June 12, 1911

The VICE PRESIDENT. Morning business is closed. The Chair Ian before the Senate House joint resolution No. 39. under the unanimous-consent agreement heretofore entered into. The Senate, as in Committee of the Whole, resumed the consideration of the joint resolution (H. J. Res. 30) proposing an amendment to the Constitution providing that Senators shall be elected by the people of the several States.

The VICE PRESIDENT. The pending question is on the substitute to the joint resolution offered by the Senator from Kansas [Mr. Bristow

Mr. :McCUMBER. Mr. President, I probably should not have risen to the discussion of this subject unless I felt that I could present to the Senate some observations that have not yet been made upon the subject. So far this matter has been discussed in relation only to two propositions-the first as to the virtue of the present provision in the Constitution and the second as to the evils that have flowed from that provision. I wish to give the Senate a statement of some of the benefits and some of the e-vils that will flow from the provision as it is proposed to be amended.

We ha"Ve had, Mr. President, primary election laws in some of our States a sufficient length of time for us to forecast, at least, the conditions that will arise under the new pronsi o n. The primary election for the nomination of Senators by popular vote will, in all r ~·'e;:'. ts, be practically the same as the election of a Senator by popular vote, and the investigation of the conditions that have entered into and surrounded the election of United States Senators in the several States under primary-election laws will, I think, be instructive in guiding our judgment in considering the proposed change to the ConstiMr. President, I intend to vote for the joint resolution which will provide for the election of United States Senators by popular vote. I desire, ho-wev-er, to discuss not only the good but some of the evils of the new proposition, and I wish to condense • what I have to say into as few words and sentences as possible. l\Ir. President, this proposed amendment to the Constitution, it adopted, will measure a great advance in the drift of our form of government from the representative established by our fathers to the democratic idea of to-day. It presupposes either a changed condition of our people requiring a modification of that document, or an error which has always been in it. The framers of the Constitution, learned in history and profound in their knowledge of human weakness, were all in accord in seeking to establish that form of government which should give to each individual of the mass complete and as direct a participation in nil the affairs of . government as should be consistent with national safety and stabillty.

They aimed to create a government by the people which should at all times assure the liberties of its citizens and pro- that tect them in the enjoyments of the fruits of their industry. Before them as they labored were the models of all old repub- the lies, . and in their hands were the histories which recorded their ruin. They recognized the fundamental truth that the liberty of the governed must ever rest upon the stability of the government; that instability and fluctuating national policies were the foes of prosperity and progress. They were fearful alike they of the rigid and selfish autocracy of an absolute monarchy on the one side, and the erratic excesses of an absolute democracy on the other. They adopted, therefore, as the foundation of their structure the republican or representative idea of government, which should embody the strength and durability of the one and avoid the dangers and excesses of the other.

The fundamental idea of course was a government by the ing people, the source of all governing power and authority, but through the instrumentality of elected representatives, of men a .JVho would be chosen because of their superior knowledge of with governmental affairs and requirements, and yet whose tenure ways of office would at all times compel them to recognize public demands and sentiment. They believed that every law enacted should be the result of careful deliberation in a forum in -where its every phase might be subjected to the test of that critical analysis which it would ordinarily receive in legislative debate, by those whose general information, supplemented the by special investigation and study, should fit them for its discussion.

In the practical application of this most liberal idea of government the framers of the Constitution foresaw some dan- duty ger-the danger that grows out of o"P"erhasty public opinion, to too often the result of passion or prejudice flowing from mis- of information or distorted truth.

To guard aganst this weakness in their structure of govern- but, ment these patriotic men, whose love of country had been inteusified by the long death struggle to bring that country into existence and actuated only by the desire to create a nation been which should be safe against internal passions and dissensions, less and strong in the counsels of the world, carefully and deliberately planned for one House of Congress whose larger membership and shorter term should cause it to quickly and naturally respond to each varying wave of public sentiment, and another coordinate hou e of legislation composed of Members who . e term of office should be of sufficient length to allow the public I the to return to sober and though~! deliberation after any turbu- ject lent or unjustified wave of public sentiment. While the fundamental idea w a s that the lower branch of Congress should at all times be directly responsive to public sentiment, whether well a or ill advised, the equally important idea was that the Senate the should be a check against any hasty legislation that might grow ing out of the direct responsibility of the House. And so not only the was the term of office of Senators made much longer than that of the Members of the House, but it was provided that they of should be elected by a body of men, comparatively few in number, selected by the people, and acting after due deliberation in I the legislative halls of the State.

This reason was accurately and tersely stated by Hamilton when speaking through the Federalist for the election of Senators by State legislatures: •

That through the medium of the State legislatures, which are select bodies of men, and which are to appoint the Members of the National but Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be com- b t posed with p e culiar cam and judgment; that these circumstances prom- e i se greater knowledge and more extensive information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by the spirit of faction and more out of the reach of those occasional! ill-humors or tern- . contamin porary prejudices a te the public and propensities, councils, beget which injustice in smaller and societies oppression frequently of a part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress, may dissatisfaction, and disgust.

Further than this, Mr. President, for the very object of effecting a continuity of this body and its purposes it was so arranged that the term of one-third of the membership only should expire with each expiring Congress, , thus further removing that body from the dangers of fluctuating public opinion and assuring to a greater degree stability of public or national policies.

For 122 years this form of government has withstood all the strains and shocks incident to the life of any young republic, be biking an advanced position in the march of human civilization.

