which do not belong in the present controversy at all. I favor the amendment, but want to strip it of burdens which it should not bear:

Mr. BORAH. No; it will not be a hundred years more, for there is an influence at work now which will change that situation; that is, the people have the notion that they want it, and are going to have it.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. The question I was going to ask the Senator was, Does the Senator feel any apprehension that the Congress of the United States would, if it continued to possess this power, act unwisely or unjustly in fixing general rules? If he does not think so, what advantage is there to be gained in changing the Constitution in that respect?

l\fr. BORAH. Well, l\lr. President, that calls for a declaration on my part which perhaps I ought not to make, but in order to be candid with the Senator I will make it. I think that Congress acted eminently unwisely at one time when they underl\1r. SUTHERLAND. Undertook to do what?

Mr. BORAH. When they undertook to do that. I am one of those who would like, if I could, to take a part of the history of the Republican Party with reference to the reconstruction days out of its history and burn it, and blot it from the memory

Mr. SMITH of Michigan. You might eliminate a few things from the record of our opponents and thus improve the veracity of history.

Mr. BORAH. I think that the wisdom of these things rests down with the people, and that it is impossible for us to exercise a greater wisdom about it than the wisdom of those whom it locally concerns. If it is a local matter, as I believe a popular election to be, then we will never show greater wisdom than the people in the several States.

It is not national in its scope; it is local in its nature, and the National Government never can deal with a local matter as intelligently as the people of the States can deal with it. That . has been the history of this Government from the beginning until now. Whenever the National Government undertakes tu deal from Washington with a local matter it makes a mistake. The Senator from Utah would not desire the National Government to step in and run a popular election in his State any more than the people in • any other part of the country would. I have no doubt that he would protest against such action just as quickly as anyone else. We have got now out in the great West some of the effects of a government from Washington with reference to loca.l affairs, and, so far as I am concerned, I do not want any more of it.

Mr. SUTHERLAl'm. Mr. President--

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield further to the Senator from Utah?

Mr. BORAH. Certainly.

Mr. SUTHERLAND. I entirely agree with the Senator that the General Government ought not to interfere in local affairs and that each State ought to be left to deal with its own local affairs. The difference between the Senator and myself arises from the fact that he regards the election of a United States Senator, who is an official of the National Government as well as of the State, as a purely local affair, while I regard it not only as a matter which concerns each of the States, but a matter which concerns them all.

Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I do not regard the election of a United States Senator as a local affair, but I regard the manner of holding the election where he is elected as purely a local affair. I contend that there can be no such thing as a national interest in the manner of holding a popular election in a State. So far as it has a national interest, the Government of the United States can take care of it, notwithstanding this proposed change.

The minority views further say:

Seventh. It has been contended by some that even if the provision of the Constitution conferring upon Congress the authority to regulate the times and manner of the election of Senators shall be eliminated full power will still exist under other general provisions. We are un~ able to agree with this contention. Under tbe resolution express power is granted to the States to regulate this subject.

That is, regulate the manner-

The language is exclusive; the whole power is granted to the State and nothing whatever upon this subject is reserved to Congress. ' The inference of this argument is that the whole power with reference to the election is granted to the States, while, as a matter of fact, we grant nothing to the States except the proposition of fixing the time and prescribing the manner- .

To expressly grant exclusive power over the subject to the State governments is equivalent to a denial of the same power to the General Government, and nothing can be clearer than that such express and exclusive grant would foreclose the General Government from exercising the same power under any general language contained in the Constitution. ·

Then how does it arise that when we have granted to the States the right to fix the manner for presidential electors, the National Government exercises its power over those elections? The confusion arises, as I said a moment ago, out of using the word .. manner " for " the right to vote" or the right to protect an election from fraud or violence or anything which interferes with a fair count.

l\Ir. President, I want, as briefly as I can now, to submit three propositions and the well-established law which sustains them: The first proposition is that the State alone can determine States. the qualifications of the voter. The National Government has no power, aside from the proposition of preventing discrimination, to interfere with any qualification which the State fixes with reference to the voter. Whenever the State determines who shall vote at an election, if there is no element oi discrimination such as is covered by the fifteenth amendment, Congress can not interfere with the action of the State. This question is so well established that I need only call attention to the authorities. Perhaps it would not be necessary to do that, except as it serves as a basis upon which to build the argument I desire to make. I here call attention to some of the authorities on the first proposition:

The United States has no voters in the States of its own creation. The elective officers of the United States m·e all elected directly or indirectly by State voters. The Members of the House of Representatives are to be chosen by the people of the States and the electors .. In each State must have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature. • * • The amendment (the fourteenth) did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. • • • No new voters were necessarily made by it. Indirectly it may have had that effect because it may have increased the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under the constitution and laws o! the States, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through States and the State laws and not directly upon the citizen. (Miner v. Happersett, 21 Wall, 178.)

