Debates in the Senate on the Seventeenth Amendment, 1911

June 12, 1911

:ELECTION OF SENATORS BY DmECT VOTE.49 min read
303: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 303 (Senate1911.Jun12.303)

The VICE PRESIDENT. The question is on agreeing to the amendment offered by the Senator from Georgia [Mr. BACON] to the substitute offered by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Bristow].

304: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 304 (Senate1911.Jun12.304)

.Mr. BACON. Mr. President, it is not my purpose to enter upon any extended argument on the general question or upon this particular amendment. It has been so short a time since Tentions. I addressed the Senate somewhat at length upon this subject that I should be reluctant to do so, even if present conditions did not make it inadvisable that I should attempt it.

305: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 305 (Senate1911.Jun12.305)

I desire simply now to present an amendment, which I trust may meet some of the objections urged by Senators to the joint resolution as it came from the Judiciary Committee. The joint re lntion as it came from t b e Judiciary · Committee, so far as it affects the particular question relating to the control of the times, places, and manner of holding the elections is in these words, to be found on page 2 of the joint resolution as reported by the Committee on the Judiciary, which is, in fact, verbatim the joint resolution as it came from the House. The language of the joint resolution, so far as it relates to that partieula.r feature, is as follows:

306: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 306 (Senate1911.Jun12.306)

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof.

307: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 307 (Senate1911.Jun12.307)

The substitute _ proposed by the Senator from Kansas leaves .out those words and leaves the question of the control of the times, places, and manner of holding the election as now ex· pressed in the Constitution, in the fourth section, which is as The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.

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308: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 308 (Senate1911.Jun12.308)

That language does not occur in the amendment offered by the Senator from Kansas, but the effect of the adoption of his substitute would be to incorporate that language in the sub· stitute offered by him.

309: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 309 (Senate1911.Jun12.309)

The amendment proposed by me is as follows: .

310: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 310 (Senate1911.Jun12.310)

The times, places, and manner o! holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may make such regulations in any State whenever the legislature thereof shall neglect or refuse to make such regulations, or from any circumstances be incapable of making the same.

311: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 311 (Senate1911.Jun12.311)

That amendment, .Mr. President, it will be seen, completely provides against the contingency which has been urged with great force and earnestne in which the State might fail to make regulations for the times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators, and in co~uence of its failure and also of"a sufficient number of other States, there would be, as stated by various SenatoYs in their arguments upon this tloor, a failure to elect Semtors, nnd in that case the wheels of the Government would practically be arrested.

312: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 312 (Senate1911.Jun12.312)

Now, Mr. President, in offering tlillt amendment I hn.Ye followed the utterances of all the con;entions of the States when they had before them the question whether or not they would adopt the Constitution and become parts of the Government · which it was proposed to form. organize, and operate under tha.t Constitution. When the Constitution was submitted to the various States there were sundry objections made by different eom·entions of those States~ some objecting to one feature and some to another, all of them, howernr, objections, which were finally withdrawn.

313: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 313 (Senate1911.Jun12.313)

r think I may safely say that there was but one single provision in the Constitution to which all of the States objected; but one single pro¥ision of the Constitution to which an of the States urged serious objections and criticisms; a provision to which they, every State-the records of which have been presened-objected. The provision thus objected to is that which gives to Congress the ultimate power to regulate the times, places, and lllfilliler of electing Members of Congress. All of the States made formal protest to this particular provision and finally agreed to the Constitution, subject to the assurance that the powers conferred by this provision would only be used to the extent as expressed in the amendment which I have to-day J ' offered, to wit that the power to regulate the manner of elec­ ' tions would or{1y be exercised when the State legislatures failed or refused to make the necessary regulations, or were for any reason incapable -of making them.

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314: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 314 (Senate1911.Jun12.314)

I want to say, Mr. President, that the language of this amendment is copied almost verbatim, and in the essential part of it verbatim, from the resolution which was adopted by the conTention of the State of New York when it adopted the Constitution.

315: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 315 (Senate1911.Jun12.315)

I am going to read, sir, although I did so upon a former occasion, the utterances of these various conventions on this subject at the time they acted upon the question whether or not they would adopt the Constitution of the United States and become a part of the Government formed thereby. I read those to the Senate in February lust when I addressed the Senate somewhat at length upon this subject. I read then from the original documents, which I then had before me. I now read from a correct copy of those utterances by those several conThe convention of the State of South Carolina used this language when it passed upon the question of · the adoption of the Constitution. In its articles of adoption the State said:

316: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 316 (Senate1911.Jun12.316)

And whereas it is essential to the preservation of the rights reserved to the several States, and the freedom of the people, under the operation of a General Government that the right of prescribing the manner, time, and places of holding the elections to the Federal Legislature should be forever inseparably annexed to the sovereignty of the several States: This convention doth declare that the same ought to remain to all posterity a perpetual and fundamental right in the local excl u ive of the interference of the General Government, except in cases where the legislatures of the states shall refuse or n eg le<:t to perform and fulfill the same according to the tenor of said Constitution.

317: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 317 (Senate1911.Jun12.317)

. .U:he : Stitte · :.af :VJI;.g:b:ifa, · in its ; act ~ oI - .fume ~ 26,Jl1B8, xdopfilug±he Constitution, used th.is language:

318: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 318 (Senate1911.Jun12.318)

That Congress shun not alter, : modify, .or interfere dn tthe t times, • pmees, and i ma.nn.er of · holding · 1euttons .for Senators "8lUl t Representatives, ar either of ;them, -. except when the ~isbrtnr~ -of :any , State neg~ect,-Ye!nse, . ar be 1 disa.bleurby . invaru.on orrrebelliun"'!o:irresex:ibetthe flame.

319: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 319 (Senate1911.Jun12.319)

North ' Carolina '"B.tlupted 'the Constitution in '178"9, 1llld :in Bo l doing used the same langua.ge that Virginia did, each . of .them ... expressing the same idea, that this dangerous , grant of power 'in the Federal · Government · was only . to provide a:ga.inst 'the contingency that the States · themselves should refuse or 1fu11 :to exercise 1t, and that Congress : should not interfere - in prescribing the times, , places, -u.na. .manner of Jidfdin_g elections except when ' the legislature of any ' State should · neglect nr -refuse or 'be . in- . capable to prescribe . the same.

320: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 320 (Senate1911.Jun12.320)

The State of New York, .from which, as l ' Saia, I ' have copied r 'this amendment, although it is rilmaBt in the -same language .in the :resolutions adopted by the < other State!?, . ratified ,the t : constitution on the 28th .. of .July, 1788, and used · this language 'in the act of -.ratification: .