Mr. President, this proposed change in the fundamental idea of the Senate of the United States, as concei...-ed by ~ the fathers, . is based, not upon any assumed error on the part of the framers of the Constitution, but rather upon the assumption, first, that we have so far progressed in general knowledge and conservative public opinion as to no longer require those safeguards which were erected as barriers against hasty judgment, and the personnel of the Senate should now be made to respond more readily to the sentiment of the hour by making position itself subservient to and dependent upon that sentiment; and, second, that the representatives selected by the people can not be trusted to faithfully represent them-two wholly irreconcilable reasons. For if the people are unable to judge correctly the character of their neighbors with whom have a close acquaintanceship, how can they judge correctly as to the character of those with who . m they can have little if any personal knowledge.

In arriving at a conclusion as to whether the constitutional change should be made in the manner of electing United Sta.tei;; Senators, we, as members of this body, are scarcely in the position to treat the subject wholly, from what we may by trainor investigation, conceive to be the logical side. As representatives of the people of our respective States we experience natural delicacy in voicing a conviction that may not accord the judgment of a majority of our constituents. It is almore comfortable to have our opinions harmonize with those of the greater number. And the desire that our acts shall meet with public approval undoubtedly will have weight deciding our votes. But, independent of this, we can not divest ourselves of the knowledge and conviction that this a government by the people; that all lawful authority comes from governed and not from the Government; and that when any question reaches a stage wherein, after as much deliberation as it is liable to receive from the public, the people by a strong preponderance of opinion desire the change, it then becomes the of Congress, the Senate as well as the House, to conform public demand. It is the right and duty of a representative the people to inform, and as much as he can, to lead those whom he represents to his views on a question of this character, failing to accomplish this, his ultimate duty is to carry their views into effect.

This question, l\Ir. President, is not one of this hour. It has agitated, as suggested by the Senator from Idaho, more or for about 80 years, and I believe it has become a settled public conviction that the change should be made; and it is rather upon that than upon the belief that the good in the measure will outweigh the bad, that I shall, ir allowed the opportunity, cast my vote for an amendment providing for the election of United States Senators by popular vote. The public, source of all governmental power, have considered the subfor years. The public, after su c h consideration, have demanded the change.

I will admit that the conclusion of the public has been upon presentation of only one side of the question; that neither reasons governing the framers of the Constitution in adoptthe present method of electing United States Sena.tors, nor evils which wm enter into the new system have been I presented as thoroughly as those which suggest the necessity I a change . The exhaustive and scholarly address of the late ' Senator Hoar has been perused by comparatively few, but am convinced that the matter will not be presented in the future to the public in such manner that they can or will carefully weigh every ele . element that supports either one or the other theory. ·

With this view, Mr. President, I might rest from further reasons why my vote should be in favor of the amendment, the importance of this matter demands that it should t d - d ·1 t I b l" th · d ty h" h rea e more lil e al · e Ieve ere IS no U W lC a representative owes to his constituents greater than that of candor; that he who is so fervent in his desire to secure the enactment of any measure that he either blinds himself or attempts · to blm· d the eyes of his constituents to its weaknesses, contemplates only the good, never the abuses which develop under it, is not a fair and · just representative of the people.

I want to be perfectly fair in the consideration of this matter. I do not want to see the people of my State or the public generally deluded with the idea that this contemplated change will be a panacea for all the evils that have shocked them in the matter of electfon of United Sta tes Senators through the medium of legislative assembles.

Mr. President, one can not fail to note that in the considera- l tion of nearly every important measUl'e involving a policy to pursued many Senators assume the attitude of the barrister rather than the jurist, carefully presenting only tbe favorable points of his own case, never alluding to i ~s weaknesses. and per - sistently ignoring the good in the cause for which others may stand. I purpose to deviate from this usual manner of presentation. We can better weigh the merits of any measure that changes existing conditions by comparing the good in the present law with the good in the contempalted one; or, better still, by weighing the known evils of the present law with the reasonably anticipated evils which will result from the new.

What are some of the present evils that will be eliminated by this change? The most important, in my mind, will be the relief afforded the State legislators themselves. The principal function of these bodies is to enact legislation for their respective States. But so important has the office of United States Sena tor become in the estimation of the public that one-third of the legislatures of the States every two years make their election the dominant issue, to the detriment of all State legislation. And it is an undeniable fact that the legislators are nominated and elected more with the view of their standing on this question than upon their efficiency as State legislators. This bad feature of the present system would be eliminated by the direct election of United States Senators by the people themselves. And if it were eliminated legislators would be chosen rather because of their fitness for their general legislative duties than because of their fidelity to any senatorial candidate.

In line with this are also the deadlocks that have occurred with increased regularity in our legislatures on account of senatorial elections-deadlocks absorbing all of the time of individual members and rendering abortive whole legislative sessions.

These conditions, :Mr. President, have become so prevalent of l ate years that the public have turned to the election of Senators by popular vote as the only escape, and in that they are unquestionably right.

Another and more important cause which has led to this demand for a change in the manner of election of United States Senators is the bribery and corruption that have been practiced by partisans of candidates, and which sometimes have been i11- dulged in by the candidates themselves, to secure the support of individual legislators; such bribery and corruption as is claimed to have disgraced the legislature of a great State but a couple of years ago. This, perhaps, more than any other, has been the controlling factor in creating a demand for popular election of Senators. If the legislator has no vote in the selec tion of t.he Senator he will not be bribed. So reasons the public.

· Every one of these rea ons, l\Ir. President, is a valid argument against the present system of electing Senators and is worthy of the greatest consideration in arriving at a conclusion; and if our investigation rested at this point, if looking only at that whch we may escape, we close our eyes to that which we will encounter, our duty would be plain and imperative.

But, Mr. President, he who consoles himself with the idea that when we have secured this amendment to our Constitution our course will be free from further evils of like nature, will not have long to enjoy the rapture of his repose. He will a wake to the fact that in escaping the evils of legislative corruption he has entered into a field of equally insidious danger and broader opportunities for the corruptionist. That which has sometimes been brought into use to convert the individual legislator, under the present system, will be used to convert the public, under t11e new system, not so much by direct dealing with the public as by controlling the source of public political instruction and thereby molding public sentiment.