The fifteenth amendment does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone. It prevents the States or the United States, however, from giving preference in this particular to one citizen of the United States over another on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. Before its adoption this could be done. It was as much within the power of the State to exclude n citizen of the United States from voting on account of race, etc., as it was on account of age, property, or education. Now, it is not. If citizens of one race having certain qualifications are permitted by law to vote, those of another having the same qualifications must be. Previous to this amendment there was no constitutional guaranty against this discrimination now there is. It follows that the amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right which is within the {>rotecting power of Congress. That right is exemption from discrimination in the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. This under the express provisions of the second section of the amendment Congress may enforce by appropriate legislation. (United States v. Reese, 92 U. S., We bold that the fifteenth amendment has invested the citizens of the United States with a new constitutional right, which is exemption from discrimination lrl. the exercise of the elective franchise on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. From this it appears that the right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute of national citizenship, but that exemption from discrimination in the exercise of that right on account of race, etc., is. The right to vote in the State comes from the States. But the right of exemption from the prohibited discrimination comes from the United States. (United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S., 555.)

The privilege to vote in any State ls not given by the Federal Constitution or by any of its amendments. It is not a privilege springing from citizenship of the United States. It may not be refused on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, but it does not follow from mere citizenship of the United States. In other words, the privilege to vote in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised ns the State may direct and upon such terms as to it may seem proper, provided, of course no discrimination is made between individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution. The State might provide that persons of foreign birth could vote without being naturalized Some States permit women to vote; others refuse them that privile~e. A State, so far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, might provide by its own constitution and laws that none but nativeborn citizens should be permitted to vote, as the Federal Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage upon anyone, and the conditions under which that right is to be exercised are matters for the States alone to prescribe, subject to the conditions of the Federal Constitution already stated, although it may be observed that the right to vote for a Member of Congress is not derived exclusively from the State law. But the elector must be one entitled to vote under the State statutes. (Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S., 632.)

Whenever the State has acted and the qualification is fixed, then the National Government may throw what protection it sees fit around that voter when he comes to cast his vote for a Federal officer; and that may be done, as was said in the Ya.r­ Ln:ough case, whether Article I, section 4, is in the Constitution or not; it may be done because it is a right dependent upon and guaranteed by the Constitution. Permit me to read here just one quotation from the Yarbrough case:

It is not correct to say that the right to vote for a Member of Congress does not depend on the Constitution of the united States.

The office, if it be properly called an office, is created by that Constitution, and by that alone. It also declares how it shall be filled, r.arucly, by election. • • •

The States in prescribing the qualifications of voters for the most numerous branch of their own legislatures do not do this with reference to the election for Members of Congress. Nor can they prescribe the qualification for voters for those eo nomine. They define who are to vote for the _popular branch of their own legislature, and the Constitution of the United States says the same persons shall vote for Members of Congress in that State. It adopts the qualification thus furnished as the qualification of its own electors for Members of Congress. It is not true, therefore, that electors for Members of Congress owe their right to vote to the State law in any sense which makes the exerci e of the right to depend exclusively on the law of the State. (Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S., p. 663, etc.)

The qualification and the status of the voter once being fixed by the State, then his right to cast that vote for Congressman or for Senator, in case this resolution is adopted, is a .right dependent upon and guaranteed by the Constitution of the United This joint resolution provides:

The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

After the State fixes the qualification and status of the voter, . then the right to cast that vote for a United States Senator, if this amendment should be adopted and finally become a part of the Constitution, would be a right dependent upon the Constitution of the United States and guaranteed by it, and Congress would have the power to protect and assure any elector the exercise of that right While the National Government could not in the first instance say who should vote, yet after the State should determine who its voters were, then the National Government can step in and guarantee to everyone whose status has been fixed by the State the right to exercise that franchise; and this may be done by any law which, in the wisdom of Congress, it deems sufficient to accomplish that purpose.

A distinction is to be made between the right to vote for a Representative to Congress and the conditions upon which that right is granted. In the preceding section it has been shown that the right to vote is conditioned upon and determined by State law. But the right itself, as thus determined, is a Federal right. That is to say, the right springs from the provision of the Federal Constitution that Representatives shall be elected by those who ha'Ve the right in each State to vote for members of ttie most numerous branch of the State legislature. The Constitution thus gives the right, but accepts as its own the qualifications which the States severally see fit to establish with reference to the election of the most numerous branch of their several State legisla· tures. (Willoughby on the Constitution vol. 1, p. 540.)