322: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 322 (Senate1911.Jun12.322)

Which had been previously . stated in the : resolution-

323: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 323 (Senate1911.Jun12.323)

Under these impressions and declaring that the ,- rights .:nforesruo . can not be abridged or violated, and that the explanations aforesaid are consistent with th-e said Constitution, 11.nfl rin 'Confidence that the amendments which shall have been proposed to the said Constitution shall .receive . an ~ly and .mature consideration, we, the said delegates • * "* . i:lo :by :these presents aBSent · to and ratify the -sdJJ Constitution

324: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 324 (Senate1911.Jun12.324)

I.u "full confiden-ce, nevertheless, tlrrrt clllltil u. convention 11hh!l " be . edllet1 and • Convened for proposing . amendments to th:e Constitution * • • that the Congress will -not · make . or alter any regulation Jn ttliis State respecting the ' . times, places, · and .manner of 'holding :elec­ tions .for · senators and Representatives unless the legislature ' in this State l>hllll · neglect 01· -refuse to "lllake laws or -regulations :for . the purpose, or from any circumstances be incaP.able o'f making the same, rand that . in those " cases such power Will only be exercised until the legislature . of this State shall make · provisions in the l>.temises.

325: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 325 (Senate1911.Jun12.325)

Uhode Jsland, June 26, . J..190, TIBed i:he sa:me language : as did < the State . of New York-on}_y -stronger.

326: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 326 (Senate1911.Jun12.326)

= Pennsylvania :said, in r th-e : article adopting the . Constitution ' That Congress 'Sllail :nctt · have · pcrwe1· ' to make or alter :regulations con­ -rei:ning tire ' time, ; place, and manner · of electing Senators and Repre­ sentatives, except ' m .ea.s:e of neglect or . refusal by -the _ State to make .:r.egnl utiOIIS -'for the purpose, · and then - only for · such time · as · snCb. .ne.glect "Ur refusal shall continue.

327: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 327 (Senate1911.Jun12.327)

The State of Massachusetts, February 6, 1789, used this J.an­ 'gllnge:

328: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 328 (Senate1911.Jun12.328)

That Congress do not exercise the powers vested in them ·ey the · fourth section • oI the · first article, · but Jn cases · when a . state . shall 'lreg!eet or refuse to make the regulations therein mentioned, or :' Shall make regulations subversive of the rights of the • people 'to · n. · free · llll.d equal representation in < Congress, agreeably o the Constitution.

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329: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 329 (Senate1911.Jun12.329)

And Massachusetts, .in the same decumen t, · went :-on to ·· say :

330: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 330 (Senate1911.Jun12.330)

And . the conventi"on :ao, 1 in the name and in behalf - uf the people of this Commonwealth, enjoin it upon their Representatives in .congress at all times, until the alterations and . Provisions aforesaid · .ha-ye t ..been :-consiaered agreealily to tlre 'fifth article ·of said • constitution, · to · exert 11 their influence and use all reasonable · antl ilegal methods -to · obtain : U ratification . of ·· said alterations . and · pr.ovision:s, : in : such : manner .8fl Js ; provided in .said . article.

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331: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 331 (Senate1911.Jun12.331)

: New . Hampshir.e . ra:tifie:d on:Jun.e.21, 1788, mid used ln re-commendation : the .sa:me . language : as did Massachusetts.

332: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 332 (Senate1911.Jun12.332)

Now, Mr. President, as .J: . stated • l\POil : the former . occasion, lit • Will be recollected that after the action of he convention .in ~g .the ; Constitution there was great contention : in · :the · country whether .. or not the Constitution should . he adopted .or ~ whether the States -should remain - under :the old .Articles :of : Confederation, e.nd there -wllB great • division among them, as ; has been stated here to-day. Among .the ..:fo:r . foremost of those who advocated the . adoption · of .the Constitution were . e . .Alexander :Hamilton .and .James Madison. They · c:ontributed very • largely to the literature of that day in the advocacy of the adoption of rthe Constitution.

333: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 333 (Senate1911.Jun12.333)

They bad . to meet .the contention . w.hiCh was then being pre­ • sented Jn. the several . conventions of fue ·· States to the - effect that do . give .the General Go.vernment .the unrestricted power to .lfypsJa.te as .to the · times, . places, and manner of holding these ele.c­ tions wa.s to confer upon the General Government a pow.er · in­ .consistent with . that . which was con.cei'ved to be . to . the interests . a.nd safety and the perpetuity < Of ~e liberties . of tfile J)eQp1e • of · the several States.

334: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 334 (Senate1911.Jun12.334)

How 1 did • they meet that contention? .Did they meet dt J:zy .contending ior what Senators here contend ,for- . tha.t there should be this power in the General Government in order 1 th.at in ;times · 'mhen J>Olitical or pru:ty -exigenGy may 1 demand ..it ihe ~ General Go."\Wrnment .may lay its -powerful .hand upon .the ;States uncl control ...and regulate the . elections .in . those States J:hr.ou_gb .regi · strars and -superv.isors . ana judge-a _ of election, with iheir :.authority - :SUP.Ported . a.t the J.POUs JJ._y marshals ~ and - deputy :marshals and if need be by the military forces of the United States?

335: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 335 (Senate1911.Jun12.335)

1 Bid : fuese !Jlmn:ilrum.t .. ad'V:amtes ;. of rthe ' rulopilan - nf :. tlm = Gons.ti- 'ltntion !make any :auch ·~ aontention? '. Did they attempt · -to jus1iib any :imah : prDposition .Before fue conventions . .of the several Htates -when · they" -wmre ealled llP<m ~ to · decide . the vital qn.estion \Wlmther · or ru:ii ::the .GoYBrnment Jiliollld ·. be formed? · By : no . means, 11.f Jl r. p rei:uucn ~..:i~ t . s·-h. cu,, ...w.lere 4-'h. .JB • 'lll> man · w h D 1. ean rea d " th e de~tes • of that ~ay~ :. there !is 'TIO crnan - w.ho ( can r:ead :the · ~cial m.ction a-s l!lllbodied m i:he utterances .. of-the conventtoi;rs · of .that dIQr, who tean do~t tf.or a moment · ifhat if Al~-er IIailll.~ton and James ..Madison Jla~ ~ken aey such · p.osition bef.~i;:e . the -cou.rrlivy · the m~w C0Im~1hrtion would Jiav.e · been • :epu?ia±.ed; an.TI ~ the taeveral • eonv:ent~on.s, .headed by · tiw . convention m 1 Ne;w N~k, J:ullowed ~Y -:prfil!ti.caUy . all the •. other States, wolild 1 ha~e s~ua: W.hatever may • be .advantages it.o . be had ;under ; fuis JJ;o]Josed general c go"irarnment, so lm:>-g 11£! you ~ontend lfor . : the ~ght · of -the £enera1 ' Gayemment. , to :mtarfeFe · with the , electians ::lll the · Stat~ rto : prescribe _ f;he rtimes nnd rthe manner -and the pla.ces, .Jreg~rdless of whether · .w.e • ..ha:.!'e · performed t that . duty · or mot, , we re:ie.ct the .IlFQPosed ..cons.titnbon.