Coincident, if not preceding this change of election of United States Senators, will be the nomination of Senators by popular vote. This means in most instances a double campaign, first fought to a finish between the candidates of a particular part and then between the successful condidates of opposing political parties. These double campaigns are so expensive to candidates that only those who have some means dare to enter the contest. Many a good man without considerable worldly possessions, who would be willing to sumbit his candidacy to a body of 100 to 200 men, many of whom might have personal knowledge of his character and worth, would not and could not enter into a contest, State wide, where but a very small percentage of the people might have any personal acquaintance with him.

Cheerfully concurring in the conclusions as to all of - the evils that may be avoided by both the nomination and the election of United States Senators by popular vote, no man can deny that the new system opens up a wonderful field of opportunity for both the millionaire and the demagogue-a field broader than any one known in our political history. _

Let us turn for a moment from the ethical to the practical side of the question. Let us look at things as they are rather than as we would wish them to be. Let us remember that the root of the evil is not in the fact that Senators are elected by the legislatures, but in human weakness and human dishonesty, and that so long as these remain a component factor in human character, just so long will corrupt influences be exerted and wrong verdicts be rendered, whether it be by the people or their representatives; whether it be through misinformation or through ignorance; whether it be through lack of interest or under the passion of the moment.

The only remedy lies in a quickened public conscience in inculcating a higher standard of political integrity.

I know, Mr. President, that if one is to accept the prevalent idea, the majority of members of legislatures and Congress leave their sense of integrity behind them the moment they are elected. We know that this is not true in any sense. We know that the average legislature represents as high a moral standard as the average public from which such legislature is chosen. We know that the members of these legislatures have equal integrity, and, as a rule, a greater knowledge of public affairs than the average citizen. The very fact of their selection is evidence of that truth. Leave men to their own judgment and conviction and they will select as their representatives those whom they regard as having a broader knowledge of industrial or political conditions than they themselves have.

'I'he late revelations concerning elections in a great county in the State of Ohio . show that the public is not wholly exempt from those weaknesses which we unhappily sometimes find in our legislatures.

This Senate is not without its lessons on that truth. Committees have reported in favor of the expulsion of men from this body because of the expenditure by them of such great sums of money in their election that the presumption of fraud and undue influence followed as a natural conclusion. And we have then seen the same men with this stigma upon their honor go before their people again and probably with the expenditure of a quarter as much money be reelected by great majorities.

Now, Mr. President, wherein does this proposed new system gi-ve greater opportunities for the corruptionist? First, in the ul>ility of a candidate possessing means, or, having the support of we alt h to secure laborers in his political vineyard, advocates for his cause, both on the platform and in the closer communication with the public; second, in the ability to own or subsidize a goodly portion of the press.

Everyone recognizes the importance of a close precinct organiz at ion in every campaign. Few men have the means to secure the number of colaborers necessary to organize a State. And it is the number of men who makes the interests of a particular candidate their business that counts for success in any closely contested campaign.

Nor can we blind ourselves to the fact that with the primaryelection system has grown the practice on the part of candidates of establishing and purchasing papers by wholesale and retail, with no loftier motive in view than that of destroying their opponents by political libel and falsehoods. Dailies and weeklies are established for no other purpose than that of meeting political exit;encies. Those papers often carry on a libelous campaign for years, and editorial writers are employed more because of their Hbiii ty in clonking truth, diffusing error, and creating founded prejudice than upon their knowledge of public questions. Here again the man of means, or if he have no great means, through the cooperation of otller interests which seek his election, who would corrupt legislators, has a far wider field for the exercise of his or its pernicious inclinations.

I know it is said that this can be met by a strict corruptpractice act. l\Ir. President, it can not be met by any such act. An act of this kind could be avoided in so many ways that one can not stop to enumerate them . No law could prohibit the friend of a candidate upon his own responsibility from expending as much as he saw fit. No law could prevent any candidate or his friends from starting a daily or weekly paper or of purchasing any number of them to boom his candidacy. No law could prevent one man from lending money to another or could compel the debtor to repay when the creditor is not pressing. Your corrupt-practice act will net the honest and conscientious man, but the rogue will work himself through its meshes. But you say this applies to the election of others than United States Senators-to governors and Congressmen. Yes; but usually in a much less degree.

The position of United States Senator seems to overshadow that of governor or Congressman, and hence the journalistic artillery will generally be . directed against the candidate for that position. The size of congressional districts generally allows opportunities for a candidate for Congress to meet his constituents and pe'rsonally refute these errors. The areas of most States make this means of defense practically impossible for most men.

There is also another dangerous portion of the press, and which must be reckoned with. It is that portion which, having a view of its own upon economic questions, seeks to destroy, by u'.nfair publications, any public official who does not conform to Thate its "Views. This is one of the greatest dangers to our people to- fitness day, dem()ralizing alike to the corruptly inclined and misleading legislature to those who are ignorant of th~ real questionS' involved. A involving, falsehood in print looks exactly like th~ truth to the man who mary does not know it is a falsehood, and hence the temptation to use upon this weapon of political warfare in a campaign before the public, In a weapon which is abandoned as practically useless in a cam- very paign before, if not the better informed, at !east the more easily fare informed, members of the legisiature5.