We deem it unnecessary to add anything to the views expressed In these opinions. We are fully sensible of the great wrong which results from bribery at elections, ll'D.d do not question the power of Congress to punish such offenses when committed in respect to the election of Federal officials. At the same time it is all important that a criminal statute should define clearly the offense which it purports to punish, and that when so defined it should be within the limits of the power ox the legislative body enacting it. Congress has no power to punish bribery at all elections. The limits of its power are til respect to elections in which the Nation is directly interested (James v. Bowman, 190 u. s., p. 142.)

The case which I now cite was an action to recover damages for a wrongful refusal to permit the plaintiff to vote. The sole question was whether or not the case involved a question under the Constitution of the United States, and the court held that it did, saying :

It is manifest from the context of the opinion in the case just referred to that the conclusion that the cause was one arising under the Constitution of the United States was predicated on the conception that the action sought the vindication or protection of the right to vote for a Member of Congress, a right "fundamentally based upon the Constltutfon of the United States, which created the office of Member of Congress, and declared that it should be elective, and pointed out the means of ascertaining who should be electors." That is to say, the ruling was that the case was equally one arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States, whether the illegal act complained of arose from a charged violation of some specific provision of the Constitution or laws J of the United States or from the violation of a State law which affected I the exercise of the right to vote for a Member of Congress, since the Constitution of the United States had adopted as the qualifications of electors for Members of Congress those prescribed by the State for electors of the most numerous branch of the legislature ot the State. (Swafford v. Templeton, 185 U. S., p. 492.) -

There are other cases to that effect which I will not take the time of the Senate to read.

After the qualification has been fixed, then it becomes a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and the Federal Government can protect that right in any manner in which it sees fit. It I can protect it just the same as it can protect any other right which is guaranteed under the Constitution of the United States. If you go out upon the public lands and undertake to acquire title to public lands, the Federal Government can protect your right so long as you are undertaking to do that, for that is a right dependent upon the Constitution. If you are arrested by a United States marshal and some individual citizen attacks you while in the custody of the marshal, the United States Government may protect you, because you have a right under the Constitution, so long as you are in the custody of a United States officer, to be protected from individual assault, and the Supreme Court has so held. Any right dependent upon that instrument, any right guaranteed by it, any right which has its existence by reason of it, may be protected in any manner which the wisdom of this body, together with that of the other body, sees fit to suggest.

We do not need Article I, section 4, to protect the purity of elections, to protect them against fraud. But with it we can go into the States and change the registry system; we can prescribe the form of the ballot; things which we ought not to do. That is the reason I am opposed to the turning over or the leaving with the Federal Government the power to prescribe those things and control those things which are purely local in every sense of the word.

The right being one protected by the Constitution of the United States, Congress may pass any law necessary to insure the exercise and enjoyment of that right. Justice Harlan, in one of his opinions, has said :

It is no longer open to question in this court that Congress may by appropriate legi s lation protect any right or privilege arising from, created or secur e d by, or dependent upon the Constitution or laws of the United States.

In the case of Logan v. United States, found in One hundred and forty-fourth United States, there is an exhaustive review of all the questions upon this subject, and after a full review of the authorities the court lays down this as the rule which is now thoroughly established by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States:

E ve ry right cr e ated by, arising under, or dependent upon the Constitution t ion of the United Sta t es may be protected and enforced by Congress s s by such means and in such manner as Congress, in the exercise of the correlati ve duty of protection, or of the l e gislative powers conferr e d upon it by the Constitution, may in its discretion de e m most eligible and best adapted to attain the object.

This decision was based upon an indictment founded upon section 5508 for assaulting a person who was in the custody of a United States marshal, the court holding that the prisoner had a right to be protected against assault while in the custody of a Federal officer, and the party assaulting him could be prosecuted under this section of the statute-5508.

Ri g hts and immunities created by or dependent upon the Constitution of the Unit e d States can be pro t ected by Congress. The form and the manner of the pr o tection may be such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise of its legislative discr e tion, shall provide. These may be vari e d to meet the necessities of the particular right to be protected. (U. S. v. Re e se, 92 U. S., 217.)

It is undoubtedly a sound position that whenever a right is guaranteed b y the Con s titution of the United States, Congress has the power to pro v ide for its enforcement either by implication arising from the corr e lative duty of Government to protect wherever a right to a citizen is conferred or under the general power contained in Article I, section 8. (U. S. v. Cruikshank, 1 Woods, 308.)