336: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 336 (Senate1911.Jun12.336)

.No . Senator · w.ho r ~as .ever ire.ad those debates, :not . onl.Y the debates 1 of : the ; Constitutional Convention - but the debates m · the several conventions 1 of . the :States, .can rise in ihis place to-ffity and say .he . h-as 1 read 1 them and believes , for a moment · tha.t . a single one of these States -would have adopted the Constitution with , any ·· such ~ proposition embodied ln lt.

337: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 337 (Senate1911.Jun12.337)

Alexander Hamilton knew ; that :fa.ct; James 'Madison "knew that .fact; and cuns.egueJ:IUy they met tiIB .objection of these . States, . not · by justifying the proposition · that the ' General Government .should have the right to interfere, but · by . solemnly . asserting that the . only purpose · ;was to use .a necessary : power when - the States themselves ! refused or neglected to avail them ­ selves , Of the opportunity. Therefore it was cthat Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, in : their · effort to have . e the Con­ · stit.ution adopted l}y the several · States, · gave . the assuranC!e, i w.hich . r am about to · read, which wa-s published thro _ throughout the count~y ~ and . doubtless · had laxgel_y its . influence in constraining the conventions of the several States to agree to the Constitu tion with L the;}Jroad grant uf pow.er in i1;, full of . confidence ' that it was only · to be · exe.rcised i :in such way as these fathers ·. Of :the r Constitution assured them it -would . only be · exel'cised.

338: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 338 (Senate1911.Jun12.338)

. Mr. CLAPP. iWill the Senator pardon ..me?

340: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 340 (Senate1911.Jun12.340)

. l\Ir. 1 0LAEP. '.I : have !listened to · the Senator with · a great tdeal uf dn.terest. Would not · the . m:.gument ~hioh : he · is .mo.king more properly apply to a :prqposed ;plnn of 1 legisla.tion under the i_ ex;isting · terms .of the r Constituiion -rather than -to the _pxo.posimon of abandoning 1 tho~m · pmvisi011B in the Constitution.'? [ . am .nnnble to : see--

341: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 341 (Senate1911.Jun12.341)

Mr. RA:OON. .This . d~s not : abandon it. lf the ""Senator ·. had . henrd the : amendment :read whi.Ch . r . .offured, · he will see thut 1t :Still mruiins 1he power in the General . Government hut 1imit-s Jts exercise to • a case where 'the , Stutes 'themselve.s :Shall fail : to werfoxm 1:hei:r : duty i in , fhat :parti"cular.

342: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 342 (Senate1911.Jun12.342)

Mr. CLA;PP.. illut 1 beginni.n,g J.Primarily., clh.e JPrQPosition i of . fhe · .Senator ;from Tdaho [Mr . .lluB:A:HJ . in .its · pres-ent fmim, jf iit · :rmounred to . nny.thing.in that respect, • would i be mi nbundonment . o.f . C!ertain }JIDY:isions which ar.e in ·. the · Constitution, , wheren£ .fhe prDjlosition 1 of the Senator .from · mm.sa-s IMr. ~msirow] wotild cSimp}y . retain . those ]JJio.tisio:ns of ~ the Gonstitution which we:i:.e ;put 1n .at the time t the . Constitution ' was . adQpted. As to what "'.\'\":ru3 meant : }).y dhose Jl~Ovisious and ·when those : pro:v.isions should be invoked by Congress, it seems to me W.Duld .Rjlply r Wlt.h • more ..fnrae to }ll'Qposed legislRtion caxzying :them into . effect than the ·. question w..hi.Ch is now .before us, as io whether . the.Y should he · abandoned · .or :retained .under this new p1nn..

343: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 343 (Senate1911.Jun12.343)

. Mr. 1 BACON. .Mr . . ~ P.res.i.dent, !I : had not · intended 1 to go into db.at L b.ranch t of ~ the ; discussion, and ..iI . .run il. little ; reluctant 1o do i.it now, , but still . I will, if the . :S.enator will :pardon me c until · I ;get .to · that :particular , point .

344: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 344 (Senate1911.Jun12.344)

l do-not rthink :the point . I · was .exactly nn at , that ct:inre relates ±I> ±he suggestion .of -the Sena.tor from Minnesota. · The :point J: am . .on is simply · this · : 1I !had "l:ead What hmi been uttered : by ltlre conventions of the:several · States showing thatltbey .objected j:o 1theJ.anguage.;as'.JlYesented · in i±he Gnnstitution, :and : as now:found in the • Constitution, : because they c.onC!.eived that .it ~lIB · capable of the construction which has been _ put ' Upon it since that .time, which ga.ve • .to ' Congress 1 the ;power .to prescribe not only the times and thewiaees · but · the . manner, · andtlnl>rescribing.the man ner necessarily prescribing fill the details · with · reference to · fill election. !D.hw±hen re"Cogn.ized thatln_presctibing '. the manne1"'af holding and conducting these elections .Congress . would mi..ve the :power to · enact registration ln:wa:; rthat .it would have ;the 1ww . er to -appoint - registrars, to .RIWOint · supervisors ·of election, to · ap point judges , of election and returning boards . to certify the results; not only so, but also to order officials of the executive department of the Government to enforce the law in that respect, to uphold at the polls the authority of registrars and supervisors and judges, and not only the power to thus invest civil officers with the authority to thus enforce the law, but with the power necessarily to order the soldiers of the United States for the purpose of upholding the civil authority.

345: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 345 (Senate1911.Jun12.345)

That was the view which the several States took of the possibility of this clause in the Constitution. They objected to it most strenuously. They contended that that was a right which belonged to each State. There was then no cloud upon the horizon which indicated the coming of a sectional storm. It was not to guard against any special and particular evil which was apprehended, but those rugged men who had so recently been through a contest by means of which they had achieved their liberty stood more than a hundred years nearer to the times of autocratic rule than we stand. They stood more than a hundred years nearer the exhibition of great central power, situated beyond their borders and controlling their local affairs. They had devoted seven years in proclaiming their rights to free themselves of such outside domination, and while there was then no particular menace from any particular quarter, they were grounded in the great fundamental proposition that they should control absolutely their own local affairs, and most particularly their elections, and that no general government should ever assume to control those local affairs for them.