The overshadowing importance in the mind of legislators of With the senatorial question, the frequency of deadlocks in the elec- demned tion of Senators, and the bribery of individual members of legis- think latures to secure the election of Senators, are perhaps about all the public have considered in arriving at their conclusion, that integrity by their direct vote they should select the Members of the · upper President,. House of Congress. Have they considered any ot these other realize questions which should challenge thought and deliberation be- laxity fore making a change? Are not these grave dangers in the sys- by its tem which we are contemplating, and · are they not equally fair obnoxious? A timely consideration of some of these dangers continue. may assist in avoiding them to some extent when we shall ha ye expect adopted the new system.

You say that legislators' votes have been purchased and other and corrupt influences used to elect United States Senators. This is practices lamentably true. In. cases where the contest is close between been two candidates the outright purchase of two or three votes may decide the cause in favor of the corruptor. But will you escape deprived this danger by the election of Senators by popular vote? If a duced candidate will debauch members of the legislature in order to injustice secure a seat in the S'enate of the United States, may he not anrl which will he not, if it is in his power, debauch a sufficient number of fail the public in a close contest to gain his point? Does not the conduct, average legislature measure in integrity with the average hon- fair esty of the public?-

I am. well awa,re that tfie whole teaching of the press to-day Mr. would indicate that men, who have borne an unsullied reputa- could tion for sincerity and character in the community from which the they have been elected, may be assumed to have lost that chfil'- the acter the moment that they become members of the State legis- own cult. lature or- of any other political body. You know I know and every thinking man knows, that this is a libel upon the iegis-1 ch~mge, lative bodies and the Congress- of the United States. Every and legislative- assembly represents the average integrity of the State Mr. and more than the average knowledge of men and measures.

But you say the units making up the public are so numerous errunent that it would be impossible to corrupt a sufficient number to ably change an election. That would depend entirely upon how close was the contest. It is impossible to corrupt any material method, percentage of the public. It is equally impossible to corrupt upon any large or- material percentage of the legislature: It is in on the closely contested cases where the corruptionist can work to the to actrn.ntage.

But there is another means used by corrupt men to secure s.eeking o:fficial recognition that is equally obnoxious to honest thinking lie, men, and that i.s the element of deception. I know the corrupter, error, the candidate without character, has a greater opportunity ress before the public generally than he would have before any agency. legislative assembly in practicing any character of deception. The Why? First, because his opponent can meet and show the popular deception to one or two hundred men where he would not be dominant able to meet and confute the falsehood before one or two or five Those million men; second, because of the greater knowledge of the sult members ot the legislature, of both public men and measures, this they are less easily imposed upon.

Ur. President, more erroneouS' and wrongful public verdicts The have been rendered-a thousand ti.mes mare-through the party. medium of political deception than were ever secured through but the purchase of votes.

False verdicts ot a legislature may be set aside by this body. seeks But where is the remedy against the widespread deception or error battles, produced through the instrumentality of yellow and unprincipled of the journalism. I know your answer that truth will prevail in the by end. Yes, Mr. President 1 but many an honest man may go ceed, down to political death in his battle to establish that truth.

We have ()f late years adopted a primary system in many of their the StateS', and it is an undeniable fact that men a:re nominated, There not so much so through the commendation of the press as the through the prejudice that is created against their adversaries will through the condemnation of a purchased press, men who have not never been able and probably never could have been able to stituents. secure nomination by any convention.

Under a system of popular election of Senators the candidate llcan who has the means, either himself or at his disposal, has a of the mighty advantage over his adversary who has none. And, as lority suggested, there are many men of superior intell.ect and whcr c01I!d and would submit their candidacy to a State who would not dare to enter into a. political contest ns it does, the enormous expenses incident ta a pti ­ campaign, a:nd inviting, as it does, pernicious assault his character as a citizen o:r. public servant a close contest the percentage which will decide may oe small, and that which becomes the element of bribery bea. legislature becomes equally potent in deciding the fate of candidates before the public.

commendable zeal the press of the country has conbribery or corruption in any form in official life. r its zeal in that direction has of fate years led it into accusations ot official dereliction where the most conscientious has governed the official action. And I wish, Mr.

that the press and the journals of the country could to what extent they are themselves responsible for · of political morals. As long as any portion of the press own precept teaches the pernicious doctrine that a.11 is in politics, so long will unfairness and political corruption The press, the instrrrctor of the public, can hardly a higher standard of political virtue on the part ot the tutored than is manifested by the tutor. Whenever an honest capable man is deprived of his merited success by corrupt acting upon legislators, the public as well as he has grievously wronged, and the a.ct merits the strongest condemna.tion. So, too, whenever a:n honest and capable man is of an election by reason of unfounded prejudice proby unjust criticism or distorted truth by the press, an to- both the man and ta the public has been done, .

also merits equal condemnation. But the press seems to to see the wrong committed by itself, and! that by its own creating in the minds of the people an idea that all Is in politics, it thereby encourages and condones COITUQt practices to- gain political success.

President, no greater or more patriotic reform crusade be carried on by the conservative and reliable portion of press of tlie country to-day than an unremitting war upon yellow, sensational, and worse than unreliable portion of its I wish to call attention to another weakness in this propo-sed and that is its tendency to destroy party affiliations party organization. . .