The fact that section 5508 was not passed under and by -virtue of Article I, s e ction 4, or dependent upon it for validity, is clearly shown in the following case of United States v. Waddell. This is a case where a party was prosecuted for interfering with another who was seeking the right of acquiring a homestead upon the unoccupied public lands of the United States, and the indictment was upheld:

Whenever the acts complained of are of a character to prevent this, or throw obstruction in the way of exercising this right, and for the purpo s e and with intent to prevent it, or to injure or oppress a person becau s e he has exercised it, then, because it is a right ass e rted under the law of the United States and granted by that law, those acts come within the purvi e w of the statute and of the constitutional power of Congress to make such statute. In the language of the court in Ex part e Yarbrough: "The power arises out of the circumstance that the func t i o n in which the party is enga g ed, or the right which he is about to e xe rcise, is d e pendent on the laws of the United States. In both of these cases it is the duty of that Government to see that he may exercis e this right fre e ly, and to protect him from violence while so doing or on account of so doing." ' Th i s langua g e is as applicable to the present case as it is to that. (U. S. v. Waddell, 112 U. S . , 80.)

Mr. President, a few words now as to the general question and then I am done. I do not know whether this resolution will prevail at this time or · not. I shall be exceedingly pleased if it does. I shall not be discouraged if it does not. I do know that the fight will never cease until the people are given an opportunity to vo e upon this subject, for we are not asking and can not ask for an amendment to the Constitution; we are only asking and can only ask that the people be given a right to vote upon the amendment. Unsettled questions have no pity for the contentment of mankind. For nearly a hundred years this question has been seriously debated among the people. For more than 50 years there has been an earnest and persistent demand that the matter be submitted to a vote in the respective legislatures. Thirty-two States of the Union have in some form of resolution called for this change. Millions of people have in some form or other asked that we submit it. To deny this right to have it submitted is to repudiate the first principles of a free government To refuse the people the right after this long-standing, earnest, patient plea to vote upon modifications of their Government is to plant the seeds of distrust and dissatisfaction in the minds of those without who e loyalty and confidence we have no government. It is unwise. It is the most disastrous course which men who would preserve the underlying principles of our Government could tion. possibly take. It is a defiant challenge of the people to have a voice in their Government. Men who would not give the right even to vote upon such a subject would, undoubtedly, if they could, deny the people any say or voice in matters of go"Vernment.

It has been declared many times that there is no public or general demand for this change in the Constitution; that the people do not want it. It is urged with much scorn and more voice that the movement has its support with a few men who are seeking cheap notoriety. Those men who so declare, by refusing to submit the question, convict by their own act their words of insincerity. Such insincere and fallacious assertions can never mislead any mind except the . self-infatuated minds which give them birth. This amendment can never be adopted unless there is an overwhelming public sentiment for it. It requires three-fourths of the States to adopt ; it only requires one-fourth to defeat. Are you not willing to submit the matter where the people must win by such great odds if they win at all? If there is no public sentiment, no earnest(, widespread, public demand, then there is no danger of submission. On the other hand, if there are three-fourths of the States of the Union in fa-vor of it, who will be so bold as to say that they are not to have a chance to vote upon it? The fact is that those who oppose this measure, while professing great reverence and love for the Constitution, nevertheless defy it. The right to amend the Constitution is just as much a part of the Constitution, just as obligatory upon men sworn to support it, as any other part of that instrument. When the people . . petition for the exercise of this power, and through long years and repeated exertions seek the right so given, to deny it is to deny them a right guaranteed by the Constitution.

But those who oppose this measure seem unwilling to submit to the crucial test of truth-that is, debate before the tribunal which is to finally decide it. If Senators who think this change unwise have faith in their arguments; if they believe that experience and reason and patriotism are against the change, will they not then consent to pass this contest from this forum to the forum of · public opinion? If you are not afraid of your cause, and if you do not distrust your argument by which you seek to sustain your position, then it must be that you distrust the judgment and the patriotism of. that · tribunal to which you are asked to submit it. If one or the ·other were not true; you would at least be willing to gi v e the people a chance to vote. Am~ who will not submit his cause to a tribunal cr e ated to determine such matters in an orderly way knows or feels either that his c a use is not just or that the tribunal is unfit.

At the last session, while this question was before us, we listened to a most polished and effective eulogy by the Senator from :Massachusetts upon the men who framed the Constitution. I agree with him fully in all he says in respect to the character and ability, the unselfish devotion, and unmatched patriotism of that remarkable group of men. I do not expect time to record the appearance of another Hamilton any sooner than it will record the appearance of another Shake I do not expect the future to see another Madison any sooner than it will see the return of a Robert Burns. Mr. President, if I could see this Government operate just as the fathers made it, I would never challenge their wisdom nor stray for one moment from the path they pointed out to their children. I do not want any different principles of government than the principles which they indorsed. and approved, but I do want those. I want to see the old Government brought back to where they left it-in the absolute control of the people, operating alone in their behalf. Whatever changes in details are necessary to accomplish this we ought to make.