346: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 346 (Senate1911.Jun12.346)

Therefore it was that they objected to this clause in the Constitution with the possibilities of which I have spoken, possibilities then, but realities since in this country; possibilities then, but realities in laws which have at one time stood upon our statute books for twenty-odd years without the ability of the people to remove themselves from such tyranny and such oppression; possibilities then, but almost realities afterwards in the bill known as the force bill, which passed the House and which came to this body and only after a long time was defeated, not by a direct vote, but by a flank movement-through a vote in the Senate to pass to the consideration of another bill.

347: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 347 (Senate1911.Jun12.347)

Thus it was, I say, that the people of that day viewed possibilities, and even in the absence of anything which was then presented as a probability, in the absence of anything which was visible and tangible, they stood upon an abstract right and upon a fundamental proposition and said they could not be moved from it, and they would have refused to form the Government rather than to surrender the · principle or to run the danger involved in its abandonment.

348: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 348 (Senate1911.Jun12.348)

Now, the advocates of the adoption of the Constitution saw that difficulty. It had to be met. If they had met it by an advocacy of the proposition, they would have failed in that contest. They met it by giving the most solemn assurances to the se-veral States that it was a power never to be exercised except when the States themselves refused or neglected to ex­ Senate. ercise it. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison, the great apostles of the adoption of the Constitution, both gave their solemn pledge. Under such a solemn pledge the State of New York, the State of Massachusetts, the State of New Jersey, the State of Rhode Island, the State of New Hampshire, the State of Pennsylvania, the State of Virginia, the State of North Carolina, and the State of South Carolina, and all the States of which we have the record, all gave their adhesion in the adoption of the Constitution, while at the same time giving the utterances of their confidence in the observance of that assurance and pledge.

349: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 349 (Senate1911.Jun12.349)

All this amendment does, Mr. President, is to ask that the Congress of the United States should to-day observe that pledge. Now, what did Alexander Hamilton say about this at a time when the thing hung in the balance, when it was doubtful whether or not the States could be reconciled to this great invasion of the right of each State to control its own elections, and when there was danger that the work of the convention would go to pieces and there would be no Government of the United States formed? Under these solemn circumstances, in the face of such a danger, to avoid possible ruin and shipwreck in the work of framing the proposed government, Alexander lations. Hamilton said this. Madison came first, but as I spoke of Hamilton I will read what Hamilton said in the fifty-eighth number of the Federalist.

350: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 350 (Senate1911.Jun12.350)

The Federalist was made up of papers which were _then circulated and read from one end of this country to the other, and upon which the people in the States and the public men at the conventions relied as that upon which they could securely depend without fear that it would afterwards be disregarded. Number after number was issued arguing why the convention of each State should adopt the Constitution and why the Con­ I stitution should be the foundation upon which should rest the new Government. Alexander Hamilton, in the fifty-eighth number of the Federalist, used this language:

351: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 351 (Senate1911.Jun12.351)

They (the convention) have submitted the regulation of elections for the Federal Government in the first instance to the local adminis-­ trations, which, in ordinary cases and when no improper views prevail, may be both more convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the national authority a right to interpo e whenever extraordinary circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its safety.

352: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 352 (Senate1911.Jun12.352)

What Hamilton meant by this general language is sufficiently shown in the specific language used by the convention of New York, which I have already quoted and read to the Senate, of which convention Hamilton was a most active and conspicuous member. The " safety " to which he alluded was the necessity for the General Government to have the power to act if the States refused or neglected to do so.

353: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 353 (Senate1911.Jun12.353)

I will say the context and all the contemporaneous publications and all the debates show that the safety to which he alluded was necessary to guard against the same contingency of which the Senator from New York [Mr. RooT] spoke in his speech during the last session of Congress, the fear that by reason of the omission of the State to provide proper machinery there could not be brought to the Chambers of Congress the Senators and the Representatives who were required in order that the Government might be carried on.

354: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 354 (Senate1911.Jun12.354)

l\1r. Madison used this language in the convention of Virginia:

355: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 355 (Senate1911.Jun12.355)

It was found necessary to leave the regulation of these (times, places, and manner) in the first places to the State governments as being best acquainted with the situation of the people, subject to the control of the General Government, in order to enable it to produce uniformity and prevent its own dissolution • • •. Were they exclusively under the control of the State governments, the General Government might easily be dissolved. But if they be regulated properly by the State legislatures, the congressional control will very probably never be exercised.

356: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 356 (Senate1911.Jun12.356)

John Jay, afterwards Chief Justice of the United States, in discussing in the New York convention, of which he was a member, this provision of the Constitution, used this language: That every government was imperfect unless lt had a power of preserving itself. Suppose that by design or accident the States should neglect to appoint the Representatives, certainly there should be some constitutional remedy for this evil. The obvious meaning of the paragraph was that, if this neglect should take place, Congress should have power by law to support the Government, and prevent the dissolution of the Union. He believed this was the design of the Federal convention.

357: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 357 (Senate1911.Jun12.357)

Mr. Madison, in the :Madison Papers, used this language in regard to this section :

358: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 358 (Senate1911.Jun12.358)

This was meant to give the National Legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the State, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.

359: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 359 (Senate1911.Jun12.359)

Mr. Madison was also a member of the Virginia convention, which, in adopting the Constitution, used the explicit language upon this question which I have already quoted and read to the Mr. President, whatever may be said as to whether or not any · of this language is ambiguous, certainly the impression made and the undertaking understood by the conventions of the States was in exact accordance with the language which I have read from the resolutions adopted by these conventions; and each one of the several States from whose convention proceedings I have read, not in ambiguous language, but in the most perfect and concise and unqualified language, adopted the Constitution with the assurance which they had from the utterances of the public men of that clay, that, while it was possible that there could be this broad construction of the language giving this power to Congress, it was not the intention or purpose that Congress should exercise this power except in cases where the States themselves failed to use it; and their adoption was conditioned upon their confidence that this pledge would be sacredly kept.

360: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 360 (Senate1911.Jun12.360)

For that reason, Mr. President, I have offered this amendment. It does not take away from the Federal Government the right or power to exert this authority to prescribe the times, places, and manner, but it limits it to the times when the States themselves shall refuse or neglect to make such reguMr. President, while it has taken some time to recite all this, the facts are so plain, the record is so complete, the conclusion is so definite and unanswerable, that no Senator will rise in his place and deny that this was the plain, manifest intention and understanding of all the States in the adoption of the Constitution. ·

361: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 361 (Senate1911.Jun12.361)

Now, Mr. President, the Senator from Minnesota [Mr. CLAPP] asked me a question which I do not feel that I am at liberty I to omit to answer, although it had not been my purpose when rose to take up the time of the Senate with it. As stated when I began, I had no intention to make any extended remarks at this time. .As I understand the suggestion of theSenator from Minnesota, it is one which has frequently been made upon this floor as to the Bristow amendment, as we now call it, the Sutherland amendment as it was known in the last Congress, because they are both exactly the same in effect.­ There is not a word of difference between them. So, if I speak of the Sutherland amendment, it will be known I do it as a matter o.f habit, as I have reference to the Bristow amendment, the two being identical. That suggestion, so frequently made, is to the effect that tllllt amendment only retains, in case we should adopt the joint resolution providing for a · direct election of Senators by vote of the people, the present powers of the Constitution in controlling the election of Senators, and makes no change in them, whereas it is contended that the joint resolution a.mending the Constitution which is reported from the Committee on the Judiciary does make a change in this particular. That, I understand, is the sugg.e.stion -0f the Senator froni Minnesota.