President, I have seen nothing m the government ef any. country in the world that is so beneficial in its result as govby party. An absolute monarchy may govern reason­ ~v~~ if it is so inclined. But wherever the duty and responsibility of government rest upon its people they need some some organization, , wh~? men, agreeing gene.rally great public questions or policies, but mth divergent kl.ea~ details, may, b~· snbrogatin_g some. of the individual ideas general policy, crystallize their principles mto appro.­ priate legislation. Two nearly evenly balanced parties, each to insta? itself in the confidence an~ esteem of the puhea.ch. watching the other fo:r the first sign of weakness o will do more for"' a country and the real ca.use of pi;og and prosperity 0.1.. the people than any other poss1blenomination and election of United States Senators by vote will do more than anything else to destroy the · party and finally result in party elimination enfuely.

who believe that the breaking up of party lines will rein benefit to the country may take great courage under proposed amendment and under our present primary sysstem with its double elections.

tendency is always toward factionalism in the dominant

It may be said to be equally so In tl.te minority party, the latter, through stress of necessity, is forced to greater unity of action. The two factions of the dominant party each to nominate its candidate, and SE» bitter are the factional so intense is the hostility of the- partisan following one against his a.d ' adversary, so blackened in that contest press and speaker is the character of the one who may sucthat the adherents of the defeated will in the final election tum rather to his political opponent than to the victor of own party.

is little comfort in this for the minority party, because moment it becomes the majority party the same conditionsfollow. The result of this is that the Senator elected may represent the political views of tile- majority of his con· We have an illustration of this in the election of a. Repubgovern-or in the State of Tennessee. The present governor · State, in my belief, Is not the actual choice of the ma.­ of the voters at that State. ms election was not the result so much of political friendship for him as of a factional enmity toward his adversary. And so intense was that enmity, and so irresistible its result, that even the name and fame of the honorable Senator from Tennessee, who put the weight of his own personality into the contest, failed to save the prestige of his party.

Under this system Republican States elect Democratic governors and Democratic States Republican governors. Under this system States nearly two to one Republican and believers in Republican policies have representatives in the Senate of the United States who do not believe in Republican policies. The election of United States Senators by popular vote means the substitution of pluralities for party majorities.

Mr. President. the mere changing of the method of election of United States Senators will not materially affect our immediate future. The representation of each State of the Union in the upper House of Congress will remain the same. The longer terms of the Senators and the continuity of the Senate will make this the deliberative Chamber and insure a reasonable check against hasty and ill-considered legislation.

It is not the mere fact of changing the Constitution, as provided in this resolution, that constitutes the real danger, but rather the doctrine upon which it is advocated, that the people need no constitutional restraints upon their momentary impulses.

Mr. President, we are growing restive under any constitutional restraint. We are teaching that legislatures are usurpers of functions that rightly belong only to the people, and so we are demanding initiatirn and referendum and recall, and so forth. We are teaching that our chosen legislators, men who are selected by their neighbo1·s because of their standing and ability, can not be trusted, and so we are demanding the election of United States Senators by popular vote. We are teaching lack of confidence in law or Constitution or courts or anything but the ill considered and sometimes the ill-advised judgment of the public. We are teaching the fallacious doctrine th at majorities can not be wrong. We are undermining in every way the representative and substituting the democratic forru of government.

I still believe that a representative form of government i s the only safe and enduring form for a free people. I believe that the only way to secure consistent and valuable legislation is through the instrumentality of a legislature and a Congress in an arena where free and immediate argument and counter argument can take place. I believe that the legislatures of the the several States selected by the people because of their confidence in their fitness are better qualified to frame laws than it is possible for the general public to do, and that they will make fewer mistakes or errors. But the demagogue and demagogic press never fail to charge that anyone, who in the arena of public di cussion. ventures the suggestion that these matters should be left as they are, is against the people; that he does not trust the people if he favors constitutions and the instru- " mentalities which the fathers thought necessary for national safety.

To what absurdities do these teachings ultimately lead us? If the legislative functions should be recalled from legislature~ and vested again in the people, why not also judicial functions? Why should not judgments be set aside or appeals allowed or disallowed by popular vote? Why should not the power be exer· cised to recall the judge whenever his opinion upon any question does not meet with the approval of the majority? Why should not lynch law take the place of judicial · trial and execution? Why should anything ever stand in the way of the immediate application and enforcement of popular will?

!\Ir. President, every legislature in the United States is composed of two houses. Why? Because the second house insures greater consideration and operates as a check against hasty and ill-considered legislation. Why are appeals allowed in our courts? They are allowed to check hasty and ill-considered judgments. We acknowledge the necessity of checks against the hasty action of learned statesmen and jurists, and yet we are charged with being against the public if we insist that the people themselves, like the legislatures and the courts, need constitutional checks against hasty action.

Mr. President, humanity will have reached the millennium when it no longer needs restraints against its own passions, its prejudices and emotions. Under our representative form of government whatever the people, after deliberation, decide that they want, they always have got and always will get, and it needs no change of Constitution to secure that end.

Let the cry of fire be heard in any great assemblage of men and women, housed in theater or hall, and that body of people, generally calm and deliberative, may become instantly stampeded. Reason for a moment will forsake her mental throne, and those old impulses,, engendered in the prehistoric struggles for existence and borne down to us from their ancient source on the waveless river of heredity, will assume a mad and momentary control of our actions, and brute force will take the place of human reason.

In every possible way we guard against these dangers, and it never occurs to us that in doing so we are evidencing our lack of faith in humanity. We 1.11ow that a whole army may sometime be stampeded, and the general who does not recognize that truth and take every precaution to check it is not a safe commander.

.Mr. President, in the political world the public may for a moment become stampeded, and the form of government which does not have its checks and barriers against these periodical occurrences is not a perfect government.

Our fathers sought to establish this necessary check by providing for one body, the indirect method of whose election should remove it from the immediate and direct influence of the passions or the prejudices of the moment. This amendment, while it does not, in my judgment, wholly destroy, certainly weakens this salutary check . .

Suppose both Houses of Congress had been in session during the early summer of 1896, and the Senators, like the Members of the House, had been elected for a term of two years only, and their election in the fall of that year depended upon a vote upon the great silver issue. Does anyone seriously doubt that we should have had free-silver legislation? Does anyone doubt that the first impulse of the public was overwhelmingly in favor of the free-silyer doctrine? Will not the yast majority of thinking men now agree that such legislation would have been disastrous? Mr. President, I have in this brief statement presented both the benefit and the evil that will flow directly from the proposed amendment, as well as what I think is the dangerous tendency of the times.