The first 70 years of the Republic are gone. They were years in which there were no influences sufficiently strong to prevent the powers of government from operating in the manner in which the fathers expected them to operate. They were years in which there were no influences sufficiently strong to turn the agencies of government into the agencies of particular interests or to wholly private and selfish purposes. But that is not true now. The last 40 years have worked a marvelous change. We have other influences to deal with. We have influences of which they never dreamed, influences stronger in wealth and power than the Government itself at that time. These things do not require changes in the principles of the fathers, but they do require readjust» and a redistribution of powers. They require the adaptation of government to modern conditions. They require that we accept the wisdom of the fathers as a guide for brave, strong men confronted with a new condition of affairs. and not as a fetich before which slavish devotees bow in nerveless, lethargic adoraMr. Madison said in the constitutional convention :

If an election by the people or through any other channel than the State legislature promised as incorrupt and impartial a preference there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those legislatures. Had he been able to see what we see and know what we know, with that idea revolving in his mind, what do you think the father of the Constitution would have done? Had he looked upon vacant chairs here because of deadlocks in the legislature; had be seen as - we saw last winter nearly one-half of . a State legislature fleeing like fugitives across a State line and then negotiating with their colleagues like contending foes; had the men who surrounded Madison passed through the filth and corruption through which this Senate has been delving its way this 13..st yea.r; had they been thwarted and frustrated and defied in the effort to secure facts concerning the integrity of l.lil election; had they believed that State legislatures would be turned by this duty from lawmaking bodies dealing conscientiously with affairs of state into -political combinations, tom and follo-ws: distracted by purely convention duties, venalized and corrupted by powerful interests who care nothing for the State, but everything for the membership of this body; if they had seen what we see, does any man doubt, in view of their declarations, ~t the fathers would have taken this duty from the legislature and given it directly to the people? The things which the fathers did are not right merely because they did them, but they, too, must stand the test of reason and the test of time and experience. I repeat, sir, that I join with those who give praise and .. honor to the fathers. But I do not believe in that kind of hero worship which makes the worshipers the nerveless, spineless, slavish .... 1·sh de ..... devotees of a dead past. I believe in the hero worship which Yitalizes and inspires, which realizes that ::ill the great names which adorn the past are as sounding brass and tinkling crmbals, except as they inspire us for those achievements which in the language of Mr. Lincoln serves to keep the jewel of liberty in the family of men.

Those who a.re seeking to bring about this reform are not distn.rbed by the charge of being demagogues or sensation hunters or sla1es to popular sentiment The world has always had to deal with a very large and a "Very respectable class of people whose intellectual orbs are in the back of their head, and the rest of the world has leUI'lled patience and tolerance because of their a.ffiicti-0n. There were able and brilliant and patriotic men who plead for the o1d Confederacy and against the adoption of the Constitution. A few weeks ago there was a great debate in the Senate of China over dispensing with the Chinaman's queue. The progressives fayored the measure. The regulars, loyal to the institutions of the fathers, plead for the maintenanee of those customs under which they had prospered and gr-0wn to power To dispense with the queue would be to strike at the \ery foundation of civil liberty and to turn the fntm-e OTer to an unthinking horde of sensation hunters trailing after new fads and worshiping in strange temples. It w11s n great debate, and men were moved to great feats of oratorical _power.

I do not recall these things in disrespect of those who differ from us on this question. I only want to remind them that questions like · this can not be met by charging its ndvoeates with insincerity and demagogy. This question can only be met by argument, by reason, by a plea to the consciences and conTicti-0ns of men. Those who fayor this change are determined and uncompromising. They will ne-ver quit until the cause is decreed against them in the only forum which has jru·i~diction to render final judgment. Realizing that they must haye two-thirds of the votes of Congress, that they must haYe three-fourths of the States, that they must meet able and determined opposition, that they must win ngainst a thousand conserrntive forces-even with thU:! handicap they are anxious for the final test of battle. They are willing to submit this to tl!e judgment and intelligence of the American people. Notoriety could be secured by easier and cheaper methods; sensations could be more easily obtained; but, armed with a just ca use, encouraged in the belief that a question is never settled until it is settled right, those who urge this measure will continue to do so until it is written by the hand of public opinion into the great charter.