362: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 362 (Senate1911.Jun12.362)

Mr. President, I think it is capable -0f easy demonstration that the adoption of an amendment giving to a direct vote of the people the choice of Sena.tors, leaving at the same time the language of the fourth section of the first article of the Constitution to apply to that changed. condition, does make a most radical change in the law, and that there will be a control by the General Government of the ,election of Senators which the General Government has not now under the present law,

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363: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 363 (Senate1911.Jun12.363)

It is true, Mr. President, that the language used in the fourth section of the first article of the Constitution is language which applies both to the election of Senators by the legislatures and to the election of Representatives by the people, but it is ma.nifest that tha.t provision in the Constitution, as it now stands, does give the Federal Government the power of control over the · manner of tile election of Representatives, which it has not and can not ha-ve under the present law in the election of Senators. Why? I .have given to-day an enumeration of the several powers which, under the construction now given to that clause of the Constitution, are brought into force and exercise whenever Congress sees fit t.o exercise the power in prescribing what shall be the manner in which the Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected.

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364: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 364 (Senate1911.Jun12.364)

There might be others added to this enumeration, but these are the plain ones that lie upon the surface. I have enumerated. the power to appoint registrars. r could ha"Ve added to that the power to pass a registration law. There is no doubt about the :fact that if Congress has the power to appoint registrars to judge of who shall vote under the registration law made by the State, congress also has the power itself to prescribe who shall be registered, and to appoint men who shall make the registration. Congress has the power to make a registration law. It is true that in the making of that registration law Congress would be limited to the placing upon the registration list those who a.re qualified to vote under the State law. There is no doubt about that; but there is always a wide discretion, where different qualifications are enumerated, in the registrars as to w.hom they put upon the list and whom they will take off it But that is aside.

365: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 365 (Senate1911.Jun12.365)

So far as the elections of Members of the House are concerned, under the power to prescribe the manner in which those elections shall be held, there is the power to pass a registration Inw oo register the -votes that shall be received at the polls, to appoint the registrars, the supervisors of elections, judges of elections, and the returning boards to decide the result of tfie elections; also marshals and deputy marshals at the polls to maintain the authority of these officers, and, if need be, soldiers at the polls to support the marshals in their effort t-0 support and enforce tlie acts of these officers.

366: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 366 (Senate1911.Jun12.366)

Theoo rs no question about the fact that under the construction given to the fourth section such is the power of Congress in prescribing the manner in which Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected. Is there any Senator here who will say that under the present law under which Senators are elected by the legislatures Congress can pass or enforce any law which shall apply to the legislature of a State in managing and controlling the legislature in electing a Senator in the same way and by the same means that Congress can under that clause of the Constitution now exercise in managing and controlling the elections of Representatives'! It is im.po.s­ sible under that clause of the Constitution for Congress to undertake to control the elections of Senators through the ai>­ pointment of registration boards to determine wlio are the legislators entitled to vooo, of judges of the election to supervise the elections by the legislature, with returning boards to determine and certify the result of the election by the legislature, with marshals and deputy marshals present at the sesiion of the legislature, and, if need be, soldiers also to enforce in the legislature the authority and orders of these registrars, judges, and supervisors and . returning boards. The mere statement of such a proposition shows its impossibility. Although the language of the Constitution as to prescribing regulations . for the control of elections ls now the same for Representatives as for Senators, who is there who can rise in his place and say that Congress, without an absolute revolution in the Government, without overturning the autonomy and sovereignty of the States, without an utter destruction of our f.orm of government, can undertake to prescribe registration laws f.or the legislatures, can undertake to supervise the election of a Senator by a legislature, to invade the halls of a legislature and set up the judges of the election, to put marshals appointed by Federal judges in the legislative halls, to see that the legislature elects Senators right, to serul the armed force& of the United States with their guns and their sabers into the halls of the legislature to enforce tile law with reference to the election of Senators?

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367: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 367 (Senate1911.Jun12.367)

Mr. President, the proposition is an absurdity. This all can now be done by Congress in controlling the manner of electing Representatives. But who will say that this can be done in the election of Senators by the legislature of a State? I um satisfied there is not a Senator here who will not admit that while all this can be done in the election of Representatives, it would be an absurdity to talk about its . being done in the election of Senators. Who can doubt it? The language of the Constitution as to the control by Congress of the elections of Senators and of Representatives is the same. The application of it is necessarily different. It is an impossibility tha.t in practical enforcement it can be the same in one case · as in the other. The same power under the law as it now exists is nominally conferred by the Constitution on the Federal Government in the election of Senators that is exercised in the election of Representatives, but practically it is impossible under the present law fo.r that power to be exercised by the Federal Government in the election of Senators; but when you change the law so that you put the election of a Senator by the people and upon the same plane as the election of a Representative, and apply the law to him which ca.n not be applied now, the power can be exercised in the election of Senators, and y:ou have made a tremendous change; you have made a revolutionary change. You have made. the law in its practical enforcement through the control registrars and supervisors and judges of elections with marshals and if need be soldiers at the polls apply to the election. of Senators, a thing that is now impossible. When this change is made, you . will haTe ma.de, Mr. President, that which, in my honest judgment, in time will unsettle the foundations of this Government You will make practically a new Government when you destroy the power of. the States to control the election ot their Senators. It may take a long time, but it will come.

368: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 368 (Senate1911.Jun12.368)

Mr. President, what is the highest practical evidence of the fact that the same law, while written on the statute books in he same words and applying to Representatives, does not in practical enforcement apply to Senators? We know that in the past 40 years, in times- of great heat, in times of great sectional difference, in times of great political excitement and partisan controversy, there were two election laws put upon the statute books. There was just as mu.ch inducement, just as much partisan desire then to control the election of Senators as there then was to control the election of Representati-ves. The great influences which caused Congress to pass those election laws for the purpose <rt controlling the election of Representatives were influences equally as potent, equally as active, equally as moving and pushing in the case of Senators as it was in the case of Representatives, and even more important from a partisan standpoint.