If I am asked why I vote for this amendment, notwithstanding the dangers which I have pointed out, I answer: First, because I believe that the vast majority of the people of the country, not under the impulse of the moment, but after the matter has been discussed for years, want the change, and under both the letter and spirit of our Constitution the right to finally chose the form of our Constitution, as well as our laws, rests in the people. In presenting its dangers alongside of its benefits I have performed my duty; second, I am not placing the amendment in the Constitution, but I am saying that it shall be submitted to the legislatures of the States, there to be considered, I hope, earnestly and dispassionately. I hope that the whole question may be so thoroughly discussed in those legislatures that it shall be brought home to every citizen of the respective States. Utterances by individual Senators in opposition to this innovation upon our Constitution are, under present conditions, discredited because of assumed interest. I wish to see the matter patriotically discussed by those legislative bodies. I do not believe the result would be very different, because I fear it is difficult to get an unbiased decision at the present time. All national questions seem to take on a partisan or factional aspect. Mr. President, I can not but believe that if the great address of the venerable Senator from Massachusetts, Senator Hoar, whose counsels still enlightened the Senate Chamber when I first entered it, could be read by all the people of this great country as carefully as they peruse their magazines and papers there would be any great agitation to remove our old constitutional safeguard against irrational judgment.

But the only public demand has been that the Senators shall be elected by popular vote. The public has neither considered nor demanded that there should be hitched to an amendment for the election of United States Senators by popular vote another amendment to the · Constitution depriving the Nation of all control over the time, place, and manner of electing Government officials. The former relates only to the method of performing a public function by the people; the latter reaches and threatens the very sovereignty of the Nation itself. No element and no function of national sovereignty ought ever to be left to the caprice or the mercy of any State. National safety demands supreme authority over the election of officials of government, without which it could not exist. Under ordinary and normal conditions no danger might follow the surrender of this authority to the States. But, Mr. President, the strength of a ship is not tried in the calm, but in the storm. A nation must have the power to cope with and meet extraordinary and abnormal conditions.

I believe that national patriotism of the people of the United States to-day is far stronger than State patriotism or State pride. And I am not aware either that the public has asked or any State legislature has petitioned that the General Government surrender any portion of its sovereign power. If I understand publi c sentiment aright, it is tending toward increased rather than decreased national power and control in eyery line of public activity. Not smalle1· but greater nationality is requh·ed by the complex industrial and uncertain sorin.1 c provisions of the present age.

Mr . President, this joint re~olution .Provides:

The Senate of the United States shall b~ comp.osed of two Senators from each State, elect e d by the people thereof for six years, an.a. each Senator shnll have one vote.

I shall Yote for that provision, for the reasons I have stated. The Constituti-0n provides:

The times , places. and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the le g islature th ereof ; but the Congress may at any time by law make .or alter such re gu lation s except as to the places of choosing 'Senators.

This resolution proposes to strike out the last clause of this pro-rislon under which Congress has .authority over such elections, and seeks to deprive the National Government of any control over such elections. I shall not · vote for that provisi on, but will support the substitute, whi.ch eliminates it from the resolution. If it shall rem::Lin in th.e resolution, I shall certainly <:ast my ·rnte against both propositions rather than take away any authority which the National Government n-0w possesses ornr the election of those who are to constitute either branch of Conercss.

l\Ir. REYBURN. I should like to ask the Senator from ".\orth Dakota a question before he takes his s.eat. Should section 4., Article I, be repealed, we eould not pass the publicity bill, could we?

lli. McCU:MBER I think the Sena.tor is correct, but it is u question which I would not want to answer oftnancl.

.Mr. HEYBURN. I think the Senator would have no difficulty in answering it.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Alabama obtained the :floor.

~Ir. BACON. Mr~ President--

'l'he PRESIDING OFFICER {Mr. MARTINE of New J~rsey in the .chair). Does the Senator from .Alabama. yie.1<.1 to the S.en.ator from Georgia '.l ·

Mr. JOHNSTON of Alabama. I yield.

Mr. BACON. l desire to offe.r an amendment to the sub- in · the joint resolution: stitute offered by the Senator from Kansas, which I .n.sk may be read, that it may be immediately printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The .amendment to the substitute will be read.

The SECBE'fABY. It is proposed to amend the substitute proposed by .Mr. BRISTOW by adding, on page 2, after nne 2, the following:

The times, plnees, nnd manner of holding elections for Serui..tors that effect shall be as prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but thc Congress ma.y make or .alter such regulatjons in any State whenen .' r toe le~islature thereof shall Il€glect or refuse to mn.ke such regula.tions, or from :my circumstances be ineapa.ble of making the Ra.me.

Mr. BA.CON. I ask that the amendment may be immediately printed for the use of the Senate, in order that we may have it in print before the discussion closes.

I will simply state that the ianguage is copied -almost liter. lly from the resolution passed by the State of New York wte.n it Hdopted the Constitution.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there be no objection, the c cui'E.'e suggested by the Senator from Georgia will be pursued.

Mr. JOHNSTON of Alabama. Mr. President, I wish to st!i.te briefly my reasons for YOting ngainst the amendment of tl.le Senn.tor from Kansas [Mr. BRISTOW] an-d why, if that amendment is adopted, I shall vote against the resolution.

I hnve my~elf witnessed elections in my State where armed United Stutes troops were assembled at the polls and where rnited States supervisors and de];)uty marshals were potentia1 in the result. I never want to see either again. During the reconstruction period these officials were used for the most partisan purposes-to intiml{J.ate the voters and prevent the fall and free and fair expression of the will of the voters.