369: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 369 (Senate1911.Jun12.369)

The same purpose which there was to control the election so far as it concerned Representatives would have given to Congress the intent to control the elections to the Senate in the same way. Yet examine those laws and what do you find! It was just as important, if not more important, to the influences which brought forth those election laws that they should control the election of Senators as that they should control the election of Representatives. Yet with the greatest inducement to control not only tile Representatives but Senators 1 you will find upon examination of those laws that they applied exclusively to the election of Representatives. There is not a word in either one of them about the election of Senators, but an the machinery pr.oviding that in any district, or in any smalle r community, a certain number, from 10 to 20, might go before a judge of a district court and make affidavit that a fair election was not- going to be held, and then empower the judge of the district court to appoint registrars and supervisors and judges to hold that election, baiUffB of the court to attend those elections to uphold the authority of those registrars and supervisors and judges, and armed men at the polls to uphold the authority of the marshals if they did not have the power, all of it relating exclusively to Representatives, and no line or letter relating to the election of Senators.

370: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 370 (Senate1911.Jun12.370)

Well, also in the force bill, at a more recent date, passed at a time when it was said there was a great need that there should be a law controlling elections in the country, when it passed the House and came to the Senate and was defeated under the methods which I have spoken of, there was not a line nor a syllable nor a letter with reference to the election of Senators. It was recognized that while the language of the Constitution empowering Congress to control elections was applicable alike to the election of · senators and the election of Representatives, it could not be in practice made to apply to the election of Senators.

371: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 371 (Senate1911.Jun12.371)

Mr. WILLIAMS. Nor as to the election at the polls where the legislature was elected by which Senators were to be elected.

372: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 372 (Senate1911.Jun12.372)

Mr. BACON. Nor, as suggested to me by my friend from Mississippi, as to the election at the polls where the legislatures were to be elected by whom Senators were to be elected. Now, l\Ir. President, is there any escape from the proposition under the law, as it now stands, although in the Constitution the same law is written with reference to Senators that is written as to Representatives, the law is in possible enforcement dif ferent from the one as to what it is as to the other; that whereas you may put registrars and supervisors and judges and marshals of the courts, and armies to support marshals and judges of election, and bring testimony as to who has been elected in the case of Representatives, it is under the law as it now exists an absolute, practical impossibility now in the case of Senators so recognized and so acted upon by Congress when it had every inducement to construe it otherwise.

373: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 373 (Senate1911.Jun12.373)

But, Mr . President, when you let that . same clause in the Constitution stand as to the control of the election of Senators, and when you provide that the election of Senators shall be by the people, then every regulation of elections which can be put on the statute book which relates to the election of Members of the · House o f Representatives can be made to apply with equal force instantly practically to the election of Senators. Is that no change? The claim that no change will be made that State. can not be supported. That has been the cry in the last Congress and in this Congress, and that is one ground upon which it is sought to be vindicated, that we are not changing the law; that we are letting the law stand as it is. One can safely challenge the proposition that the law will not be most radically and fundamentally changed; and until some one does answer this argument, let no one again repeat the assertion that the law as to the control of the election of Senators will not, in practical effect, be thus changed.

374: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 374 (Senate1911.Jun12.374)

Mr. President, I did not intend to occupy the time of the Senate with any extended argument this afternoon. I do not know that I should have said a word at this time if my distinguished friend from Missouri [Mr. STONE] had not insisted that I should explain the amendment which I offered to the Senate. I had purposed to let it go upon its merits. I had said to tlie Senator from Idaho [l\fr. BoBAH] that I did not feel that I could properly go on to-day; but, Mr. President, as I have entered upon the subject, and have been unwittingly led into a general discussion, I want to discuss one other feature of the subject.

375: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 375 (Senate1911.Jun12.375)

One of the arguments which has been pressed with great earnestness and with unremitting perseverance has been the one I have attempted to answer this afternoon-that the change in the law submitting the election of Senators to the direct vote of the people, with no supervision other than that which is now contained in the Constitution, would not change in effect . the present Constitution as regards the control of those elections · by the Government. If I have not demonstrated the fact that it would make a change of a most radical and far-reaching character, then, Mr. President, it is because I have not the command of language in order to express the thoughts which are in my mind and the arguments which have presented themselves to me. One other proposition which has been urged here to-day as a reason why this amendment which comes from the Committee on the Judiciary-which is the same that passed the House of Representatives-should not be adopted and why the amendment now offered by the Senator from Kansas [Mr BRISTOW] and formerly offered by the Senator from Utah [Mr. SUTHERLAND] should be adopted in lieu of it is that, even conceding that there is this change, even conceding that the effect of it will be to change radically the power of Congress over the election of Senators, at least it only gives Congress the same power over the election of Senators which it has over the election of Representatives, and t h erefore should not be objected to.

376: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 376 (Senate1911.Jun12.376)

I had no intention of going into that, but, with th& permission of the Senate, if I do not unduly weary it on this very warm evening, when, of course, I must suffer more from my persistence than they from submitting to it, I want to answer th a t.

377: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 377 (Senate1911.Jun12.377)

Conceding that the effect will be to change the control of the United States Government now in the election of Senators, and that in that change it only gives the Government of the United States the same power over the election of Senators that it now has over the election of Representatives, why, it is asked, should there be any reason why the Government of the United States should not have the same control over the election of Senators as it has over the election of Representatives? Well, sir, I want to give several reasons. Some of them h a ve been given heretofore, and I shall do no more than touch them, at least those of them that I understand to have been already discussed. There are one or two of them, however, that I do not i recollect having heard discussed, which I may speak of a little more at length.

378: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 378 (Senate1911.Jun12.378)

In the first place, as I have endeavored to demonstrate, the power now claimed and which at times has been exercised in the control of the election of Representatives is altogether greater than that contemplated . or intended by the framers of the Constitution, and if any change is to be made it should be a change which would take away the power to interfere with the elections of Representatives and not a change to give further power to interfere with the election of Senators.

379: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 379 (Senate1911.Jun12.379)

In the next place, as has been repeatedly said here and not very long ago said by my learned friend, the Senator from Mississippi [Mr. WILLI.AMS], on my left, a Senator occupies a very different relation to the Government in his representation of a State here from what a Representati-ve occupies in his representation of a given number of people. A Senator represents not only the people found within the State, but he represents the corporate entity of the State. He represents more than that, Mr. President; he represents that which the Supreme Court of the United States in more than one decision has recognized to wit, the sovereignty of a State. '

380: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 380 (Senate1911.Jun12.380)

Mr. WILLIAMS. Ile represents the State regardless of the number of people within the State.

381: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 381 (Senate1911.Jun12.381)

Mr. BACON. He represents the State, as is said by the Senator from Mississippi, regardless of the number of people in The Supreme Court of the United States has more than once said that within its sphere the State is as much of a sovereign as the United States in its sphere, and the Senator represents here not only the people and all the materi a l interests within a State, but he represents the corpora t e entity and the sovereignty of the State. ·

382: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 382 (Senate1911.Jun12.382)

Certainly, Ur. President, there is the strongest of reasons why the State should control the selection of the men who are thus to represent the State in this high Council of States. In the one case the representation is a representation of that which is in its nature national; it is a representation which ' includes a certain number of people, greater in the aggregate in one State than in another, equal in its representation in the one district as in another, whether in the same State or not, ) It is a rep . representation of that which is more particularly national. In the other it is the representation of that which is an entity in itself, and which has the same dignity each that another has, regardless of how much greater in area or population the one may be than the other.

383: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 383 (Senate1911.Jun12.383)

But, Mr. President, there is another view of it of a more practical character that I want to suggest to the Senate, and that is that the election of a Senator and his presence in this body and the power which he exercises is a matter of surpassing importance-much greater than the re p resentation of a Representative in the House of Representatives. Sir, I do not in any degree underestimate the dignity and importance of the . House of Representatives. To one familiar with the duties and authority of other national representative bodies and who knows the vast scope of the immense interests controlled by the American House of Repres e ntatives and the wide range of its I activities and powers, there can be no hesitation in saying that it is, as a strictly legislative body and in its legislative capacity, the most powerful and important of all representative bodies of the world.

384: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 384 (Senate1911.Jun12.384)

But the Senate is much more than a legislative b o dy. Aside .from the question of numbers, the power which the Senate has in the peculiar functions which are devolved upon Senators makes the office of Senator of far greater imp o r t ance. But passing from that for a moment and returning to the question of numbers . There is one suggestion in that c o nnection that I wish to make. We hear a great deal about the interests and about the control of the senate by the so-called interests. I think much of that is exaggerated; in fact, I know it is; but it is possible in the future, as it has been in the past, that it will be greatly to the interest of the interests to control the Senate. The control of one or two Representatives in the other House is a minor matter, because of the great number of men there, aside from " the greater difference still of the functions which they perform; but the control of a few men in the Senate is a matter of most vital importance. The control of the election of one man in the Senate may change the practical control of the Government. It may be at some time that there is some Senator who is particularly disagreeable to certain influences. He may be a man who stands not in awe of the powers that be, political, financial, or otherwise. To control such a man as that in the other House would have very little influence upon the destinies of the country or upon the laws which are to be passed or the legislative functions to be performed, but to control the election or return of such a man in the Senate may be a matter of the vastest importance.

385: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 385 (Senate1911.Jun12.385)

Mr. President, the application I make of that is this: One of the greatest evils which are apprehended in regard to the election of Senators by the people is the danger that contests over seats will arise in the Senate which can not be settled practically upon their merits because of the vast number of votes which shall have been cast in any senatorial election, and which will be in consequence decided by the Senate on political grounds, or on some other grounds. Whenever you put it within the power of Congress to pass registration laws and make supervisors and judges of elections, for the purpose of doing that which the minority in their report from the Judiciary Committee assert as one of the purposes of the Bristow amendment, for the purpose of gathering evidence in regard to the election of Senators, it will be an easy matter in the interest of party or of any great influential interest to gather evidence, through these supervisors and judges of election, by which any man may be gotten rid of in this body who may have made himself distasteful or dangerous to some great and powerful influence in this country, political or otherwise. As long as such a man is safe in the confidence of his people, and so long as his State can control the election of its Senators, he is safe from the attack of those without his State-but not SQ if those without his State through party influence in the Senate can control these elections within the State.

386: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 386 (Senate1911.Jun12.386)

The same thing will be true as to contests between political parties. The minority in their report say that the necessity for Federal control is that the Government may have officers at the polls who should gather evidence and come here and tell us what has been done in an election which entitles one man to a seat and which makes it proper and necessary to turn another man out of his seat. Everybody knows that when it comes to canvassing hundreds of thousands of votes it is an impossibility for the Senate to perform such a task, and with the evidence of these registrars and supervisors and judges and marshals, partisans as they doubtless will be, there will be always enough upon which to base a decision in favor of either man according as the predominant influences, political or otherwise, may desire that one man may be allowed to retain a seat or that he may be turned out and another man may be given it.

387: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 387 (Senate1911.Jun12.387)

Time will not permit that I further elaborate that thought, but there are other reasons why the States should control the question as to how their Senators should be elected. .

388: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 388 (Senate1911.Jun12.388)

Mr. President, we frequently hear about the rights reserved to the States, but there is one very remarkable thing that has struck me in regard to the Constitution which we do not hear so often spoken of, and that is, that the purpose of the fathers in forming the Constitution was not only to give to the States certain rights which could not be infringed upon, but they constructed the Government in such a way that the States as States should, in their equal representation in the Senate, be the principal agency, the controlling influence, in everything connected with the exercise of the sovereign powers of the Government; that the States, as States, through their representation in the Senate, should themselves control the most important functions of the Federal Government.

389: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 389 (Senate1911.Jun12.389)

I repeat, sir, that the Senate is much more than a legislative body. It has legislative, executive, and judicial functions. With the House of Representatives it shares the legislative function in the enactment of statutes. With the President it shares the executive functions in the treaty-making power and the appointment of all the officers of the Government. Upon impeachment proceedings by the House, the Senate is empowered to try and upon conviction to dismiss from office any officer of the Government, from the highest to the lowest and ,from such judgment and sentence there is no appeal. But this is by no means all.

390: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 390 (Senate1911.Jun12.390)