Such methods as that gaYe the party in power swarms of unscrupulons _partisans, paid by the Government, to carry out the m11 of the bosses; and they did not hesitate to abuse their power. These men were not chosen from the voters of the counties in w.hich they acted, but were imported . from other cities and counties and States. Pretending to re];)resent the aut hor ity of the United States, they really represented the orcleTs of the political bosses of the party in power.

If we .are to have Senators elected by the people, they should be the free and untrammeled choice of the people. The · members of the legislature, now the electors of Senators, are e1ected by the free choice of the voters, without any interference or assistance from any Federal officials.

I am unable to see why the people can not be trusted to elect Senators directly, if they can be trusted to elect representatives who can elect Senators.

If the _people are to be controlled by outsiders, or tamely submit to it, they are unworthy to elect Senators. If we are now to surrender our rigbt to choose Senators, free from Fed.- eral control, in order to obtain n. direct vote by the people, I shall prefer no change to be made. If we are to surrender rights we now enjoy to gain this, fue price is too gren.t. We will not, like the dog in the fable, _ giv-e up the substance we ha\"'"e in order to gain an elusive shadow.

So far as I know, e1ery State in the South now nominates Senators by primary el ections, and in none has the choice of the people been questioned or denied by the legislat ure.

Tuery State can do this without any amendment to the Con.- stitution, without surrendering a single right it has. If the present method of electing ~ators is satisfactory to the people of any State, why should other States compel them to change it? We wish to continue to decide for ourselrns who shall be the electo rs. The Con titution and amendments suffici~1tly guarc1 against unjust discrinllnatlon.

It is my intention to \ote fo r the reso1ution as it passed the House, but if it is changed as proposed by the Senator fr o m Kansas I shall vote against it; and I want to warn the r e al friends of the measure that to EO amend it encl:rngers its pao:i;,!lge her.e and in the House, and if it should suniYe the action of Congress it will encounter the m ost strenuous opposition to irs ratification by the States.

Senators who really w.a.nt the r esol ution ndopted, .a.nc1 the right given the people to elect Senators directly, will take a strange course 'by changing it so as to e!lco unter the mos t serious opposition in Congr ess and elsewhere, thus defeating or postponing this reform many years. They may l>e able to explain to their people their course, but it will re.quir e the multiplication of many words.

Mr. BORAH. Mr. President, I dislike to trespass further upon the time of the Senate in the discussion of this que tlon. I will be as brief as the subject will permit.

.Some objection has been made to the word " as " as it uppe J. 1•s The times. places, and manner of hold ing elections for Senators sh all be as presenlled in each State l>y the legislature thereof.

I shall ask, when we reach the JJOint wheTe I may c1o so, to eliminate the word "as" from the joint resolution. The objec - tion made is that the language ought to b.e Illil.ndatory, :rn-J I bav-e no objection. I do not think the fTiend.s of the joia t resolution ha·rn any objection to the language being change<l to In my judgment, hmve·rer, the practical effect would be rrc ­ cisely the same. I can not conceive of an nction to compel a State to perform a political function, :.md it would in practic 1 l effect nt last rest with ~e State as to what it sbonld <lo in prescribing the manner of holding fill election. But, noh.-ith­ •' I standing that, those who make the objection seem to think its I merit is greater than I, and I am J)erfectly willing at tlle p ·ope r I time to ask that the word be eliminated from th-e joint resoldioa. It has also been suggested that Article I, section 4, should have been rewritten; that, as the joint resolution is now pr e· sented, it leaves in a certain place in the Constiti::.tion a portion of Article I, section 4., and deals 1nth the same subject matte r in another portion of the Constitution, ruid th-at it would !l s.y e been better form and better style had we entirely rewritten Article I, section 4.

In answer to that I ha ye this to sug gest : We ha'\""e fo11owPC1 the same method that was ado];)ted in amending the Constitution both as to the fourteenth and as to the twelfth ume:idlne:it. Wh.en we came to amend .Article I, section 2, of the Constttf.!tio:i we dealt with the subject matter which wns treated by Articl I, section 2, in the fourteenth amendment, but did not rewrite Article I, section 2. We did not eYe::.1 refer to the change. We simply took up the subject matter which was c.overe.d by Article I, section 2, and covered it by the fourteenth amendment, len.v­ ing the old provisions of the Constitution to stand a.s they now stand in the Constitution with whateveT mod.iftcation.s are made by the fourteenth amendment.

This is equally true with reference to Article II, section 1, of the Constitution, which we amended by the twelfth amendment. We did not refer to Article II, section 1, but we simply dealt with the same subject matter and co-vered the same by the m-elfth amendment.

Therefore, whatever value there may be in the objection, 'the manner in which we are proceeding bas precedent in these two instances. "I need only say in passing, as everyone will readily recognize, that 1n construing the Constitution eyery part oi the Constitution is considered, and as was said the other duy by the Senator from New York [Mr. O'Go~N], the original provisions of the Constitution, together with ~e ru;nendment, would be taken and considered together. I cite briefly some authorities upon that point:

The whole instrument is to be examined with a view to ascertaining the meaning of each and every part. • • • Each provision. must. be construed so that It shall harmonize with all others without d1stortmg the meaning of any of such provisions ~ the end that th~ intent of the framers may be ascertained and carried out and effect given to the instrument as a whole. (Ency. of Law and Procedure, 1 vol. 8, p. 730.)

For the purpose of barmonizing apparently conflicting clauses each must be read with direct reference to every other which relates to the same subject, and so read if possible as to avoid repugnancy. (french v. Teschemaker, 24 Cal., 518.) .

Constitutions are not to be interpreted according to the word!! used in particular clauses. The whole must be considered with a. view to ascertaining the sense in which the words were employed and its terms must be taken in their ordinary and common acceptation, because they are presumed to be so understood by the framers and by the people who adopted it. (Wilcox ti. People, 90 ID., 186.)