It may sound like a startling statement, but the Constitution of the United States gives to the States through their representation in the Senate a greater power in the control of the Federal Government than it gives to all the people of the United States combined. It gives to the Senate in the carrying on of the Federal Government a greater power than it gives to any other agency, or any other part of the Government, or of the country, or that which makes up the Government. There are some things denied to the Executive; there are some things denied to the House of Representatives; there are some things which the Senate can do in connection with the Executive; there are some things which the Senate can do in connection with the House of Representatives; but there is nothing that can be done without the Senate. With the House of Representatives it can pass a law with the approval of the President of the United States, and it can pass a law with the disapproval of the President of the United States. It can repeal a law over the objection of the President of the United States. With the President of the United States the Senate can make a treaty, which is the supreme law of the land, against the wish of the House of Representatives. With the House of Representatives the Senate can subsequently, by the enactment of a statute, repeal that treaty against the wish of the President of the United States. The Senate in conjunction with the Hom:e can declare and make war against a foreign nation contrary to the wish and over the objection of the President; and then the Senate and the President, acting together in making a treaty, may stop that war and make peace with that country against the wish and over · the objection of the House of Representatives. The Senate of the United States, in cooperation with the President, can make any officer of the United States from the Chief Justice down to a marshal of a district, and the Senate of the United States, acting with the House of Representatives, can turn that man out of office without the consent and against the wish of the President of the United States. So I might go on. There are some things which can be done without the House of Representatives and against the wish of the House; there are some things which can be done without the Executive and against the wish of the Executive; there are some things which can be done by the Senate in conjunction with the one over the objection of the other, and vice versa; but there is no single thing which either the House of Representatives can do or the Executive can do without the consent of the Senate. The Senate is the great conservative, central feature of the Government, and the reason of it is this: That the States, each possessing supreme power in itself, were, when the Federal Government was formed, not willing to make the Federal Government unless in the making of it the States should not only have reserved to them the right of controlling their individual and local matters, but also unless the States should have the most prominent and active and controlling part in every function of the Government through their equal and direct representation in the Senate.

391: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 391 (Senate1911.Jun12.391)

Thus it appears, Mr. President, that in this vast machinery of government, while some things can be done without the House, while some things can be done without the President, there is no single function of government of a constructive or of a destructive character, but that at some vital point in the progress of these great and vital governmental measures the Senate must give its assent, and without its assent none of these things can be done. I repeat that that was the great feature in the Constitution adopted not for the purpose simply of forming a well-adjusted Government, but for the purpose of retaining to the States, through their equal representation in the Senate, their power in the control of every active, affirmative function of the Government. The creation and peculiar constitution of the Senate was the great covenant entered into between the States when they framed and adopted the Constitution, and when these great and varied powers were conferred upon those who should represent them in the Senate. What a mockery, what an absolute mockery, to talk about the retention of such power; what an absolute mockery to say that no great function of the Government can be performed unless the States shall consent to it through their Senators, and then pass a law which will say that the States must be overseen in the selection of their Senators; that the States must be controlled; that the States must be supervised and directed when they are to select the men who are to perform this high and mighty function.

392: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 392 (Senate1911.Jun12.392)

Mr. President, my solemn judgment, with the limited opportunity I have had to peruse the political acts of this Government and to look over its legislation, is that there has never been a proposition which strikes so fundamentally at the basic principles upon which the . States have entered into ~he Government as that which seeks to assert the proposition that the General Government shall control the manner in which Senators shall be elected. And, sir, of all bodies in the world that we should be the ones to stand for that proposition! The House of Representatives recognize this. They have in the resolution which they .have passed : and ,. sent to us grandly stood for the maintenance of the pow.ers of the : States.

393: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 393 (Senate1911.Jun12.393)

The · House of Representatives sent ns a joint resolution, ;which was a recognition . of this right of the states. The.y - sent us a joint resolution in which they .say they :recognize that the General Government . or the people o.f the , other States should not :interfer.e fa the local election . of Senators; yet , it -i.s proposed · that we, the special guardians of these mighty functions, we whose duty it 'is to . uphold this mgis of power, we who .should magnify our office-that we shall he the .ones, over the objec­ . tion of the House of Representatives, ta strike . down this pow.er of the States and put it in the power of the General Government, or of a dominant party Jn the Government-to practi.cally . dictate, when political or other influences -shall demand it, · who shall ' be declar.ed to · b.e the representative of a State in the Senate. Why, Mr: .Pr . President, l say, of all men, wh.y should we b . e the ones to sanction or p _ permit such a thing? It ;would he bad enough for the House of "'Representatives ±o send us a joint resolution such as that now _prop . osed by the .. .substitute of . the · senator from Kansas [Mr. Bristow], which is-the .same amendment as that offered previously by the Senator from 1Ita1l [Mr. SUTHERLAND]; it would be bad enoughJf they had s.ent such a · resolution to us, and if they had done . so we~y right should have refused to concur in it; we should..hav . e..rePlied, " In · the .name .of our States, in the name at the great.foundation . principles of . our Government, in the name of i.J.lDse . sovereignties w.ho . sur- · rendered in })art their sovereignty upon the assurance that their right ±o .- control their _ elections should not .be .destroyed, we reject the proposition." "Unless the Senate - does consent, :the _ practical exercise of the right to control the election of Senators can not ' be taken from the States.

394: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 394 (Senate1911.Jun12.394)

· :riir. President, .I do not know how it may oe as to others, . but 1f "'I should vote for the proposed substitute of the · senator "from Kansas, with this right thus .to invade the . States and control the local .election of Senators, ..a.nil the time should come during the remainder of.my life-and wllo can te11 when .it:Sb.3.11. . .comewhen supervisors .and registrars n.ndju · judges of . election and ~ marshals and soldiers ut the polls JilionTil, after a heated contested election, come herewith theirpa.r.tisan evidence, . andaman Whom the people uf ~y State : had Jegitimately-e1e:cted-sho _ should, nnuerthe operation o1 'this law;be turned out of the Senate and a man not · the representative of my JlCOJ}le .should be ' brought her.e . and . put in _ his place, Sir, I would call on the : rocks a.n:d the mountains o :tan on me and ' hide meftom tile indignation af111y people.

395: Senate, June 12, 1911, ¶ 395 (Senate1911.Jun12.395)

It is bad enough when we permit others to .rob llB ... or our rights; lt is bad . enough w.hen we permit . others to take frr- '1 u s that · which belongs to us; it .Tu ba.d ~ enough when we le t tlJ. ose who dolt only · by the strong1lanfi ' tear from our brows th.e authority and the . dignity -which belong to us; but '1t is an nn­ -speakable thing that we Should do : it .ourselves. " Why, Mr. President, I am reminded of the fabled eagle, who, when stricken and · dying on 'the plain, found in that dying _ g moment · its chief agony · when ' it · saw "that "the shaft which had _ pierced ' its "Vitals 'had - been -guided QY a · feather which _ had -fallen from its own wing. When this .amendment ' has been adopted by :the · states in -the 'form in which 1.t is now proposed · to · impose "it 1lpuil us, it -will be an 'irrevocable act. iin my opinion, the great dignity mid · security and stability of office in i:!Ie Senate - will be gone; in my op'inion, · the great · function - of the States that through their representatives in this body should exercise a eonl trolling • power · that tlle people ' themselves . ao not · exercise, . and · that they · Should · exercise a power that · -all · the other influences 'PUt together r ill the • Government do not _ equal-=-when, i\fr. 'Presi - - dent, • we -strike-that down, in · niy opinion we · have done ' that · which will unsettle the foundations and · destroy ' the · stability • <>'f rfliis • Government.

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