.Mr. BORAH. Article I, section 4, provides:

The times places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representati'ves shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make o-r alter such regulations, except as to the place of choosing Senators.

That is the provision of the Constitution as it now exists. That is the provision which we propose to change by the joint resolution which we are now considering. The joint resolution as reported substitutes for that which I have just read:

The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators shall be as prescribed. in ea.ch State by the legislature thereof.

The simple issue, therefore, is that the joint resolution as . reported from the committee takes away the proviso which retains in Congress the power to alter or regulate the action of the State.

Both the joint resolution reported from the committee and the substitute repose, in the first instance, in the State the power to fix the times, places, and manner of holding elections:

Mr. HEYBURN. Mr. President--

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield to his colleague?

Mr. BORAH. I will, in just a moment.

The original joint resolution takes away the power to override or overrule the action of the State in case Congress should see fit to do so.

Mr. HEYBURN. Mr. President, it does more. It leaves the State to fix the place of the election of Senators. Under the Constitution it can only be done where the legislature meets by authority of law. Under this proposed amendment it will be done in each voting precinct in the State, and not at all at the place contemplated in the Constitution. Mr. BORAH. I may be in error as to the suggestion of my colleague. but, as I catch it, it does n~ change the proposition which I have just suggested, and that I.S that the original joint resolution as reported from the committee takes away from I Congress the power to revise or to overrule the action of the I State with reference to the times, places, and manner, except 1 as to the place. The place of choosing Senators is left to the , f State, according to the now existing provisions of the Constitution.

Mr. HEYBURN. My remark was directed at the remark of my colleague preceding the one to which he refers-I did not lmow whether I would ask to interrupt him or not at that timein which the Senator excepted the place.

l\Ir. BORAH. Very well I am very glad to have the suggestion, although, I think, when we come to read the RECORD there will be very little difference between my colleague and myself; at least as I understood him.

The exact issue, therefore, which is presented by the original joint resolution and by the substitute of the Senator from Kansas [Mr. BRISTOW], is whether or not Congress shall retain the power to revise the action of the State with reference to the times and manner of holding the election.

Mr. HEYBURN. Mr. President, I hope it will not annoy my colleague, but there are some questions which in this closing hour we ought to understand. Does not the Senator agree that the amendment abolishing the provisions proposed to be abolished in section 4 of Article I would render the passage of the publicity bill futile? ·

Mr. BORAH. No, sir; I do not

Mr. HEYBURN. Under what authority can a publicity bill be enacted except under tlmt section? ' Mr. BORAH. I will try to cover that before I get through, but I do not desire in this closing hour to be diverted too f.ar or too long from the subject in hand.

The principal contention here is over the words "manner of holding elections." The subject of the change deals alone with the question of the manner of holding the election and not the power to determine who shall be the voter. It deals alone with the question of how the voter shall exercise and put into effect his will.

Mr. HEYBURN. What else is there?

Mr. BORAH. Deals alone with the machinery of holding the election. I read here in connection with this a statement by Justice Field of the Supreme Court, wherein he says:

Regulations as to the manner of holding them [the elections] can not extend beyond the designation of the mode in which the will of the voters shall be expressed and ascertained. The power does not authorize Congress to determine who shall participate in the election or what shall be the qualification of voters. These are matters not pertaining to or involved in the manner of holding the election, and their regulation rests exclusively with the States. The only restriction upon them with respect to these matters is found in the provision that the electors of Representatives in Congress shall have the qualifications required for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature, and the provision relating to the suffrage of the colored race.

A vast amount of confusion has crept into this debate by reason of the fact that the manner of holding elections has been confused with the right to cast a vote after the manner of casting it has been determined. This is discussed later, and I only refer to it in passing.

Mr. President, we do not by this amendment introduce any new or untried principle into the Constitution. We do not invoke an untried proposition. We are not proceeding without experience, and we are not seeking to establish in the Constitution a method which has not heretofore been tried. We leave the manner in which the election of Senators shall be held to be prescribed and determined in the same way that we to-day prescribe and det.ermine the manner of holding the election for presidential electors .

Mr. HEYBURN. I should like further to ask my colleague a question here.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Does the Senator from Idaho yield further to his colleague?

Mr. BORAH. I do.

Mr. HEYBURN. Would this amendment prevent the people of the State from still exercising the ' right to choose a Senator through the medium of their legislature?

Mr. BORAH. Does my colleague mean the amendment proposed by the committee!

Mr. HEYBURN. Yes. Inasmuch as the voters of the State are given the power, without limitation or definition, could they not still exercise the right through the legislature, if they saw fit, acting as a people?

Mr. BORAH. I do not understand exactly the point which my colleague is making.

Mr. HEYBURN. I did not want to take up the Senator's time.

Mr. BORAH. I should be glad to have the Sena.tor take np enough time to explain what he means.

Mr. HEYBURN. I thought I would succeed in attracting the Senator's attention to that point which he had not covered.

?.fr. BORAH. My colleague always attracts my attention.

Mr. HEYBURN. This joint resolution says that-

The Senate of the United States shall be composed . ed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six: years.

It does not say how the people shall elect them. The people elect them now. Shall the people act through the medium of their legislature? Is that language sufficient, in other words, to prevent them from doing it, should they determine to do it, by the constitution of the State or otherwise?

Mr. BORAH. The friends of the resolution are willing to risk it. I have no doubt, in view of the fact that the change takes it away . from the legislature and puts it in the people, a court would construe that the language was sufficient to rest it in the people. The change is perfect both in language and intent l\Ir. HEYBURN. There is no language in the amendment which says the legislature may not do it.